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**THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS, 1947**

**VOLUME I**

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THE  
YEAR BOOK OF  
WORLD AFFAIRS  
1947

*Published under the auspices of*  
THE LONDON INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

LONDON  
STEVENS & SONS LIMITED  
1947

*First published in 1967 by  
Stevens & Sons Limited  
of 119 & 120 Chancery Lane  
London - Law Publishers  
and printed in Great Britain  
by The Eastern Press Ltd  
of London and Reading*

## INTRODUCTORY NOTE

It is the purpose of the London Institute of World Affairs to provide an independent international forum for the critical and constructive discussion of, and research into, problems of world affairs.

*World Affairs*, the quarterly journal of the Institute, and *The Library of World Affairs* are the agencies by which, so far, the Institute has sought to promote this object. It has, however, been felt for a considerable period that there are topics which require a fuller and more thorough treatment than it is possible to give in the Quarterly and which, nevertheless, do not necessarily require the space of a book to be adequately covered. It is the hope of the Institute Council and of the Editors that *The Year Book of World Affairs* will provide the medium for the publication of such research articles on world affairs and that it will form a useful addition to the publications sponsored by the London Institute of World Affairs.

G. W. K.

G. S.

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# PERMANENT FEATURES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

By  
W. GURIAN

IN February, 1914, P. N. Durnovo, the former Russian Minister of the Interior and elder statesman, addressed to Tsar Nicholas II a memorandum<sup>1</sup> in which he argued that not Germany, but Britain was Russia's enemy, and, therefore, that a German-Russian war ought to be avoided. Great Britain, he elaborated, was the supporter of revolutionary forces and a war with Germany would only promote revolution. 'Strange as it may seem, Britain, monarchical and conservative to the marrow at home, has in her foreign relations always acted as the protector of the most demagogic tendencies, invariably encouraging all popular movements that aim at the weakening of the monarchical principle.' Durnovo believed that Russia was in no way prepared for a world war, and emphasised: 'It is our firm conviction . . . that there must inevitably break out in the defeated country a social revolution which, by the very nature of things, will spread to the country of the victor . . . An especially favourable soil for social upheavals is found in Russia where the masses undoubtedly profess, unconsciously, the principles of Socialism . . . A political revolution [he meant a change to a parliamentary-democratic regime] is not possible in Russia, and any revolutionary movement must inevitably degenerate into a Socialist movement. . . . The Russian masses, whether workmen or peasants, are not looking for political rights which they neither want nor comprehend.'

This memorandum has been regarded as a remarkable

<sup>1</sup> English translation in F. A. Golder, *Documents of Russian History 1914-1917*, London, New York, 1927, 3 ff.

prophecy,<sup>1</sup> but it shows that Durnovo anticipated correctly the general trend of Russian internal developments and, at the same time, misjudged the future relations of Russia, Great Britain and the world. The war against Germany brought about the collapse of the Tsarist regime in March, 1917. After a few months the democratic liberal Provisional Government gave place to Lenin's Soviet regime, which, although it destroyed all political liberties, promised to fulfil the elementary social aspirations of the masses. But this revolution did not succeed in spreading among the victors—neither Germany, victorious over Russia, nor Great Britain nor the other Western victors over Germany became Communist. Great Britain did not support Russian world-revolutionary propaganda, but, on the contrary, opposed it most energetically, in contrast to her nineteenth-century attitude of favouring liberal and democratic movements on the Continent, the attitude which Durnovo had in mind. What Durnovo feared and Lenin hoped for did not materialise—no world revolution ended World War I.

In 1946 the situation is radically changed. The Soviet Union succeeded where Nicholas II failed—Germany has been defeated. Does this mean that the Soviets can now accomplish what was beyond their power after World War I? Will social and pro-Communist revolutions sweep the world? Will the revolutionary potential of the period after World War I become a revolutionary reality after World War II? Will the foreign policy of Lenin, who emphasised from the beginning of his rule that world revolution could not be expected at once, and that it was necessary to manoeuvre patiently for it, win after almost three decades? Or will this foreign policy obtain a victory which Lenin did not expect? Will it only succeed in building up a gigantic empire which, though with a peculiar tradition and self-interpretation, is an empire among other empires?

These questions determine the approach of the present

<sup>1</sup> M. Aldanov, 'P. N. Durnovo, Prophet of War and Revolution', *The Russian Review*, Autumn, 1942

article to the fundamental problems of Soviet foreign policy. Who is right among the students of Soviet affairs—those who with Timasheff<sup>3</sup> believe that Russian nationalism has won and that, in spite of temporary comebacks, Communism with its international and world revolutionary hopes is on the retreat, or those who with Dallin<sup>4</sup> assume that Stalinism is only a new method of realising the old programme? According to Dallin, conquest and power politics have replaced the old belief in proletarian solidarity and the efficiency of the propaganda and of the organisational work of the Third International with its sections, the various Communist parties.

\* \* \* \* \*

During World War I, Lenin maintained an uncompromising opposition to all the policies of the Tsarist regime. He was a defeatist, believing that all Powers were imperialist Powers, and that, therefore, humanity would not be interested in the victory of any side. He even used nationalist arguments to justify his defeatism. In the Autumn of 1914 he wrote in an article,<sup>5</sup> which has escaped general notice, that the Great Russians should be proud to liberate themselves from the yoke of the Tsars and to realise democracy and Socialism. Such a successful revolution would be the basis of true Russian patriotism. After the Bolsheviks came to power in October, 1917, Lenin abandoned his defeatism; he stated that

<sup>3</sup> N. S. Timasheff, *The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia*, New York, 1946. In the course of the Great Retreat, the Russian nation has broken the backbone of the Communist monster. In the course of the Great Retreat, the Russians have been more and more inclined to restore those links with the past which had been flagrantly destroyed under the Communist experiment' (415-416).

D. J. Dallin, *The Real Secret Russia*, New Haven, 1944. 'Communism in power can be only Stalinism, nothing else is possible. The Moscow formula, "Stalin is the Lenin of today", is quite correct' (53).

Lenin, *Sotchineniia*, 3rd ed., Vol. XVIII, Moscow, 1929, article 'On the national pride of the Great Russians'. 'We love our language and fatherland, we work with the greatest energy to elevate its working masses [that is, nine tenths of the population] to the conscious life of democrats and Socialists. . . . We are full of feelings of national pride, for the Great Russian nation has also created a revolutionary class. . . . We are full of national pride, and, therefore, we hate particularly our past of slavery. . . .' (81) (All translations from the Russian are my own, W. G.)

he had become a defender of Russia (an *oboronetz*)\*; for now Russia, under the Soviet Government, had become the basis for the progress of humanity towards Socialism. Lenin also realised that the October victory of the forces fighting for Socialism in Russia did not mean that this victory would be assured in all other countries, or even in Russia herself. He was very proud when he was able to announce that the Soviet regime had outlasted the days of the Parisian commune.<sup>7</sup> And he emphasised that it would be wrong to sacrifice the 'healthy born baby'—the regime of the October revolution—to the hopes of international revolution. The opportunity of developing his views on foreign policy was given to him by the debate on the separate peace with Imperial Germany.<sup>8</sup> From the beginning, Lenin opposed all those who believed that a peace with an imperialist power, a peace that would obviously favour the imperialists and sacrifice the revolutionary forces inside Germany as well as in the German-occupied eastern territories of Poland, the Baltic States and the Ukraine, must be rejected. He took the attitude that the Soviets had no reason to expect an immediate world revolution. He emphasised that it was necessary to take power relations into consideration—the Russian peasants and workers had no army and were too tired to oppose the advancing German forces—and he claimed that to ignore realities would result only in worse peace conditions and, perhaps, even in the total destruction of the Soviet regime.

The Brest-Litovsk crisis is the key to the understanding

\* Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. XXII, Moscow, 1923. 'We are fatherland defenders (*oborontsy*), since November 7 [October 25], 1917; we are for the defence of the fatherland since this day' (221). Article published in *Pravda* of February 25, 1918.)

<sup>7</sup> Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. XXII. 'Report on the Activities of the Council of People's Commissars' of January 21 (11) 1918, 295 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Lenin *op. cit.* Vol. XXII. Particularly important are the theses on the immediate conclusion of a separate and annexationist peace (193 ff.) and the article on the revolutionary phrase (261 ff.). 'The slogans are excellent, seductive, intoxicating—but they have no basis, that is the essence of the revolutionary phrase.' The revolutionary phrase is the repetition of revolutionary slogans without taking into account the objective conditions. Stalin disagreed with Lenin's policies. 'Stalin is wrong when he says that one should not subscribe (to the treaty of Brest-Litovsk) (277)'

of Soviet foreign policy. Lenin did not give up his world-revolutionary aim. The very belief in the world-revolutionary utopia, in the ultimately inevitable victory of Communism, justified careful adaptation to existing realities, that is to say, power politics. The foundations of Soviet patriotism are laid. Russia becomes the fatherland of Communists, because she is controlled by a Communist government. As the history of the Third International will show, this first proletarian government demands that its foreign policy be regarded as the policy of the international proletariat by all Communists in all other countries. The Soviet regime is at the same time the Government of Russia, and the power which works for the future world order of justice. Soviet nationalism is the complement of Communist internationalism.

During the crisis of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin realised what his opponents, the Left-Communists under Bukharin, had overlooked. He understood that the world revolution would not come at once, simply by means of appeals and propaganda. Later on, he recognised as a mistake his belief of 1918 that a world revolution would develop in a few months as a result of the World War. In 1919 he founded the general staff of the world revolution, the Third International. After the end of the civil war in Russia (1921), he postponed his revolutionary aims again and inaugurated the N.E.P. (New Economic Policy); for he realised that Russia needed a breathing spell, and that she had to learn from the capitalist countries which she hoped to overcome. To this end, Lenin even accepted a policy of granting business enterprises no concessions to foreign capitalists.

The crisis of Brest-Litovsk reveals the two-fold aspect of the foreign policy of the Soviet doctrinaire—utopianism and cynical realism. The doctrinaire and utopian aspect consists in the acceptance of the Marxian-Leninist analysis of capitalism and of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism in which it begins to disintegrate. This analysis may be supplemented by some actual experiences. Lenin died before the emergence of Fascism, but the fundamental terminology and doctrine

remain unchanged. The Communist party is the vanguard of the proletariat. The proletariat will found the new society in which the realisation of the interests of humanity will supplant domination by a few capitalists. There are distinctions between capitalist, semi-capitalist and feudal countries. There is the possibility of an uneven development which would permit the acceleration of evolution, the skipping over of social stages, and telescoping into one period the destruction of the feudal order and the overcoming of a bourgeois democracy (as in Russia).

This doctrine gives wonderful opportunities for changes and reversals. It can be claimed that periods were wrongly interpreted—e.g., what was in reality a feudal period had been regarded as a half-democratic one. The advances made by a democratic order were overlooked by left-wing radicals, who in an infantile way were over-enthusiastic and became drunk with their own oratory. The Communist dialectic also made it possible to say that there were betrayers who prevented the right development, who were not bold enough, and who had become enslaved by their comfortable life. Lenin himself had pointed out that the imperialists win over the leaders of Socialist parties and of the working class by corrupting them, and creating for them better conditions of life.\* This explanation by way of betrayal is then used against everybody who is accused of preventing the expected Communist success or who opposes the policies of the dominant Communist group, from Ruth Fischer and Brandler to Trotsky and Bukharin-Rykov. This doctrinaire terminology has done much harm to the policies of Russia. It can be quoted against the Soviet leaders. Dallin does not have to forge statements of Stalin in favour of world revolution and of the victory of Communism

\* Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. XIX, 3rd ed., Moscow, 1936. Cf. the preface to the German and French edition of *Imperialism as the Latest Stage of Capitalism*: "from this gigantic extra profit, it is possible to buy labour leaders and the upper level of the labour aristocracy. This group of labourers or labour aristocracy . . . is the main support of the Second International, and at present the main support of the bourgeoisie" (77, dated July 6 1920).

throughout the world.<sup>10</sup> This terminology has impressed and sometimes misled the leaders of the Soviet Union themselves. Stalin obviously believed that the Russo-Finnish war would not last long, because he overestimated Communist revolutionary influences among the Finnish masses.<sup>11</sup> Apparently the Soviet leaders miscalculated Communist influences in Nazi Germany. Only during World War II did they advance the theory of people's imperialism. Thus people's imperialism poisoned the working class of a nation and made it responsible for the exploitation of other nations.<sup>12</sup>

The indestructible character of utopian beliefs is based upon the assumption that such beliefs offer keys to the necessary development of history which will end in a moral way—realising what is most useful and at the same time just. This attitude permits the development of a cynical realism. There is certainty that the opponents will disappear. But the time and means of destruction are not known. It is therefore possible to co-operate with the opponent as long as he is strong enough and the Communist army has not yet gained enough strength and experience. But it is also perfectly right to annihilate him as soon as the opportunity to do so arises. Lenin used the sealed car given him by the German General Staff in 1917 in order to come to Russia for the overthrow of the Provisional Government, in whose disappearance he as well as Ludendorff—for rather different reasons—was interested.<sup>13</sup> He did not thereby become an eternal ally of

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *op. cit.*, 43 ff. chapter, *The Devil's Name is Trotsky* which tries to show that there is no fundamental difference between Stalin and the world revolutionary Trotsky, that Stalin is 'the outstanding champion of world revolution today'.

<sup>11</sup> Even the defender of many aspects of Stalin's policies, P. L. Schuman, writes: 'Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov . . . assumed that Finland would not fight, that most Finns would rally to Kussinen [the head of the Russian sponsored Communist government—W. (1)] and overthrow their old leaders. . . .' (*Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad*, New York, 1946, 287.)

<sup>12</sup> This theory was developed in the war writings of Ilya Ehrenburg, the most widely read Soviet war correspondent. But at the same time, it was sometimes claimed that the war was fought only against the Nazis, that the German people could not be destroyed. The clearest formulation of the theory of people's imperialism is to be found in an article of O. Lange, the present Polish Ambassador to the U.S.A., in *Nation*, December 20, 1941: 'What Peace for Germany?'

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Schuman, *op. cit.*, 9.

Ludendorff. Co-operation with Churchill during World War II provided no obstacle to restoring him to the position of World Enemy No. 1 after the war. The Soviet historian Tarle praised Churchill in 1944 as the founder of Anglo-Russian co-operation and attacked him bitterly in 1946 as the most dangerous exponent of British imperialism.<sup>14</sup> Soviet propaganda justifies the most devious shifts and the most spectacular changes of views by reference to the eternal principles of social and historical development. This cynical realism makes the understanding of Soviet policy somewhat difficult for those who do not share its peculiar utopian and doctrinaire basis, a basis that makes it ruthless and intensifies its amorality. For everything may be justified by the utopian aim, and the most brutal actions and unexpected changes may be attributed to considerations of humanity and justified by an analysis of the existing conditions.

Has the character of the cynical realism of Soviet policies changed since Lenin? I think that no change in fundamentals can be observed. But a change in the emphasis of propaganda appeals can be discovered. The gulf between utopia and the present order is perceived with greater clarity. Lenin himself passed from a belief that the world revolution would come in a few months to the conviction of the necessity of the NEP. Bolshevik education in the realities of the world has continued. Stalin and Vysbinsky emphasise that the proletarian State will continue to live in a non-proletarian and capitalist world which will try to destroy it, and which will even exercise a corrupting influence inside its frontiers.<sup>15</sup> Thus, the State and its power must be emphasised, and the withering away of the State becomes an even more distant goal. The institutions and policies of the destructive revolutionary period during which the young power of the Bolsheviks felt compelled to differentiate itself most emphatically from the hated Tsarist regime had to be abandoned. Typical of this development is

<sup>14</sup> The praise of Churchill is to be found in Tarle, *Krimskaya Voyna*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1944.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Michael T. Florinsky, *Towards an Understanding of the U.S.S.R.*, New York 1937 223 ff. ('Stalin on Capitalist Environment')



the recent assumption by Stalin and his associates of the titles of Prime Minister and Minister, titles which Lenin regarded as particularly hateful and gladly abandoned. The earlier utopian experiments have been dropped for the time being and are replaced by policies that will enhance the State's material power. The present cannot be sacrificed to the future. The healthy child of Lenin, the Soviet regime, has meanwhile become quite a strong young man, and Stalin acts in Lenin's spirit when he refuses to sacrifice him to hopes and promises which may not be fulfilled.

The determining influence in the various tendencies of Soviet foreign policy is the fact that the Soviet regime remains the proletarian-Socialist regime in capitalist surroundings. An attempt will be made in this article to analyse the various trends in Soviet foreign policy by enumerating and interpreting the most important events in the relations of the Soviets with other Powers. There is no pretence of completeness in this analysis and no discussion of details, some of which may be found in such works as those of Fischer, Milyukov, Taracouzio, Dallin and Yakhontoff.<sup>14</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

In its early days, the Soviet regime, born in the October revolution, emphasised its revolutionary character and its absolute opposition to its predecessors, the Tsarist and liberal regimes. This attitude also dominated its foreign policy. With the help of an illiterate sailor whom he had met quite casually, Trotsky, the new Commissar of Foreign Affairs, began the publication of secret documents found in the archives of his ministry.<sup>15</sup> The principle that all nationalities—apart from

<sup>14</sup> Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, 2 vols. London, 1930. Paul Milukov, *La Politique extérieure des Soviets*, Paris, 1936; T. A. Taracouzio, *The Soviet Union and International Law*, New York, 1935; T. A. Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy*, New York, 1940; J. Dallin, *Russia's Foreign Policies 1932-1940*, New Haven, 1942; D. J. Dallin, *Russia and Post-war Europe*, New Haven, 1943; V. Yakhontoff, *U.S.S.R.'s Foreign Policy*, New York, 1945. *Soviet Foreign Policy during the Patriotic War. Documents and Materials*, Vol. I, June 23, 1941—December 31, 1943, London, 1946.

<sup>15</sup> About this sailor, Markin, cf. I. Mauskv, *Vneschnaya Politika R.S.F.S.R. 1917-1922*, Moscow, 1923, where it is described how Markin fired machine guns for his amusement along the corridors of the Foreign Office.

the Great Russian—had the right of separation from the Russian Empire was emphatically proclaimed. The treaties that partitioned Poland were declared void.<sup>17</sup> To the Russian Mohammedans, Lenin and Stalin directed an appeal in which they announced that the Mohammedans could regain unrestricted liberty.<sup>18</sup> The negotiations with representatives of Imperial Germany and the other Central Powers, opened after the rejection by the United States and the Entente of the Bolshevik appeals for a general peace discussion, were accompanied by revolutionary propaganda. The Council of Peoples' Commissars even approved a subsidy for radical movements outside Russia.<sup>19</sup> This first stage of Soviet foreign policies was characterised by a radicalism which hoped that a total transformation of the world was imminent. Even Lenin, who, in the crisis of Brest-Litovsk, estimated in a realistic way the existing conditions, believed that such a change would come soon. When the Third International was founded in 1919, he expressed the conviction that the Soviet world republic was an early possibility.<sup>20</sup>

But these radical methods, which bluntly rejected all traditional diplomatic techniques and legal obligations, could not be maintained when the expected revolutions did not come. The Soviets were obliged to recognise that they were living in a world of non-Communist States, and that this co-existence of regimes fundamentally opposed to each other would endure for a long time. It was, therefore, not sufficient to utilise the distrust of the non-Soviet Governments against one another. Polish policy, for example, in 1919 aided the Soviet regime

<sup>17</sup> Max M. Laserson, *Russia and the Western World*, New York 1943, 181  
Decree of August 28, 1918

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Max M. Laserson, 'The Development of Soviet Foreign Policy in Europe 1917-43' A selection of Documents *International Conciliation*, New York, 1943, 12 ff

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Max M. Laserson *Russia* , 16, note 4, and his comments on the Decree of December 13 1917 No decree or ordinance of this sort is found in the later records

<sup>20</sup> Lenin, *Solchinnia*, Vol XXIV, 3rd ed., Moscow, 1937 Speech on the foundation of the Communist International 'The comrades who are present in this room have seen how the First Soviet Republic was founded, they now witness the founding of the Third Communist International, and they will all witness the establishment of the World Federative Soviet Republic' (Delivered on March 6 1919)

which Poland had not officially recognised.<sup>22</sup> Soon it became necessary to conclude treaties that would allow normal relations with non-Communist States. This policy took definite form in 1920 with the various treaties in which the Soviet regime recognised the independence of States that had formerly been part of, or connected with, the Russian Empire, and, in turn, Soviet Russia was recognised by them.<sup>23</sup> When Lenin recognised the impossibility of re-establishing production under the conditions of War-Communism, the New Economic Policy was inaugurated and was accompanied by the normalisation of relations with most of the Great Powers. The Soviet regime, organised as the Soviet Union in 1922, recognised its losses in Central Europe, although it made an exception regarding Bessarabia, which had been seized by Roumania. Only Georgia had been forcibly reincorporated into the Soviet Union.<sup>24</sup> Trade and diplomatic relations with capitalist Powers were re-established—trade relations alone where diplomatic relations could not be arranged (as with the United States of America). Internal reconstruction first, then the extension of State control over the whole life, particularly over the peasant economy by collectivisation, were the predominant policies.<sup>25</sup> These domestic considerations caused the postponement or abandonment of all aggressive and expansionist foreign policies.

True, this defensive attitude was accompanied by hopes that the Third International would have some spectacular successes, for instance, in Germany (1923) or in China (1927). The peaceful official and legal policies of the Soviets were accompanied by illegal Communist policies. But the activities

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Louis Fischer, *op cit*, 229 ff., where the relations between the Communist Marklevsky and Josef Beck, the future Polish Foreign Minister, are described.

<sup>23</sup> These treaties are reprinted in Laranson's *The Development*, 46 ff. Cf. also A. Taracouzis, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy*.

<sup>24</sup> An attempt to justify this incorporation is to be found in Louis Fischer, *op cit*, 218 ff. "To the Bolsheviks, the crucial point was: 'Shall we leave an opening for the British to dominate Georgia?' . . . In view of Georgia's bad record as an independent and a neutral, they said 'No'."

<sup>25</sup> A particularly important description of the policies of collectivisation is given by A. Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System*, Cambridge, 1946.

of the Third International and its various sections did not influence official Soviet foreign policy, even though they sometimes caused—or excused—disagreeable incidents, for example, the so-called Arcos incident in England, and the search of the Soviet trade commission in Germany.<sup>26</sup> The Third International suffered a succession of defeats in spite of some Communist electoral successes in Germany, Czechoslovakia and France.<sup>27</sup> Its efforts to mobilise Asia against British rule were more sensational than serious; its Balkan enterprises ended in disaster, its activities, particularly in Germany and France, generally had the effect of exciting anti-Communist scares rather than of winning real support for the bastion of World Communism, the Soviet Union.

In Soviet foreign policy, certain pronounced sympathies are discernible in the pre-Hitler period. Under both Foreign Commissar Chicherin, in office until 1930, and under Litvinov, until the rise of Nazism to power in 1933, relations with Germany were particularly friendly. After the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922,<sup>28</sup> the Soviets openly supported the anti-Versailles front. They believed that Great Britain and France were still the likely leaders of intervention as they had been in the earlier civil war period. They resented the existence of a *cordon sanitaire*, part of which (Poland and Roumania) was under the influence of France, while two of the Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia) were under the influence of Britain. They were anxious to keep the capitalist States disunited and believed that Germany was rather weak and, therefore, had to be supported in her fight against Versailles. They did not like the Locarno policy which might have reconciled Germany with her former enemies, and they were full of mistrust and hate against the League of Nations which they regarded as a hypocritical instrument for the justification of anti-Soviet policies.<sup>29</sup> Relations with Turkey were

<sup>26</sup> On these incidents, cf. Louis Fischer, *op cit*, 582 ff and 586 ff.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. F. Borkenau, *World Communism, A History of the Third International*, New York, 1939.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Laserson, *The Development*, 66 ff.

<sup>29</sup> Note of March 15, 1923 'The Soviet Government . . . regards [the League] as a coalition of certain States endeavouring to usurp power over other States

particularly friendly. Mustafa Kemal's (Ataturk's) fight for a free and independent Turkey was seen as a blow against British power and therefore supported. Litvinov was fond of repeating that Soviet relations with Turkey presented a model of the friendly relations that Russia could maintain with non-Communist States.<sup>30</sup> The emphasis upon national self-determination has been practically abandoned in Russian internal policies though the right of separation has been retained in the Soviet constitution up to this day.<sup>31</sup> It was considered self-evident that the solidarity of the masses led by the one Communist party would bring about the solution of all problems. Thus, the theoretically existing right of separation was a practical problem only for other States where nationalities were suppressed and exploited. The Soviet Union would not have to face the problem; for there, as Stalin's formula emphasised, all people enjoyed the same culture, though in various national forms.

It may, therefore, be said that, until Hitler came to power in 1933, Soviet policy was defensive and pacifist, in spite of all the activities of the Third International and the persistence of the hopes of world revolution. They were rather pro-German, and anti-British as well as anti-French. The Soviet Union emphasised the necessity of keeping her territories intact (after the losses of World War I had been recognised in 1920), particularly in Asia, where Japanese expansionist attempts had to be kept within strict limits.<sup>32</sup>

and making their attempt on the rights and independence of other nations in a false appearance of groundless legality . . . Laserson, *The Development*, 20

<sup>30</sup> Commissar of Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov, declared in his final speech at the conference of Montreux on July 21, 1936: 'It is necessary to acknowledge that the fifteen years old intimate friendship between the two resurrected States, Soviet Union and Turkey, is unbreakable and not only a temporary combination' (M. Litvinov, *Vneshnaya Politika U.S.S.R.*, Moscow, 1937, 151)

<sup>31</sup> The constitution of the U.S.S.R., Chap. II, Art. 17: 'To every Union Republic is reserved the right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R.'

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Paul Miloukov, *op. cit.*, Chap. XVIII, 'Accords avec le Japon', Louis Fischer, *op. cit.*, 550 ff. T. A. Taracouzis, *War and Peace*, observes: ' . . . Soviet relations with the Empire of the Rising Sun were perforce mainly directed towards preventing Japan from becoming uncontrollable in her ambitious designs in Asia' (126; cf. also 213 ff. on Soviet-Japanese relations in Manchuria); D. J. Dallin, *Soviet Russian Foreign Policy*, Chap. XII—'Negotiations and Pact with Japan'.

Revolutionary propaganda had no other lasting success than the creation and justification of anti-Communist movements. The menace and example of the Soviet Union played a decisive role in the rise of Fascism and Nazism. These movements found inspiration in the knowledge that one party could obtain and maintain power in a great State. In times of crisis, they saw that the fear of Communism could be used to paralyse their democratic opponents. In spite of all conflicts between Socialists and Communists, the Fascists deliberately did not distinguish between them and managed to win adherents from groups that hoped for a social revolution, but hated Communism.

The decisive turn in Soviet foreign policy came after it became clear that the Hitler regime would last and that it would not be overcome by a mass movement under Communist leadership. At first, the Communists had greeted Hitler's coming into power as a defeat of the Weimar Republic which would soon turn into the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Germany. But after it had become obvious that the illegal German Communist Party was as helpless against Hitler as the illegal Social Democrats, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union began to change. Germany left the League of Nations in 1933; the Soviet Union, sponsored by Barthou, the same French statesman who had so violently opposed her in 1922 at the conference of Genoa, joined the League. A military alliance with France was concluded.<sup>13</sup> The hostility of the Third International towards Social Democrat groups was dropped. Until the adoption of the Popular Front policy they had been bitterly fought and denounced as traitors, as 'Social Fascists'; now they were asked to join with other democratic forces and with the Communists in common fronts against the Fascist threat. The system of non-intervention and treaties of friendship was completed by Litvinov, though such a treaty was rejected by

<sup>13</sup> The French Soviet mutual assistance agreement of May 2, 1935, was signed for France by Pierre Laval. *Lanseron, Development*, 67 ff.

Japan.<sup>24</sup> The Soviet Foreign Commissar became a most popular figure in Geneva. The League of Nations ceased to be denounced as a capitalist bulwark and an instrument of anti-Soviet intervention and became the instrument of collective security. Germany was no longer the friend; she was now regarded as the greatest threat from which Russia sought protection by co-operating with France and Great Britain. The policy of industrialisation and improvement of Russia's economic basis for militarisation was ruthlessly continued; at the same time, the drafting and acceptance of the Stalin constitution (1936) sought to create the impression that the Soviet regime would adapt itself to Western democratic forms. Pro-Soviet publicists, such as Anna Louise Strong, announced that there would be a real contest among candidates in the elections for the Supreme Soviet.<sup>25</sup> Discriminations against certain groups in the Union, such as the sons of priests, were emphatically abolished. But the democratisation was stopped by the great purge which began shortly before the acceptance of the Stalin constitution.<sup>26</sup> This vast purge lowered considerably the prestige of the Soviet Union. Pro-Soviet groups and persons now turned against it. Even such a faithful defender and interpreter of Soviet policies as Louis Fischer began to turn away from the Soviets. The claim that international Communism was responsible for the Spanish Civil War impressed only anti-Soviet circles, whereas the purge caused uncertainty in the

<sup>24</sup> Cf. T. A. Taracouzio, *op cit*, 217. 'The proposition [to conclude a non aggression pact] was twice brought forward [by U S S R] towards the end of 1932. In reply to this, the Japanese Government expressed surprise and stated that any thoughts of aggression against the U S S R were utterly alien to Japanese policy.' A list of the treaties of Neutrality, Non Aggression, etc., concluded until the outbreak of World War II is given by T. A. Taracouzio, *op. cit*, 319 ff. Such treaties were concluded with Afghanistan, China, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Poland and Turkey.

<sup>25</sup> Anna Louise Strong, *The New Soviet Constitution*, New York, 1937. F. L. Schuman, *op cit*, admits 'Soviet elections most commonly assume the form of all but unanimous endorsement of the candidates whose names appear on the ballot' (315).

<sup>26</sup> On the extent of the purge, F. L. Schuman, *op cit*, 261 ff., or W. Duranty, *I S S R*, New York, 1941, 210 ff.

attitude towards the U.S.S.R. of rather pro-Soviet groups.<sup>17</sup> The attempt to justify the purge as a necessary means of strengthening the Soviet Union in its preparation for resistance against the Fascist-Nazi attack was made only during World War II.

It is unlikely that foreign policy played a decisive role in the purge. The reasons for the purge are quite complex. There was, first of all, the realisation by Stalin and his collaborators that it was impossible to reconcile the old Bolsheviks who would persist in their efforts to regain power. They were, therefore, ruthlessly eliminated. Indeed, to some extent they were probably guilty of organising opposition groups. In a one-party State, such groups were illegal and had to resort to terrorism. Moreover, old Bolsheviks who had not joined in activities against Stalin, were sacrificed to a policy which would not distinguish between potential and real enemies. Professor Schuman, who is inclined to sympathise with Soviet policies and to justify them, advanced the explanation that the Soviets 'preferred to see a thousand innocents liquidated rather than see a single traitor escape'.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, personal vengeance and resentment played a great role. Finally, there was the necessity of suppressing professional and national opposition, in many cases probably more potential than real, against the party. Thus, officers, diplomatic and economic leaders as well as prominent figures in the various national republics, were marked out as victims.

For a time, the purge counteracted the efforts of Soviet leaders to present Russia as progressing towards democratic normalisation. Those who pictured the Soviet regime as a brutal, inhuman one-party dictatorship seemed to be justified. Finally, the purge strengthened the belief of many foreigners that Russia was incapable of real action in the case of a serious conflict in international affairs.

The next turning point in Soviet foreign policy came in

<sup>17</sup> Characteristic is the development of Markousha Fischer (*My Lives in Russia*, New York 1944) and of her husband, Louis Fischer (*Men and Politics*, an autobiography, New York, 1941)

<sup>18</sup> *Op cit.*, 208



the year 1938 with the conference of Munich. The appeasers ignored Russia. There is no direct information on the deliberations which resulted in Litvinov's removal (Spring, 1939), and in Stalin's veiled warning that Russia would be willing to co-operate with Germany. The manoeuvring of the Soviets now took a new direction. The policy of co-operating with the West was abandoned. Negotiations with France and Great Britain for a common front against Germany were conducted very slowly. Russia did not take them seriously; for the Soviet leaders suspected that especially Great Britain was not willing to grant Russia's demands for the use of the territories of the Baltic States and of Poland in case of war. Finally, the Soviets decided to conclude a non-intervention pact with Hitler's Germany, represented by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop.<sup>22</sup>

Again, the motivation is very complex. The Soviets were not sure what France and Great Britain really wanted. They were not sure whether their future allies would be able to help them against a German attack; for France and Britain did not have the necessary military means and equipment to do so. There was also the hope that a war would end in a prolonged stalemate, in a mutual weakening of Germany, France and Great Britain, a development that would increase the bargaining power of Russia and perhaps open new chances for expansion and revolutionary developments.

The expansionist opportunities opened by the Second World War were thoroughly exploited. Russia made use of the understanding with Germany and of pressure which ended in the complete incorporation of the Baltic States after they had granted bases to Russia. The annexations were justified by plebiscites which hardly correspond to Western democratic

<sup>22</sup> Schuman, *op. cit.*, 370 ff., who tries to defend the pact as proof of Moscow's 'diplomatic astuteness'. 'Stalin's policy of self protection against the Tory Nazi threat was a success, inasmuch as it led to an Anglo-German war in which the U.S.S.R. was neutral.' But Schuman admits that the Kremlin committed the error of 'under evaluation of Nazi military might'. Writers hostile to the Stalin regime challenge the claim of Schuman and pro-Stalinist writers that the time gained by the pact was successfully used by the U.S.S.R. to prepare against the coming German attack (e.g., V. Kravchenko: *I Chase Freedom*, New York, 1946).

standards. Eastern Poland became Russian prey as a result of German military victories. Only with Finland was war necessary in order to make the Soviet-desired adjustments. Russian attempts to influence Turkey bore no fruit. All negotiations broke down, and apparently Germany rejected the Russian project of partitioning Eastern Europe and the Near East, which would have given Russia control of the Dardanelles.<sup>40</sup>

Was the attitude of Russia from 1938 to 1941 incompatible with the Leninist scheme and with the tactics developed by the founder of the Soviet regime? Lenin himself had always emphasised the necessity of survival for the Socialist island. Thus, he had opposed those who advocated a radical policy of hands off, of no compromises with imperialist gangsters. The later Soviet leaders came to believe that active resistance against the most dangerous gangster, Hitler, was momentarily impossible. They believed that the wisest thing would be the exploitation of the situation for the strengthening of Russia's power. Curiously enough, they probably trusted Hitler too much. They believed that they could at least delay his attack, as appears from the fact that they were surprised when, in June, 1941, Hitler's attack really came. It is possible that they may have overestimated the effect which the non-aggression pact with Japan, concluded just a few weeks earlier, would have on Germany.<sup>41</sup> Or they may have thought that the conclusion of this pact after the Japanese Foreign Minister had met Hitler and Mussolini was evidence of Axis willingness to bargain with the Soviet.

The emphasis on a more nationalistic and patriotic line in the Soviet Union itself was, in no way, a breaking away from Leninism. The Soviet peoples could now be patriotic; for, according to Lenin himself, the regime of imperialist exploiters had disappeared in Russia with the October Revolution.

<sup>40</sup> For survey of Russian foreign policy from 1939-41, cf. Schuman, *op cit.*, and Dallin, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy*.

<sup>41</sup> Text of this treaty with comment, cf. Schuman, *op cit.*, 407 ff. cf. also J. Scott, *Duel for Europe*, Boston, 1942, 234 ff., describing the atmosphere in Moscow when the pact was concluded.

Lenin himself, too, had always taken the mentality of the masses into consideration. He had retreated from War-Communism to the N.E.P., after he had observed the mood of the peasants, whom the Soviet regime, weak as it then was, could not at that time, challenge. It would also be wrong to date from the policies of 1938 the return to a more respectful attitude towards Russian traditions. This change occurred much earlier. It was prepared by the fight of Stalin against Trotsky, which was conducted under the slogan of building Socialism first in one country. It was anticipated by the campaign against the anti-patriotic historical school of Pokrovsky, a campaign which began after the death of that distinguished Communist historian (1932).<sup>41</sup> It was expressed in the condemnation of the attempt of Bedny, the Communist writer of political propaganda verses, to satirise the introduction of Christianity into Russia. It had become manifest in the official praise of Alexei Tolstoy's *Peter the Great*, which suggested in the most obvious way that Stalin was the Peter the Great of the twentieth century. The crude Soviet nationalism was extremely useful during the first years of World War II. The Soviet Union regained territories which had been lost by the weak Tsarist regime. The control of the Baltic States, which the weak Soviet regime was unable to regain in 1919 after the collapse of Imperial Germany, became possible after the Soviet Union had become strong. The disappointment of many liberals who were shocked by the co-operation of Stalin and Hitler was discounted. The liberals had also opposed the mass terror of the first years of the Soviet regime as inhuman and barbarous. But that did not prevent them later from becoming interested students and occasional defenders of the boldest social experiment of our time. World War II was first presented as a war between imperialists with whom the Soviets were not

<sup>41</sup> The best description of the change in Soviet conceptions of Russian history is to be found in the article of G. Rogan, 'La Crise de la Science historique russe', *Revue Historique*, Paris, 1940, 1-35. Since 1934, 'le caractère national, son légitime de la révolution russe, est mis en évidence au détriment de son caractère internationaliste'.

concerned. It was even permissible for a Communist to sympathise with Germany; for Germany had permitted Russian expansion, whereas the Western Powers had been all but willing to intervene actively against Soviet expansion, and had supported Russia's expulsion from the League of Nations after the attack on Finland.<sup>43</sup>

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The situation changed radically with Hitler's attack on Russia on June 22, 1941. The anti-Fascist line was resumed. The war had become the great patriotic war; for the Soviet Union was threatened by a ruthless foreign invader. In his speech on November 7, 1941, celebrating the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Stalin mentioned Lenin, but apart from this patron of the Soviet regime, he mentioned only Russian national figures, Alexander Nevsky, Kutuzov, Suvorov and others. Anti-German propaganda stressed the cruelties of the German invader, for example, in the widely read articles of the war correspondent Ehrenburg. Stalin made, however, a distinction between the German people and the barbarous Nazi leaders. Organisations composed of German Communists and German war prisoners, including officers; were created and utilised. This action caused fear abroad that Russia would make use of them in setting up a pro-Soviet German Government. During the period of Russian retreat, an understanding with the Polish Government in exile under General Sikorski was reached. But according to the Russian interpretation, this understanding did not mean that Russia would restore the Russo-Polish frontiers as they had existed before the outbreak of World War II. Even this understanding did not last. Russo-Polish military collaboration was not successful. The Poles complained about lack of equipment; the Russians about Polish reluctance to go to the front. Finally, the Polish army was evacuated. Thereafter, a Polish committee was set up, drawn from Polish leftists and men who expected a Russian victory. This committee became the basis for the Polish Provisional Government which was

<sup>43</sup> Tanserson *Development* 34 ff

established at Lublin in 1944 after the diplomatic break with the government in exile. It was obvious that Russia regarded the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union as an irreversible fact. This had become clear during the negotiations for the Anglo-Soviet Alliance. It seems that only President Roosevelt's intervention prevented Great Britain from recognising the *fait accompli*.<sup>44</sup>

There were, of course, difficulties in adjusting Russia's war effort to that of the Allies. Russia needed war supplies from Great Britain and the United States. These supplies were brought at great risk to Murmansk, and later on via Persia to Russia. Misunderstandings concerning the second front arose. Russia not only expected an early second front in order to be relieved, but also opposed a second front in Southern Europe.

But all these debates and conflicts were overshadowed by the question: What will Russia do after the War? A certain optimism developed. Russia accepted the fundamental proposals of Secretary Hull, made at the conference of Moscow, to participate in a new League of Nations. The Third International was declared to be no longer in accord with practical necessities, and dissolved itself. The belief increased that Stalin's regime was increasingly turning towards nationalism, and abandoning Communist traditions. Strangely enough, this change was thought to herald the possibility of permanent understanding. Sources of distrust remained. There was the continuance of Russian neutrality in the Far East, but that was explained in terms of military considerations; Russia was avoiding a two-front war, and Japan had not enough forces to challenge Russia aggressively, after having decided upon expansion at the expense of Southeast Asia. There were unusual Russian methods of diplomacy: Great Britain was denounced in the Russian press, which is controlled by the government, for starting secret negotiations with the Nazis. This occurred after an understanding among the Big Three

<sup>44</sup> A. Krock, 'How the Atlantic Charter survived a Crisis', *New York Times*, June 13, 1942

had been reached at Tcheran. There was the fear of a Russian deal with Germany, the fear that Russia was possibly using the suspicion against Great Britain as a pretext for a separate peace. Russia's behaviour towards Poland was looked upon as a symptom of a Russian expansionism with which it would be very difficult to deal.<sup>41</sup> But Russian contribution to the war effort was valued so highly that far-reaching concessions were made. Churchill could not realise his project of a second front in Southern Europe, in the Balkans. He supported Russian territorial claims against Poland which were finally accepted at Yalta (1945). There, also, the American and British partners agreed to concessions to Russia in the Far East, in order to secure Russia's participation in the war against Japan. It was supposed that this war would require a direct and costly attack on the Japanese home islands. Russia's fear of being outvoted in the United Nations was answered by granting the veto power to the Big Five, thereby making impossible any political action against any one of them by the new organisation. Finally, at Potsdam, the occupation of Germany was arranged. The provisional frontiers of Poland in the west were accepted. Fundamental features of reparation payments and of the procedure in preparing the peace treaties were outlined. An understanding was also reached, during the Moscow Conference of 1945, concerning Russian participation in a committee to advise the Allied commander of the forces in Japan.

But despite all these conferences, after the defeat of Germany the situation visibly started to deteriorate. Future historians will perhaps know many more details than are available today, but it seems that even today it is possible to characterise the fundamental trends of recent relations between the Western Powers and Russia. First there was the atomic bomb. Its production had not been disclosed to

<sup>41</sup> Cf. M. Lascron and J. Shotwell, *Poland and Russia, 1919-1945*, New York 1945, S. Kononov, *Russo Polish Relations*, J. Dallin, *Russia and Post war Europe* 196 ff. and the articles of O. Halecki, *Review of Politics*, Notre Dame, Vols. V and VI, 1943 and 1944, W. Lednicki, *Review of Politics*, Vol. VI, 1944, and N. S. Timasheff, *Review of Politics*, Vol. VI, 1944.

Russia. No official complaint was ever made against this policy which had been finally decided at a meeting of President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and Prime Minister Mackenzie-King. As the Canadian spy story shows, Russia was most anxious to get as much information as possible, even before the issue of the atomic bomb secret arose. Secondly, despite the solemn renunciation of the policy of building up zones of influence which Secretary of State Hull obtained in Moscow, this policy continued. Russia rejected all attempts to create a federation of completely independent States in Eastern Central Europe and persisted in considering such policies as a return to the policy of a *cordon sanitaire* and as directed against her. Her policy was to maintain in all States bordering on Russia or those of special interest to her, as Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, at least friendly governments which would never oppose her foreign policy. Abroad, the fear existed that these governments would be Communist, or coalition governments under Communist influence; such tendencies developed also in Czechoslovakia, despite the fact that Benes remained President, and a Socialist, Fierlinger, first headed the government; and in Hungary, despite the electoral victory of a non-Communist party, which thereupon succeeded in taking over the public leadership in the cabinet. This Russian policy caused much misgiving. The Polish Provisional Government was recognised most reluctantly, and this recognition is still criticised in some influential quarters. The Bulgarian Government has not yet been recognised. But even if all the governments in Eastern Central Europe are recognised, the fear will remain that Russia is creating a power combination as a base for continuous extension. In addition, there is opposition to Russian methods of economic penetration and domination, and suspicion that Russia will try to dominate first her zone in Germany and then all Germany, by organising a merger between Communists and Socialists, in which the Communists would predominate. Thirdly, there is the fear that Russia will not co-operate with the Western Powers. She will try to expand as much as she can, not only in

Europe, but also in Asia, exploiting the Chinese Communists and anti-imperialist and colonial movements, using pressure against Iran and perhaps even risking a local war against Turkey. This Russian policy would challenge not only British interests by attempting to reach the Mediterranean, but also American interests, for China is today under American protection, and Russian policy could be interpreted as a threat to the Open Door policy of the United States. Fourth, there is the impression that the Third International in a new form has resumed activities. This impression has been strengthened in the United States by the circumstances under which Earl Browder was deprived of his leadership of the Communist party. He was associated with policies of co-operation with the existing social order, the prosecution of the war, and the support of the anti-Hitler front. The bitter denunciation of Browder by the French Communist leader Duclos was the signal for his downfall. This development, together with the Canadian spy story in which a Communist deputy is held to have played the role of a leading Russian agent, revived the belief in a Communist world conspiracy under Russian leadership and in the interest of aggressive Soviet revolutionary policies. Fifth, the goodwill created during the war by heroic Russian resistance against the Nazi invader has been nullified by clumsy Russian behaviour. Mr. Toynbee has told in *Horizon* (1946) how the bad manners of a Russian football team sent to England enraged their originally pro-Russian English hosts and spectators. A similar effect was created by the Russian behaviour at international conferences, particularly at UNO meetings. The Russian demands caused less harm than the Russian methods of presenting them. The impression was created that Russia simply did not care to be polite and co-operative. The bad presentation of cases for which there was much sympathy before they were presented, created the impression that Russia was merely looking for pretexts, that she played a super-machiavellian



game at its worst, and that she put forward demands in order to establish bargaining points.

All these factors have radically changed relations with Russia. Those who continue to demand co-operation with Russia are put in an increasingly difficult position. They can be denounced as pro-Communist or at least as naïve liberals who have not realised that the honeymoon with the heroic Red Army has ended. Also, where an avowedly aggressive policy against Russia is not recommended, uncertainty and distrust predominate and will continue to be strong, even after a political understanding with Russia has been reached. In the United States there is much open talk on an unavoidable World War III, and this talk is not only to be heard among professional Red-baiters or military experts. Some of these experts believe that Russia must be eliminated as a first-class Power as soon as possible; for otherwise she will become too strong and too industrialised. The population of future Russia will by far outdistance the population of other countries."

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Are there permanent features and trends in Soviet politics? The abstract ideological justification always remains the same, as we have seen. The Soviet regime is always for world peace, but this world peace can be established only by a universal victory of the proletariat under the leadership of the Communist vanguard; for the imperialistic Powers are always inclined to pursue policies leading to conflicts and wars. These Powers are conspiring to encircle the Soviet regime, for it threatens their social order by the very existence of a more progressive one which, despite all backwardness in detail, represents the Socialist society of the future. Therefore, they are anxious to nip it in the bud, particularly after it has become stronger and started to win influence among all nations.

Of course, this fundamental scheme can be manipulated

<sup>44</sup> Cf. the estimates in F. W. Notestein and others, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union*, Princeton, 1941.

for the justification of the most varied policies. It can be used for justifying an isolationist Soviet policy—for the U.S.S.R. must keep aloof from capitalist intrigues and manœuvres in which she is not interested. The Soviet regime has to watch its own interests. Its very survival and gain of time for further development represent a victory of world revolution. The same fundamental scheme can be also used to justify co-operation with those among the Powers which are least dangerous for the Soviet regime. After Hitler's rise to power, the Soviet leaders discovered that according to Lenin, formal bourgeois democracy is better than the complete absence of freedom of speech and association.<sup>47</sup> The League of Nations, democratic parties, even the hated and despised Social Fascists, as the Social Democrats were formerly called, were then regarded as allies against a greater danger—the danger of Nazi Germany. Before 1933, the same fundamental attitude was used to justify participation in the anti-Versailles front. England and France, at that time, were regarded as the most dangerous planners of interventions and intrigues.

The Soviet conception of history and social development permits extraordinary flexibility. But one attribute remains unchanged: the Soviet Union is always regarded as a regime *sui generis* with a particular mission that sets it apart from all other regimes. Between them and the Soviet Union there is always mistrust and suspicion. Belief in its universal mission and its peculiarity has been a permanent feature of Soviet policy. Mistrust and suspicion are not a psychological feature of some Soviet leaders of special or limited world experience, they are the consequence of the foundations of the regime. The regime has as its basis a unique character

<sup>47</sup> Lenin, *Sotchinenia*, 3rd ed., Moscow, 1937. "A bourgeois republic, parliament, universal suffrage—all that constitutes from the point of view of social development, a tremendous progress. Only the capitalists gave to the suppressed class of the proletariat the opportunity of creating those socialist parties which are conscious—by leading the struggle of the masses. This development of the working class would have been impossible without parliamentarianism, suffrage." (375, lecture on 'The State', July 11, 1919. A few sentences earlier, the brutal domination of Capital as it exists in the U.S.A. is most severely condemned by Lenin.)

and a missionary claim which cannot be shared and accepted by other Powers. The Marxian theorists believe that even when capitalist States are not in an open state of war against the Soviet Union, such a state of peace merely disguises a form of war between the capitalist Powers and the Soviet Union. These periods of 'peace' are sometimes marked by disagreements among the 'enemy' States, and divisions in the ranks of the 'enemy' may be exploited to gain a breathing spell for the Soviets by means of temporary alliances. Temporary compromises can be made, as, for instance, during the first years of the Soviet regime when a common front against Great Britain bound Turkey and the Soviets together, or during World War II when it was necessary to defeat Hitler, a common enemy of Russia and the West. But such compromises do not mean lasting understanding and co-operation; far, in this case, the Soviet Union would lose the basis of its existence. Lenin always appased those leftist infants who refused to participate in representative bodies and elections, because these bodies and elections were instruments of capitalism. But, at the same time, he emphasised that the Bolsheviks entered representative bodies and participated in elections not in order to co-operate but to exploit the possibilities of propaganda, to develop their own organisation and to prepare for the seizure of power.<sup>44</sup> Co-operation on the part of the Soviets has a provisional character, and this provisional character and dependence upon circumstances has been developed into a conscious method by the doctrinaire basis of Soviet policies. Changes and manoeuvres are also practised by other regimes, but in the Soviet Union they are elevated to the rank of an ethical principle. The belief in their own mission makes the Soviets inclined to misinterpret the behaviour of

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Lenin's famous pamphlet on 'Infantile Leftism in Communism', *Sotchinienia*, Vol. XXV, 8th ed., 171-250; in his article on the conditions of admission to the Communist International, published on July 20, 1920, Lenin emphasised 'the Communists are obliged to create everywhere a parallel illegal apparatus, which at the decisive moment would be able to help the party to fulfil its duty towards the revolution' (230-1)

others; even when foreign nations have no aggressive designs, they are looked upon as devils and planners of evil. Or their passivity is interpreted as proof of the fact that the capitalists are decadent, no longer able to act in unison, and that the world has entered the period of decadent imperialism.

This distrust was originally caused by the distinction between the Socialist and proletarian world to which the future belongs, and the capitalist and bourgeois world which has become an evil force. With its continued existence, Soviet hostility to the bourgeois regimes assumes a more concrete character. The world proletariat is identified with the Soviet regime and the ruling party of the regime. No possibility is recognised of making a distinction between the world revolution and the Russian regime. The Soviet regime needs the world revolution and at the same time it is the most important instrument of the world revolution. The difference between the interests of the world revolution and the interests of the regime disappear. Many ex-Communists have in bitter disappointment complained that the Third International became an instrument of the Russian Communist Party, and it was in vain that the Trotskyites appealed to the Comintern against the leadership of the Russian Communist Party.<sup>49</sup> The use of propaganda and military methods by the Soviet regime was determined by considerations of power. In 1919 the Red armies were not strong enough to reconquer permanently the Baltic States, whereas today they are strong enough to control Eastern Central Europe. But, from the start, these military operations were accompanied by propaganda waves. The power elements of Soviet policies which emphasise the State and its instruments, increased due to the fact that the world revolution did not come, whereas the regime in Russia lasted; but the multi-national character of the Soviet Union was stressed in order to keep the various peoples of the Union together and to contrast the Union with Tsarism as well as with imperialism.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Borkenau, *op. cit.*, 269 ff. Stalin dominated Russia and through it the Comintern (237)

Accusations of Great Russian nationalism on the one side and tendencies towards separatism and hate against Great Russians on the other side were used according to the necessities of the struggle inside the Communist party.<sup>56</sup> During World War II the party was intentionally kept somewhat in the background. But even before the war, Stalin had used the slogan of the Bolshevik outside the party in order to maintain the influence of the regime over the masses and persons outside the party. After the war, the fear has arisen that too much emphasis on patriotism can become a threat to the regime, and therefore the emphasis is now again more upon the party doctrine, schooling in Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism. The interrelationship between Soviet nationalism and Soviet belief in Marxian-Leninist views on world development is another permanent feature of the regime.

This interrelation is often overlooked, because the reasons for the changed attitude of the Soviets towards the past are not correctly estimated. Originally, the Soviet regime was weak and had to emphasise its differences from the forgotten and recent Tsarist regime. For example, to have resumed the Tsarist policy of conquering the Dardanelles in 1918-19 would simply have been impossible. There was not enough power in the hands of the Soviets. The lack of military power had to be replaced by propaganda, for instance, by promises to grant to the oppressed non-Russian nationalities of the Empire an absolute right of secession.

But with the strengthening and stabilisation of the regime, the policy of unifying all peoples of the former Russian Empire and also of expanding, where possible, beyond its boundaries reappeared. That is no transformation of the world revolutionary belief into a nationalist one. Practical limitations change the emphasis upon world revolution to an

<sup>56</sup> Typical of this method is the pamphlet of E. F. Girschak *Na dva fronta s barbe s nationalismom* (On two fronts in the struggle with Nationalism). Moscow, 1930. The preface is written by Skrypnyk, who later on as an alleged Ukrainian nationalist, was forced to commit suicide. The book opens with a quotation from Stalin, recommending the fight against Great Russian chauvinism as well as against local nationalism.

emphasis on the defence of the Soviet Union and the strengthening of its power and influence. This is done not only by the domestic Five-Year plans, but also by expansion in various forms, the erection of new Soviet republics, and the creation of zones of influence of different types.<sup>21</sup>

Only if the fundamental attitude of the Soviet Union is understood, can the significance of the tactical changes in its foreign policy be grasped. After World War II, the wishful belief of living in a world-revolutionary situation has again increased. This revolutionary situation requires renewed emphasis on the unique character of the Soviet Union. Changes in leadership and tactics of the Communist parties show that a more aggressive policy is being conducted. Browder, the dismissed leader of the American Communists, was charged with opportunism and with neglecting to carry on class warfare against the capitalist regime. But this aggressive policy is at the same time a policy destined to aid the expansion and the international influence of the Soviet Union. The Union needs security, it must appear as equal to all the Great Powers in all parts of the world. Therefore, it pursues the policy of creating and maintaining 'a cordon sanitaire in reverse' by establishing pro-Soviet governments on her Western frontiers and by concluding trade agreements which give a monopolist position to the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet Union is eager to appear in the Security Council of UNO as the Power which does not fear being isolated in the midst of Powers who are either unwilling to face the continuing Fascist danger or who perhaps contemplate aggressive action against the U.S.S.R. These tactics, which emphasise the unique character of the Soviet regime, explain the eagerness of Vyshinsky, during the London meeting of the Security Council in 1946, to raise issues on which Russia was bound to be defeated.

It is a paradoxical fact that this aggressive revolutionary attitude makes old problems of Russian expansionist policy

<sup>21</sup> Cf. the concluding remarks in G. R. Trevelyan, *The Russian Revolution*, New York, 1944.

reappear. In 1917 Stalin and Lenin signed an appeal to the Mohammedans that stressed the fact that Constantinople ought to remain a Moslem city, and thereby emphasised the distinction between the new regime and oppressive Tsarism.<sup>42</sup> Milyukov was attacked by the Bolshevik party for his demand that the Dardanelles be put under Russian control, and was nicknamed Dardanefski. That has been radically changed. The strong Soviet Union of today is seeking to reach the Mediterranean, to control the Dardanelles, to win concessions and at least a sphere of influence in Iran. But these changes appear as the consequence of the successful Bolshevik regime in Russia. Russia must obtain security, equal rights and equal influence in a world of capitalist Powers. This fight for security and influence requires methods which the newly-born and weak regime rejected; secrecy of negotiations and exclusion from international conferences of smaller Powers, which would only support the opponents of Russia, are demanded by the U.S.S.R.; for she has now become one of the Big Three. These policies can be accepted by those who emphasise the unique Socialist character of the Soviet Union as well as by those who are interested in Russia's power and strength, who are nationalist, and therefore proud of the achievements of the Red armies, not because they are Red, but the armies of the successor of the Russian Empire. A similar co-operation based on completely different fundamental attitudes existed before; in 1920, the Nationalist General Brussilov favoured helping the Soviet regime after it had become involved in war with Poland. Brussilov certainly did not share the world revolutionary hopes of Lenin.

Oscillation between more aggressive and more restrained foreign policies permits the adoption of the most flexible methods, and the use of several lines at the same time. Lenin had always recommended such tactics. He had opposed those who, during the period of the Bolshevik fight for power, recommended either exclusively legal or exclusively illegal

<sup>42</sup> Laserson, *Development*, 13: ' . . . Constantinople shall remain in the Moslem hands '.

methods. He had also emphasised the combination of both methods in the fight of the Third International for world revolution. The legal aspect of Communism stresses democracy, uses the existing rights to organise groups, to participate in elections and electoral campaigns, to publish newspapers, etc. The Communist party appears as a party fighting for social reforms, opposing exploitation, supporting peace movements, opposing imperialist expansion, and revealing, if it is exposed by police measures, the limitations of capitalist democracy. But, at the same time, illegal organisations and groups are built up in order to be ready for the eventuality of suppression of Communist and pro-Communist groups, and also for revolutionary situations in which power can be taken over.

What influence does this combination of methods have on Soviet foreign policy? On the one hand, its policy involves formal observance of international law and treaty obligations. This legal propriety is publicly emphasised. A democratic terminology is used. Official Russian policy denied any responsibility for the policy of the Third International.<sup>22</sup> Activities of the Comintern and statements on party congresses, for example, the fact that the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, Rakovsky, signed the world revolutionary programme of the opposition directed against Stalin (1927), have caused much trouble for the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, for this Commissariat has been anxious to appear as a strict adherent to legal methods and traditional diplomatic forms. On the other hand, it is obvious that the machinery of the Comintern, the various Communist parties, formed a most important, though not officially and publicly admitted, instrument in the hands of the leaders of Russian foreign policy. Of course, they were repudiated as long as they were not successful—the Communist parties in the Baltic States were not favoured, at least, in the market place, when

<sup>22</sup> Cf. the reply of the Soviet Government to a protest of the United States against activities of the Communist International (Lawson, *Development*, 27 ff.)



in 1939 the Soviet Union took over only military and naval bases and disclaimed plans of incorporation and Sovietisation. But when there was a possibility of taking over, the situation soon changed. Communist parties or pro-Soviet groups became the masters, openly supported by the Soviet Government. The armies advancing in Poland during the war of 1920 were accompanied by a committee, prepared to assume the role of the Polish Government, among whom the Polish aristocrat, Dzherzhinsky, the chief of the Tcheka, played a decisive role. A similar committee was recognised as the Finnish Government, after, in 1939, the Finnish cabinet had rejected Russian demands for military bases and frontier adjustments.<sup>44</sup>

The fact that the tactics have changed from the old practice of using partisan elements to the current endeavour to form democratic coalition governments does not alter the fundamental policy. In these governments the moderate groups are dominated by the strictly disciplined Communist nucleus. Sometimes, the Communists try to use non-Communist parties, for example, in Iran or Bulgaria. Sometimes, as in the Germany of 1946, an appeal to the whole working population, backed by the army of occupation, is believed to be useful in accomplishing a Communist merger with the Social Democrats. But the basic method has remained the same from the beginning of the Soviet regime. Movements outside the boundaries of the Soviet Union are used for Russian foreign policy. This manipulation is of course covered up by the formula that there is a natural harmony between democratic social aspirations and Soviet policies. Soviet foreign policy is simply regarded as the policy of the world proletariat, for the defence against Fascism, for peace and democracy. Moreover, at the very beginning of the regime, as in Poland in 1920 (without success), or in Georgia in 1921 (with success), the Red armies brought with them the pro-Communist, pro-Soviet committees and

<sup>44</sup> \* Stalin abruptly abandoned the feckless, puppet regime of Kuusinen (op. cit., 380)

governing bodies that were to be established in countries dominated by anti-Soviet Governments. What has changed is the power of the Red Army. Obviously the Red Army of 1945-46 cannot be compared with the Red Army of 1919-20 which was easily driven from the Baltic States, and defeated in Poland after spectacular initial successes.

This co-existence of several political lines and agents intended to carry them out makes changes in Soviet foreign policy very easy. If the revolutionary hopes are not realised—after, for instance, the German Republican Government had overcome the critical situation of 1923—then the legal public line is emphasised, and even a great moderation in the pursuit of this line is adopted. The leaders of the Union then argued that, in such circumstances, the peoples of the Soviet Union were exhausted, and that much had to be done before the Union could catch up with the technically more advanced capitalist Powers. A new breathing spell was therefore necessary. The governments of the Baltic States were recognised after 1920. Or, if there is fear of immediate intervention, attempts are made, as after Hitler's rise to power, to secure the help of one capitalist group, of the Western Powers, against Germany. The co-existence of several policies which can be exchanged, if one of them has failed or new situations have arisen, gives to Soviet policy the aspect of being unpredictable. But this unpredictable character is only the consequence of the Soviet endeavour to exploit all situations by calculating them in advance. If the interpretation that a revolutionary situation has arisen proves to be wrong, then the policy required by the 'relative stabilisation of capitalism' or by the unshaken power of non-proletarian middle class and peasant groups, can be introduced. The newly formed governments sponsored by the Soviet vanish as suddenly as they have been formed. The classic example is the disappearance of the pro-Communist Finnish Government of Kuusinen in 1940 after it had failed to establish itself in spite of Soviet recognition.

Such changes in the long run may rouse the suspicion of

the non-Soviet world, but they do not matter inside Russia. For any direct influence of public discussion and public opinion has been eliminated in the Soviet Union. This tendency to manufacture public opinion existed from the beginning. At first, Lenin and his party had to appear as acting in response to the Soviet majority.<sup>55</sup> Within limits, they had to tolerate other Socialist parties. Even inside the Communist party it was not easy to enforce public unanimity by strict party discipline. But this situation has changed. All other parties have been eliminated. Due to his unquestioned authority, Lenin was able to tolerate some discussion inside the party, but that was impossible for Stalin, who had to impose his authority on elements who were inclined to regard him only as one of the many lieutenants of the great Lenin.<sup>56</sup> There are, of course, disagreements and discussions inside the party which also reflect the moods of the population and its different groups. But they no longer come out into the open. Disagreements aired publicly, as in 1939 by Zhdanov, a member of the Politbureau, who expressed doubts concerning the negotiations with Great Britain and France, are prearranged in order to influence the attitude of other Powers, and to create currents in international public opinion. The public unanimity makes sudden changes and shifts possible; for no one can publicly raise the question of consistency, or of the responsibility for the failure of previous policies.

The permanent features of Soviet foreign policy which derive from this fundamental structure of the Soviet regime show that the interplay of utopianism and cynical realism determines its development and changes. The utopian element has played a decisive role in strengthening the regime and in building the totalitarian and one-party State. The claims

<sup>55</sup> In the first weeks of the regime, Lenin had many difficulties with such Bolsheviks as Rykov, Kamenev, etc., who demanded a coalition of all socialist groups. It was necessary to form a coalition with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries.

<sup>56</sup> In all his polemics, Trotsky claims that Stalin did not play a prominent role in the party in 1917, nor in the Civil War. (The last formulation: *Stalin*, New York, 1946.) Cf. also, B. Souvarine, *Stalin*, New York, 1940.

of the one-party and the ruthless energy necessary for their realisation were produced by the belief in the world historic mission of the Communists, the vanguard and brain of the proletariat, the class destined to bring about the just and classless society. The fact that this Utopia cannot be accomplished at once, but can result only from long development and from a protracted period of struggles with class enemies, makes the rise of a cynical adaptation to, and exploitation of, existing power relations possible. Therefore, the emphasis upon the Soviet Union and its power is only apparently a shift away from the utopian world revolution—it is seen by the Soviet leaders only as a tactical manœuvre, a 'breathing spell'. But this self-interpretation of the trends of Soviet policies, and particularly of Soviet foreign policy, should not be accepted by the other Powers. Co-operation with the Soviet Union can be based upon the view that the tactical adaptation will more and more postpone, and finally overcome the fight for world revolution.

True, the difficulty remains: what about the power politics of the Soviet Union, even if they are not seen in the light of the Marxist perspective of the future? In its first years, the Soviet regime was glad to survive, after the dissipation of the early dreams of the imperialist World War being transformed into a class war, with Lenin at the helm of the Universal Soviet Republic. The Soviet Union emphasised internal politics despite all efforts of the Comintern. Parts of the old Russian Empire were abandoned. In the peace treaty of Riga with Poland, territories which were regarded as Russian were given up. The Baltic States were recognised; no real efforts were made to regain Bessarabia from Roumania. Friendship with Turkey was maintained, even at the cost of territorial concessions (Kars; Ardahan). Then the period of fear of Nazi intervention followed. Opposition to the treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations was dropped. After Munich, this policy was replaced by a policy of neutrality, of reaching an understanding with Germany in order to avoid participation in war, and thus to

achieve the position of arbiter in the coming world conflict. This period was also the period of a territorial expansion, tolerated by Germany. From 1941-45 the Soviet Union was involved in war against the Hitler Reich, and there followed co-operation with Great Britain and with the U.S.A. The period of the war, its conclusion and early aftermath reveal that Russia has resumed her expansion. She has imposed her domination and control over Eastern and Central Europe. How far will this domination reach? This domination is accompanied by claims in the Far and Near East, particularly in the Mediterranean and Iran. Has the Soviet Union become an aggressive imperialist Power in the belief that it can expand further, in its dissatisfaction with its present limits?

The answer to this question depends not upon the Soviet Union alone. The history of its foreign policy has shown that, in spite of errors in detail and hesitations due to revolutionary utopianism, it has always taken into account existing power conditions. These involve not only the resistance of other Powers against its policies, but also their inability or ability to maintain internal stability, to solve social problems and to organise collaboration with each other. The existence of the German-Anglo-American antagonism made possible the expansionist policy of Russia after 1939. It is clear that Soviet foreign policy is today again based on the calculation that the other Powers will not remain united. The Soviets also hope that the fluid conditions of the post-war period will operate in their favour. They can manoeuvre and exploit uncertainties and the general exhaustion. The absence of a counter-balance against them on the European Continent is to their advantage. Moreover, they can raise the accusation that blocks and alliance systems are built up in order to prepare an anti-Soviet policy. But if the aggressive policy fails or becomes impracticable, as it meets with too much resistance, then a withdrawal can take place. Emphasis can be laid on internal reconstruction—on new attempts to catch up with the production of the U.S.A.—an aim the realisation of which still lies in the distant future, as the figures in

Stalin's production programme speech of 1946 show. The U.S.S.R. can be satisfied with having changed the *cordon sanitaire* and replaced it by a system under its own influence. It can be satisfied with the defeat of Germany, and can consider the future of Germany an open question. Russia can work for a united Germany under Communist control or for a weakened Germany on which she will still retain a strong Communist influence to meet the claims of France. She can replace aggressive isolationism, to which she tended after the war, by a more co-operative attitude, giving up her most radical demands and therefore accepting compromises, which will at least maintain her position in the Far East and Middle East. She can become more co-operative in UNO and claim that she is anxious to preserve peace and international goodwill. She can adopt this attitude, and postpone the fulfilment of her aims to a future which, as her leaders believe, will necessarily come. She can rely upon the ally which has so far helped her to overcome all crises and to utilise all breathing spells—time.

What caused the adoption of the current aggressive foreign policy, which has antagonised public opinion outside her frontiers and has endangered the goodwill created by the heroic fight of Russia's armies and peoples, particularly in England and the U.S.A? That is the great mystery of the Kremlin, for time seems to work for the Soviet Union, as the calculation of future population figures shows. The intransigent policies of 1945-46 can only be explained by overestimation of revolutionary possibilities in the post-war world, and by the internal situation. External tension permits the maintenance of the balance between the various tendencies inside the party, as well as between the party on the one side and the army command and the technical bureaucracy on the other; the claim that capitalist Powers continue to threaten the security of the Soviet Union gives excuses for the continuance of sacrifices and of the low standard of living which cannot be greatly raised, even after the victory. But it is impossible to discuss the conflicts inside the leading groups. We are too little informed

about what is going on behind the iron curtain which hides all debates among the members of the ruling élite and its various groups in the U.S.S.R. Nobody, apart from those directly concerned, knows the real meaning of certain changes in the leading personnel (the removal of Beria, the rise of Bulganin, the apparent eclipse of Zhdanov). Until now, the Soviet leaders have succeeded in combining the world revolutionary line with a realisation of traditional Russian demands in Europe and Asia. 'Breathing spells', warnings against 'dizziness by success', can be applied if the power constellation in the world shows that Russia will meet an energetic resistance, which her leaders would regard as endangering the Soviet regime.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>27</sup> I am glad to express publicly my thanks to Professor M A Fitzsimons, Professor of History, University of Notre Dame, without whose untiring assistance this article would have never been completed

# WESTERN AND SOVIET DEMOCRACY

By  
R. SCHLESINGER

## THE TWO CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRACY

IN recent discussions it has been regarded as a commonplace that there are two concepts of Democracy, an Eastern (Soviet), and a Western (Anglo-American). Sometimes the distinction is used as a form of abuse, in the sense of describing that partner in the common struggle against Hitlerism with whose internal system and policies one disagrees as a mere pseudo-democracy; sometimes it is applied as a reluctant recognition that there are different standards applicable to different regions, and that there is no sense in arguing about anything except the proper delimitation of the respective spheres of influence. I have no intention to argue with those who revert to the Fascist habit of regarding 'describing the enemy' as the essence of politics<sup>1</sup>. From the scientific point of view it is not difficult to refute those who regard the definition of democracy as a mere means of national self-assertion and are prepared to derive basic tenets of democracy from historically determined aspects of the constitution of their own countries, such as the British Cabinet system or the power of the American Courts to veto statutory enactments. In fact, the representatives of that attitude refute each other by their different definitions of 'democracy', based on the different institutions of two countries which recognise each other as 'democratic' because they take a similar line in the great social issues of our time.

The case for the second interpretation of the two concepts of democracy appears stronger; and many senseless criticisms, from either side in the great dispute, result from

<sup>1</sup> Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen* 1933 pp 23-9



failure to appreciate the element of truth which it contains. British condemnations of 'police-States' are based upon the assumption that the average citizen of an Eastern European State, who has felt the need for a thorough social transformation and sees it being carried through with those means as are necessary to protect the new regime against internal and external counter-revolution, will take the same attitude as would the Britisher if 'similar' measures were carried through by 'similar' institutions in this country. On the other side, Soviet people are inclined to explain the comparative weakness of the British Communist Party, if not by comparison with the oppression of the Russian opposition by the Czarist regime, or with the alliance of German right-wing Social Democrats with militarist reaction, then at least by some failure of the British Communists to learn and to apply the proper revolutionary theory. But when the impossibility of applying identical concepts to institutions and movements with a completely different historic background is fully recognised, we remain still confronted with the issue whether there is some common trend, though realised in different national forms. The very use—or misuse—of the term 'democracy' as a means of self-assertion, and of 'describing the enemy', suggests the existence of such a trend, if not amongst all those people who use it, then at least amongst those to whom they appeal. We must not forget that the basic ideology of the U.S.S.R. is of Western European origin, based not only on the experiences of Chartism, which may be regarded as a transitional stage in the evolution of the British Labour movement, but also upon a French record which few of us would regard as definitely closed. On the other hand, the 'Western concept' of democracy, though actually realised only amongst the white populations of the Anglo-Saxon countries,<sup>2</sup> and in some smaller North-West European countries, has strongly

<sup>2</sup> For an outstanding investigation of that limitation which actually goes to the root of all the self-limitations of the concept, see Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma, The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, London and New York, 1944.

influenced ideological developments all over the world, including the Russian revolution. However different the concepts, and even more the institutions in which they have found expression may be, they represent different links in one chain of historical evolution. True, their interconnection, and possible contradiction was not realised a century ago, when 'democracy' was nearly as suspect in this country as Bolshevism was during the 'twenties of this century.

From the very beginning the 'people' who 'rule' in a democracy has been conceived as the many, as opposed to those who like to be described by their philosophers as the best, because they are the rich and educated. Democracy represents a certain social interest, supposedly that of the numerical majority, because there are more smallholders and artisans than usurers and merchants, more peasants than landlords, and more workers than capitalists. Political institutions that safeguard majority-rule are desired because they are supposed to embody the interest of that majority. If they fail to deliver the expected results, the assumption must be that the powers that be, in consequence of their ability to exercise indirect pressure and of their control of the means of ideological influence, have prevented the many from voting freely after due consideration of their true interests. From such a deplorable state of things some democrats may draw the conclusion that, in view of the enormous difficulties implied in a revolutionary transformation, emancipation should be delayed till the masses are educated to overcome these handicaps, whilst others may suggest the removal of such handicaps by force. Within the discussed concept of democracy this difference is merely of a tactical character; for it is supposed that the interests of the many are fundamentally opposed to those of the ruling minority, though they may, and in due course do, coincide with the national interest and, thus, also with the interests of the expropriated former rulers. There are no common ethical standards from the standpoint of which an obligation of the minority to submit to decisions of the

majority can be derived; for the very foundations of society, and of social ethics, are the contested issue. He who in attempting a thorough change which contradicts the ruling minority's concepts of the foundations of society strictly keeps to the rules of a game which his opponents cannot regard as a mere game, invites defeat. He is not even likely to win more sympathy in countries that share his concepts of the game, but not his standards of social ethics, than did the Austrian and Spanish democrats. For purely practical reasons, the minority may choose rather to submit to the ballot than to face likely defeat by the bullet; but such submission is not likely to outlive the minority's conviction that the bullets of the majority are actually the stronger men. Such conviction depends not only on the majority's success in internal reconstruction, but also on the international situation, and all factors affecting it. From the standpoint of the minority, democracy in the above sense is always a dictatorship. From the standpoint of the majority it is justified not by the applied institutional procedure, but by its outcome, by emancipating and educating the masses of the people. Though revolutionary struggles are not unlikely to produce utopian ideas, the supporter of this concept of democracy need not be a utopian who envisages complete equality of all men, or equal participation of all in shaping the common will; but his basic approach implies that social orders, and the means by which they have been established, should be judged in accordance with the test whether obsolete inequalities have been removed in fact as well as in law, equal opportunities have been created and the maximum encouragement has been given to all citizens to make the best conceivable use of them.

As opposed to this dynamic approach it is possible to conceive democratic institutions as a means by which the broad masses of the people should be integrated into a certain social framework which is taken for granted, with due allowance for reforms likely to arise from the need of the groups struggling for power to compete for the votes of

a mass-electorate. In this approach, the emphasis is put on certain institutions and their due working, and all agencies that prevent majority-decisions from interfering with the accepted social framework are welcomed. This means that even those who regard coupon elections or 'Red Letters' as flaws in the working of their democracy are bound to regard the influence of the pulpit, of a popular press owned by private *entrepreneurs*, perhaps even of the reactions of a complicated economic machinery upon 'undesirable' decisions of the electorate, as proper agencies of keeping the latter in the limits within which a powerful minority would be likely to accept its decisions. Behind 'the little man entering a little box and making a little cross on a little piece of paper' stand a great number of assumptions, which in most cases remain hidden. Only occasionally is it honestly stated that the social interest of the majority, when opposing the foundations of existing society (or their sublimation in 'fundamental rights' of property) would destroy the moral foundations for the subordination of the minority under majority decisions, and therefore be undemocratic, or that Continental countries where such 'unwise' use is likely to be made of democratic machinery are not yet 'ripe for democracy'. General acceptance of such limitations would quickly destroy the value of the second type of democracy as an article for export; for its basic assumption, that is to say, the integration of the majority of the people into the existing framework depends on certain social conditions, and therefore, is subject to certain limitations in space and time. Whatever the merits of the Metropolitan Police Force in London, a rather high amount of wishful thinking is needed in order to assert that instruction of the new Greek police force by London police officers is sufficient in order to create in Greece those conditions that enable the British police force to be impartial in British politics.

The first concept of democracy is much better protected against contradictions between its basic assumptions and the influence exercised by it abroad; everywhere there are

'underdogs' who may sympathise with the country which has completed the emancipation of its own former 'underdogs', especially if its competitors in world politics appeal to the sympathies of existing vested interests all over the world. Competition between the World Powers for the sympathies of different strata in certain countries, especially if combined with speculations on the likely effects of the atomic bomb, is not likely to further that collaboration in domestic reconstruction which is an essential condition of a proper application of institutional democratic machinery. Yet it will not fail automatically to produce one of its ideological weapons: mutual reproaches against 'undemocratic regimes'. The demands brought forward in such discussions may be rather naïve, for example, that the U.S.S.R. should prove its ability to co-operate on a democratic basis by admitting opposition against the foundations of its society, and by agreeing that the advocates of its own social structure in the rest of the world be outlawed.<sup>1</sup> As the actually contested issue is the sphere of influence of social and economic systems, changes in political representation are unlikely to result in fundamental changes. It is not the sociologist's task to argue on that level. However it is his legitimate function to provide standards by which the various propagandist assumptions can be checked. But such standards cannot be found on the institutional level.

#### ARE THERE COMMON STANDARDS?

Under different conditions, 'identical' institutions have a different social function. Rightly or wrongly it may be assumed that in Britain the concentration of executive power in the hands of a long-established machinery works as a means of securing the gradualness of progress. Whether the civic rights granted to British Fascists are a mere by-product of that freedom of expression which is needed in

<sup>1</sup> See Walter Lippmann, *U.S. War aims*, London, 1944, especially pp. 90-4 and Annex XII.

order to shape public opinion as the basic agent of British democracy, or a repetition of those mistakes that contributed to the downfall of the Weimar Republic, is an open question, the answer to which largely depends upon whether the Marxist interpretation of Fascism as a product of certain trends in monopoly capitalism is correct. The Russians, for whom the correctness of that interpretation is a foregone conclusion, are likely to see facts which appear natural to most British people with very different eyes. Once the British concept of democracy is applied outside the British Isles, where it is deeply rooted, its very application appears bound to provoke most legitimate doubts as to its actual social function. For British barristers a fundamental problem of law was involved in the issue whether defendants before a British military tribunal should be granted unrestricted scope to bring forward any argument in their favour, yet there was no problem for Russians how to interpret a defence of the relative merits of Fascism in the Lueneburg trial by commissioned officers of an army allied with the U S S R., and in a country where underground Fascism evidently looks for encouragement from some of the victorious Powers. Englishmen, who are accustomed to find the guarantee of democratic institutions in the Opposition's chance to become the alternative Government, may be horrified by the prospect that in Germany the working-class majority may find political expression in a united party which is likely to become a stable majority. They are equally horrified by the 90 per cent. majorities in Eastern European elections. The Russians, convinced as they are that, in these countries, ballots are substitutes for bullets, find it comforting to learn that, in the event of a civil war, 90 per cent. of the population would stand behind the Government collaborating with them. They can have little understanding of the attitude of those who measure the degree of democracy realised in Central European elections by the success achieved by right-wing parties, even if that success was obviously conditioned by support coming

forward from Fascist elements who had been deprived of the means of direct expression.<sup>4</sup> No greater understanding of the social function of certain institutions was shown when Stalin compared the 'one-party' system realised by Mr. Attlee's Government with the plurality of parties participating in the East European Government coalitions. True, the mistake may be partly excused by it being repeated, a few days later, by the British Foreign Secretary who justified the conditions that forced abstention upon the Greek Left by the fact that still fourteen 'parties' were left between which the electorate could make its choice.

If there were none but institutional standards, it would be advisable not to attempt to define democracy in a sense valid for all countries. Such a conclusion is, indeed, drawn by most of those who, being accustomed to the Anglo-Saxon institutional concept of democracy, see its limitations in space and time, or simply are afraid of the implications of propagandist attempts to generalise that concept. They are inclined to regard the Soviet system as a regime which has brought to a large part of the world higher standards of economic and cultural welfare than would have been conceivable under any alternative regime. If there must be democratic ideological standards, they are prepared to regard the regime of the U.S.S.R. as an economic, as distinct from a political, democracy.<sup>5</sup> As long as we speak of democracy, that is to

<sup>4</sup> See the interesting articles in *The Economist*, December 1, 1944, and in *The World To-day*, December, 1944, p. 265.

<sup>5</sup> Sometimes the juxtaposition of economic and political equality is used, which is no less misleading. The U.S.S.R., at least in her present stage of development, is not based upon the utopian assumption that actual equality of economic welfare, or equal participation of all citizens in shaping public policies, is conceivable in our time: what she claims to have achieved is equality of opportunity to all citizens to receive the maximum qualification and thereby the maximum income accessible to their natural gifts, and to play that role in political life for which they have the desire and qualifications. Political equality, in the sense of equal political rights, is a commonplace in all modern States, some specific flaws like the Negro problem in U.S.A. apart. Its suspension in the U.S.S.R. for the members of the former ruling classes was, from the very beginning, regarded as a mere transitional measure and repealed in 1936. The U.S.S.R. would claim to have supplemented equality of political rights by economic conditions that encourage all citizens to make

say, of a political regime, as distinct from economic concepts such as planning of economic activities or full employment, such a juxtaposition is misleading; as Soviet economics are directed by the State, there can be in the U.S.S.R. no more economic than political democracy. But it is quite conceivable that a State which controls all aspects of economic life and allows its citizens certain restricted opportunities of shaping its policies may, thereby, give them more opportunities of shaping the economic conditions under which they live than does another State which allows for more 'political freedom' whilst leaving economic life to the control of private *entrepreneurs* not subject to democratic control.

Actually, the U.S.S.R. submits her regime to a test of political democracy, not only in her propaganda—which would be irrelevant—but also in her attempts to put her regime on the strongest possible foundations. This test is based not upon the freedom to advocate alternative policies, but upon the success of the regime in inducing as large as possible a part of the citizens to participate actively in administering public affairs. Economic security and intensive educational efforts—as well as the federal structure of the Union which is intended to remove any vestiges of racial inequality—are aims which are pursued not merely for their own sake,\* but quite consciously also as inducements to increased civic activities. It is quite true that the average citizen of the U.S.S.R. has very few opportunities of influencing 'the general line of the party' (as also, it seems, the average Briton has very restricted opportunities to influence what is described as 'the continuity of foreign policy'), but he is invited to participate in the election and supervision of those who carry through that line in those

use of those rights, but even the actual opportunity of some right being used does not yet imply its actual use. Democracy, in the sense as the term is being used in the U.S.S.R.—and by most progressives in other countries—implies not only civic rights, but actual participation of the citizens in shaping public policies.

\* *Federalism* had no merits of its own from the point of view of original Bolshevik ideology which aimed at abolishing racial inequality by giving to class allegiances the place of national allegiances. See my *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe* London, 1915 pp 326-34



places where he is immediately concerned; in municipality, *kolkhozes* and trade union. It should not be forgotten that the administration of social insurance and of most welfare activities is left to the complete autonomy of the Trade Unions, and that two People's Assessors sit in every Court with rights equal to those of the trained Judge who presides (and who, besides, is bound to report regularly to the electorate on his activities). The huge demand of the State for voluntary collaborators in the most varied fields, and its need for such collaboration as well as for public criticism as a means of safeguarding the correct realisation of its intentions by the bureaucracy, put participation in the execution of public policies in the sphere of his special interest within the average citizen's range. In the traditional British sense of local self-government there is in the U.S.S.R. probably a higher degree of democracy than in most other countries. It is quite true that the millions of individuals participating in it represent merely a certain trend in political feeling—but did British juries and magistrates, at the time when the term 'self-government' was coined, represent more than such a trend? All the achievements of the U.S.S.R. in organising and making literate the village, in emancipating women, in solving the nationalities question, are bound to increase the number of active citizens; and the very criticism by people who complain that the basic issues of Marxist policies have been removed from the sphere of public discussion may be explained by the fact that people who were, and still are, incapable of understanding those issues have moved into the foreground of the political scene.

An outstanding observer<sup>1</sup> has described the typical attitude in the country which regards itself as the model of Western democracy as a combination of mass-passivity with individual leadership. I should suggest that the attitude typical for Soviet democracy is a combination of mass-activity with collective leadership. This juxtaposition may illustrate the

<sup>1</sup> Gunnar Myrdal, *op cit.*, Chapter 33.

problem of either position, as well as the existence of common standards according to which either realisation of democracy can be judged. Progressive Western democrats like Masaryk and Roosevelt considered that political rights are not sufficient to describe a system as democratic unless actual conditions encourage the average citizen to be an active member of the body politic. They rejected the traditional liberal concept of democratic rights as mere opportunities for the citizens to check abuses of political power, with freedom conceived as a maximised State-free sphere of the individual. In our days, when positive State-interference in most fields of life is unavoidable, political freedom cannot be conceived except as active participation of the citizen in shaping the conditions under which he has to live. On the other hand, it cannot be denied, even from the Soviet point of view, that such participation should include the discussion of, and the decision upon, alternative solutions of the problems before the community. In no country are the foundations of society submitted to free decisions by the majority, unless in the sense of the latter tipping the balance in a hypothetical civil war. For every State and its institutions (including those providing for majority decisions) are instruments for protecting a certain order of society; and there is no moral foundation for the minority's submission to majority-decisions except upon the basis of certain recognised concepts of social order.\* As far as the foundations of society are concerned, there is little difference between a system that honestly grants political rights 'in order to strengthen the established order of society', and another which, in constitutional theory, puts no limitations upon their use, but is based in its actual working upon

\* The opposite case has been made in Kelsen's *Socialism and the State*, Vienna 1920. He bases Democracy upon a relativist attitude, which accepts majority decision because it does not accept the validity of any absolute standards of social order. But this is merely a different way of saying that democratic decision is impossible in those fields where strong opinions about right and wrong sometimes even with a metaphysical foundation are bound to arise.

\* Arts. 125-6 of the Soviet Constitution

an attitude that rejects opposition to the established pattern as 'un-Ruritanian' and gives little protection to the advocates of 'un-Ruritanian' ideas. In either case the advocates of such changes will be reproached by those interested in the existing system with undermining the foundations of society,<sup>19</sup> but this charge can much more easily be made where outlawry of the opponents of the existing pattern is a recognised norm than where there is at least a theoretical standard of freedom to which the opposition can refer. In this sense the internal discipline within 'the vocation of leadership', to use the Webbs' term, is a restriction, however necessary, of democracy as interpreted by the Soviets themselves. The difficulty is inherent in either side of the problem: mass-activity in politics is inconceivable without the assumption of permanent dynamic progress, which is bound to provoke the opposition of the threatened interests, and therefore to enforce a certain discipline upon the organisations carrying through the change. But the fact that there is a common problem, and that the reproaches directed against the Soviet 'police State' are based upon the same philosophical foundations as those directed against the New Deal or the Labour Government, prove the existence of common standards, upon which the achievements on either side can be compared.

These standards should not be confused with the institutional devices by which they are pursued on either side. To regard the U.S.S.R. as undemocratic because of her One-Party system makes sense only if it is assumed either that there can be no democracy without the existence of antagonist classes, finding political expression in antagonist political parties, or that the competition of two political machineries of the American pattern is the only conceivable institutional device for giving trends in public opinion their due expression. These assumptions evidently contradict each other, as is shown by the current rejection of the first as 'un-American'

<sup>19</sup> For a characteristic example, see the description of the rather moderate reforms carried through by the Viennese Social Democrats as 'Austro Bolshevism', not only by their local opponents, but also by trends influential in public opinion in this country. See my above quoted book, pp. 279-81.

by the advocates of the second. If, on the other hand, a two-party system based on class distinction becomes stabilised in a country with *Britain's social structure*, or if (as in the pre-Hitlerite Central European democracies) coalitions of a certain composition become inevitable, and the average citizen is actually bound by his social position to support a certain one of the coalition parties, the renowned 'swing of the pendulum' ceases to be the true guarantee of agreement between governors and governed, and the solution must be found in the same field as in the U.S.S.R.: in the internal democracy of the organisations which provide the only opportunity for the average citizen to have his say in public affairs (in former days he had no opportunity whatever for this, a fact which is easily forgotten by the advocates of a gentry-concept of 'democracy').

#### THE PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL INTERCOURSE

The barriers at present preventing interconnection between public opinion in the U.S.S.R. and the outside world should not be identified with the limitations with which Western journalists find themselves confronted in the U.S.S.R. Whatever people may think who are accustomed to identify their professional interests with the interests of democracy, it is part of their functions to help in overcoming the contradictions existing between the social order and the mass-suffrage existing in their own countries by seeing that the latter is used in the proper way. The U.S.S.R. is not in a position to reduce imports of dried eggs in order to maintain imports of Hollywood films; therefore she is prepared to face the wrath of the threatened interests and close her doors to people who are capable of writing headlines of the type: 'The Russians want the Atomic Bomb. Let them have one,' or, in any case, are not prepared to oust the producers of similar headlines from their profession.<sup>11</sup> Just because they

<sup>11</sup> There seems to be the obvious expedient of differentiation amongst foreign journalists etc. seeking admission to, and facilities within the U.S.S.R., and to some extent it is applied. But also in that expedient great difficulties are involved. It is not likely to relieve very much the outside pressure

are accustomed to investigate the social conditions under which some freedom is exercised, the Russians are bound to regard many aspects of what, in the West, is called Freedom of the Press as freedom to the warmonger, and are not prepared to accept the formal view that the active anti-Soviet propaganda exercised by the press of a Church with some twenty million supporters in the U.S.A., and courted by most of the influential trends in that country, is counterbalanced by the pro-Soviet propaganda of an unimportant sect, exposed to periodical witch-hunts. All those selective influences that, witch-hunts apart, are in the Western countries exercised by preferences of editors, publishers, reviewers, librarians, and by the unbalanced scale of backing which the products of the freedom of expression receive from the average citizen as a result of the prevailing social pattern, are, in the U.S.S.R., exercised by the State which is responsible for the education and information of the public, just as for many other activities that are carried through in other countries by private enterprise. If a more than one-sided criticism of the present deplorable lack of mutual information is desired, it cannot be based upon the discriminating influence exercised for some time in this country by the Polish emigré interest and its supporters on all publications on the U.S.S.R. as a legitimate use of democratic rights, and the selection of publications by the Soviet State Publishing Trust as an un-democratic 'unification' of public opinion. Before discussing the reasons why the Soviet State restricts facilities to Western journalists, we should keep in mind what it regards (natural differences of outlook apart), as the proper

brought in this regard to bear upon the U.S.S.R., for the most powerful 'pull' happens frequently to back those very groups of newspaper interests against which the U.S.S.R. has the soundest reasons to discriminate. It involves the danger that those publications, the authors of which are granted facilities for collecting information, may get a semi-official character which is undesirable from the point of view of the Soviets, who would disagree with most of what are called in the West 'pro-Soviet publications', as well as of the latter's success. It would also increase the premium already standing on the least desirable type of critic of the U.S.S.R., the renegade left-winger

standards of journalism, as applied by itself in its domestic sphere.

There can be no doubt that, being free of any competitive urge to cater for what is called 'the psychology of the average reader', the Soviet State, in the fields of information and instruction, keeps to educational standards higher than those current in other countries with a longer record of literacy. I do not think that any part of English journalism, apart from the contributions of special correspondents to *The Times* and to the *Manchester Guardian*, would come up to the standards of the reasoned articles, two or three of which are daily published in each of the larger Soviet newspapers with a circulation of more than a million copies. In spite of competitive attractions, lectures on foreign countries and international affairs, on a level certainly not below that of the average W.E.A. class, are delivered in the open air in the Moscow Park of Culture and Recreation before large audiences. Knowing Russia as well as Britain, as a foreigner, I do not doubt that the average Soviet citizen gets more information on Britain, and other countries,<sup>12</sup> than his counterpart would get on Russia. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that a British student interested in Soviet conditions, who is capable of overcoming all the bias implied in the conditions of book selection in public libraries and in the prevailing tone of the periodicals, can get, in English, much more varied information about the U.S.S.R. than his counterpart there can get on Britain, unless he knows foreign languages (as the Russian is more likely to do than the Britisher) and has access to those libraries where foreign books are available. In spite of the already mentioned competition between Stalin and Bevin in misunderstanding the Western concept of democracy, the more realistic approach of the Soviets to a correct interpretation of the conditions of other countries can hardly be questioned by anyone who has followed the opinions uttered before Stalingrad even amongst 'well-informed' people in this

<sup>12</sup> I had the opportunity to illustrate this in two reviews of popular Soviet publications in *The London Quarterly of World Affairs* (October, 1945)

country about the chances of the U.S.S.R. to withstand the Hitlerite onslaught, or who at present follows the nonsense written on the likely effects of the atomic bomb.

For the mutual relations between the West and the U.S.S.R. as well as for the possibilities of either system to learn from the achievements of the other, the background of the average attitude of the 'common man' without any ambition at deeper understanding of international relations is no less important than the knowledge available to the instructed minority. In this regard, the average public on either side of the barrier gets a picture distorted by the inability of those responsible for popular propaganda (in the broadest sense of the word) to understand the basic attitude of the other side, and by a very intensive desire for national self-assertion. The fact that on the Western, but not on the Eastern side of the barrier, the latter frequently grows into encouragement of a crusading spirit, if not direct, war-mongering, is likely to be explained by most readers of this paper as an unavoidable, however deplorable, by-product of a desirable freedom of expression. Yet Russians may ask why utterances like the above quoted are not discouraged by the unofficial agencies controlling American public opinion at least in the same degree as if they had been pro-Communist or (in the solid South) pro-Negro. Extremes aside, national self-assertion is nothing deplorable according to present British or Soviet standards. It seems unavoidable that popular expressions of it imply not a mere statement that 'our way of life is good for our conditions' but also the generalisation that it be the best conceivable one. The average inhabitant of the U.S.S.R. is not only told that the Soviet regime has enabled enormous progress to be made in comparison with pre-revolutionary times, and more progress than conceivable under any alternative regime, which seem to me obvious truths; he is also invited to form his judgment about 'capitalism' in general on the basis of illustrations drawn from the experience of Pilsudskian Poland, Royal-fascist Rumania or Yugoslavia, India, Japan or China.

From the point of view of the Soviet propagandist it may be argued—apart from his higher ability to understand the conditions of countries similar to those from which the Russian revolution had to start—that his comparison is the only relevant one; for a defeat of the U.S.S.R. in competition with the Western Powers would mean the introduction not of British institutions in Russia but of what interventionists strove for a quarter of a century ago. On the British side, even those who constantly try to explain to their co-nationals that the Russians are bound to be suspicious, fail to appreciate the elementary fact that, reasons for suspicion once taken for granted, there is no trait in the system and ideologies of the conceivable opponent that would not be judged according to the function which it might fulfil in the framework of an eventual aggression. Things have a certain inherent logic: once ally A has, by a novel device, killed 200,000 men, women and children in a war already nearly won, and thus has invited the allegation that this was done in order to show ally B his own superiority and to deprive him of part of his share in the fruits of the common victory; once, further, the whole propaganda machinery of ally A is applied in order to demonstrate that sole possession of the said instrument of indiscriminate destruction is proof of his higher civilisation in comparison with that of the police-State B, and is evidence of the working of Divine Providence which should be defended by the police against any attempts of police-State B to get hold of the secret, then B is bound to translate any phraseology applied by A about the rights of small nations, etc., into terms of distance from its own vital oil centres, bomber bases, or the bases for its own protective fighter screen. The practical relations that are bound to follow from such an interpretation will further feed the propaganda of A by providing additional proof of B not taking seriously even those principles shared by him and A, thus proving himself to be a likely aggressor. To minds accustomed to a legal interpretation of basic social principles it appears obvious that failure to share a new



invention, or even provocative emphasis on it towards former allies is, at the worst, proof of lack of confidence and courtesy, whilst violation of the sanctity of treaties is a proof of lawlessness. Even those who regard it as their specific task to answer such charges in the camp of A will deplore the practical reactions of B as the proof of a complete lack of understanding of the importance of international sympathies. They fail to realise that only at a certain stage in the development of international conflicts the kind of sympathy which they can offer has a value comparable to that of those ideologies that may be usefully applied in external propaganda once the hopes of peaceful collaboration with the former partners have been reduced to a minimum.

These remarks appear pessimistic enough. I should not like to see them interpreted to mean that I regarded war as likely between the former allies; all peoples are tired of war, and war cannot be made with propaganda phrases and atomic bombs. I do not even think that those who overplay national self-assertion envisage war, for I do not regard them as fools who wish to lead all that they stood for to a new Stalingrad. They intend to defend it, not against the ghost of Soviet aggression (which, as they very well know, is a mere ghost) but against the possibility that the achievements of the U.S.S.R. make the superiority of the system they stand for doubtful amongst peoples who are tired of war and its causes. There is not the slightest chance that anyone except uninfluential sects could envisage on application of the Soviet system to the Anglo-Saxon countries, and even less that any reasonable being could envisage application of the Anglo-Saxon system to the U.S.S.R.; but, in theory, it is conceivable that their co-existence, especially if associated with that spirit of solidarity as developed by large sectors of public opinion during the anti-fascist war would be conducive to attempts at integrating the one or the other of their respective achievements into the framework of the other partner's system. This can safely be prevented if, on the one side, an atmosphere is created of 'fighting the

danger of appeasing the most dangerous foe of Christian civilisation', and, on the other, an atmosphere of material and ideological rearmament against a new capitalist intervention. During the second World War the Comintern was dissolved, and we saw far-reaching *rapprochements* within the various resistance movements; now, the preservation of the split within the German Labour movement that helped Hitler into power is being elevated to a standard of Western democracy, and from either side of the barrier we hear the well-known slogans about 'the danger from Moscow' and 'British imperialism oppressing the colonial peoples'. Readers will remember that these slogans were repeated for fifteen years without producing war. They may be repeated for another 150 years without producing anything except a degeneration of national self-assertion on either side into depreciation of the other. But it is obvious that under such circumstances few of the achievements of one side are likely to be found amongst the possible alternatives within the reach of the citizens of the other; the very co-existence of the two systems may form an additional factor strictly limiting democratic choice within either of them.

It would be a mistake to conclude that such limitations due to the co-existence of the two systems would impede the development of democracy within either of them, in any sense appreciable by common standards. Struggle has always been the father of progress; and as we remember that the extension of suffrage to the broad masses of the British people has originated from the competition of oligarchic parties, we see in our days the peoples of India as well as the workers and peasants of Eastern Germany getting greater freedom to shape their own fates than they could expect when the relations between the great allies were at the best. But, certainly, the prospects of democracy in either system should be investigated within its own framework.

IS DEMOCRACY COMPATIBLE WITH THE REGIME OF THE  
U.S.S.R.?

The alleged incompatibility of socialism with democracy is frequently 'proved' by a definition of the latter as including the freedom of private enterprise. It is not worth while to dwell upon such, purely ideological, statements. More serious questions arise from the fact that, in a society based upon that freedom, the proposal of alternative policies to the electorate, like any other important activity, is carried through by competing private enterprises. For most people it is extremely difficult to imagine such, and similar, functions carried out in societies with other basic agencies. As soon as the main political divisions arise between the owners and non-owners of the means of production, the 'free press' represents the stand of public opinion in a way which is obviously unfair if measured by the distribution of electoral sympathies; but it can be said in favour of the institution that it allows for some expression (be it only in the shape of a small uninfluential weekly) for nearly every popular trend. In a socialist society which controls all printing presses, the function would have to be taken over by some other agency, say, by the interest of the ruling group itself in submitting issues to public discussion, and realised by the grant of some autonomy to professional bodies of journalists; and the above-mentioned shortcomings of the existing device should be a warning against perfectionist demands on its possible successor. But a serious problem there is, and certainly it is difficult of solution under the one-party system prevailing in the U.S.S.R.

A current argument<sup>12</sup> questions the possibility of democracy in the U.S.S.R. because there is a ruling group with a vested interest in preserving power, which might be endangered if popular opposition were unfettered

<sup>12</sup> Comp. H. J. Laski, *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, London, 1917, p. 67, and the review of this book in *The London Quarterly of World Affairs* (July, 1915).

by granting democratic rights. This argument can be made for every existing State, and with rather more justification for States whose political structure has been shaped in less recent times, so that there is more likelihood of its being contradicted by popular forces meanwhile developed. Regarding the U.S.S.R. it makes sense only on the assumption that there is a widespread popular demand for 'permanent revolution' going beyond the structure actually achieved, say in the sense of transition to what Marx has called 'the higher stage of Communist society'. The assertion of such a demand is one of the basic tenets of Trotskyism, but is hardly shared by those who repeat the argument, and it seems completely indefensible in the light of Soviet reality. If there are no forces in the U.S.S.R. which, if unfettered, would drive the Russian revolution forward, the 'vested interest' of the rulers of the U.S.S.R. needs defence only against a counter-revolution, which would not be a democratic demand, or against popular demands within the existing framework that are incompatible with the needs of its survival, say, opposition against the sacrifices necessary in the interest of preserving national independence in an hostile world. In the latter case no mere vested interest of the ruling group is defended by restrictions imposed on democracy. But restrictions, however necessary in the national interest, are still restrictions; and the problem of democracy in the U.S.S.R. becomes only the more serious once we realise that its limitations are not due to the shortsightedness, or lust for power, of some rulers who could be overthrown by a change in institutions.

In order to put the problem of democracy in the U.S.S.R. in a realistic way, we have to compare the actual state of things not with some utopia but with those standards that can be derived from a comparative inquiry into Western and Eastern democratic achievements. As regards the actual opportunity for the average citizen actively to participate in public life, I should not hesitate to say that, in spite of its initial handicap, the U.S.S.R. heads international

developments; as regards the freedom to advocate alternative policies, it may be asserted that it is more restricted than in any other State claiming to represent a democratic outlook. With this statement, I have not in mind the freedom to advocate fundamental changes in social relations, which in every State is of a rather ideological character. I speak of the actual possibility for the Soviet electorate to decide issues similar in scope to those which the British electorate<sup>14</sup> has decided when preferring nationalisation of mines with collaboration of private business and existing managers to State-supervised organisation of the mines by the mine owners themselves. It would have been a good test of democracy in the realist, as distinct from the utopian, sense, if, say, the matrimonial legislation of July 1944, which decided most important issues in the average Soviet citizen's life, had been submitted to a free decision of the electorate after thorough discussion of the pros and cons of the various conceivable solutions. This has not been done. To anyone who knows the U.S.S.R. it is obvious why it has not been done, and could not have been done in the case of any issue of comparable importance. It is quite true that various possible types of matrimonial legislation are theoretically compatible with State-socialism as existing in the present U.S.S.R. (just as various ways of controlling mines are compatible with that permeation of free capitalist enterprise by State capitalism which is characteristic of Britain to-day); but unhappily only one of the possible types of Soviet matrimonial legislation can be the most suitable to keep the birth-rate up to that level as needed for the preservation of the Soviet system under present conditions. After concluding victoriously a fight for her very existence and sacrificing the flower of her youth, the U.S.S.R. finds herself confronted more than before with a world united under a different system. After the destruction of the two

<sup>14</sup> I doubt whether the American electorate would be free to decide similar issues, and still more whether such policies would be loyally carried out by the administration.

aggressors that threatened her Western and Eastern borders as well as the predominant countries of the capitalist world, the phrase about 'capitalist encirclement' has become more of a reality than it was at any time before, especially as no Power outside the U.S.S.R. enjoys actual independence from the strongest, and most conscious, of the capitalist countries. The tactical position of the U.S.S.R. may have improved by moving the Western defence belt from the Dvina to the Elbe, from the Dniester to the Adriatic Sea, and the South-Eastern from the Amur to the Yellow Sea; but the strategical position of one-fourth of the world opposed by three-quarters may be worse than that of the renowned 'sixth' confronted by a plurality of potential opponents, entangled in the sharpest mutual contradictions. It may be said that the realisation of such dangers is difficult, and that the Russians are over-cautious. But who would not be cautious when everything he stands for depends on the goodwill of other people who are not conspicuous for their ability to imagine their counterpart's position? Amongst the neighbours and conceivable opponents of the U.S.S.R. is the nation with the largest population and the highest population pressure in the world, and the preservation within that nation of a regime that is bound to turn this pressure outwards is regarded by the leading Power within the capitalist bloc as vital interest. As long as these conditions continue the Soviet has no chance of establishing any equilibrium, unless it can quickly raise the population of Siberia to, say, American standards. To return to our example, it is obvious that only one type of matrimonial legislation can be the most suitable to cope with the described conditions; and this type of matrimonial legislation is not bound to coincide with the material interests, or even some desirable cultural standards—in themselves completely legitimate—as conceived by the majority of the electorate. Therefore, it cannot be left to its free decision. The same holds true, on an even higher degree, whenever the priorities of butter (or housing) against

guns (or means to counter the atomic bomb) are in question. To proclaim the 'peace-smoking' activities of the last-mentioned weapon, monopolised in the hands of conceivable opponents of the U.S.S.R., and, at the same time, to reproach the latter for keeping its political system and that of its allies in such a shape as is necessary in order to meet the threat, is, to put it mildly, illogical.

In order to find the conditions under which the Soviet system can cease to plan for extreme emergencies, and therefore give socialist democracy a fair test, we have to ask for the conditions under which the equilibrium, which has been disturbed by the breakdown of the pre-War system, will be definitely restored. One conceivable way to end the problem would be destruction of the U.S.S.R. and the establishment of an American-dominated World State, though in the attempt to achieve that solution the would-be conqueror, if not also human civilisation, might be destroyed. Apart from this utopia, there are three ways each of which, or a combination of which, may restore equilibrium between the two systems: (1) gradual increase of the power of the U.S.S.R. so that she could defend herself even against a combination of all the other Great Powers, with due allowance for the advantages of defence and for the larger popular support which the U.S.S.R. may command in comparison with its possible opponents (at least so far as the latter's colonies are concerned); (2) such changes in the political life of one of the other 'big four' (for which China would be the only likely candidate) that would render its alignment against the U.S.S.R. inconceivable; or (3) new antagonisms rising in the capitalist world. Technical changes (for instance, an eventual obsolescence of sea power as compared with air power, in which field of development the U.S.S.R. possesses a more equal start) may ease the tension, but they may do the opposite. This would have happened unless the politicians, who expected an Anglo-Saxon monopoly of the atomic bomb for some years to come, had been mistaken. On the whole, they are more likely to make

for insecurity, unless they are actually controlled by an international agency. But this begs our question as it presupposes some equilibrium as a condition of agreement amongst the members of the atomic bomb commission of U.N.O.

Until some equilibrium is achieved, the weaker of the two systems can feel no sense of security. Therefore, it cannot risk that issues important for its defence (and in the times of total war every issue important for the electorate is also important for defence) should be decided on grounds other than those of defence. And this will be best judged by specialists. Therefore, there will be narrow limits to democratic decision, even issues so popular with the electorate as, say, a big housing programme for the U.S.S.R. could hardly be decided upon to accord simply to the tastes of the prospective consumers apart from the needs of dispersal as a means of civil defence. It is difficult to estimate the likely duration of the period of transition before the new equilibrium will be established. But if we assume that no catastrophes of any kind interfere, there will be no undue optimism in expecting the population of the U.S.S.R. to increase at the same rate as that of the U.S.A. did during the period of its greatest expansion in the nineteenth century; the greater opportunities for encouraging births that are involved in planned economies may compensate for the lack of immigration. After a generation, or so, the heart of the Eurasian continent will be populated by half a milliard of people, and the power of its example will have induced a settlement of the internal issues of what will probably still be the largest people in the world. Progress will not have come to a standstill in the rest of the world, and a new equilibrium between the Eurasian and the Anglo-Saxon civilisations will be created. Whether they will actually have established similar patterns of economic life by different approaches, or whether they will carry two different forms of human civilisation into the coming ages, is of little importance, as it will no longer be worth while for either of them to be afraid of the other. The



claims of any single civilisation to dominate the world will definitely have to be dropped in view of the achieved emancipation of the so-called 'coloured' peoples, which is bound to result in the restoration of a four- or five-Power system (though with units different from those of the nineteenth century).

Once that stage of international development is achieved, the U.S.S.R. will combine both a sense of external security and of unlimited opportunities for the individual, as was characteristic in nineteenth-century America, but without the economic system that brought individual opportunity to an end once the West was settled. Once the advantage of the Anglo-Saxon countries has been caught up with, production statistics and 'socialist competition' organised in order to stimulate development will cease to be an issue of life and death for the U.S.S.R., and will become one amongst various national interests. Then the actual conditions of free decisions will have been created, and socialist democracy may get its first honest test in history. It will not be utopia. Nor will it be a replica of present Anglo-Saxon democracy. But there is no reason for denying that, judged by either of the two standards discussed above, it may be more democratic than any of the forms of democracy realised so far.

# CZECHOSLOVAKIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

BY

A. G. BETTANY

## I

THE importance of Czechoslovakia as a country occupying a unique place in post-war Europe, from the political and social as well as from the strategical point of view, was foreseen long before the conflict ended. The wisdom of President Benes in grasping the hand offered him by Soviet Russia and concluding the treaty of alliance of December 12, 1945, made it highly probable that his country would occupy after the achievement of victory a position midway between Eastern communism and the Western liberal and capitalistic conception of democracy. The wartime alliance has inevitably been consolidated into ties of an enduring social and political character.

Although the Czechoslovak leaders have necessarily been deeply influenced by Soviet Russian ways of thought it would be wrong to infer that the country has become a mere tutelary appendage of Russia. In spite of lying behind what has been picturesquely called the iron curtain, Czechoslovakia has enjoyed national sovereignty and independence since the Allied armies secured her liberation in May, 1945. There has been no apparent evidence of direct Soviet interference in her affairs, even during the uneasy six months when Russian and American armies were occupying the whole of her territory. The Russian commanders made considerable demands as a matter of course upon Czechoslovak resources for the maintenance of their troops; these were not always convenient and were sometimes resented, but the Prague Government was left in complete control of the country.

The strong Russophile influences were by no means con-

fined to the politicians of the Left and their supporters. Liberation had been largely achieved by Russian arms after bloody battles fought upon Czechoslovak territory and the whole country welcomed the Russian troops not only as rescuers but as kinsfolk in the great Slavonic family.

Leading statesmen such as Mr. Zdenek Fierlinger, the former Prime Minister, who had lived during the war in Russia, returned to their homeland deeply impressed by the Soviet way of life and naturally sought in the Soviet Union models for the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia. The predominance of the Left parties, including the Catholic Populists, in the new republic is not, however, attributable solely to the influence of Moscow. The more conservative parties owe their eclipse largely to another cause. During the unhappy years which followed Munich the Left parties alone kept their hands clean. Their refusal to be contaminated by negotiations with the Germans both before and after the outbreak of war had given them their great opportunity, as well as a great responsibility.

It is unfortunate that world opinion, and especially the press, has paid so little attention to events in Czechoslovakia, although this is perhaps mainly for the reason that they have not been able to compete in sensationalism with happenings elsewhere. Consequently, the greatest popular ignorance surrounds this country which offers remarkable features of interest not only from the point of view of international politics but from that of the social reformer and the economic theorist.

The outstanding phenomenon of Czechoslovakia is the remarkable degree of unity displayed by the country as a whole. Even after taking into account the innumerable currents of dissent and doubt which are inevitable in a State undergoing a drastic series of surgical operations, it can be said that the Government is supported by the overwhelming mass of the people.

The reconstructive programme of the coalition Government was contained in the manifesto signed at Kosice in Slovakia

on March 27, 1945. This document holds the plan for the new national, socialistic, democratic republic of Czechoslovakia. Its references to foreign policy are a confession of faith in Soviet Russia and the Slavonic brotherhood. It says: 'As an expression of the great gratitude of the Czech and Slovak peoples to the U.S.S.R., the Government will adhere unwaveringly to the closest alliance with the Soviet Union as the main line of Czechoslovak foreign policy. The basis for this will remain the treaty of December 12, 1943. From the outset the Government will safeguard practical collaboration—military, political, economic and cultural—with the U.S.S.R. At the same time it wishes to effect a mutual exchange of representatives with the neighbouring Ukrainian S.S.R. In questions of the punishment of Germany, reparations, delimitation of frontiers and the organisation of the future peace, the Czechoslovak Government aims at standing shoulder to shoulder with the U.S.S.R. and in line with the other Slav and democratic countries.

'The Government will strive to form a firm bond of alliance with a new and democratic Poland so that as soon as possible the treaty of December 12, 1943, may be broadened into a Three Power Pact. The Government will also pursue the Slavonic line of its foreign policy towards Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. After the rectification of all crimes and injustices committed by the Hungarian invaders the Government will support efforts for a rapprochement between a new and really democratic Hungary and Austria and the neighbouring Slavonic nations and States.'

This definition of foreign policy has since been steadfastly pursued by the Prague Government under the enlightened guidance of President Eduard Benes. In one direction, however, its efforts have received a severe check. The hopes of more friendly relations with Poland have so far not been realised as common sense has not yet prevailed over mutual dislike and suspicion. The main bone of contention has been the disputed possession of that part of Teschen south of the river Olza which forms the present frontier.

The Kosice programme was drafted in the first flush of enthusiasm over the Soviet victories, which doubtless explains the minor key in which Czechoslovakia's gratitude towards her Western Allies was worded.

'The Government', the programme continues, 'will strengthen friendly relations with Great Britain whose aid during the war we value so highly, and will seek with the United States the same particularly close friendship as with France, and will endeavour that Czechoslovakia shall become an active participant in the framing of a new order in liberated democratic Europe.'

Had the possibility occurred of revising the Kosice programme twelve months later, a more generous recognition might perhaps have been accorded to the two great Western Powers whose stupendous efforts in production and military skill not only saved Czechoslovakia but also Soviet Russia from disaster. Czechoslovaks have also become more appreciative of the vast help they have received from UNRRA, which in spite of its name is mainly a British and American affair. It cannot be too often stressed that Great Britain, although impoverished by the war, has contributed twenty-six per cent. towards all UNRRA supplies. Without this assistance recovery would have been much slower and the pangs of hunger much more acute not only in over-populated Prague but especially in war-devastated Slovakia to which, incidentally, the central Government has sent a generous share of UNRRA supplies.

## II

The Kosice programme also provided for sweeping economic and political reforms. Possibly no State in history has attempted such an elaborate series of reconstructive measures, all at the same time, as Czechoslovakia, even if one includes revolutionary Russia. Most of these measures have been enforced by the speedy and effective means of presidential decrees having the effect of law. Sufficient time, however, has not yet elapsed for them to have been properly digested by the country. Several years at least, therefore, must pass

before even a provisional judgment can be pronounced upon these ambitious reforms.

The Kosice programme laid down the policy of a national State consisting solely of Czechs and Slovaks. This necessarily involved the expulsion of the bulk of the German and Hungarian minorities. This must be the first time in history that a State has freely decided to deprive herself of about one quarter of her inhabitants. The Sudetenland, now known as the Frontier Region, comprises a wide belt of territory in northern, western and southern Bohemia, most of which was peopled by a large majority of Germans. Soon after liberation it became necessary to distinguish who were Germans and who were Czechs. Although by that time some hundreds of thousands had already left the country or been clapped into internment camps, the preponderance of white or yellow armlets, the sign of the German, showed to the most cursory traveller the gravity of the Sudeten problem.

In the main the Sudetenland consists of forest-clad mountains, rich farmlands and prosperous coalfields, which have enabled many areas to become centres of thriving industrial life, producing electric power, synthetic fuel, chemicals, iron and steel, machinery, motorcars, glassware, jewellery, textiles, carpets, china and many other articles.

It is hard to see how the Czechs are going to manage without the bulk of their Sudeten workers for many years to come. The authorities believe that Czechoslovak workers from other parts of the country will replace the Germans from northern and western Bohemia and that scores of thousands of Czech and Slovak workers in the United States, France, Belgium and other countries will return home as soon as they know that work awaits them in the new national State.

The Germans were conspicuous by their productive skill and organising capacity, and on the other hand they proved themselves to be hard working and successful farmers. Their skill has in many cases been handed down for generations

and cannot be replaced without a laborious recolonisation scheme, accompanied by thorough apprenticeship and training of new workers.

The Ministry of the Interior under the Communist Mr. Václav Nosek, which is in charge of the transfer of the German and Hungarian minorities, had hoped to rid the country of the Sudetens by the end of July, 1946, and produced an elaborate plan of evacuation, which should have begun in the previous December, for removing them to the Russian and American zones of Germany at the average rate of about a quarter of a million a month. There was never much prospect for the realisation of this programme and it soon became clear that the Russians, no less than the Americans, were not ready to receive hordes of new arrivals in the depth of winter, thus adding to their own troubles in administering the disrupted Reich.

Gone were the days when the Germans could be bundled over the frontier; for one thing there were too many of them. Moreover, Czech public opinion no less than that of the civilised world would not have tolerated a repetition of the scenes which marked the expulsions in the first weeks after liberation.

For the most part these Nazi fugitives left the country in disorderly flight and their sufferings were proportionately great. The lucky ones seem to have been a few privileged people in Prague who received official warning on May 4, the day before the Czech uprising, that Hitler's game was up. They were accompanied by an exodus of terrified Germans from the frontier zone. Most of them abandoned their flats and houses after summary preparations for flight. Beds were unmade, food was left cooking on kitchen stoves, meals were abandoned half eaten and homes were left in incredible disorder. These Germans disappeared over the frontier so fast that no arrangements whatever could be made for them in Germany. On entering the Reich thousands were driven by hunger to plunder the homes and farms of their fellow German citizens in eastern Germany. The terror inspired by the depredations and

behaviour of the fugitives from Czechoslovakia was so intense that Marshal Zhukov was petitioned to send troops to protect the population.

Crossing the border was a primitive business for the Germans in those early weeks. For the most part they returned 'home to the Reich', to quote their own slogan, on foot unless they were sick, aged, young mothers or children when they had a chance of being transported most of the way. A typical route was the main road running from Prague through the holiday resort of Teplice in northern Bohemia over the mountains to Dresden. The Germans were detrained at Teplice and had to walk the nine miles to the frontier at Zinwald up the steep, splendidly engineered mountain road, lined with the ruins of war. Hundreds of German and Russian tanks and army vehicles of all descriptions fringed the road, eloquent signs of the desperate character of this last phase of the struggle.

On the German side of the border the fugitives were received where possible by Soviet and German officials who made the able-bodied proceed a further four miles on foot to Gneising where they were entrained for Pirna near Dresden. There the lucky ones were allowed to choose their destination in Germany while the remainder were diverted to reception camps.

Although stern and unrelenting in their attitude towards the Germans at whose hands they had suffered so much, the Czechs are too deeply attached to their humane and civilised ideals to tolerate organised cruelty such as stained the German conduct towards those in their power. The national love of order also revolted against such scenes, and stern instructions were issued from Prague to curb the often rough-and-ready methods of the local authorities. These were invariably the local National Committees, which had come into life in the excitement of liberation, and contained far too few administrators and far too many zealous patriots. Another factor which operated to check abuses was the keen national pride of the Czechs which makes them extremely sensitive to



criticism, especially if coming from abroad. Articles or letters appearing in papers like the 'Manchester Guardian', alleging Czech ill-treatment of the Germans, are deeply resented, but if there should be the slightest justification for them, the hint is usually taken.

The nearest approach to hardship imposed upon the Germans is the rule that non-workers should be allowed the same meagre rations as the Germans gave to the Jews. In point of fact the rations were usually rather better than that, and as the Sudetenland is for the most part of a mixed urban and rural character the Germans have had fair opportunities of supplementing their official fare.

### III

The Czechs are likewise determined to rid the republic of the Hungarians, but this plan is confronted with the obstacle that there is no Potsdam agreement giving Allied sanction to their wholesale transfer. Agreement has been reached in principle for the exchange of Hungarian and Slovak minorities, but even if the Slovaks in Hungary were to return to a man to their original motherland there would remain a large number of Hungarians in Slovakia for whom there would be no Slovaks to exchange.

The Hungarian Government had the effrontery to propose that the Hungarians who would be exchanged for Slovaks should only be taken from those parts of Slovakia where they were not particularly numerous, and that the southern plain, where they form the large majority, should be handed over to Hungary. There can be few cases in history of a defeated country seeking to annex territory belonging to one of the victors. Yet the proposal was seriously made. Some Hungarians do not realise that they have lost the war.

Slovak feeling against the Hungarians, although acute in some villages, cannot be compared with the bitter hatred of the Czechs for the Germans. On the whole the Hungarians in Slovakia desire to remain where they are, not only for economic reasons but because they would enjoy greater

political freedom. Many Slovaks consider that generally speaking the Hungarians are good neighbours, except when their simple minds are incited by agitators from Budapest. Thousands of Slovak and Hungarian families are united by marriage. Moreover, Slovakia and Hungary are very largely inter-dependent economically. Hungary in the past has exchanged her agricultural produce for timber, textiles and, notably, sugar from Slovakia. A result of the present stifling of trade between the two countries was seen in the important Danubian river port of Komarno, whose population fell from thirty-three thousand during the war to less than fifteen thousand six months afterwards.

#### IV

The incorporation of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, the easternmost tip of the republic, into Soviet Russia was a sore disappointment to the Czechs. This mountainous and thickly timbered section of the country contained only a relatively small population of some 350,000, and was economically dependent upon the rest of Czechoslovakia. The population, apart from the large colony of Jews, is Ruthenian and akin to the Ukrainians. The territory was annexed without any consultation of the inhabitants. Although the Czechs have since produced various ingenious theories, such as having held Ruthenia in trust for the Russians, in point of fact they felt deeply hurt, especially as they had expected more generosity from their greatly admired big brothers.

The immediate economic consequence was that Czechoslovakia was deprived of its supplies of salt for several months. The incorporation of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was unpopular with a large proportion of its inhabitants, especially the Jews who flocked over the frontier into Slovakia. The Ruthenian soldiers in the Czech forces opted in large numbers to retain their Czechoslovak nationality and they were joined where possible by their families.

## V

The ultimate frontiers of Czechoslovakia, apart from the loss of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, are unlikely to undergo many alterations. The Czechs have claimed several small enclaves in German territory, notably Ratibor, Kladsko and Hlubice. These are peopled mostly by people speaking the Czech tongue and originating from Bohemia. The claims are strategic as well as ethnographic in intention.

A more shadowy proposal is that of incorporating Lusatia, the region in eastern Germany inhabited by the Lusatian Serbs or Wends. The Lusatian movement for autonomy received a stimulus after the defeat of Germany and attracted many adherents who doubtless felt that any banner is better for rallying round than the defeated swastika and eagle of the Reich. The authentic Lusatians who number probably a quarter of a million desire incorporation in a Slavonic State—they are indifferent whether it is Poland or Czechoslovakia. The Czechs, however, are hesitant whether it would be wise to extend their frontiers so deeply into Germany. Meanwhile the cause of Lusatian nationalism is given diplomatic and material support on the basis of sympathy rather than of practical politics.

## VI

Czechoslovakia's relations with Poland are clouded by the obstinate case of Teschen. The two parties have been unable to reach agreement on this problem in which the primarily economic and secondarily racial arguments of Czechoslovakia are opposed by the primarily racial and secondarily economic contentions of Poland.

No argument is without its counter-argument. Czechoslovak claims that southern Teschen must be retained because of its railway, coal mines and steel mills are answered by the objection that Poland would be only too glad to supply all these things on advantageous terms to Czechoslovakia provided that the area, or most of it, was incorporated in the new republic. The Poles contend that most of the people in the disputed area are Polish, to which the Czechs reply that

there is no means of proving this by statistics. Even a referendum would not give a satisfying result, partly because the atmosphere would become too heated for the voting to reflect a calm and deliberate decision, and partly because many of the people concerned are not too certain where they want to go. The point of decision would not be only a matter of nationality; domestic and economic considerations would inevitably obscure the issue. Moreover, there are many Poles who would like to preserve their Polish nationality while continuing to work in Czechoslovakia.

The problem of Teschen is a fascinating study that would fill an article by itself, and probably draw upon the author the maledictions of both sides. When he visited the area last summer the present writer was invited, as the first Allied journalist to see the area since the liberation, to give a talk over the Moravska Ostrava radio. In spite of his efforts to avoid using any words which might give offence, he was reproached by both Czechs and Poles who complained that the other side had been unduly favoured.

If the Government's policy of creating a homogeneous national State of Czechs and Slovaks succeeds, the ethnographic mixtures of the old Austrian Empire will have been finally sorted out in regions where they perhaps were thickest. Whether the Slavonic island that will result will be helpful for the maintenance of European peace only time can show. The Czechs and to a lesser extent the Slovaks believe that the Germans and Hungarians can never be anything but their enemies and that the proper place for enemies is outside the frontiers. The reply to this is that the Sudetens and Hungarians may take their grudges with them to their new homes, and not only perpetuate their animosities but encourage ideas of vengeance in Germany and Hungary.

## VII

An important part of the Kosice programme deals with the recognition of the Slovaks as an independent nation. The intention is that the Czechs and Slovaks shall live side by side on an equality, thus expressing the brotherhood of the two

peoples. The Slovak National Council is the constitutional organ of the Slovak nation which is also represented in the Czechoslovak Provisional Parliament to the extent of one-third of its three hundred members. The concession of such a large representation was a generous gesture by the Czechs and evidence of their determination not to repeat the mistakes of the first republic which had a tendency to treat the Slovaks as backward brethren. This was resented and was the main cause of the split by which Hitler profited. At present the Czechs are resolved to share their greater wealth with the Slovaks. This is further shown by the substantial allocation of UNRRA goods to Slovakia. Incidentally, their distribution by the Slovak authorities has been carried out with less efficiency than the case of starving eastern Slovakia demanded. This is putting it mildly.

The Slovaks for their part, in spite of their generous treatment by the Czechs, have maintained an attitude of extreme independence towards their bigger brethren. Good sense requires that they should bury their grievances and concentrate their energies upon restoring their battered country and trying to close the cultural gap between the Czechs and themselves. For the existence of this gap they are not to blame; it is the inheritance of Hungarian misrule.

### VIII

The mingled influences of East and West are strikingly seen in Czechoslovakia's political life. The Eastern influence may be roughly estimated at sixty per cent., the democratic conceptions of the West accounting for the remainder. Fundamentally the Soviet idea of the one-party State has been departed from in form, but the rigidity of Czechoslovakia's four-party coalition system achieves much the same results. However, the Government effectively represents four distinct political ways of thinking, which is impossible under the Soviet system, and thus the different points of view of the majority of the nation are reflected in the conduct of the various ministries and in new legislation.

Similarity to the Soviet system is seen in the fact that the members of the former conservative parties, notably the Agrarians, are not represented either in the National Assembly or in the Government.

This state of things may appear profoundly unsatisfactory to those with Western democratic ideas, but there are explanations based upon the political history of the first republic which must in fairness be considered before passing judgment. Before the war and also before Munich the large Left-wing minority was excluded from office by an unholy alliance of the Czech and Slovak conservative parties with the Germans. They were generally supported by the Catholic Popular party, representing Catholic, moderate, Christian Socialist opinion. After Munich they broke away from their uncomfortable bedfellows, to the honour of their leader, Monsignor Šramek. The congratulations which poured upon him from all sides on his seventy-fifth birthday last year testified to the great respect and affection with which he is regarded by his countrymen.

The record of the Agrarian party, and especially that of its leaders such as Mr. Beran, was such that no democracy in the world could have stomached its survival in the liberated republic. Although jurists are doubtful whether the revival of the Agrarians under a different label can be legally prevented, the Government have made it quite clear that they will not tolerate the resurrection of any of the parties which displayed disloyalty at a critical time.

President Benes has repeatedly said that he is opposed to any increase in the present number of parties; he considers that four parties should be sufficient to give effective representation to all shades of political thought. The weak part of Dr. Benes's argument is that these four parties represent different shades of the same colour. This is shown by the fact that many members of the Agrarian and other proscribed parties have not felt themselves able to give wholehearted support to the four Government parties. Thus the agricultural interest, which formed the backbone of the pro-

scribed parties and employs practically half the country, is not represented in the present system of government.

The Left parties, the Communists, the Social Democrats and the National Socialists (the former party of President Benes), represent for the most part either urban workmen or intellectuals; the Government officials, a very numerous class, are now definitely Left wing, probably because of their low salaries and meagre outlook.

The Catholic Popular party, which has one foot in the towns and the other in the country, is the only political organisation which largely represents not only the worker on the land but the factory hand and many of the black-coated class. This is especially true in Moravia, the stronghold of the party.

The Catholic party, however, has gone a long way towards accepting Socialist ideas. Therefore the voter who is neither a Catholic nor a Socialist has no party which he can conscientiously support. The unwillingness of the parties in power to permit the emergence of another party is partly due to their hope of attracting the votes of the old parties. This is especially the case of the more moderate National Socialist and Catholic Popular parties.

Although democratic practice in Czechoslovakia has not been without its blemishes either in the first republic or the second, the democratic ideals of the nation, largely based upon the teachings of their first modern leader, President T. G. Masaryk, are deep-rooted and sincere. It would be surprising if the Czechs were not somewhat lacking in political experience as they have had barely twenty years of self-government and this was sandwiched between Austrian bureaucracy and Hitlerian tyranny. The Czechs are plodding idealists, blessed with a great deal of practical common sense, and not easily discouraged.

## IX

The elections on May 20 passed off very much as might have been expected. Polling throughout the republic was efficiently organised and orderly. While the Communists in

the Czech lands obtained about ten per cent. more votes than their opponents had believed likely, in Slovakia the Communists fared badly. The general effect of the voting in the two parts of the country was in the nature of a pronounced squint, Bohemia and Moravia having a decided cast towards the Left while Slovakia gazed resolutely towards the Right. This contrasting political complexion bodes ill for the immediate relations of the two partners unless both behave with greater tolerance towards one another than that displayed by some Czech Communist politicians after the polls, who darkly hinted at the necessity of weeding the Fascist reactionaries out of the 'political dust-bin', as they unwisely chose to call the Slovak Democratic party.

In the Czech lands the percentage of votes cast for the respective parties was as follows: Communists 40.17 per cent., People's party 20.23 per cent., National Socialists 23.66 per cent. and Social Democrats 15.59 per cent. In Slovakia the Democrats secured 61.43 per cent., the Communists 30.43 per cent., while the newly constituted Freedom and Labour parties only obtained a handful of votes.

The Constituent Assembly was formed on the basis of proportional representation, and the same principle was observed in the construction of the new cabinet. The Communists enjoyed the fruits of victory by obtaining, as they were entitled to, the Prime Ministership as well as the Presidency of the Assembly. After President Benes had been re-elected President with general acclamation, Mr. Klement Gottwald, the Communist leader, accepted the invitation to form a new government. Mr. Anton Zapotocky, the President of the Trades Union Council, was elected President of the Assembly by a narrow majority.

It is too early at the time of writing to foresee how the new administration will shape, but some useful changes have been made, including the removal of a few weak ministers. Generally speaking the political direction of the republic is not likely to undergo any decided change during the two years' tenure of the newly elected Parliament. The Com-



munists are doubtless resolved to strengthen their position in the republic, but they have shouldered the main responsibility of the government and are faced with many grave and in some cases almost insoluble problems.

## X

No article on Czechoslovakia would be complete without an appreciation of the President, Dr. Benes. In his spacious study in the beautiful and historic Hradecany Castle he works indefatigably, receiving callers, dealing with State papers and consulting with his ministers. When he likes he can draw inspiration from his study windows overlooking the 'Golden City' of Prague with its hundreds of spires in the Little Quarter and the Old Town, with the sluggish Vltava flowing between them. With infinite patience and skill he is striving to guide his country from the chaotic dawn of liberation after a devastating war to a noble and prosperous future. Patience is the theme constantly in his mind—patience while eager politicians and inexperienced civil servants are learning their difficult jobs of governing the nation or managing the country's nationalised industries. Dr. Benes is confident that his patience will be rewarded and that by the time he lays down his heavy burden Czechoslovakia will be a contented and wealthy social democracy.

For years President Benes has borne his onerous office, but thanks to his tough physique, resilient spirits and the devoted care of his wife he shows little sign of his strenuous years of duty. His very appearance shows what he is—an erudite Czech professor, of sturdy peasant stock, turned statesman and become the father of his country.

## XI

Nowhere is the impact of Eastern ideas on a nation with a predominantly Western economy seen to greater advantage than in the partial nationalisation of Czechoslovak industry and commerce. This was carried out in the autumn of 1945 by presidential decree. In deciding upon these measures the

Government were impelled partly by theoretical socialism and partly by political necessity resulting from the state in which many concerns were left by the war.

A large proportion of the most important enterprises in the country were in German hands; others belonged to collaborators or Hungarians. The managements of these properties had to be placed in the hands of trustees so that they could be carried on until the Government decided what should be done with them. Among these properties were many belonging to Allied nationals which had been seized by the Germans. The position was complicated by the rise of Works Councils and National Councils, mostly dominated by Communists, who made it difficult for the Government to restore them to their former owners, even if they were not Germans or collaborators. Some of the Works Councils were not too careful in inquiring who the previous owners were; and thus the important Schicht soap and margarine works belonging to Unilevers were constantly described as a German concern. Similarly the properties formerly belonging to Jews, most of whom had German names, have been in many cases unjustifiably retained.

Although Czechoslovak socialism was inspired by the Russian model, it is no slavish imitation. It has profited from the experience of Russia and is designed to fit the peculiar conditions of the republic. Unlike Soviet Russia, Czechoslovakia cannot be self-supporting but must largely depend upon foreign trade for raw materials, for some of her foodstuffs and for many finished products. She must therefore produce at competitive prices and maintain close contact with the rest of the world.

The nationalisation of the country's principal industries falls into two groups. First come the key industries, such as the mines, the iron, steel and large engineering works including Skoda and Vitkovic, the banks and insurance companies.

Secondly come a host of factories in other industries employing more than given quotas of workers, varying with

every industry. In some cases the figure is three hundred workers and in others five hundred. These limitations require careful scrutiny before their effect can be seen, as some undertakings require relatively few workers while others need a great many. Generally speaking, small independent concerns, well managed and mechanised, escape nationalisation while larger enterprises in which various processes are linked together fall victims to the decrees.

It seems likely that existing managements will be retained under State control unless they are found inefficient and politically unreliable. Former proprietors, if loyal Czechs or Slovaks, have in many instances been consulted in the running of nationalised concerns and have sometimes been appointed managers, or allowed to recommend those with the requisite technical qualifications. Thus former owners have often continued to have a direct interest in their factories and the State bonds which will be issued to them in lieu of their share certificates will be a first charge on the profits, again strengthening their interest.

In these circumstances nationalisation often did not mean an abrupt break with the past. In some cases nationalisation may be little more than a matter of form. The State will have the legal ownership while the former proprietors may be allowed if efficient to continue in the management and even benefit by a system of payment by results. Nationalisation was not framed on a rigid, dogmatic pattern.

By the wording of the presidential decrees all nationalised concerns are to be run independently, subject to directions from the central planning authorities, and the managements are expected to administer them on business lines. This means that they should not be run at a loss.

An interesting point is that the employees of the newly nationalised concerns are not entitled to be known as civil servants; that is, although employees of State undertakings they do not belong to the bureaucracy. This is at any rate the Government's intention. Bureaucracy flourishes in Czechoslovakia and although it is recognised as a national weakness

none seems to know how to overcome it. As inheritors of the Austrian tradition, Czech bureaucrats often tend to regard themselves as a caste, *destined not to serve but to rule* the rest of the nation.

Greater efficiency than hitherto is hoped for in the nationalised concerns. The Works Councils, established everywhere after the liberation, which often impeded the managements are now required to attend to their proper business of looking after the welfare of the workers and to leave the job of managing to the managers.

No survey of Czechoslovakian industries can ignore the powerful and magnetic personality of Antonin Zapotocky, the chairman of U.R.O., the Trade Union Council. His masterful manner has caused him to be dubbed the 'Urocrat'. He controls the organisation of 1,500,000 trade unionists, comprising factory workers, employees in offices and shops and Government servants. His great achievement was the *unification of the trade unions which were formerly divided into confessional bodies*. Although nominally non-party, the trade union movement is under the strong Communist influence of its leader. One half of the workers in Czechoslovakia are organised in U.R.O., and if a serious clash arose between U.R.O. and the central government it is doubtful which would carry the day. Zapotocky's views are consulted on almost all questions of State as befits the most powerful personality in the republic after the President.

The Communists are desperately anxious to improve output not only in nationalised but in independently owned concerns. The workers are daily urged to work harder than ever and not to expect more of everything for less effort. At first nationalisation frequently evoked the comment from workers that 'now we are the bosses we shall not need to do so much work'. The contrary may well be the case. Appeals are made to the workers on street hoardings, in the newspapers and on the radio as well as in party speeches, reminding them of their duty as producers not to fail the nation. To sum up they are told that now the factories are the property of the

nation it is for the workers to take as much trouble as their former proprietors did to see that they flourish. As the former Prime Minister, Mr. Zdenek Fierlinger, said: 'The improvement in the workers' standard of life depends upon the workers' efforts.'

In spite of the extensive nationalisation of key and other large industries Czechoslovakia will remain a land of small landowners and small businesses. The peasants, comprising nearly half the population, mostly own the soil they till; the distributive trades and house property generally remain in private hands, and so will a great number of small firms, workshops and factories, many of which have largely contributed to their country's foreign trade and general prosperity.

The Government is well aware of the importance of encouraging the enterprise of medium and small producers, and believes, in Mr. Fierlinger's words, that by nationalisation 'new and better conditions will be created for private enterprise because it will be freed from the unhealthy and uncontrollable competition of monopolies, finance and vested interests in production'.

Thus Czechoslovakia, with her traditions drawn both from East and West, is trying to gain advantages by drawing from the experience of both. With the exception of former owners and their principal employees, public opinion, from members of the Government down to the man in the street, believes sincerely in the virtues of limited nationalisation. It appears to have come to stay, but loopholes exist whereby in certain cases factories may eventually be returned to private enterprise.

Much of the enthusiasm for nationalisation may be explained by the fact that formerly the relations between employers and workers were far from happy. Wages and conditions were not nearly as good as they might have been, and British and American business men visiting Czechoslovakia often found a state of affairs contrasting sadly with the condition of labour in their own countries. The Czech

workers generally had a raw deal, especially under the German occupation, and they are determined never to suffer again the domination of an employer class which was often arrogant as well as grasping. International finance, which had a large share of Czechoslovakian industry, comes also under this general condemnation. Large blocks of shares in such concerns of worldwide renown as the Skoda engineering works or the Vitkovice iron and steelworks changed hands between groups of international financiers with scant thought for the workers or the larger issues at stake.

The nationalised industries are controlled at the top by an Economic Council and a State Planning Body. Separate directorates, subject to the supreme controlling authorities, have been formed for co-ordinating such industries as mining, glass, china, paper and cellulose. Foreign trade likewise comes under State planning. The wood industry, for example, has its own organisation for the promotion of export sales, comprising all operations from timber felling and saw-mills to factories producing finished articles, and including not only nationalised concerns but those still in private ownership. It is clear that privately owned concerns will inevitably be subjected to a large measure of State control.

## XII

Pre-war output is unlikely to be attained until nationalised and unnationalised concerns get into their stride again. Nationalisation has been an unsettling operation. A good example, however, has been set in coal mining, production having risen steeply since the abnormally low output to which it fell for some months after liberation. During the winter months some pits even improved upon their pre-war figures. By the time the frosts of 1946-47 come there should be sufficient reserve stocks of fuel to banish the nightmare of a cold winter. Great use has been made of German prisoner labour and also of that of Czech collaborators. It stands to reason, however, that these relatively cheap and abundant supplies of labour will not last for ever.

The problems facing Czechoslovak production are serious, especially from the point of view of labour shortage. Some relief may be obtained by employing in industry Slovak labourers drawn from the less productive agricultural districts of Slovakia. The abruptness with which Czechoslovakia turned over to socialism, with planning and co-ordination instead of private enterprise, inevitably caused at first a steep fall in working efficiency. One of the main causes was the larger proportion of workers engaged in administrative and supervisory duties. A survey of fourteen of the largest concerns in the engineering industry in the first five months after liberation showed that 'they paid 244 crowns in wages to administrative workers for every 100 crowns paid to productive workers. Formerly 80 crowns were paid to administrative workers for every 100 crowns paid to productive workers'. For some time the general decline in production in some of the most important factories was in the neighbourhood of fifty per cent.

The nation as a whole is determined to make a success of socialism and it would be unwise to regard such gloomy statistics as prophetic. Czechoslovakia's urgent need of foreign currency will be a powerful stimulus to efficiency. Differences in price levels between Czechoslovak producers and the world market may be overcome either by increased efficiency, devaluing the crown from the apparently artificial rate of 200 crowns to the pound, or by subsidising exports, or by any combination of these three. Subsidising exports is an honoured tradition in that country. It is worth while recalling that for many years before the war export bounties were paid on sugar. The Government was very well satisfied with the arrangement. It had the disadvantage that the importing countries, especially Great Britain, were blamed by the ill-informed in Czechoslovakia for forcing upon the country an unfair bargain, one result of which was that sugar was sold for export at a far lower price than that paid by Czechoslovak consumers.

President Benes has made it quite clear that he considers that nationalisation has gone too far and too fast. By virtue of his constitutional powers he could have imposed his veto upon the proposals and limited nationalisation to the banks, the public utilities and the key industries, such as iron, steel, coal and glass, leaving the manufacturing processes generally to private enterprise, although the leading engineering works such as Skodas would probably have been nationalised in any case. But the only open opposition came from the Slovak Democrats, and for the President to have curtailed nationalisation without the support of one at least of the Czech parties would have been risky and perhaps impossible. It might have precipitated a major political crisis which would not only have swept away the President, but have saddled the country with a still more Leftist regime.

The story is that when the matter came before the Government for decision Dr Benes looked at Monsignor Šramek to see whether he would support his more cautious proposals; but the Catholic leader is said to have given no sign of intervening, sitting stolidly in his place with his hands clasped across his corpulent stomach. In this way, so the story runs, the moderates were defeated and Czechoslovakia became an advanced Socialist State.

### XIII

Western influences were dominant in Czechoslovakia before the war in education, which ranked among the most progressive in the world. Elementary and secondary education were free for all and higher education was easily accessible to all who had enough brains to profit by a course of university study.

This happy progress came to an abrupt end when the Germans overran the country as the consequence of Munich. The Nazis knew that they must first get hold of the younger generation if they were to succeed in completely enslaving the country. They had already carried out this programme in Germany and they afterwards repeated it with redoubled



ruthlessness in the occupied countries. Elementary education was regarded as good enough for Czechs. In the secondary schools German was the main subject; but for the benefit of pupils who knew insufficient German, classes were held in a mixture of Czech and German. As the teachers themselves were often imperfect in German the results were grotesque.

The disastrous effects of Nazi influences on education will take years to overcome, especially the results of the closing of the Czech universities in the autumn of 1939, when many students were shot or carried away to concentration camps after brutal maltreatment. For six years the youth was practically uneducated and the consequences are seen in the lack of skilled applicants for the civil service and other skilled occupations.

In the schools today the place of honour among modern languages is held by Russian, English coming a good second. In Prague there were at one time no fewer than five hundred students learning to qualify as teachers of English. To judge by the frequency with which English is spoken in the ministries, in commerce and shops the language enjoys a deep-rooted popularity.

The eagerness of the young to regain the lost years is often pathetic; despite poor physique due to prolonged undernourishment, as soon as their day's work is done thousands of men and women students start their studies. This is helped to some extent because the working day, which begins much earlier than in Great Britain, ends about 2.30 p.m. or 3 p.m. The university students know how much they have missed and how hard they must work so that the new republic may be supplied with all the doctors, lawyers, civil servants, scientists and teachers for which there is a crying need.

The Czechs and Slovaks have always been proud of their cultural heritage. Six years of servitude have not extinguished this pride. It is a cheering sign that a nation, still suffering from shortages in almost all the necessities of life, should give so much of its energies to the cause of education.

## XIV

Few nations have taken so much upon themselves as the Czechoslovaks. There have been many examples in history of nations under the control of a firm and enlightened leader striving to remodel in a few years their entire political and social system. Modern Turkey and Russia are cases in point; but all have been relatively backward States and their sudden progress has usually been secured by wholesale borrowings and adaptations.

The case of Czechoslovakia is entirely different. Although the standards of life in the first republic were not quite on the level of those prevailing in France, Great Britain or the United States, they were comparable. Czechoslovakia had a highly developed economic system, largely dependent upon foreign trade, her democratic institutions were firmly established and life was easy, humane and civilised. The easiest course for her after the war might have been to try to restore the former conditions. But no! Undismayed by the ruins of war, they gave themselves a new constitution, inspired both by Eastern and Western practice; they nationalised the bulk of their industries, again with a judicious compromise between East and West, they broke up large estates, deprived themselves quite coolly of a large part of their skilled labour by expelling as many as possible of their German and Hungarian minorities, and in the field of foreign affairs they adopted a new alignment with Russia while remaining on friendly terms with the West.

Czechoslovakia's leaders, with their great President at their head, recognise that their progress and prosperity depend upon the maintenance of good relations between East and West, two worlds so widely separated by distance, customs and culture. President Benes told the writer that he believed that the destiny of his country was to form the bridge between them.

The attitude of Czechoslovaks, and especially Czechs, is intensely realistic in their approach to their everyday problems. The joy of liberation may have given too much stimulus to

the theorising instincts of the Czechs, who are prone to this weakness like most central European peoples, but in the main, in spite of all temptations, they are a sturdy, practical and independent people. They are determined to make an even greater success of the second republic than they did of the first.

# THE PROBLEM OF TANGIER

By  
GRAHAM H. STUART

TANGIER has long been a city of paradoxes. It is one of Morocco's most fascinating cities, yet though closest to Europe it is farthest from the well-travelled tourist lanes. It is a strategically located city of vital importance to Great Britain, which she received as a gift, yet she surrendered it voluntarily to the Moors after spending millions of pounds on improving its harbour. It is a city which, although never the capital of Morocco, has for centuries been the seat of all foreign legations. It is an area far from the purview of the Monroe Doctrine, nevertheless the United States participated for a century in every international undertaking there without a Senate debate or a Congressional investigation. It is a city where the U.S.S.R. recently insisted upon having three representatives in the Assembly and one in the Committee of Control—a representation equal to that of Great Britain and the United States; yet when it was conceded no Russian came to participate in the international administration. Finally, it is a city where the official currency, the Moroccan franc, is used principally for paying taxes, buying postage stamps, or settling gambling debts, while the non-official Spanish peseta is used for practically everything else.

For centuries Morocco, like the other Barbary States, had treaty relations with the European Powers. The earliest granted extraterritorial jurisdiction, the later treaties were usually concerned with protection against the pirates. But in Morocco a system of protection gradually developed which, by making certain Moors protégés of foreign Powers, was abused shamefully and nowhere more so than in Tangier. The Sultan protested to the representatives of the Powers on many occasions and finally thirteen Powers and Morocco sent their representatives to Madrid, in 1880, to see what could be done.

Although the protégé system was not abolished it was at least regularised and the various Powers were placed on an equal footing. However, it also afforded the Powers a means of political infiltration and brought Morocco into the maelstrom of Power politics.

However, even earlier, the other forms of protection had brought about international co-operation in Tangier. One was protection against the plague, the other against shipwreck. As far back as 1805 the consuls were permitted by the Sultan to look after the public health of the Port, and in 1840 a Sanitary Council was set up to administer the regulations more effectively. By the beginning of the twentieth century the Sanitary Council had become an international Hygiene Commission which controlled practically all the public works of the city essential to public health and welfare.

The protection against shipwreck was obtained by the interested Powers collaborating in the maintenance of a lighthouse at Cape Sportel. Originally ten Powers co-operated but by the outbreak of the First World War thirteen Governments were participating in this international measure of protection.

The most important problem of protection, however, was the maintenance of the independence of Morocco against the aggressive imperialist designs of the European Powers. Fortunately for Morocco the British possession of Gibraltar served as a sort of sheet anchor of protection against both French and Spanish aspirations. On several occasions, notably in 1845 and in 1859, British instructions to her representatives showed a determination to uphold the sovereignty of the Sultan and to prevent the landing of European troops in Tangier. Apparently the Sultan was not unaware of these threats to his Empire, for in 1871 he offered the United States a protectorate over Morocco because he feared that the European Powers might reach a satisfactory agreement among themselves for the dismemberment of his Empire. The United States politely declined the offer but did consent to use its friendly offices to prevent such an act.

## THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF TANGIER

The internationalisation of Tangier came about as a result of these two factors: first, the need to maintain the sovereignty of the Sultan against the encroachment of vitally interested European Powers—particularly France, Spain, and Great Britain, and secondly, to maintain the special status of the city brought about by the elaborate control of its administration already exercised by the representatives of the Powers.

Spain, both geographically and historically, unquestionably could make the best claim to Morocco. France after the conquest of Algeria and Tunis was perhaps the best situated strategically to make her influence felt. Great Britain was primarily interested in the region opposite Gibraltar and was determined to prevent any other Power from seizing the city across the Straits from which she had overhastily withdrawn.

With the opening of the twentieth century, European rivalry for the control of Morocco became more intense, with Germany and Italy now playing more important roles. France had obtained a special position by secret agreements with Italy, Great Britain and Spain, but Germany was not unaware of the diplomatic jockeying. Persuaded by Chancellor von Bülow, the Kaiser, while cruising in the Mediterranean early in 1905, disembarked at Tangier, and declared publicly to the Sultan that it was to the interest of Germany that the Sultan remain 'an absolutely independent sovereign' and that Germany was determined to protect her interests in Morocco. This frank pronouncement brought about such a serious crisis that President Theodore Roosevelt stepped in and urged the Powers to confer in an international conference. The Conference of Algieras of 1906 was the result and the principal world Powers including the United States subscribed to the maintenance of the independence of the Sultan, the integrity of his territory and commercial liberty for all.

French imperialist ambitions were not to be estopped by this arrangement and internal troubles in Morocco gave her the cause to intervene. Europe again faced the threat of war

when the Kaiser, in 1911, sent a German gunboat to Agadir, claiming that France had violated the Treaty of Algeceiras. France, determined to have a free hand in Morocco, agreed to buy Germany off by surrendering almost half of her Congo territory. A new agreement with Spain conceded, but at the same time delimited, Spain's zone of influence. The French Treaty of March 30, 1912, with Morocco which gave France a protectorate over most of the Sultan's Empire provided that the city of Tangier should keep the special character which it always possessed.

During these diplomatic manoeuvres, Great Britain kept her eye fixed upon Tangier. She was determined that no strong Power should possess this vitally strategic area across from Gibraltar. Lord Nelson and Joseph Chamberlain had both indicated the importance of Tangier to British policy. In the secret Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904, it was agreed that Tangier was to keep the special character which the presence of the diplomatic corps and its municipal and sanitary institutions had given it. Immediately after France obtained a free hand from Germany in 1911, Great Britain notified France that Tangier would have to be internationally controlled and suggested the International Settlement at Shanghai as a model.

A tripartite technical commission representing Great Britain, France and Spain was set up in June, 1912, and after a number of drafts had been submitted and revised, a final convention was agreed upon on November 5, 1914. This Convention and the Shereefian Dahir establishing the International Zone of Tangier were never put into operation due to the outbreak of the World War in 1914.<sup>1</sup> Great Britain and France wished to make it effective at once but Spain refused, undoubtedly hoping that if Germany were victorious she might take over control of Tangier as a part of the Spanish Zone.

<sup>1</sup> It is believed that no official publication of these documents has ever been made, but an authoritative copy of the French originals may be found in Graham H. Stuart's *The International City of Tangier* (Stanford University Press, 1931), Appendices III, IV.

## THE STATUTE OF 1923 AND ITS REVISION

As a result of the Allied victory in the First World War, France felt justified in insisting upon the incorporation of Tangier into her sphere of influence, whereas the Spanish ambassador, speaking in London on February 20, 1920, declared that 'Tangier belongs geographically, ethnographically, psychologically and therefore logically to the Spanish Zone. . . .' It was Great Britain again which cast the deciding vote, and at the Cannes Conference of 1922, Lord Curzon informed M. Briand that Great Britain had recognised the French protectorate over Morocco with the definite understanding that Tangier was to be internationalised and she looked forward to action in this direction.

After numerous diplomatic parleys between Great Britain, France and Spain, it was agreed to hold a conference of experts in London in June, 1923, to draft a project for the Government of Tangier. This was to be followed by a conference of plenipotentiaries in Paris to put the draft in final form. Although at first Spain and France maintained vigorously their respective positions, Spain finally swung to the British side in favour of internationalisation and a draft in this sense was signed by the delegates of the three Powers in Paris, December 18, 1923.

During the Conference, Italy insisted that she be admitted as an important Mediterranean Power, but she was informed that the proceedings were merely a continuation of the negotiations begun in 1912 in which Italy had not participated. The United States also, upon two different occasions during the course of the Conference, notified the three Powers that they, as signatory to the Act of Algeiras, were fundamentally interested in the maintenance of the Open Door and trusted that the Conference would do nothing to violate this principle. The French Government gave assurances that the Open Door would be maintained and all foreign interests in Tangier protected.

The Convention regarding the Organisation of the Statute of the Tangier Zone became legally effective May 14, 1924,



with the deposit of the ratifications of France, Great Britain and Spain.<sup>2</sup> The other Powers signatories of the Act of Algeciras were forthwith invited to accede and all did so except the United States. Secretary of State Hughes felt the representation accorded to the United States was so small that they could not afford to be responsible for policies in the formulation of which they had no real influence. Italy, having been refused representation in the Conference, not only did not accede but refused to recognise the new regime.

The continued intransigent attitude of Italy, coupled with the demands of Dictator Primo de Rivera of Spain that the Statute be revised to give Spain a more favourable position, finally forced a new conference. The revised Statute which was signed in Paris, July 25, 1928, accepted Italy into the international administration on an approximate parity with Great Britain and gave Spain a somewhat more privileged status than before. The Zone of Tangier was governed by the terms of the revised Statute of 1928 until Spain took over the government by military forces in June, 1940.

#### THE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY

Lack of space prevents more than a very cursory description of the international administrative machinery. The Statute was concluded for a period of twelve years and automatically renewed for a period of twelve years until 1948. The sovereignty of the Sultan was recognised and vested in a Mendoub appointed with the consent of France. Legislative powers were vested in an international legislative assembly consisting of twenty-seven members: four French and four Spanish, three British and three Italian, one American, one Belgian, one Dutch and one Portuguese, nominated by the respective Consulates, and in addition six Mussulman and three Jewish subjects of the Sultan nominated by the Mendoub. Since the United States did not accept, no American was ever named.

Although this international assembly was given the power

<sup>2</sup> Due to delays resulting from technical difficulties, the Statute did not actually operate until June 1, 1925.

to legislate for the Zone, the real power was in the Committee of Control which was composed of the consuls of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. It could veto acts of the Assembly, dissolve the Assembly and could insure economic equality for the signatory Powers and the execution of laws and regulations.

The actual administration was in the hands of an administrator aided by three assistants in charge of health, finance and judicial services. The first administrator was Freneb and his assistants were Spanish, British and Italian. Subsequently a Spanish administrator was chosen and a French assistant took over the health work.

A Mixed Court of five judges of Belgian, British, Spanish, French and Italian nationalities dispensed justice under a very elaborate code of laws. Since the United States was not a party to the Statute, the capitulatory regime was still maintained by the United States.

The chief criticisms justly levelled against the Statute were that the Tangier electorate was disenfranchised, that the financial burden of fixed charges was too high, and that the economic interests of the Zone were disregarded. Furthermore, considering the highly privileged position held by the French the administration could not be termed truly international. On the other hand, the administration was well carried on and justice fairly well administered, considering the rather cumbersome machinery and the conflicting interests of the Powers.

#### SPAIN TAKES CONTROL OF THE ZONE

We have already noted that Spain felt that the Tangier Zone should properly belong within the Spanish Zone, and even after becoming a party to the Statute of 1923, she gave evidence of her dissatisfaction at its being given an international status. On August 25, 1926, Spain approached the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States requesting permission to annex Tangier with the understanding that no fortifications would be erected, the Open Door Zone and law and order would be preserved.

If annexation were not possible, Spain suggested that she be given a mandate for Tangier under the auspices of the League of Nations.<sup>3</sup> No action was taken upon her suggestions. Also during the negotiations of 1927-28 for the revision of the Statute, Spain sought in vain the incorporation of Tangier with the Spanish Zone.

With the second World War engrossing Great Britain and France to the exclusion of secondary matters, Spain felt that she could act unilaterally, and on June 14, 1940, Spanish forces entered the International Zone with the alleged object of preserving its neutrality. At first Spain limited her action to military occupation, but on November 8, 1940, Colonel Antonio Yuste, Chief of the Occupation Force, assumed charge of Tangier as Governor-General and Delegate of the Spanish High Commission in Morocco. At the same time he ordered that the Committee of Control and the Legislative Assembly be abolished. A decree of November 23, 1940, extended the law of the Spanish Zone to Tangier. Before the end of the year the international gendarmerie had been disbanded, the Port Commission was abolished, and the Administrator and Assistant Administrators were removed from office. In 1941 the Cape Spartel lighthouse was taken over. The only agency of international administration which continued to function in Tangier was the Mixed Court.

The next step was to subordinate the Moroccan officials to the authorities of Spanish Morocco. In March, 1941, the Mendouh was evicted and his place taken by a Pasha designated by the Khalifa (Sultan's representative) of the Spanish Zone. This was followed on May 3, 1941, by the absorption of the Shereefian Customs Administration. Finally, in March, 1942, the Shereefian Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Service, a French controlled service, was combined with the Khalifian communication service. The British and Italian post offices continued to function. In December, 1942, a new superior administrative post was created for Tangier with the appointment of an Interventor who was to head the municipal administration under the High Commissioner and his Delegates.

<sup>3</sup> See 1926 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Vol. II, 726 E

By a decree of February 6, 1941, a special economic regime had been set up for Tangier which was administered by the Directorate of Economy, Industry and Commerce through the intermediary of the Tangier Bureau of Economy, Industry and Commerce. Although all currencies were to circulate freely, the payment of customs duties, taxes and certain other charges had to be made in pesetas. Since the supply of pesetas in the Zone was low, Spanish money acquired a fictitiously high value.

Although the Tangier Zone was neutralised and no fortifications permitted, it was reported early in 1943 that anti-aircraft guns had been installed and machine guns set up.

#### THE REACTION OF THE POWERS

No power enjoying treaty rights in Tangier before World War II recognised the Spanish control *de jure*. France could not prevent it but she regarded the Spanish occupation as purely temporary and constantly protested at violations of French or Shereefian rights. Great Britain at first protested but by an exchange of notes in January, 1941, she recognised that Spain had a special interest in Tangier, in return for which British rights were guaranteed protection. Great Britain, however, had made it clear that it considered the Spanish control *de facto* and temporary.

Inasmuch as the United States had always disclaimed political interest in Tangier, its action was limited to a notification of treaty rights maintaining the Open Door and its interest in the Zone's neutrality. No recognition of the occupation was given either *de facto* or *de jure*.

A fair evaluation of the results of Spanish occupation obtained by questioning neutral officials of the Zone and Moslem nationals would seem to indicate that very few if any benefits had been derived from the Spanish administration. Substantial increases occurred in taxes and the cost of services and the cost of living rose considerably. The unilateral action of seizure was both unwarranted and illegal and in spite of promises to the contrary the civilian adminis-

tration authority of the International Zone was usurped by the Spanish military regime. The German Government was permitted to establish a Consulate General in the Zone and Axis agents were enabled to carry on activities inimical to the Allies. It was not until May 2, 1944, after considerable pressure upon the part of Great Britain and the United States, that the Spanish Government agreed to close the German Consulate and expel German agents.

#### SPANISH RELINQUISHMENT OF THE OCCUPATION

With the success of the United Nations in the war the Spanish Government became less insistent upon maintaining unilateral control of the Tangier Zone. In fact, Spanish Consul-General Castillo stated publicly that Tangier would have to revert to its international status after the war. Nevertheless it was intimated that Spain expected to have a privileged status in the new international regime—a position equivalent to or even superior to that formerly possessed by France.

The reversal of Spanish policy of permanent possession became increasingly apparent during the year 1944. The Spanish Consul-General recommended that all Spanish troops beyond those needed for policing should be withdrawn from the International Zone. In October the Military Delegate, General Uriarte, was replaced by a civilian, Consul-General Suñer, as the delegate of the Spanish High Commissioner.

The Allies were not unaware of the change of the Spanish attitude and it was realised that if Spain withdrew suddenly a serious situation would arise unless some preliminary arrangement had been worked out by the Allies to occupy and administer the Zone. The responsibility belonged primarily to the United States and Great Britain since it was these Powers whose forces had driven the Germans from North Africa and were actually in military control of Morocco. France also would have to be considered since her protectorate over Morocco was still recognised by the Allies. However, it was soon made evident that except in the case

of an emergency the Allies were not disposed to take any drastic action until after the defeat of Germany. Once this had been achieved Spain would be asked to withdraw her forces and the future status of the Zone could be determined either by a Conference of the interested Powers or by the proposed world security organisation.

The unconditional surrender of Germany took place on May 8, 1945, and almost immediately thereafter France urged an early consideration of the Tangier question. Spain realised that her position had now become extremely precarious and early in June she notified Great Britain of her readiness to regularise the situation in Tangier. At the same time she began a partial withdrawal of troops from the Zone. However, Great Britain and France were not disposed to discuss the future disposition of Tangier with Spain until previous discussion had taken place with the United States which, through the military operations in Morocco, had become vitally interested in the Tangier problem.

It was agreed to have representatives of the three Powers, Great Britain, France and the United States meet in Paris and decide what action should be taken. Originally the Conference was scheduled to take place during the month of July but unexpectedly it was learned that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desired to participate. The surprise was occasioned by the fact that although Russia had joined in the Cape Spartel Convention and had participated in the Conference of Algeciras, the U.S.S.R. had shown no interest whatsoever in the question of Tangier, and it was doubtful if a half a dozen Soviet citizens could be found in the entire International Zone. Nevertheless, if the Soviet Government wished to participate the other Powers were not disposed to object, but it was necessary to postpone the Conference for a month to give Russia time to choose her delegates. Although Spain demanded the right to participate in the Conference the attendance of the representatives of Stalin precluded any possibility of permitting Franco's delegates to be present.

## THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON TANGIER

The Conference of Experts on Tangier met at Paris on August 10, 1945, and completed its work on the last day of the month. The head of the French delegation, M. Meyrier, was chosen president of the Conference. The various questions pertaining to the re-establishment of the international regime suppressed in 1940 by Spain were examined by the Conference. From the beginning it was evident that a decided difference of opinion existed between the British and French delegations. The British policy as presented by Consul-General Peake was to set up a temporary regime as simple as possible and then immediately prepare a statute for a new permanent organisation which would be more truly international than the previous regime. The French, on the contrary, wished to restore the Convention of 1923 practically intact and make only such changes as should be required to admit the United States and Soviet Russia. The U.S.S.R. seemed to have but one definite policy but this was a veritable *idée fixe*; the delegates from Moscow were determined to keep Franco Spain from any participation in the administration of Tangier. The United States on the whole favoured the British programme but as a newcomer in active participation in the Zone's Government was not committed to any preconceived policy. For this reason Mr. Harry S. Villard, the head of the American delegation, quite often served as a neutralising influence when nationalistic attitudes threatened an objective solution of the various problems.

The results of the Conference were presented in a Final Act of three parts: (I) a series of resolutions which were to be recommended to the interested Governments for adoption; (II) a unilateral declaration by the Soviet delegation and a joint declaration by the American, British and French delegates; (III) an Anglo-French Agreement for the re-establishment of the international administration of Tangier.

Inasmuch as logically the Anglo-French Agreement is the basis of the resolutions and declarations, a brief summary

of its provisions is necessary. The first three articles provide that from October 11, 1945, until a permanent Convention shall be prepared by a conference of the Powers signatory of the Act of Algeciras and come into force, the Tangier Zone of Morocco will be provisionally administered in accordance with the 1923 Convention as modified by the present Agreement so as to permit the collaboration of the United States of America and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Provision is made for the preparation of the new Convention as soon as possible but not later than six months from the establishment of the provisional regime. Articles 4 to 6 require the withdrawal from the Zone of all Spanish military, naval, air and police forces by October 11, 1945, and the handing over to the Committee of Control of all properties, for the necessary financing, and for such revision of existing decrees and regulations as may be required. Article 7 gives the United States and the Soviet Union representation both upon the Committee of Control and upon the International Legislative Assembly. In the latter case each are allocated three members, putting them on a parity with Great Britain. No change is made in the representation of the other nationalities. The Administrator must be a person of Belgian, Dutch, Portuguese or Swedish nationality, as must be the assistant administrator of finance. The French retain the assistant administrator for Moroccan affairs. New provisions have been adopted for the policing of the Zone with the same limitations upon the nationality of the Commandant as for the Administrator. Article 8 provides that during the provisional administration the Committee of Control may by unanimous vote adopt any amendments deemed advisable. Articles 9, 10 and 11 provide for ratification and accession of the Powers signatory of the Act of Algeciras not present at the Paris Conference.

The Resolutions merely give in detail the requirements for the holding of the Conference to draw up the permanent Convention, the giving to Spain of notice to withdraw, the procedure to take care of any emergency provisioning of the



Zone, and the arrangements for obtaining the principal administrative officials.

The unilateral declaration of the Soviet delegation was inserted in spite of long and bitter opposition on the part of the other Powers' representatives. It declares that Spain may not be admitted to participation in the permanent administration of the Zone until the Franco Government shall be replaced by a democratic regime. In fact the Soviet representatives wished also to exclude Spain from participation in the provisional administration. Inasmuch as a considerable amount of food for the Zone came from Spain, and there were more Spaniards in the Zone than all other Europeans together, the other Powers were unwilling to accept such a drastic limitation. They did, however, in a joint declaration state that they did not think it desirable to hold the next Conference as long as Franco remained in power, but they did insist upon permitting Spain to participate in the provisional administration.

#### DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE CONFERENCE

Immediately following the Conference certified copies of the documents were communicated by the French Government to Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. A separate communication was addressed to the Spanish Government by the Governments of France and Great Britain as a result of which Spain withdrew from unilateral occupation of Tangier and on October 11, 1945, turned over the administration of the International Zone to the Committee of Control. The Spanish Government, however, agreed to participate in the provisional regime as set up in Paris. The Italian Government was invited to accede when the other signatory Governments should agree and subject to any relevant provisions of the peace treaty with Italy.

The Mendoub, personal representative of the Sultan of Morocco, accompanied by a body of Shereefian police forces returned to Tangier on October 11. The Committee of Control assumed responsibility for the administration and elected Vice Admiral Luis Antonio de Magalhaes Correia as

Administrator of the Zone and Mr. François Craceo, a Belgian national, as Assistant Administrator for Finance. Subsequently another Belgian, M. Le Grand, was chosen as Commandant of the Police. To serve as technical adviser to the Committee of Control until the administration of the Zone might be effectively organised, a former French administrator, Monsieur le Fur, was engaged.

The United States immediately appointed Mr. Paul H. Alling, the American Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General at Tangier, as its representative on the Committee of Control, and shortly afterwards named three American citizens to serve on the International Legislative Assembly. The Soviet Government, however, appointed no representatives on either governmental body. Of the other four acceding signatories of the Algeiras Convention all except Sweden participated actively in the work of the provisional administration.

Inasmuch as it was expected that each participating government would make suggestions regarding the revision of the 1923 Statute which might be presented to the Conference to be held within six months, each delegation spent some little time in preparing amendments which it deemed essential. These proposals were discussed informally among the various members of the consular corps. However, in spite of the active efforts of France and Russia to force Franco out of power the six months period elapsed without any change in the Government of Spain. The Conference in Paris therefore was not able to be held in April, 1946, as had been planned and the problem of the future administration of Tangier remained still to be solved.

#### THE FUTURE OF TANGIER

Although defined as an international city, the administration of Tangier has never been truly international. The Statute prepared in 1913-14 was the only one that looked towards a wholly international status. The Convention of 1923, the revised Convention of 1928 and the provisional regime set up by the Paris Conference of 1945 were all so

drawn as to give France a privileged position. With the Mendoub practically a puppet of the French Protectorate at Rabat, with the International Legislative Assembly heavily weighted in favour of France, with the customs service practically under the control of France, with the Port Concession subject to French influence, Tangier cannot be said to possess an international administration either politically or economically. If the Powers hope to establish a really successful international administration—one that will protect adequately the rights of the inhabitants of the Zone and at the same time provide equality of commercial opportunity to all the nations of the world substantial changes must be made in the present organic Act.

In revising the existing government there should be no derogation of the sovereignty of the Sultan. In fact it would be desirable that his authority should be increased and his prestige enhanced. Under these circumstances a Khalifa who is the direct representative of the Sultan would seem to be a more suitable head of the Moroccan community than the Mendoub who is in reality a functionary of the Protectorate.

The International Legislative Assembly should be radically changed both in its representative character and in the method of choosing its members. The present system of allowing certain States a larger representation than others tends to make the body more interested in the nationalistic aims of the Great Powers than in the interests of the Tangier Zone. A survey of voting under the present system seems to indicate that the national groups often vote under the order of their Consul-General and in support of legislation favouring their country's interests rather than for the good of the Zone. If each State were given equal representation, and representatives were elected by the national group with adequate requirements for residence in the Zone and property qualifications, the tendency would be for Assembly members to think of themselves as representing the community and interests of the Zone rather than the imperialistic aspirations of the Powers. Such an attitude would have an immediate

repercussion on the passage of legislation looking towards the betterment of the Zone. The argument that the limitation of one representative for the Moslem population is unfair, considering the large proportion of Moroccan nationals, is weakened when account is taken of the fact that, except for imports and taxes, the Assembly has little jurisdiction over the Moslem, or, for that matter, the Jewish inhabitants. They have their own governmental agencies wholly separate from the control of the International Administration.

The members of the Committee of Control should possess diplomatic rather than consular rank and should be given the power by unanimous consent to amend the Statute if such modifications are deemed essential for the effective administration of the Zone.

The Administrator should not only execute the decisions of the Assembly and direct the administration of the Zone, but he should be empowered to make regulations at his own discretion for the effective administration of the Zone in accordance with policies established by the Legislative Assembly.

Freedom of speech, of assembly, of the press and of worship should be guaranteed, and complete freedom as regards the establishment of educational institutions should be required.

The Mixed Court of Tangier has not been as successful as had been hoped and its organisation and powers must be drastically modified. The *juges adjoints* have not proved satisfactory, there have been too many cumulative functions imposed upon the titular judges, there is no authoritative head to the judicial system, inexcusable delays in obtaining judgments have occurred, and the right of appeal has been shamefully abused.

Perhaps the economic faults of the present regime are even more serious than the political. Tangier has long suffered from a burden of public debt which is wholly unjustifiable. Ever since the Protectorate was established in 1912 Tangier has been paying approximately 500,000 francs

annually on loans made to the Moroccan Empire in 1904 and 1910, very little of which money was used for improvements in Tangier. The International Zone is saddled with an annual service of the loans for the Tangier Port Company concession amounting to over five million francs annually that should be refunded at a much lower rate. Tangier's share in the Tangier Fez Railway with only fourteen out of 309 kilometres in the Zone and with no director on the board of fifteen directors has been an annual payment of 1,200,000 francs, an amount wholly out of proportion to the value of the railroad to the International Zone.

The Port of Tangier which should be Tangier's most important economic asset is in its present condition a financial liability. The breakwater is not long enough nor high enough at its extremity, the unloading facilities are wholly inadequate and, at the present time, due to the failure to dredge and keep the channel along the quay free from silting up, a large freighter has to disembark all cargo by lighters. An enlargement of the quay and better unloading equipment is vitally needed so that the Port may compete on more equal terms with Ceuta and Casablanca.

There are cogent reasons for establishing a Free Port at Tangier. Since the Zone is small and has practically no natural resources, and since the hinterland itself is unimportant, the principal opportunities for utilising the Port are as a refueling area and as a place for warehousing, processing, assembling and reshipping merchandise. Its geographical location would be a great asset in this kind of commercial operation.

The International Administration should have complete control of the collection of customs for the Zone. It should also have a representative on the Board of Directors of the State Bank of Morocco and should share proportionately in all profits accruing to the Bank through its status as a State Bank. A single stabilised currency would be a great boon to Tangier but it should be in accordance with an internationally fixed standard. When the French tobacco monopoly

expires in December, 1947, Tangier should retain full control over the importation, sale, manufacture and distribution of tobacco within the Tangier Zone.

Tangier is potentially a tourists' paradise. Its natural beauty, fine climate, excellent beach and accessible location are almost unsurpassed. It would be difficult to find a more delightful place to spend a vacation. The city already boasts facilities for golf and tennis and possesses very excellent hotels. Given a reasonable opportunity to exploit her own possibilities and at the same time to reduce the burdens imposed from without, Tangier would have every reason to feel optimistic as to her economic future. This is possible under an international administration only if there be political and economic equality for all Powers interested in the Zone and a fair opportunity afforded to the inhabitants to participate effectively in the government of the Zone.

# THE COMMUNAL PROBLEM IN INDIA

By

C. S. MILFORD

'IN 1935 the unity of India was taken for granted by all parties. In 1945 Partition is the cardinal issue of Indian politics.' So writes Sir Reginald Coupland in his recent book *India, a Restatement*<sup>1</sup>. In these words he sums up what is at once the central problem and the central tragedy of India today. The earlier Mogul Emperors established at least a tolerable *modus vivendi* between the two communities and this tradition has to a great extent persisted in many of the States. Later British rule gave external unity and, in spite of the doubts of earlier British statesmen, it did seem during the first thirty years of this century that this might lead to a real sense of common unity and nationhood. But these fair blossoms have been severely cut by the frosty winds of the last fifteen years. This article will attempt very briefly to discuss how this situation has arisen, and to assess the problem which now faces British and Indian statesmen. While concerned in the first place with the Moslem question, it will also examine the position and influence of some of the other minorities.

## THE BACKGROUND

The communal divisions of India, like caste within Hindu society, are complex in their origin. Both had undoubtedly a racial beginning; the higher castes were descendants of the ancient Aryan invaders who wished to maintain their superiority over the darker skinned natives whom they conquered, and the first Moslems in India were Persian and

<sup>1</sup> It is almost unnecessary to say how much this article owes to the comprehensive treatment of the whole Indian constitutional problem by Sir Reginald Coupland in the three volumes of the *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, as well as in his later book.

Turkish invaders. But in both cases the clear racial divisions are greatly blurred. The South Indian Brahmin of today is usually quite clearly of Dravidian origin, and similarly the great majority of Moslems, even in North India, are not descendants of the invader at all. It is reckoned that only one-sixth of them, even in the Punjab, are of foreign origin and the rest are descended from Indians who embraced Islam at one period or another.<sup>2</sup> It is not, therefore, true to say that the Moslems are a separate nation in the ordinary sense of the term.

In culture and religion, however, it would be hard to find a greater contrast. The antithesis between the puritan, dogmatic monotheism of Islam born in the desert and the luxuriant polytheism and all-inclusive philosophy of Hinduism is too well known to need emphasis. At the deeper levels of religious experience there are, it is true, many points of contact between Hindu and Moslem mysticism, and this no doubt encouraged Akbar in his celebrated attempts to find a synthesis. Both faiths also had a share in the origin of the religion of the Sikhs and of the followers of the sixteenth-century poet and revivalist Kabir. But these movements have done little to soften the cleavage between the two groups as a whole.

In one respect the ideas commonly held in the West on this matter need modification. The greater part of the Hindus live in the rice-growing parts of India and are slighter in physique than the Moslems of the north-west. The Hindu religious tradition gives a very high place to the virtues of gentleness and detachment from worldly things, and it might well be thought that this would place them at a great disadvantage in military strength as against the Moslems with their traditions of conquest and Holy Wars. The Westerner, when he thinks of the Hindu, tends to picture the mild ascetic or the bespectacled scholar or clerk, while his typical Moslem is the border frontiersman who is never without his rifle. Today this is a dangerously misleading picture. The Rajputs, Mahrattas and other Hindus have always had great military

<sup>2</sup> Thompson and Garrett: *Race and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, p. 122



traditions, and the former were a very important part of the Mogul forces. But with the coming of mechanised war, recruiting has been on a wider basis than before and in the Engineers and Artillery, Hindus, largely from the south, are in a great majority. It would be very dangerous to suppose that there would be no fear of armed conflict between separate Hindu and Moslem States in India because of the military superiority of the latter. It is also a curious fact that the warlike Pathans of the North-west Frontier are the least favourable to Mr. Jinnah of all the Moslems.

Again, as in the case of caste, economic relationships have played their part in the divisions. In many parts the Hindus are the shopkeepers and moneylenders, and the Moslems peasants. In other cases itinerant Moslem usurers, the 'Kahuliwalas', lend money to Hindu labourers. But even when one or other of these relationships does not hold, economic competition tends to accentuate the difference among the educated middle classes; each community has its quota of places in the public services, professional colleges, etc.; when vacancies are advertised in the police or railways, the notice states that so many Moslems, so many Hindus and usually some of the minority communities will be appointed. The same is true of appointments of teachers in Government schools, and the individual has, in fact, no official status except as a member of one or another religious group. The problem is always cropping up in unexpected places; in writing school textbooks on Indian history, authors have to be most non-committal in their judgment of Aurangzeb, the oppressor of the Hindus, and of Sivaji, the hero of the Mahratta resistance to the Moguls. Even in English Readers, if edifying biographical sketches of Hindu worthies are included, a corresponding number of Moslems must find their place too. Schoolboys may count themselves the gainers, for holidays are constantly being extended in response to demands that if so many days are given for a Hindu festival, the same number must be given for a Moslem festival at the same time of the year!

It has been said above that the two communities have learned to live together, especially in the regions such as Bengal, where very few Moslems are of foreign origin, and villagers of the two communities are hardly distinguishable. They join in each other's festivals, and a popular modern Moslem poet Jasimuddin has written lyrics on the Hindu theme of Krishna and Radha. Here there is no language difficulty, nor can one tell the Hindu from the Moslem by his dress in the ordinary way. As one goes further north differences of dress and language become more pronounced; Hindustani has proved a useful *lingua franca*, but, for instance, students in the United Provinces, though they speak the same language for everyday use, find that when they wish to speak in a literary debate or to present an address to a distinguished guest, the Moslems at once tend to introduce classical Persian and the Hindus Sanskrit. The fact that two entirely different scripts are used accentuates the difference. Serious attempts have been made recently to develop Hindustani as a literary language, but its prospects would certainly be brighter if both groups could agree to use the Roman script. This has been seriously suggested by some progressive leaders, including Nehru, and it would incidentally greatly help in solving the problem of illiteracy. In the same way, though students in Bengal all normally wear the same dress, on special occasions, such as a parade on the University Founder's Day, the Moslems tend to put on the long black coat and fez and the Hindus turbans. There has been much friendliness between educated Hindus and Moslems, as well as among the villagers. In Calcutta University the Hindu scholars, who largely dominate, have recently taken the lead in establishing a Department in Moslem History and Culture. In fact, it is widely true that the differences are more potential than actual, and are capable of being largely overcome or rapidly inflamed by conscious acts of leadership and policy.

#### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Up to 1916, though from time to time self-government for India had been stated to be the ultimate aim of British policy

it was always assumed by British statesmen that the divisions of the country, and specially the Hindu-Moslem problem, ruled parliamentary democracy of the British type out of the question. In 1832 James Mill said that in the then state of Indian society he considered anything approaching representation as entirely out of the question, and Macaulay endorsed this judgment: 'We have to frame a good government for a country into which by universal acknowledgment we could not introduce those institutions which all our habits, which all the reasonings of European philosophers, which all the history of our own part of the world would lead us to consider the one great security for good government',<sup>1</sup> and Mill's more famous son in his *Representative Government* suggested that India could only develop politically 'through far wider political conceptions than merely English or European practice can supply, and through a much more pronounced study of Indian experience and of the conditions of Indian Government than either English politicians or those who supply the English public with opinions have hitherto shown any willingness to undertake'. Again, in 1892, Lord Dufferin explained that the development of Legislative Councils must not be interpreted as an approach to English parliamentary government and an English constitution.<sup>2</sup> Such warnings were reiterated by other spokesmen and finally Lord Morley, in defending the reforms sponsored by himself and Lord Minto in 1909, spoke as follows: 'If it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or necessarily to the establishment of a parliamentary system in India, I for one would have nothing to do with it.'<sup>3</sup>

Now that India has been launched for nearly thirty years on the voyage towards just this parliamentary system, these doubts about the practicability of a simple unified parliamentary government for the whole of India have proved only too well founded. But unfortunately insufficient attention was for long given to developing any alternative. As one looks back

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Coupland, *Report*, Vol. I, p. 20

<sup>2</sup> Coupland, *loc. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 25

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* Vol. I, p. 26

it would seem that British and Indian statesmen must share the responsibility. It is easy to blame the Hindu leaders for insisting too long on a unitary government and to say that they should have long ago been ready for the kind of concessions that they are now only too willing to make in order to preserve some kind of unity. But up to about 1924 it was assumed on all hands that a centralised government on the British parliamentary model was the goal, but that Indians were not ready for it. No alternative was seriously considered. It was only natural that the Nationalist leaders should bend their energies to prove that they were, in fact, ready for it. In this they received strong encouragement from the British side in the reforms of 1919. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report, while recognising the seriousness of the communal problem, considered that in spite of it a step towards really responsible government ought to be taken: 'Our reason is the faith that is in us' was their answer to doubts, and they believed that by the practice of this system the capacity for it would develop.

In these circumstances the crucial question regarding the communal issue was, how could sufficient unity be obtained for the successful working of parliamentary democracy? The answer given by the Congress was clear and consistent. It has always claimed to be a purely political and nationalist party, transcending communal divisions, and has believed that if Congressmen were given a free hand and sectional interests were not artificially encouraged, the necessary unity would be easily attained. At first it seemed as if good progress might be made along these lines. In 1916, in the 'Lucknow Pact' between the Congress and the Moslem League, the claim to separate electorates for the Moslems was admitted by the former for the first and, as it has proved, for the last time. (These special communal electorates had first been granted by the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909. Though all subsequent British authorities, including the Montagu-Chelmsford and Simon Reports, agreed that they were bound to militate against the attainment of a sense of

national unity, a large part of Moslem opinion attached such importance to them as a safeguard of their interests, that they were regretfully included in each subsequent recommendation on the constitutional problem.) In the years immediately after the launching of the new Constitution in 1921, the Moslem leaders seemed to be definitely aligning themselves with the Nationalist movement; their attitude generally being that of the Hindus, that the reforms did not go far enough, but might be used as a starting point from which to make further demands.

The League, however, in 1924 for the first time laid down the principle that the future Constitution must be a federal one, 'The functions of the Central Government being confined to such matters only as are of general and common concern'. The 'Nehru Report' of the All Parties Conference of 1928, the first purely Indian attempt to draft concrete proposals for a Constitution, unfortunately did not take the idea of federation very seriously, while it also went back on the 1916 concession of separate electorates. In 1929 the All India Moslem Conference reiterated the demand for a Federal Constitution with the residuary powers vested in the provinces, and from this time onwards the communal rift steadily widened. The Simon Report of 1930 clearly recognised the necessity of federation and the possibility that the Central Government might not follow the British parliamentary model. But it did not equally recognise the urgency of the problem. It was still thinking of slow progress towards a distant goal, and was concerned chiefly with the question--how full responsible government could be developed in the provinces as the basis for an ultimate federation. For the present it recommended that a centralised government under British control should be retained. Lord Irwin and his Government also emphasised the need for a strong and unified centre and naturally the Nationalist leaders of the Congress did the same.

During the Round Table Conferences of 1930-32, the idea of federation suddenly emerged in much more concrete form

through the action of the Princes, who made it known that they were willing to join in a Federation, provided that the Federal Government was to some extent responsible to the Central Legislature. The Nawab of Bhopal, their spokesman, said: 'We can only federate with a self-governing and Federal British India.'

There was during the Round Table Conference much detailed discussion of the communal question and of the division of responsibility between the Centre and the Provinces, and the question where residuary powers should reside. But there was little radical thinking on the lines which today seem to offer some hope of a solution, such as a minimal Central Government with statutory representation of minorities in its Executive, or the possibility of the separation of the Legislature and the Executive along the lines of the American and Swiss Constitutions.

We may sum up the story by saying that the Moslems showed too little trust in the Congress leaders, who were genuinely anxious for a united India in which politics would not be dominated by community, and the Hindus did not sufficiently recognise the necessity of reassuring the Moslems at all costs. The British, though fully recognising the difficulties of applying the British system, did not appreciate the urgency of exploring alternatives, or the danger that while they were waiting for distant developments the situation might so deteriorate that any settlement might become impossible. It is interesting to speculate what might have happened if proposals for immediate self-government, like those of 1942 and the subsequent years, had been put forward by the British Government in 1930; whether these could have forestalled the subsequent exacerbation of Hindu-Moslem relations, or whether the present cleavage would have merely been postponed to appear in more violent form under a National Government. Probably diverse answers will always be given. It has, of course, been constantly alleged by Indian Nationalists that ever since separate electorates were introduced in 1909, the British have deliberately encouraged the

communal divisions on the calculation that their own presence would thereby be made indispensable for an indefinite period. It is only too tragically clear that the problem has much deeper roots than this, and there is no evidence that British action has deliberately inflamed it. It must, however, be admitted that British publicists, perhaps inevitably concerned to justify Britain's retention of authority, have often appeared to show considerable satisfaction at the divisions, and in particular to exaggerate the importance of dissident groups, such as the Radical Democratic Party, which appear to be useful as a make-weight against the Congress. A good deal of support has been given both to this movement and to that of Dr. Ambedkar as champions of the underdog against the Congress which has certainly been backed by many Indian industrialists. Indians, however, are quick to notice that this support does not come from left-wing writers who, except for the Communists very recently, have usually favoured the Congress; and also that it has been much more noticeable since the groups referred to have become organised as opponents of the Congress, while no great solicitude has been shown in this country in the past for the outcastes and others, who have sometimes been exploited by British as well as by Indian business. In the British owned Kolar Gold Fields, dividends up to 180 per cent. have sometimes been declared, and in sixty years the total dividends have amounted to eighteen times the capital invested, but the miners, who are mostly outcastes, still get a basic wage of nine annas a day. It is also very easy to exaggerate the extent to which Congress is dominated by big business. It is interesting that in the recent elections among the few independents who have been elected are most of the landowners' representatives.

#### THE SCHEDULED CASTES

Before passing on to the more recent developments of the Hindu-Moslem problem, something may be said of other minorities, the Scheduled Castes and the Christians. The former have become politically conscious only in the last generation; their total is round about 50,000,000. This

includes a certain number of aboriginal tribes, especially in Central India and Assam, who have remained practically outside Hindu society. But the great majority are outcastes who were degraded to this position partly on racial grounds, being descendants of the most primitive of the people conquered by the Aryan invaders, and partly because their occupations of scavenging, tanning and so on are regarded as unclean. They have long enjoyed theoretical equality in the eyes of the law; in 1865 an 'Untouchable' sued a school for refusal to admit his son and the principle was laid down that all Government schools must be open to all classes. But this has only very slowly been realised in practice.

Much pioneer work has been done for their uplift by Christian Missions, especially since about 1880, and some millions of them have become Christians. The challenge of this movement is one of the factors which have stimulated Mr. Gandhi and other Hindu leaders to exert themselves in their service. Mr. Gandhi has been specially anxious, partly for religious reasons, to keep them within the Hindu system, and through the Harijan Sevak Sangh (society for the service of the 'People of God'—Mr. Gandhi's name for the outcastes) he has agitated for their admission to temples, especially in South India. Many Hindu volunteers showed real heroism and selflessness in this movement which resulted, among other things, in a proclamation by the Maharajah of Travancore in 1936, declaring all temples open to all Hindus irrespective of caste. The Congress Governments in 1937-39, especially in Madras and Bombay, also passed a number of measures to remove their disabilities.

Meanwhile, however, their economic position was improving only very slowly. But they began to organise themselves, especially in the towns, but also in rural areas, particularly the Mahars in the Bombay Presidency, the group to which Mr. Ambedkar himself belongs, and the Ezhavas in Travancore. It is a slightly ironical fact that their very degradation gives them a special strength when they combine. Municipal scavengers have formed unions and have formidable bargaining



power, since no one else will touch their work, and they are usually among the best paid municipal workers. In Bombay seven out of fifteen of the municipal employees are members of the Bombay Municipal Workers Union started by Dr. Ambedkar in 1931.\*

The outcasts, then called the Depressed Classes, were first given separate political recognition in the Constitution of 1939 when their interests were represented by nominated members in the Provincial Legislative Councils. They themselves were dissatisfied with this, partly because they were not given representation in proportion to their numbers. (This, of course, raises one of the most controversial aspects of the whole communal problem which applies also to the Muslims, especially in an area such as Bengal. Should a backward group be given immediate representation according to its numbers, or should it be content first with special educational and other opportunities which may help it to catch up with other sections of the community? And the answer largely depends on the further question, do they wish eventually to identify themselves with the majority, or do they value their separate existence as a permanent prospect?) It was probably inevitable that the claim for separate electorates should eventually be put forward. This was done for the first time at the Round Table Conference, at which the Depressed Classes were represented by Dr. Ambedkar, who had been nominated member of the Bombay Council from 1926, and was now the acknowledged leader of a large section of his community. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's Communal Award of 1932 placed the Scheduled Castes, as they were now called, in separate electorates. As is well known, this proposal was strongly objected to by Mr. Gandhi, on the ground that it would needlessly perpetuate the social divisions of Hinduism; and by threatening to fast to death he persuaded both parties to accept an alternative scheme whereby separate Scheduled Caste electorates choose four candidates for each seat at a primary election, and the final choice is made by

\* L. Ganeshaiah, *The Untouchables of India*, p. 82 (Oxford University Press). His pamphlet gives a very useful account of the whole of this question.

the general constituencies; but the number of representatives is greater than in the original Award. The result of this has been that in the two subsequent elections the great majority of Scheduled Caste representatives have been members of the Congress Party. This arrangement has been much criticised and Dr Ambedkar argues that it stultifies their separate representation—the caste Hindus especially in Bengal complain that it unduly reduces their own representation—the Scheduled Castes have nearly one-third of the seats allotted to Hindus, who are already outnumbered by the Moslems, although the vast majority of educated men in the province are caste Hindus. But perhaps under the present conditions in India a compromise which dissatisfies both parties has much to be said for it.

What is the right solution for the future? The question is all the more difficult because unworthy motives so easily enter into any judgment. While Mr. Gandhi is undoubtedly sincere in his belief that to remain part of an enlightened and reformed Hinduism is best for the Outcastes themselves, many Hindu politicians value them chiefly for their additional voting power. As an organiser of the Trade Union and Labour Movements, Dr. Ambedkar has deserved well of his people. But in so far as the fundamental problems of the under-privileged in India are economic, it is healthy that they should not be complicated more than can be avoided by religious and social divisions. The Labour Movement in India is already weakened by rivalries between the T.U.C., connected with the Congress—the Indian Federation of Labour, which has grown out of Mr. M. N. Roy's Radical Democratic Party—the Communists: and the Moslem League—apart from the All-India Scheduled Caste Federation. And guarantees in the new Constitution which tend to perpetuate such divisions are clearly undesirable. The war will have done something to break down the division between caste and out-caste; for the first time combatant units have been recruited from the latter, and two units at least, one known to the British soldiers as the 'dhobis and cha-walas battalion' formed

of untouchables from the Punjab, and the 'Beharis' who are aboriginals from Chota Nagpur, greatly distinguished themselves in jungle fighting in the Burma campaign. It seems certain that in any interim government the Scheduled Castes must be represented alongside the other minorities. And they will equally certainly need their own self-help organisations to fight for their social progress. But if elections in the future constitutions are based on manhood suffrage, their numbers will give them great strength without the need of any separate electorates.

#### THE CHRISTIANS

Christians are the third largest community in India (unless the Scheduled Castes are regarded as a separate group) numbering over seven millions, while the Sikhs are less than six millions. They have rendered conspicuous service in the war, especially in the technical services which were largely recruited from the educated Christians of South India. It has often been said that the Christians are denationalised, and morally and politically dependent on the foreign government. As lately as 1940 Mr. Gandhi said: 'The moment a person turns Christian he becomes a "sahib log". He almost changes his nationality. He gets a job and position which he could not otherwise have got, he adopts foreign dress and ways of living. He cuts himself off from his own people and begins to fancy himself a limb of the ruling class.' Though there may have been some truth in this in the past, it is certainly a travesty of the present position. Christians have been for many years steadily identifying themselves more and more with the Nationalist movement, and the following statement by the late Dr. V. S. Azariah, Bishop of Dornakal, made in his diocesan magazine in 1942, is representative. 'With trembling conviction Indian Christians see that they must go on the side of India's freedom. If China, Japan, Persia and Turkey can hold their heads up as independent nations in the eyes of the world, their motherland should certainly have the

<sup>1</sup> Reported in *The Guardian* (Madras), January 14, 1940

same status. With millenniums of culture and civilisation with its hoary traditions of wealth and power, with its incorrigible God-consciousness—their dear India, they feel, deserves to be a free India.’

At the Round Table Conference it was proposed to extend to the Christians, as to the Scheduled Castes, the privilege of separate electorates already given in 1921 to the Sikhs as well as to the Moslems. At the Conference the representative of the Protestants (Dr. S. K. Datta of the Y.M.C.A.) said that he would prefer to have some seats reserved for election by the General Constituencies: but the Roman Catholic representative did not agree, and separate electorates were included in the 1935 Act. This difference of opinion persists up to the present.

Meanwhile the All-India Conference of Indian Christians, which is the chief medium of expression of Protestant political opinion, was tending more and more to follow the lead given by Dr. Datta, though there was for some time considerable hesitation. But since 1940 the Conference has come down firmly in favour of joint electorates. At the same time it has put forward clear demands for statutory guarantees of fundamental human rights to be included in any future constitution, including the right of worship, and practice and propagation of religion. The National Christian Council representing the organised Churches (except the Roman) has put forward similar demands.

It seems to the writer that this is clearly the right policy for a small minority. A small community must in the long run depend for its welfare on the goodwill of the majority groups. One or two representatives existing solely to safeguard Christian interests can do little and may even have the opposite effect to that desired: for the other communities may feel that the welfare of Christians is no affair of theirs. On the other hand a general claim for statutory safeguards for all minorities clears the community from any charge of narrowness.

It is of further interest to note that while hitherto most

of the Christian members have been Independents, in the new elections many have stood as Congressmen. Reports so far available show that in Madras six Christians have been elected as Congressmen, and in the United Provinces and Orissa one each, while there are three Christian Independents in Madras, one in the United Provinces and none in Orissa. It is natural for Christians to identify themselves with the movement for a united as well as an independent India; and Congress is also committed to a Declaration of Fundamental Rights very similar to that adopted by the Christians. When Christians have shown merit it has been fairly generously recognised by the Nationalist leaders. Out of the thirty members of Sir T. B. Saprú's Conciliation Committee, four were Indian Christians, and four were also included in the committee of eight which helped Mr. Gandhi to draft his 'Wardha' scheme of education.

It is perhaps only natural that such a small and scattered minority should find it comparatively easy to take this generous attitude on political questions. But in one part of India Christians form a very important minority, namely, Travancore and Cochin where they number nearly one-third of the population. They are also a prosperous and highly educated group, owing to the presence of the 'Syrian Christians' who have been there for at least 1,600 years. Here, therefore, their position is on a small scale somewhat parallel to that of the Moslems in India as a whole.

Since 1932 there has been an Advisory Legislature in Travancore. There are no communal electorates, but for election to the lower house there are multi-member constituencies, in which eight seats are reserved for the Ezhavas (a well-organised Scheduled Caste), three for the Moslems and three for the 'Latin Christians' who are considered more backward than the other Christian groups; but the latter depend for their representation on the general vote. There are similar arrangements in Cochin State, and under this system the Christians seem to have held their own and there has been no wide demand for separate electorates, though there have

been complaints that the demarcation of constituencies has been such that certain areas where Christians are specially numerous are not fairly represented. According to the latest Travancore Administration Report on the selection of candidates for the Intermediate Branch of the State Service, sixteen Hindus, fifteen Christians and one Moslem were accepted during the year.

It cannot be denied that there is another side to the picture. There have been periods of considerable tension in recent years, not so much between the two communities as such, as between the Christians and the State Government: complaints of partiality being not against the Hindu Maharajah but against his very vigorous Dewan, Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar. This has been accentuated by the fact that Christians have taken the lead in the State Congress, a political organisation somewhat parallel to the Congress in British India, which has been agitating for the introduction of responsible government.

An All Christian Conference was held in Travancore in January, 1940, which stated various grievances. Some of these were strictly political, that the proposed constitutional reforms do not go far enough, in that the Dewan will be still an irreplaceable head of the Executive; and that the monarchy is sufficient to guarantee the continuity of administration, so that a responsible ministry could now be safely introduced. Some were religious—*e.g.*, that educational concessions to children of the backward classes were withdrawn if they became Christians, but restored to them on reconversion.

In fine, it may be said that we find here in miniature the kind of problems which will arise in a self-governing India, and on the whole the picture suggests a hopeful prospect. At least, there is no demand for a separate Christian State or for the ending of State autonomy.

#### THE EMERGENCE OF PAKISTAN

The Moguls opened a new era in India because they came to regard themselves as Indians, not Turks or Afghans. Previous Moslem invaders, though they might rule from Delhi,

regarded Kabul as their real home. Under Akbar and his successors, Delhi was the true centre of the Empire, and Afghanistan became an outlying province. From this time onwards the Moslems, though they might assert their own rights and culture, continued to call themselves Indians. The President of the Moslem League said in 1915: 'When a question concerning the welfare of India and justice to Indians arises, I am not only an Indian and an Indian alone, favouring no community and no individual, but on the side of those who desire the advantage of India as a whole.'\* This continued to be the attitude of the Moslem leaders up to and after the Round Table Conference.

The essence of 'Pakistan' is the complete reversal of this attitude. The Pakistan National Movement was founded in 1933 by Mr. C. Rahmat Ali, then a post-graduate student at Cambridge, with the immediate object of combating the action of the Moslem representatives at the Conference who had accepted the Federation proposals then put forward. They included all the chief Moslem leaders who were not members of the Congress, including Sir Muhammad Iqbal and Mr. Jinnah. 'Worst of all was the fact that all these leading classes had come to believe that, after all, Moslems were Indians: that "India" was their home; . . . they were politically absorbed by what Rahmat Ali has rightly called "the soul-killing cult of Indianism".'† The author of the pamphlet just quoted is quite frank in looking back to the old glories of the Mogul Empire, which he says came to an end (in 1857!) just because the Moguls had always remained a minority in the country which they ruled. He asserts that the 'Anglo-Hindu Entente' was trying to force the Moslems into a federation. To avoid final absorption in India Rahmat Ali urged the Moslems to declare themselves a separate nation and to claim the north-west of India where they formed a majority as their own special territory.

The name PAKISTAN was derived from the five areas, Punjab, Afghanistan (N.-W. F. P.) Kashmir, Sind and Baluchi-

\* Quoted by L. S. S. O'Malley, *Modern India and the West*

† Khan A. Hamid, *The Founder of Pakistan*, 1912 p. 2

stan. The name should therefore strictly be applied only to the first instalment of the Scheme. But Rahmat Ali did not by any means stop there. By 1940 he had produced a further edition of the plan; in this Bengal and Assam, in which two provinces together Moslems number thirty-six and a half out of seventy and a half millions, and the State of Hyderabad, in which they are only a little over two millions out of sixteen and a half millions, are also claimed as Moslem home-lands, under the titles of Bang-i-Islam and Osmanistan. The latter claim is based chiefly on the fact that Hyderabad has long had a Moslem ruler, and it is suggested that an exchange of populations might give Moslems a majority here also.

At first the Moslem leaders did not take the plan seriously, and the remark of Mr. Yusuf Ali in his evidence before the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee in 1933 has often been quoted—that it was a ‘students’ scheme’. But by 1940 the claim for the recognition of Pakistan and Bang-i-Islam as three sovereign Moslem States entirely separate from India had been officially adopted by the League. (The Nizam and his government have not looked with favour on the extension of the plan to their dominion.)

What were the reasons for this extraordinary revolution? In part it must be attributed to the intransigence of the Congress when they were in power in seven provinces from 1937-39, and the consequent genuine fear of a ‘Hindu Raj’. This aspect of the matter is exhaustively dealt with by Coupland in his Report, Vol. II, though he admits that the accusations of oppression of the Moslems in these provinces were found to be grossly exaggerated. The Congress leaders can hardly be blamed for trying to win the Moslems for their party, since they have always claimed to be non-communal and some of their leaders like Nehru would certainly like to see religion play a much smaller part in Indian politics. In offering places in their Ministries only to those Moslems who consented to join the Congress they believed that they were only following British parliamentary practice. But the fact remains that their treatment of the League was tactless and



impolitic, and it is significant that support for Pakistan has been strongest in the Hindu majority provinces. Though the recent elections show that the idea has now been widely accepted by Moslems in the Punjab, in the N.-W. F. P., where Moslems number nearly ninety per cent. and have little fear of Hindu domination, the Congress majority has been further strengthened.

But apart from any question of the Congress policy, the federation proposed in 1935, which carried on to a great extent the British tradition of a strong Centre, would have put the Moslems at a disadvantage. Cynics said at the time that the accession of the Princes would make it unnecessary for the British to placate the Moslems any further; and without in any way endorsing the implications of this remark, one may well regret that some of the schemes of decentralisation which have since been put forward were not considered earlier.

For the present, Pakistan is the official Moslem League policy, though no details are given and its exponents when pressed usually say that only after the principle has been admitted can they discuss ways and means. But meanwhile Mr. Rahmat Ali, the author of the Scheme, has not been idle: in 1942 his plan reached a third stage. In the form in which it is now being stated by Mr. Jinnah it would mean that very large non-Moslem minorities would be included in the Moslem States. Mr. Jinnah himself has admitted this and has appealed to those minorities to trust the Moslems to treat them well, though he is only willing for Moslems to vote if a plebiscite is taken on the issue. In two areas the position would be specially embarrassing. In Bengal, not only is there a large Hindu majority in the western part of the province which includes Calcutta, but some ninety per cent. of the University graduates are Hindus. Bengali culture is overwhelmingly Hindu in its traditions, and the bulk of the Moslems are cultivators, boatmen, etc., in East Bengal.

Perhaps even more awkward is the fact that the Sikhs would all come within Pakistan. Though they number less than six million, their wealth and solidarity as well as their

military traditions give them an importance out of proportion to their numbers. They have stated that they will on no account accept Pakistan, and the Akalis, their best-organised political party, has from 1940 announced that if North-west India becomes a separate Moslem State, they will demand the establishment of a separate Sikh State within it. Other Sikh leaders, though no more favourable to Pakistan, oppose the Akali plan on the ground that the Sikhs are not a majority in any one area.

This Akali claim, however, gave Rahmat Ali the cue for the next stage of his plan, an exposition of which will be found in a pamphlet entitled 'The Millat and the Mission' published by the Pakistan National Movement, 16 Montagu Road, Cambridge, in 1942. Let us meet the Sikh claim, he says, and go further and set aside special enclaves for the Hindu minorities also in the Moslem lands: but on condition that reciprocal privileges are given to us, and that in any part of India where there are Moslems a proportionate territory be allotted to them as their national home in that area. Seven such enclaves are proposed, in addition to the three Moslem States previously suggested, including two in Ceylon. 'We must take care that the proportional areas [for the non-Moslems] in Pakistan, Bangistan and Osmanistan are allotted where possible as enclaves. For that alone will give us the compensating advantage of, first, keeping separate the Hindus and Sikhs and their areas from one another, and, secondly, of keeping the Hindu minority proportional areas just as separate from their main strongholds as ours will be from Pakistan, Bangistan and Osmanistan.'<sup>10</sup> Lest it should be thought that the Hindu and Sikh minorities would be dangerously isolated (the Hindu area for Bengal shown on Mr. Rahmat Ali's map is in North Bengal some hundreds of miles from the sea), he adds, 'the development of aviation has, once and for all, solved the problem of the communications of land-locked countries with the world'.

If the reader's natural impulse is to dismiss all this as a fantastic dream, it is perhaps wise to recall that the first

<sup>10</sup> *The Millat and the Mission*, p. 15

version of the plan was treated in the same summary way by the Moslem leaders themselves. The obvious administrative and economic difficulties in the scheme in its present official form have often been pointed out, and these difficulties would apply with far greater force to the proposal to paint little green patches of Moslem territory all over India—or 'Dinia' as it is now to be renamed. But religious and national sentiment has an awkward way of triumphing over common sense and plain economic interest. The very language used is designed to emphasise the religious sanctions for a clean division. Rahmat Ali throughout speaks of the Moslem nation as a *Millat* and the Hindu as a *Jati*. They are, he claims, different in kind, and the Moslem *Millat* cannot find its fulfilment except in conditions which make theocratic government possible. The danger of a complete break-up of India is therefore one that must be seriously reckoned with.

#### IS A SETTLEMENT POSSIBLE?

There is no space for more than the briefest mention of the plans now being explored for solving the communal problem. Much is being written about them daily, and anything said here may be quite out of date before it is published.

The most constructive moves on the Moslem side have come from the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, Premier of the Punjab, who was the first to suggest an 'Agency' centre. The Provinces would have almost complete autonomy; final sovereignty would reside with them, and they would delegate to the centre only a minimum of essential functions. A development of this idea is the proposal now being discussed for two federations intermediate between the Provinces and the Centre.

The first move in this direction from the Congress side was made by Mr. C. Rajagopalachariar, who from 1942 insisted that the principle of Pakistan should be recognised: a courageous act which led to his expulsion from the Congress, and even now has prevented his reacceptance as Premier of Madras. But the Congress as a whole has moved a long way towards

his position: and a summary of a proposed constitution published recently by Professor S. N. Agarwal with Mr. Gandhi's approval recognises the principle of maximum decentralisation, with residuary powers vesting in the federating units. He also suggests that the central legislature shall consist of one representative of each provincial legislature—a proposal also made by Sir Mahomed Zafrulla Khan, on whom has to some extent fallen the mantle of Sir Sikander as a moderate Moslem leader. If alternatively the Central Government is formed by direct nomination from the All-India parties, Sir Mahomed and the Congress are both ready to accept the proposal, also adopted by Sir T. B. Saprú's Conciliation Committee, that forty per cent. of the places should go to the Moslem and Caste Hindus, and twenty per cent. to the minorities.

Very broadly it may be said that Indian opinion falls into an extreme and a moderate position on each side. At opposite poles stand the League and the Hindu Mahasabha, *standing rigidly for complete unity and absolute separation*. Nothing has been said about the Mahasabha in these pages because the recent elections have virtually extinguished it—one of the more hopeful features of the situation. All the more responsibility will therefore rest on the League if it does in fact prove impossible to reach a settlement, and credit must be given to the Congress leaders for having met and triumphed over a bitter Hindu opposition which has all along roundly accused them of appeasement.

# NATIONALISM IN EASTERN ASIA

By

G. W. KEETON

To those who were unfamiliar with Eastern Asia, and to a number of those who were familiar, the existence and intensity of nationalism revealed by the collapse of Japan's military power in August, 1945, came as a great surprise. During the war, there had been very little connected discussion of Far Eastern problems in this country, and what there was generally took as its starting-point the position as it existed in 1939, more especially in so far as the colonial possessions of the European powers were concerned. It was not doubted that the principles of the 'Atlantic' Charter were fully applicable to this area, but it was assumed that these principles would be applied by the colonising power, whose judgment of the *tempo* of change would ultimately prevail, but whose stewardship might possibly be reviewed by a Pacific Council. This was the suggestion advanced by Lord Hailley, on behalf of the British delegation to the unofficial conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December, 1942, in the following terms:

'I suggest that there should be created a Council for the Pacific Zone, consisting of the representatives of the sovereign powers concerned. It would have a double function. It would, in the first place, be the local agency of whatever organisation may be established by the United Nations for safeguarding the peace of Asia in common with other parts of the world. The preservation of peace demands not merely the provision of air, naval and military forces, but of a wide range of civil activities ancillary to them. These civil activities would be the direct charge of the Pacific Zone Council.

Its second function would be to secure, by joint consultation and by co-operative action, a common policy, so far

as may be, in the economic development and in the tariff and customs arrangements within this zone. It would maintain a technical staff, available for advising the administrations concerned on health, agriculture, economic or cultural problems. It would be the agency through which areas unable to finance their own development would obtain the assistance required. It would receive regular reports from the different national administrations in the area. It would finally—and I desire to emphasise this point—be charged with the periodic review of the progress made in the promotion of self-governing institutions in the dependencies, and in the improvement of their standard of living.’<sup>1</sup>

Broadly, the position taken up by Holland and France, the two other principal colonial powers in the Far East, was the same; but their point of view met with little sympathy, either from China (situated in close proximity to the principal colonial areas, and herself recently emancipated from a semi-colonial status), or from the United States (whose expansion has been mainly continental, and who has clearly defined her Far Eastern policy in her relations with the Philippines), or (more surprisingly) from the British Dominions, whose delegates expressed disappointment, not only with the ‘complacent’ attitude of the British delegation, but also with the failure of the American delegates to enunciate a practical alternative policy.<sup>2</sup> Events have moved fast since 1942, however, and today the emancipation of the Philippines by the United States has been completely eclipsed by the emancipation of India by Great Britain. Both these examples will have far-reaching effects upon the status of other Far Eastern colonial possessions. In any event, the extent of the problem revealed by the Japanese collapse has made the general line of the *Mont Tremblant* discussions obsolete.

#### SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Before proceeding further, it will be well to indicate the area to which the problem under discussion extends. It includes China (both China proper, and the outlying territories

<sup>1</sup> *War and Peace in the Pacific*, pp 13-14

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid* pp 120 et seq

of Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet), Korea, French Indo-China, Malaya, Netherlands-India, and Burma. Geographically, the remoter islands of the Pacific should also be included, but the problems of these islands are not primarily problems created by an impatient nationalism. They are problems of migration, complicated by the strategic plans of the greater Far Eastern Powers. For that reason they are excluded from the present discussion.

Moreover, certain general considerations must be borne in mind in discussing Far Eastern nationalism. The impact of Europe upon Eastern Asia was first felt in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch being the pioneers. Few traces of the Portuguese and Spanish colonial empires now survive in this area, however, but the Dutch have been firmly established in some parts of Netherlands-India for nearly three and a half centuries. Their relationship with Netherlands-India therefore resembles, and is older than, our own with India. On the other hand, the other colonial possessions in this area are more modern in origin. The first British foothold in Malaya was at Penang in the eighteenth century. Singapore was acquired at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but modern Malaya as a whole is the creation of the last sixty years. Burma was acquired in three successive stages between 1810 and 1887; French Indo-China was acquired at approximately the same period. Both were for long periods and in varying degrees within the orbit of the Chinese Imperial system which, before the decay of the Manchu Empire in the nineteenth century, was 'the Middle Kingdom' of a Far Eastern political system from which, owing to China's size and resources, large-scale war had been abolished.

At various times, every part of the Far Eastern area (except possibly Malaya) had been the centre of an advanced civilisation, which had fallen into decay before the European powers asserted their influence. The West brought a superior efficiency, especially in warfare, and also

a desire to develop local resources and to extend commerce. It also brought the assertion of racial superiority, which was bitterly resented, especially since in many cases the assertion of superiority was unconscious. At a later stage in colonial development, commerce, railways and communications, religion, education, and even the cinema have all played their parts in disrupting social systems which have remained relatively stable over long periods of time. Even where European colonies, in the strict sense, were not established, 'the treaty port system' was introduced. At one period during the nineteenth century it extended to Indo-China (Annam and Tongking), Siam, China, Japan and Korea. In the treaty ports, once again, racial discrimination tended to be a factor exacerbating international relations.

So long as the power of the Western nations appeared irresistible, the colonial and treaty port regimes were borne more or less patiently, more especially as there tended to be some identity of outlook between the chief Western powers with Far Eastern interests. A change in attitude came, however, after the rise of Japan, and her victories over China and Russia. Finally, the first World War proved that the Western powers themselves were torn by internal divisions, out of which Oriental peoples might one day profit.

Full advantage of these considerations was taken by Japan. The extent of her ambitions in Eastern Asia was first revealed by the presentation of the Twenty-One Demands to China in 1915, when the prosecution of the first World War made it impossible for any other power to do anything about them. These Demands and the peremptory method of presenting them plainly showed that Japan aimed eventually at reducing the whole of China to colonial status. From this position, Japan was compelled to retreat at the Washington Conference in 1922, but the ultimate objectives of her policy remained unaltered, even though for the time being little could be done to attain them. From 1931 onwards, however, the economic difficulties of the West, the failure of the United States to



pursue a consistent Far Eastern policy, and the lack of accord between the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain presented Japan with an opportunity which she exploited to the full extent.

Between 1931 and 1945 Japan pursued a policy of expansion the object of which was to establish a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere which, if achieved, would have turned the Pacific into a Japanese lake. Seen through Western eyes, this was simply a process of Imperialist exploitation on an enormous scale. To many of the inhabitants of Eastern Asia, however, it had a quite different appearance as a result of the techniques employed by the Japanese, following a close and exhaustive study of the peoples whom they sought to bring under their control. Many of the techniques employed were far from new. They were borrowed from the Western nations, who had all employed them in their contact with Oriental peoples, albeit the Japanese improved upon most of them. For example, the Japanese, during their occupation of Eastern Asia, made a determined effort to establish Japanese as the *lingua franca* of this vast area, in spite of the manifest difficulties of such a policy. They also posed as the apostles of progress, education and culture, founding universities, learned societies, technical schools, printing presses and other media through which Japanese propaganda could be unobtrusively spread. There were scientific and educational congresses, where hand-picked delegations from the occupied territories were received with all external marks of honour. Far Eastern colonies, which, with few exceptions, had never felt any real sense of kinship with a Western motherland, were given a new sense of importance and a feeling of community with the apparently all-conquering Japanese race. Much of this cultural propaganda was extremely well done, and its effects (even in China) may remain for many years.

Further, the Japanese had proved apt pupils in the political techniques of the second World War. Annam, Tongking and Burma were not conquered; they were

'liberated from white oppression', and the marks of their liberation were carefully emphasised. 'Independent' governments were established, and these appointed ambassadors to Tokyo, and to one another, and at various times they duly declared war on the United Nations, or on some of them. 'National' armies were raised, 'national' flags were flown, and where Japanese arms had failed to 'liberate' a country (for example, India) a 'provisional government' was formed, with the power of raising 'volunteers' for the war against 'Western Imperialism'. It was all rather like 'Alice through the Looking-Glass', but it certainly had a different appearance in the Far East, especially in the heyday of the Japanese triumph.

The motives of those who embraced the Japanese point of view were diverse, and they were by no means all despicable. There certainly were political adventurers, and even more dubious characters. There were also honest dupes, as well as ardent nationalists who would accept any means to throw off Western authority, and who were therefore prepared to abandon the Japanese as soon as Japanese power failed. So long as Japan expected to win the war, or to retain a substantial part of what she had gained, these Far Eastern nationalisms remained controlled, responding as desired to Japanese prompting; but when Japan realised that all was lost, she encouraged the most extreme manifestations of nationalism, either with the hope of turning nominal into effective support from these junior partners, or (what is more probable) with the full realisation of the size of the problem they were creating for their conquerors.

In their appeal to Far Eastern races, the Japanese had a great asset which they exploited to the full in their appeal for a crusade of the yellow and brown races against the white. The Far East saw in the Japanese the avengers of several centuries of humiliation and subservience, and thus overlooked the fact that in terminating one colonial epoch, they were inaugurating another. The Japanese, therefore, paid great attention to matters of prestige, and they

lost no opportunity of exhibiting their white prisoners in the most humiliating circumstances. Having hitherto seen white persons only in positions of prominence, the Far Eastern races now beheld them at the mercy of the all-conquering Japanese. With the satisfaction of race-feelings therefore went a very healthy respect for the Japanese as a people of even greater apparent strength than those who had formerly ruled them. Moreover, not a few made the further deduction that if a colonial power was not able to protect colonial peoples, then it was high time that those peoples acquired responsibility for their own destinies.

The manner of the Japanese collapse did little to destroy the habits of thought which the Japanese occupation had induced. The Japanese victories were spectacular, swift, and progressive. They were accompanied by fierce fighting, heavy casualties, and the capture of many prisoners. All this could be followed and understood by Far Eastern peoples. It was the sort of thing to which they had been accustomed for centuries. It was the clearest possible evidence of Japan's vast military resources. To have eradicated the profound impression which these victories created, it would have been necessary for the Japanese to have suffered a succession of bloody and humiliating defeats in the areas where their victories had previously been won. Instead, Japan was defeated at sea, in scattered Pacific islands, and eventually, by an entirely novel weapon of warfare, used on the Japanese homeland itself. So sudden was the collapse that the Far East was unable fully to comprehend it, any more than the Japanese people themselves were able to at first, and for some time after the surrender, large hodies of undefeated Japanese troops remained in control of the occupied territories. When Western forces arrived they were compelled to employ Japanese forces for the task of maintaining order—a procedure which was not comprehended in the least, and which cannot have failed to puzzle the East. Thus, there are at least the materials upon which the legend of Japan's invincibility may one day be

hult. Even if that is unconvincing, it can always be argued that Japan went down fighting the battle of Oriental freedom against virtually the whole world.

One further general factor must be mentioned. Nominally, Japan's territorial ambitions were concealed beneath the term 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'. The term was well-chosen. Over 1,200,000,000 people live within it, if India is included, and the major problem which requires solution is economic, rather than political. With vast areas over-populated, the major question is survival through a more efficient utilisation of national resources. Japan's propaganda was directed to show that exploitation by the West had prevented that development, and that her own policy would produce that mutual prosperity which the title of her programme implied. If reconstruction policies in the Far East should fail to improve the standard of living, thoughts will inevitably turn towards the Japanese alternative, not necessarily as an objective, but as an ideal which the victory of the United Nations has destroyed. Once again, as in 'Alice through the Looking-Glass', familiar things reappear, but backwards, in areas where Japanese propaganda has been free to do its worst. The situation presents a challenge to the United Nations, which can only be ignored at the cost of continued upheaval throughout Eastern Asia. It will be in very real danger of being ignored if the rivalries of the major powers are projected into this area.

#### THE CHINESE ENIGMA

The future of the whole Far Eastern area will be profoundly affected by what happens in China during the next five years, for without a unified and stable China large-scale Far Eastern planning is futile. During the war, China was represented at successive conferences on the footing of a great power. This was at once a tribute to China's tenacity in resisting Japan, and a recognition of her very considerable potentialities. Nevertheless, it would be idle

to deny that China has fallen a long way below what had been expected of her, both in wartime and afterwards, and the reason for that failure in achievement is to be found in the unresolved internal struggle. From the time of the Taiping Rebellion, ninety years ago, China's political, social and economic structure has been changing, and the end of that process is not yet in sight. Unlike many previous upheavals, it has been considerably influenced by external events, and China has progressively become a mirror in which world-wide international rivalries are reflected. The course of the Taiping Rebellion itself was profoundly influenced by the attitude of foreign powers, and it is doubtful whether the dynasty would have survived this assault upon it without foreign aid. At the end of the century, the Boxer Rebellion precipitated foreign intervention which threatened the continued existence of China as a nation; whilst the successive phases of the Revolution which has been proceeding since 1911 have been in turn influenced by the first World War, the progress of the Soviet experiment, and the emergence of the Soviet Union and the United States as world powers, and the world struggle which is now in progress between them. Only the necessity for a common front against Japan has hindered the emergence of that rivalry, the solution of which will have decisive effects upon the Pacific area as a whole. It would be a dangerous over-simplification to regard the Soviet as pledged to the support of Chinese Communism, and the United States as equally committed to the Nationalists, but so long as the deep antagonism of the two wings of the Chinese Revolution persists, *for exactly so long will Soviet-American rivalries find dangerously explosive material ready at hand.* Even were formal accord between Nationalists and Communists possible, this would do no more than transfer the struggle for power into the internal structure of Chinese political life, and in that internal struggle neither the Soviet nor the United States could afford to remain disinterested. Beneath the different ideological labels, an age-long Chinese conflict

is being fought out. The Chinese Nationalists are sometimes called 'Fascist' and are accused of 'landlordism'. In reality, they stand for a modernised version of the traditional Chinese structure. The Communists, on the other hand, whatever they may profess ideologically, represent the uprising of the peasantry. Whichever side eventually prevails will set the pattern for a great deal of Eastern Asia, and for that reason the Chinese struggle is being followed with close attention throughout Eastern Asia. It follows, therefore, that the progress of the Chinese Revolution is of profound significance for the rest of the world.

Altogether apart from this fundamental cleavage, China has many other problems, political, economic and social, awaiting solution. The 'semi-colonial' era has ended, and the foreign rights have been relinquished. There are, however, the problems of industrial development, the improvement of agriculture, and the resettlement of population<sup>3</sup>; and there are delicate questions affecting the vast outlying territories of China. Since 1924, Outer Mongolia, though still formally Chinese, has been independent, and has entered into a defensive alliance with the Soviet Union. During the Soviet-Japanese disputes between 1931 and 1945, the Soviet made it plain to Japan that any effort to extend her influence to Outer Mongolia would be resisted by force. Recently, the Chinese Government has said that if Outer Mongolia wished to achieve formal independence, China would not resist it. The Outer Mongolian question is now, therefore, for all practical purposes ended. It is otherwise with the problems of Manchuria, Sinkiang and (in a different sphere) Hong Kong.

In Manchuria, there is no race problem. Its inhabitants are Chinese, and most of them have migrated to Manchuria from the north-eastern provinces of China Proper during the past forty years. It is true that between the wars there was some friction between Chinese and Korean settlers, but this was fomented by the Japanese, and there is no reason to suppose that it will be a difficult matter to remove the

<sup>3</sup> On this, see Y. C. Ma, 'The Problems of Post War Economic Reconstruction in China', *The London Quarterly of World Affairs*, Vol. XII, No. 1, pp. 62-72.

causes of friction today. By the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945, the Soviet recognised Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, although the Soviet gained joint rights with China in the Liaotung Peninsula, where Port Arthur and Dairen are situated. At the time of writing, the Soviet is evacuating Manchuria, but there is bitterness in China because, before withdrawal, the Soviet has removed much of the machinery which the Japanese installed there. The need for machinery of both the Soviet Union and China is great, but China feels that, as territorial sovereign, her claims were at least as great as the Soviet's and that her sacrifices in the Far Eastern War were far greater. Further, the withdrawal of the Soviet has been accompanied by a widespread and bitter resistance on the part of the Communists to the assumption of control by Chungking. This is open defiance of the accord between Nationalists and Communists, reached at the instigation of General Marshall, and it is a serious obstacle, both to Chinese unity, and to reconstruction in Manchuria. The situation is all the more serious since Manchurian resources are an important factor in the plans for an improvement in economic conditions in Northern China, Korea, and Japan. Indeed, it is probably not putting it too high to say that whoever controls Manchuria effectively can very greatly influence Japan's economic future.

Sinkiang, like Manchuria, has very considerable potentialities, and also like Manchuria, could receive a considerable number of Chinese settlers. It was added to China in the early days of the Manchu dynasty (hence the name *Sinkiang*, the New Dominion), and both its communications and economic connections have been with the adjacent Russian territories, rather than with the rest of China. Russia has been continuously interested in this area since 1870 at the latest, and at various times since 1911 the political links with China have been slender. On the other hand it must be added that the Soviet has behaved with restraint and foresight in its relations with Sinkiang, and again in the treaty of 1945 recognised China's sovereignty in this province.

Hong Kong is the only point at which Chinese and British interests potentially conflict. Hong Kong is a British colony, ceded in 1842 by the Treaty of Nanking, which ended the first Anglo-Chinese War, and extended in 1856-60. It was intended to be a secure base for British and other merchants trading to South China, and it has always been a 'free port' open to merchants of all nations (including the Chinese) without discrimination. In addition to the actual colony, there is a leased territory of some 300 square miles, leased for ninety-nine years in 1898. The recent war has shown that Hong Kong, in its present form, cannot be defended against a powerful opponent. To-day, the Chinese are asking for its return. The answer to this request is not easy. Hong Kong in 1842 was a barren and almost uninhabited collection of islands. To-day it is one of the world's great ports. Moreover, China herself, as we have seen, is far from unity, and as yet we have no clear picture of the security arrangements which will be established for the Pacific. A possible solution might be to make Hong Kong a joint Anglo-Chinese enterprise in the same way as Port Arthur is to be a joint Sino-Soviet enterprise. Hong Kong still has very great commercial importance, and very great potentiality as a meeting-place of Chinese and British culture.

#### KOREA BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES

The problems of Korea are substantially the problems of China in miniature. An Empire under nominal Chinese suzerainty until 1895, it was annexed by Japan in 1910, and its economy was almost entirely integrated with that of Japan. During the past decade it has been partially industrialised for war purposes, but more varied industrialisation is necessary; and there is also an agrarian problem, due to primitive methods of agriculture, tiny holdings, and agrarian indebtedness. Moreover, in the political field, there are serious cleavages. The older revolutionaries looked primarily for American aid and sought to imitate Western democratic models. During the 'thirties some of the younger Korean



revolutionaries were influenced by the Chinese Nationalists, and, in addition, the Korean Communists were well organised. These differences were accentuated by the Japanese collapse with the occupation of Northern Korea, north of latitude 38, by Soviet troops, and of the remainder by the United States. Left to herself, Korea will again fall a victim to internal dissensions, which may easily cloak Soviet-American rivalries. Here, as in China, the social struggle which lies behind ideological differences is already in progress, and it is hard to see how a solution based on compromise is possible. As the double occupation proceeds, Korea is becoming increasingly restless, and there has even been voiced occasional regret for the passing of Japanese rule. As in other parts of the world, the differences in the Russian and the American outlook are producing wide differences in social and political policy. In Northern Korea, the landowning class has been eliminated for all practical purposes, and enemy-held land has been redistributed among the peasants. This has reacted sharply upon conditions in Korean-owned estates, where rent paying and the payment of interest on mortgages has almost ceased. As conditions have deteriorated, many of the Korean landowners, industrialists and business men have migrated to the Southern zone, where the American occupying forces have sought to secure the establishment of a democratic regime, and have shown favour to the more well-to-do classes who, in turn, are regarded with the deepest suspicion by the Soviet forces in their own zone. In consequence of this deep social and political cleavage, not even a provisional government for the whole of Korea is so far in sight.

Everything therefore depends upon the ultimate objectives of American policy upon the Far Eastern mainland. For the Soviet, Korea is a land of great interest, being adjacent to the Maritime Provinces, and to Soviet interests in South Manchuria. As yet, the United States has not produced in Korea a progressive social policy, and inasmuch as the major problem here, as elsewhere in Eastern Asia, is the improvement of the lot of the peasant farmer, the appeal of policies

pursued in the Russian zone is very strong. Here, as elsewhere in the world, capitalism is fighting a rearguard action, and the appeal of the 'middle way' to the Oriental mind appears to be negligible. For all that, Korea cannot fail to be deeply influenced by the progressive evolution of American policy in China.

To sum up, the future of Korea depends almost entirely upon the course taken by the Soviet-American struggle which is now in progress.

#### FRENCH INDO-CHINA

Although the French reoccupation of Indo-China has attracted less general attention than the troubles of the Dutch in Indonesia, the problem there is no less considerable, and it is complicated by the relationship of Indo-China to China, by the weakness of French power, and by the ambiguous attitude pursued by the Vichy administration there between 1940 and 1945. What is known as French Indo-China is really a collection of areas, formerly independent. Of these, the chief are Tongking, Annam, Cochin China, Cambodia and Laos. In Tongking, Annam and Cochin China the population are predominantly Annamese, and racially they are closely akin to the Chinese. That kinship is emphasised by the fact that in the last half century there has been extensive Chinese settlement in these former kingdoms, and much subsequent intermarriage. Moreover, there is a good deal of trade between them and the adjacent provinces of China, and for a much longer period of time China has exercised an important cultural influence. Until 1883 China was also the suzerain power. Cambodia and Laos have each a distinct nationality, the people of Laos being the most backward. *The sharp development of Annamese national feeling in recent years has produced by way of reaction a corresponding growth of national feeling amongst the other two peoples, which has expressed itself in resistance to Annamese and Chinese settlement and commercial domination.*

In Indo-China the French have not been seen at their

best as colonists, and Annamese national feeling was already exceedingly restive before 1939. It was sharply accentuated after the French collapse in 1940, and it received support from China, whose supply route through Saigon was closed in consequence of Japanese pressure. When, in 1941, the Japanese proceeded to a formal occupation, it became possible for China to encourage Annamese resistance more openly.

The Japanese collapse found the French unable to take any effective action for the maintenance of order. The Chinese were in occupation of some of the northern territory, and British forces took over control in the south. Further it was necessary for a time to maintain order with the assistance of Japanese troops—a development which caused a most unfavourable impression. Later, the French sent forces, thus permitting the British (mainly Indian and Gurkha) troops to withdraw by March, 1946. Previous to the withdrawal, there had already been serious conflicts between French troops and the Viet-Minh, the organisation in which the various Annamese independence movements have now combined. This movement is under Communist control, but had received active encouragement from the Japanese immediately before the surrender. There is thus a very serious problem awaiting solution by the French authorities. It is being tackled by the adoption of a comprehensive plan for an Indo-Chinese federation, which will include the Republic of Viet-Nam (the former Tongking and Annam), Cochinchina (which has recently received a grant of full representative institutions), the Kingdom of Cambodia (over which France has relinquished her protectorate), and Laos, where the Viet-Minh has made comparatively little headway, although, for a short time, it was sufficiently powerful to overthrow the King of Luang Prabang, with whom the French had made a new agreement.

The French have faced the political problem with characteristic realism; they have abandoned the earlier idea of an Indo-China closely federated with France, and are in process of creating an Indo-Chinese Dominion with full political and economic responsibility. There are, however,

complicating factors similar to those which exist in India. There are several distinct races who may not combine too well in the new federal structure; but above all, it is the economic problem which lies at the root of existing dissatisfaction. Over 2,000,000 died of starvation in Indo-China in 1945. In 1946 the number may be doubled, although in normal times Indo-China exports rice in large quantities. Lack of transport, a breakdown of the irrigation system, and political disorder are the primary causes of this. This is a temporary problem, though a serious one. Behind it lies the general Far Eastern problem—the impoverished small cultivator. The policy of the Viet-Minh towards this problem is not in doubt. It will seek to make the cultivator the owner of his holding. This alone, however, will not solve the problem of overpopulation or of primitive methods of agriculture. Whether France, in turn, can give the necessary economic and technical assistance is doubtful, but that such assistance is necessary, and in liberal measure is evident. Without it, serious unrest may be expected to continue.

#### THE PHILIPPINES

The Philippine archipelago presents a problem distinct from those so far considered. It is not complicated by rival policies of the great powers, for Philippine nationality has been developed exclusively by American policy, the ultimate objective of independence having been repeatedly declared prior to 1941. The stubborn defence of the main island by Philippine forces under General MacArthur in 1941-42 demonstrated the quality of the work which had been done by the United States, and emphasised at the same time the strength of Philippine national feeling. The Japanese occupation produced its usual crop of quislings, many of whom have now been punished, and here, as elsewhere, extremist movements have made their appearance. Nevertheless the closeness of the American connection suggests that the Philippine Commonwealth will continue to look to American social and political models, whilst the geographical position

of the Commonwealth suggests that it will play an important part in any Far Eastern security system which may be established.

#### NETHERLANDS-INDIA

The Dutch possessions in the Far East constitute the most important colonial problem awaiting solution in this area. The economic wealth of Netherlands-India is well known, and the control of it was the main issue in the stubborn diplomatic duel between the United States and Japan in the two years which elapsed between the outbreak of war in Europe on September 3, 1939, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941. Conscious of the growth of national feeling in this area, the Dutch had already in 1941 announced that at the end of the war the whole of the Dutch possessions, in Europe, in America and in Eastern Asia would be transformed into a triune kingdom, in which all three parts would be on a footing of equality with one another. Unfortunately, this plan was never worked out in sufficient detail to be capable of being put clearly before the inhabitants of Netherlands-India. In any event, the prolongation of the war, coupled with Japanese connivance in independence movements in its later stages made the plan obsolete before a chance arrived to put it into operation. When the Japanese surrendered, the task of maintaining order passed initially to the British, who were placed in the embarrassing position of seeking to do nothing to prejudice the Dutch position, whilst at the same time seeking to remain on the best possible terms with the Indonesian independence movement.

By general consent, the Dutch showed greater foresight than Great Britain or the United States in assessing the extent of Japanese ambitions in the Pacific before 1941. This was not unnatural, as Netherlands-India was one of the main objectives of Japanese policy, and the Dutch offered stubborn resistance to each successive Japanese move. Further, two general factors affecting this area must be

borne in mind. The Dutch have been a colonising power in this area for over three hundred years, and during that time they have persistently followed an enlightened policy, making very great efforts to weld the varying native populations of the area into a harmonious political system. Secondly, of a total population of this area of approximately 70,000,000, nearly 50,000,000 of them inhabit Java, which is about as large as England and Wales. The density of population in Java is, therefore, nearly 1,000 to the square mile—the greatest in the world, for that of Belgium is no more than 700 to the square mile, and Belgium is mainly industrial, whilst Java is mainly agricultural. This heavy population is of modern growth, and is a consequence of Dutch rule and initiative, as the high population of India is a consequence of British rule. The high populations of India and Java have important consequences for the rest of Netherlands-India; for there is emigration from both Java and India to the sparsely-populated but potentially productive islands of the East Indies. This is resented by the indigenous peoples, who are predominantly of Malay stock, but with many local differences, and with many variations in civilisation. The Indonesian independence movement, as it has called itself, has already shown some disposition to claim to speak on behalf of Netherlands-India as a whole. This is a completely fallacious claim, as the problems of Java, in so far as they are problems arising from over-population, are not shared by the inhabitants of the remainder of the archipelago. Furthermore, the Javanese is politically highly-developed and inherits a civilisation of great antiquity.

As the situation has developed in Java, all thoughts of a Dutch reconquest have had to be abandoned, as the nationalists had assumed effective control of most of the island outside Batavia and one or two other main centres of population. The situation was seriously complicated, too, by the fact that the nationalists detained many Dutch, men, women and children as hostages. Negotiations, with

Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr as intermediary, have concentrated upon the future relationship of Java to Holland, and an exploration of the question whether anything less than complete formal independence will prove acceptable to the Javanese. On a long-term view, the Javanese would be well-advised to accept continued association with the Dutch, who can give them much assistance towards standing economically on their own feet. Without external aid, Java faces famine, and perhaps the outbreak of civil war and anarchy, for obviously so high a population, drawing its living from agriculture, must be assured of foreign markets if recurring crises are to be avoided. An independent Java would have to make its own terms upon the question of emigration to the adjacent islands.

#### A MALAYAN UNION?

Malaya presents the most difficult British colonial problem in this area. Roughly the same size as Java, it abounds with natural resources, the chief being rubber and tin. Both politically and racially, Malaya has peculiar problems. Four races—Europeans, Malays, Chinese and Indians—live side by side. All except the Malays are sojourners, rather than citizens, and the Malay takes little part in the economic development of the peninsula; all of which has occurred under British rule, and much of it during the present century. Down to 1939, British colonial territory was limited to Penang, Malacca, and Singapore. The latter, then an uninhabited island, was purchased from the Sultan of Johore a century and a half ago, as a result of the foresight and pertinacity of Sir Stamford Raffles. It has since become one of the world's great ports, with a population rapidly approaching a million. North of Singapore lies the largest of the Malay States, Johore, and beyond this, the Federated Malay States, ruled by native Sultans, and advised by British residents, who are responsible to the High Commissioner. North of these lie the unfederated Malay States, which were formerly the object of Siamese ambition, but

which were finally removed from the sphere of Siamese influence in 1908. In the past, the relations between the Malay States, both federated and unfederated, and Great Britain have been peculiarly harmonious. Dynastic disputes (which were chronic and recurrent in Malaya) were settled by the Crown's representative. Foreign relations were in the hands of the Crown as a result of treaties freely concluded, whilst the native administrations shared in the revenues accruing from economic development which the pacification of the peninsula had made possible.

The Japanese invasion and occupation have revealed flaws, however. It has shown a detachment amongst some of the races which was a real source of weakness. In the future, it is clear, a real effort must be made to associate all four races in the future progress of the peninsula. Without it, and with the present tide of nationalism sweeping the Far East, there is grave danger that Malaya may become the scene of racial strife. As it is, the Malays are now organised on a national basis as never before, and they are showing increasing restiveness at the presence of Indian and Chinese communities in Malaya. With the object of minimising inter-racial friction, therefore, the British Government have put forward a plan for a Malayan union, which will unite the whole of the peninsula, excluding Singapore, which is to remain a British colony. Within the union there will be fashioned a common Malayan citizenship, open to members of all races who satisfy the necessary conditions of residence. Moreover, Malaya affords, in a different setting, another example of the general Far Eastern problem, for a correspondent in *The Times*, March 28, 1946, wrote:

'A dynamic policy of economic advancement of the indigenous population is an urgent necessity. In fact, a wholesale reform of Malayan economy, based on the need for preserving an indigenous and stable landed peasantry, may seem desirable. There is immense scope for improvement in agricultural methods and the further development



of the co-operative system. Technical training would be an effective means of affording the Malays opportunities in commerce and industry. Wider education would be a medium by which a greater sense of unity and common purpose could be engendered in the minds of the young Malays, and there should be an intensive campaign to promote the required political adjustments and to abolish deep-rooted racial prejudices and the bitterness caused by the war.'

There is reflected in this contribution a marked change from the pre-war policy towards controlled economic development, and the strengthening of the position of the Malay who, apart from the ports, still predominates in the peninsula. That such a policy will meet with resistance both from Indians and Chinese, and perhaps also from Javanese (who have recently been attracted to Malaya) is clear. It would seem, however, that the policy has already encountered resistance from the Malays—at any rate from the Sultans, whose attachment to their treaty relations with the Crown closely resembles that of the Indian Princes. In a letter to *The Times*, April 16, 1946, a number of former Governors, Residents, and other high officials of Malaya wrote:

'We, who have held the high appointments mentioned below in the Government services in Malaya, desire to express our profound concern at the manner in which nine Malay Rulers, in their loyal trust of the British Government, have been "invited" to sign treaties which they imperfectly understood, transferring "full power and jurisdiction to His Majesty the King" in their respective "protected States".

'Our concern is the greater on account of the summary method by which the Rulers' signatures to these treaties were obtained. Immediately after three and a half years of Japanese occupation, and while a large British Army was still in Malaya, their Highnesses, with no advice, legal or other, at their disposal and with no opportunity adequately to consult their State Councils and their subjects, were induced to sign forthwith an "agreement" placed before

them by an official, whose instructions were to "invite" their signatures and at the same time to scrutinise their loyalty with power to recognise them or to depose them and appoint "suitable Malay personages" in their stead. The treaties were so worded as to appear to some at least of the Rulers as merely a reaffirmation of loyalty to the King after the Japanese interregnum, and their purport is indeed so obscure that members of Parliament are still uncertain of their meaning.

'We have good reason to believe that their Highnesses and the people of Malaya would consider favourably a true federation of the nine States in association with the Straits Settlements, full regard being paid to the claims of all persons whose real home is in Malaya. In our opinion, it is still possible to achieve such a federation, without annexation, and in such a manner as to encourage a spirit of active co-operation and to restore confidence in British good faith.

'We deprecate the mutilation of the proposed "Malayan Union" by the exclusion of its greatest port and town, Singapore.

'We deprecate the manner in which the people of the Straits Settlements and of the Malay States are being coerced by Orders in Council without regard to democratic principles, and finally we deprecate with all the emphasis at our command the issue of the preliminary Orders in Council, purporting to provide no more than a "framework" for the immediate administration of Malaya, but being in effect an instrument for the annexation of the Malay States.'

It is unfortunately true, however, that there can be no omelette without the breaking of eggs. Technically, the British Crown is acting within its rights, since Malaya has been recovered by force of arms. Moreover, the necessity for implementing the new policy is urgent, and there would be obvious difficulties in proceeding to a Malay Union by way of debate in the Legislatures of the Straits Settlements, of the Federated Malay States and of the Unfederated States. Nevertheless, at the time of writing, Malayan opinion has

proved sufficiently strong for the Colonial Office to modify its proposals, substituting a Federation, which will be in effect an enlargement of the existing Federation, for the proposed Union. The present constitutional dispute in Malaya sharply stresses how far national rivalries have developed in the past five years, and how they have undermined systems of colonial administration which before 1900 worked without noticeable strain.

#### BURMA IN TRANSITION

Before the Japanese surrender, there was a disposition to consider Burma's problems as distinct from those of the Far Eastern area under consideration, and to suggest that an orderly and perhaps delayed progress towards Dominion status would meet the aspirations of the Burmese people. It is already apparent that such hopes are ill-founded. Though preserving their walled aloofness, the people of Burma have been greatly influenced by the progress of events in Java, in French Indo-China, and in India itself, and a dangerous political situation is steadily developing. The territory now included within the area designated 'Burma' includes not only Upper and Lower Burma, but also the Shan States, inhabited by a people racially quite distinct from the Burmese. From the future constitutional evolution of Burma proper, the Shan States will be excluded.

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Burma acknowledged Chinese suzerainty, and was influenced to some extent by Chinese civilisation, although the connection was never close. The annexation of Burma to India led for a time to the subordination of Burmese to Indian affairs. It has also led to a progressive emigration from India to Burma, a movement which is deeply resented by the Burmese, more especially as it has involved the increasing control of Burmese economic life by the more assertive Indian trader. After the first World War, Burma was detached from India, and the goal of British policy in Burma was declared to be the creation of another dominion. Considerable progress towards self-government had been

achieved before the Japanese invasion in 1942, under a constitution introduced in 1935.

The Japanese surrender has created extremely difficult problems for the returning administration. Burma has suffered from two campaigns, with the result that, whilst in normal times Burma is the greatest rice-exporting country in the world, exporting half of her annual crop of 7,000,000 tons, during 1946 she will produce barely enough for her own needs, and there is little hope that the position will have improved materially by 1947. A correspondent of *The Times*, surveying the situation in April, 1946, pointed out that unless cheap consumer goods were made available immediately, the incentive for rice cultivation will be lacking. The results of the absence of Burma's rice surplus in relation to India have already been extremely serious, and will continue to be so for the next two years.

Side by side with the economic problem is the political problem. During the occupation, the Japanese encouraged Burma's aspirations towards independence, whilst on the other hand, resistance to the Japanese developed among the younger and more radical-minded Burmese, who to-day find themselves in disfavour with the returned administration, functioning as it does with the aid of an unrepresentative Executive Council. To complicate the position still further, the internal administration of the country had been reduced to chaos as a result of the campaigns there and of the disruption brought about by the Japanese, and the British Treasury has acted promptly and with foresight in advancing £87,000,000 to Burma to recreate essential services, and to bridge the period of transition. Yet this advance implies corresponding responsibilities, and the Burmese are to-day impatient of the control involved in the process of rehabilitation. The main instrument of Burmese political activity is the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, whose programme resembles in some important particulars that of the Viet-Minh in Indo-China, and like that party, its technique is derived from Communist rather

than from Western democratic models. Its aim is to end British economic control of Burma's resources. To associate this party with the task of evolving a democratic Burma will not be easy, but unless it is attempted, the future of Burma will be difficult.

### CONCLUSION

From this brief survey of Far Eastern conditions since the Japanese surrender, certain important features have, of necessity, been omitted. Apart from the problem of the Pacific Islands, already mentioned, there is the problem of Japan, which presents some features which reappear in many of the areas already considered, but which, on account of Japan's recent history and the presence of occupying armies, cannot be briefly treated in this contribution.

The most striking general feature emerging from this analysis of Far Eastern conditions is the rapid development of widespread and well-organised radical Left-wing parties out of resistance groups. These have robbed the older organisations of credit and authority in colonial territories, and even in China they are formidable rivals to the Nationalists who, without Anglo-American support, would probably be unable either to suppress them or to co-operate with them. The second general feature of this area is the problem of a rapidly increasing agricultural population, wresting a bare living from the soil by the most primitive methods, and now in a dangerously explosive frame of mind, owing to the disintegration of the Far East which the Far Eastern war and the Japanese occupation have brought about. It is from these land-hungry small cultivators that the new political organisations derive their strength. They are neither pro- nor anti-Japanese, nor pro- nor anti-Western. They are simply pro-peasant, and impatient of any checks to the repudiation of landlordism and agricultural indebtedness. This, however, though it gives a keen edge to their nationalism, is no final solution of their economic problems. An independent Burma would exclude Indian immigration. So would an independent Java.

Yet Java and India both seek outlets for overabundant population. So does China. Moreover, every Far Eastern community will need both financial aid and expert guidance if population pressure is to be relieved by progressive industrialisation. To denounce Western 'exploitation' is to-day a certain method of obtaining adherents in the Far East, but if Western 'exploitation' goes, and nothing takes its place, wide areas will starve in the midst of plenty, for lack of transport, modern implements, and a generally-accepted system of exchange. This necessarily means that, although the old colonial system has gone, some other Far Eastern system must be developed to take its place. Such a system, however, depends upon agreement between the major powers, and agreement between, for example, the Soviet and the United States either upon social policy or political organisation is remote. If, however, international rivalries are to be allowed to operate in the Far Eastern area, then the whole of that area will have entered upon a long period of political and social unrest with unpredictable consequences. If the Peace Conference upon the Far East fails to produce an agreed policy, the Far Eastern War will have been fought in vain.

Note Since this article was written, a representative Executive Council has been installed in Burma. See *The Times*, September 27, 1946

# INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOCIETY

By

G. SCHWARZENBERGER

THE key to understanding the functions fulfilled by any legal system, whether national or international, lies in the structure of its social background. Naturally, such a relationship is not a one-sided one. Yet primarily it is the specific character of the social group which impresses itself on the law. Merely in a secondary way, the law reacts back on its social environment. Fundamentally, social life expresses itself in two different group relationships: those of a society and those of a community. The relations between master and slave in slave-holding societies, between shareholders in modern commercial enterprises, or between the ruling class and the subjects of a totalitarian State offer instances of the former type; and those between the members of a family, blood brotherhood, or living church exemplify the latter. An examination of the legal systems corresponding to these social relationships reveals two essentially different types of law: the law of power and the law of co-ordination. The former mainly fulfils the functions of making possible social co-existence and of adjusting diverging interests in accordance with the prevalent power relation between rulers and ruled. The task of the latter consists in contributing to the further integration of the community and is normally restricted to the enforcement in exceptional cases of the minimum standards regarded as indispensable by the community. Yet it cannot be emphasised strongly enough that, in reality, these pure types of society and community, and their corresponding types of law, always have a tendency to be blurred to a greater or lesser extent. A community will often be prepared to make use of the self-interest of its members as

a vehicle of social action, and, equally, a society requires a modicum of fairness and mutuality. Then the law of reciprocity provides a meeting-ground for, and an intermediate stage between, the laws of power and of co-ordination.

By reference to these three basic types of law and by the analysis of the concrete relationship between them in any given legal system, it becomes possible to go beyond the current and highly abstract definitions of law and to analyse more closely the place of law in any particular social group. If international law partakes of the character of law, its functions can be made evident only by the correlation of international law to its own peculiar social environment. Two questions therefore arise: what is the nature of the social substratum of international law, and what are the dominant motive powers determining the actions of groups in the international sphere?

#### THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

To conceive international relations in terms of a community requires a certain sense of humour. Examples from the most recent past are not wanting. Yet compared with these the period preceding the First World War has the advantage of being both near enough to be within everyone's memory and knowledge and yet sufficiently remote to appear as the responsibility of bygone generations.

After the Franco-German war of 1870-1871, France was isolated. The meeting in Berlin, in September, 1872, between the Emperors of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia made this situation apparent to the world at large. As was shown by the League of the Three Emperors, formed at Schoenbrunn in 1873, the German-Austrian Alliance of 1879, and the Alliance of the three Empires of 1881, Bismarck's policy aimed at the maintenance and consolidation of the position achieved by Germany on the chessboard of Europe. Even on the basis of such a benevolent interpretation of Bismarck's foreign policy, the peculiarities of the assumptions on which inter-State relations are based become evident. It is taken



for granted that, at least for defensive purposes, every State has uppermost in its mind its own existence and survival and, in the case of a Greater power, this means survival as a Greater power. This interest may or may not coincide with that of peace. If it does not, everything, including peace, has to be subordinated to what appears to be the highest value: the survival of the Greater powers as Greater powers.

Bismarck's system of defensive alliances reached its high watermark with the conclusion of the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia of 1887. Once the Treaty was allowed to lapse, in 1890, the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary could no longer safely be regarded by Russia as in no circumstances being directed against herself. In accordance with the advice tendered to his king by an Indian philosopher nearly two thousand years ago, the Russian reaction was inevitable: 'The enemy of your enemy is your friend.' Thus, in spite of the misgivings of republican and liberal Frenchmen over an alignment with the Czarist autocracy and of corresponding ideological qualms on the part of the rulers of Russia, the rapprochement between France and Russia and the alliance between both countries were a foregone conclusion. The German-Austrian alliance had produced its counter-alliance. Quite naturally, each side began to look round for additional allies, and States not yet finally committed to one or the other camp uneasily sat on the fence and, in this way, only increased the general uncertainty and distrust. Thus, in a State system which was composed of more than two States and which was already sufficiently closely integrated for no one State to be able to ignore such alignments, alliances and counter-alliances inevitably led to a balance of power. In such an atmosphere, and by the impetus of a general armament race, unavoidable in such a system, a major conflagration sooner or later became a certainty. The object of diplomacy was no longer to preserve peace, but, at the best, to postpone war, and to

manœuvre one's own country into the best possible tactical position in the storm to come.

The relations of States on such a footing with each other may be described as a system of power politics. Scientifically used, the term signifies first the typical forms of the behaviour of groups within a society as distinct from a community. Secondly, it implies that the relations between these groups are based on two fundamental assumptions: each group is not merely a means to an end, but an end in itself; and, at least for purposes of self-preservation, any measures required to achieve this object are justified. Thirdly, it means that the hierarchy between groups within such a system is measured by their political, economic and military strength; that is to say, their weight in any potential or actual conflict.

In order to understand the origin and growth of world power politics, it is necessary to be aware of the three most powerful agencies behind the formation of this system. In constant interaction between each other, the trends towards disintegration, expansion and centralisation have produced our world society.

Whatever the shortcomings of the Middle Ages may have been, during that period Europe formed a commonwealth based on common Christian values, on a common philosophical and scientific outlook, on a common code of honour, on a common architecture, and, amongst the educated, even on a common language. Under the combined onslaught of the disruptive spiritual, social and economic forces of the Renaissance, the medieval system succumbed. The absolutist States of Europe, fragments of the pyramidal structure of the medieval community, provided one of the few rallying points which were left. Internecine struggles among them and a period of apparent chaos brought to the surface those amongst the Leviathans who, by reason of power, geographical position, and shrewdness of their rulers, were best fitted to weather the turmoil of an age of revolution and transition.

The forces unloosed by the Renaissance, however, were

too vigorous and dynamic to allow themselves to be compressed within the compass of medieval Europe. The world was their field, and, in the process of the colonial and imperial expansion of the European Powers, the European society of nations gradually engulfed the New World, Asia and Africa. Though divided in their religious allegiances, the European States still shared a vast fund of values, cherished by Catholics and Protestants alike and ultimately derived both from Christianity and the rediscovery of antiquity. This tradition could be passed on to the newly discovered continents in which emigrants from Europe settled in considerable numbers. Yet, though Europe was strong enough to open up and to subjugate other parts of the world, it could not force the rest of mankind to accept the Western way of life. At the most, the old civilisations of Asia were prepared to bide their time and, meanwhile, to study the means by which the West so successfully had defeated what they still considered to be their own superior ways of life. Thus, not much more than the overwhelming power of the Western States, the common technical devices of modern industry and finance and mutual commercial interests, held together the emerging world society, ruled by the Western civilised nations, as they, at least, regarded themselves.

In the course of the continuous struggle for survival, European States and empires grew and decayed, but some of them succeeded in stabilising themselves and in drawing additional strength from a newly emerging emotional force, modern nationalism. Based on discrepancies in economic and military power, the size of their population and national cohesion, a hierarchy between greater and smaller States developed. If the great wars of the past centuries in Europe are surveyed and judged by their results rather than by the intentions of the belligerents, it becomes obvious that their objective function has been continuously to test the claims of States to be regarded as Greater powers and, in a rough-handed manner, to intensify the trend towards centralisation and towards the creation of still greater States and empires.

In the nineteenth century it was the Pentarchy of Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Prussia (later Germany), and Russia which ruled over Europe. In 1919, the fate of the world was decided by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers: the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan. Today, this function is being fulfilled by the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth and Empire, China and France.

#### THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POWER

The sceptic may be forgiven for doubting whether in a sphere so much permeated by power there is any scope for law whatsoever. Yet the same States which for more than four centuries have been immersed in the vortex of power politics themselves attest to the reality of international law. In the diplomatic notes of their foreign offices they regularly complain of any violation of their rights under international customary law and under international treaties; they demand and make reparation for violations of international law; they conclude agreements for the settlement of their disputes, appear before international tribunals and Courts as plaintiffs and defendants, and, still more important, ungrudgingly and in a most gentlemanly fashion, comply with international awards. In their practice, international judicial institutions, particularly the Permanent Court of International Justice, have built up an imposing system of case law, ranging over the whole field of international law.

What, then, are the functions fulfilled by law in the international society?

In a society in which power is the overriding consideration, it is not unnatural that, primarily, law should serve the purposes of those who wield power rather than restrain the mighty in the interest of the weak who may be in need of the law's protection. A few examples may illustrate the ideological aspects of international law.

In a system of power politics, peace is but the interval between major wars. The equilibrium of force on which it rests is formulated in legal terms in the peace treaty, and

the non-war period lasts as long as the States which have been victorious in the preceding struggle are able and willing to maintain the order established at the peace conference. If there were no peace treaty, the victors would either have to fight to the finish and incorporate the countries of the defeated enemies into their own territories or keep them under some kind of semi-permanent occupation. It therefore saves strenuous exertions if it is possible to obtain the consent of the vanquished to more limited measures which may equally well serve the purpose of maintaining the hegemony established by the force of arms. If this can be achieved, the settlement is no longer based on mere force. The signature of the vanquished and the contractual character of the obligations undertaken by him endow the peace treaty with the sanctity of law. While in the national law of any civilised State the free consent of the parties to a contract is a condition of its validity, in international law nothing short of actual physical threat to, or coercion of, the actual persons of the plenipotentiaries invalidates an international treaty.

If a State desires to break an international engagement, international law offers convenient excuses of a quasi-legal character such as the principles of self-preservation or self-defence or the *clausula rebus sic stantibus*. Admittedly, it is a sound legal principle that a treaty does not cover situations which, at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, neither party could possibly have contemplated. Thus, in countries in which the currency had lost practically all its value, it was rightly held that a serious inflation affected the very basis of contracts, and that a party could not be asked to perform its contract merely in order to receive valueless paper in exchange. Yet there is all the difference between a situation in which independent Courts judge the submissions of the parties concerned and either pronounce the contract to be terminated or adjust it to changed circumstances, and the position which exists in international law. Here, in the absence of agreements to the contrary, States are not bound to submit their disputes to tribunals or Courts, and they

remain judges in their own causes. This means that allegation stands against allegation, and it mainly becomes a question of propagating public opinion both at home and abroad whether the unilateral action taken is considered as a breach of treaty or as a well-justified act. The measures taken by Russia in 1871 regarding the Black Sea clauses in the Peace Treaty of 1856, by Austria-Hungary in 1908 regarding the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the denunciation by the Third Reich of the Locarno Treaties and of the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland bear out this point.

Equally, devices such as intervention, pacific blockade, or reprisals are very often merely unjustified acts of violence in time of peace, or else they amount to a resort to war under the disguise of measures taken in accordance with the international law of peace. Though examples could be multiplied, it may suffice to recall the blockade of the Venezuelan ports by Germany, Great Britain and Italy in 1903 or the Italian bombardment of Corfu in 1923. While abuse of law is not a phenomenon unknown even in the laws of civilised communities, the absence of organs which can automatically investigate the legality of measures of self-help means that any State which is sufficiently powerful may with impunity cloak its high-handed action in the garment of law, and thus mock the very name of international law.

The significance of the abuses to which the absence of an automatic judicial review of such unilateral acts lays open international law may be challenged on the ground that these examples magnify beyond proportion occasional and regrettable exceptions, and that the emphasis on these instances does not do justice to the higher standards with which, at most times, the majority of States unhesitatingly conform. Even granting this argument, the predominance of the law of power in international law rests on much deeper foundations. It goes down to the very root of international customary law, to the conception of State sovereignty. Any change in the *status quo*, territorial or otherwise, depends on the consent of the States concerned, and any matter which,

by customary or treaty law, is not subject to international law is within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the sovereign State. What this means becomes clear if we enumerate merely two or three of the topics which, in accordance with international law, States have a right to reserve to their national jurisdiction: access to raw materials and markets and questions of migration. In a society which is as dynamic as modern society in its internal and external aspects, such a state of affairs is only tolerable on one condition: if States are willing to compromise and to agree voluntarily to make concessions which, in fairness and justice, they can be asked to grant. If this should not be the case, a State is faced with a difficult alternative. It must either resign itself to the refusal of its demands on the part of other States or it must be able to lend weight to its request by the threat or application of pressure. By building international law on the foundation of national sovereignty and by their jealous guardianship of this apparently priceless possession, States make quite sure that, in the international sphere, the rule of law remains subject to the overriding rule of force.

Though this description of international law as a law of power may be grudgingly conceded as a correct appraisal of pre-1914 international law, it may be held that such an analysis does scant justice to the development of international law in the inter-war period between 1919 and 1939 and to its particular achievements, the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact. It would be too easy to refute such an objection by an all-too-long list of notorious failures of the General system and of the numerous breaches of the Pact of Paris for the Renunciation of War. What, however, cannot be passed over in silence, is the fact that the drafters of both these collective treaties failed to face exactly that issue which could be shirked only at the price of frustration: State sovereignty. Quite apart from the absurd interpretation of the unanimity principle under Article 11 of the League Covenant, which, in the case of the Manchukuo conflict, was held to require the inclusion of the aggressor, the crux of the

matter is how a collective system deals with disputes which States are not prepared to settle on the basis of existing international law. Short of a unanimous report on the part of the League Council, an aggressor had not to fear any collective action whatsoever. Even if the required unanimity had been reached—Article 15 mercifully provides that, in counting the unanimous vote, the parties to a dispute may be ignored—all that happened was the compulsory application of economic sanctions. Yet as the sanctions experiment in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict and the non-application of the oil sanction have shown, in the absence of willingness on the part of the League members to apply military sanctions, this merely meant that the aggressor, and not the League of Nations, decided on the economic or military character of any particular sanction. Furthermore, if the issue related to a matter which international law reserves to the domestic jurisdiction of a State—usually those questions over which States consider it worth while fighting for—the League Council was precluded from making any recommendation at all. To select merely one more instance, the procedure for revision visualised in Article 19 of the Covenant was grotesque. If a treaty had become unapplicable—whatever this may have meant—or if the continuance of certain international conditions endangered the peace of the world, the League Assembly could advise member States to reconsider the position. If the member States did so, all was well; if not, they were under no further obligation, and the League could do no more.

It could at least be said in favour of the League of Nations that it attempted to solve the problem of world order by a threefold positive approach: the pacific settlement of international disputes, collective security and disarmament. The Pact of Paris, however, limits itself to the outlawry of war on paper. Just as no constitution-maker has yet succeeded in preventing revolution by prohibiting it, so the fate of this treaty was a foregone conclusion. Less known is the diplomatic correspondence preceding and accompanying the conclusion of the Pact. Kellogg himself affirmed that the Pact



did not prevent a signatory State from resorting to war in self-defence, and that each State had to decide for itself whether such a situation had arisen. Thus it was left to every aggressor to determine for himself whether his action amounted to self-defence, and to each signatory to see, in whatever light he chose, the aggression on the part of any other signatory State. In this connection, it is well to remember that, at the outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinian War, the withdrawal of Abyssinian troops to a zone of twenty miles behind the Abyssinian frontier was cited by Mussolini as irrefutable proof of the Abyssinian intention to attack what was once Italian East Africa.

Whoever is naïve enough to believe it, may think that all these shortcomings of the League of Nations and of the Kellogg Pact have been regrettable oversights and blunders on the part of the Statesmen concerned and of their professional advisers. To hold this view implies a very poor opinion of the intellectual capacities of those responsible for the fates of nations. Together with the notorious reservations of national honour and vital interests in the arbitration treaties of the pre-1914 era, these all-too-obvious loopholes in the collective agreements of the post-1919 period appear to suggest a different interpretation. Steeped as foreign offices are in the traditions of power politics, and imbued, as they are, with their duty of serving the interests of their own countries first and last, these guardians of national sovereignty and of national interest may or may not believe in the possibility of a true international community. In any case, they consider it to be their task to save their countries from the follies and the 'idealism' of public opinion and, if necessary, of their own political heads. Though, in form, they may sometimes have had to give way to the pressure of public opinion in the democracies and to the necessity of honouring election pledges, in substance, they have always succeeded in re-introducing through the backdoor all the reservations required for the undiminished survival of national sovereignty. If public opinion does not permit them to play power politics in the

polished forms of the eighteenth century or in the more brutal ways of the nineteenth century, the same game can be played in the twentieth-century style of power politics in disguise. It has been the misfortune of international law, as applied in the twenty years between the First and Second World Wars, to provide the technical ways and means for the achievement of these objects.

#### THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECIPROCITY

Is international law, then, merely a pious fraud, at which the augurs smile? To rest content with an unqualified answer in the affirmative would be as unrealistic and unscientific as is the attitude of those who choose to ignore the ideological functions fulfilled by international law. As long as there is a system of world power politics, international law will have to serve its purposes. Yet international law is not only a law of power. It is also a law of reciprocity, and even traces of the law of co-ordination are not entirely lacking.

In the rules regarding diplomatic immunity or regarding territorial waters, the working of the principle of reciprocity becomes apparent. At a time when, in these spheres, international law was still in a formative stage, States had the choice whether to interpret restrictively the rights of immunity granted to the representatives of foreign States or whether to give them a liberal construction. If, in the interest of their own untrammelled sovereignty, they had preferred the former course, there was nothing to prevent them from taking such a line. In this case, however, they could not expect a more generous treatment for their own representatives in foreign countries than they themselves were prepared to grant to those of other States. Actually, States did not act in such a short-sighted manner. Thus an international customary law grew up which derived its strength and authority from the automatic working of the principle of reciprocity. In most civilised countries it received added support from national statutes, codifying the rules of international common law, and from national Courts, sustaining international law by a

liberal construction of these statutes. Or, to turn to the question of the sea frontier, States found it necessary and opportune to subject to their exclusive control a belt of the high sea next to their own coast line. If they made exaggerated claims regarding the width of their own territorial waters, they were bound to be met by the same argument whenever they demanded the benefits of the freedom of the high seas in waters bordering on the coasts of other States. Thus, at a time when the range of shore batteries extended to about three miles, a widely accepted rule of customary law crystallised, fixing at this distance the minimum limits of territorial waters.

Though peace treaties offer an example *par excellence* of treaties likely to be used in the interest of the law of power, the normal function of international treaties consists in giving concrete expression to the principle of reciprocity in spheres in which, on a basis of mutuality, States desire to limit the exercise of their unfettered national sovereignties. States are likely to do so only when, in their view, the benefits to be derived from the restriction of the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of other States appear to outweigh or, at least, to balance the disadvantages resulting from a restriction of their own freedom. Thus crime constitutes a menace to any human society. If, by simply leaving the country in which punishment threatens them, criminals could manage to escape punishment or, if without risk, criminals could operate on an international scale, criminal justice would be outwitted by the most dangerous types of lawbreakers. Extradition treaties provide an easy means of solving the problem. Similarly, in the spheres of transit, of transport, of communications on land, sea, and in the air, of the protection of economic interests abroad such as copyright or trade marks, or of international trade, treaties on the basis of reciprocity make normal life at least bearable in a world of sovereign States.

It is not by accident that all this evidence of the working of the principle of reciprocity is taken from spheres which, from the point of view of power politics, are either merely

peripheric or completely irrelevant. Yet if States wish to behave in a rational manner even in the realm of political issues, they can meet on the common denominator of reciprocity. An outstanding example is offered by a comparison between the Minorities Treaties of the post-1919 period and the Geneva Convention of 1922 between Germany and Poland regarding Upper Silesia. The States which had been unilaterally burdened in 1919 and after with obligations in favour of national, racial and religious minorities, not unnaturally considered these clauses to form an intolerable burden on their still new—and, therefore, rather touchy—national sovereignties. When, however, after the division of Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland, both States were induced to accept far-reaching restrictions of their national sovereignties on both sides of a highly artificial border, it was found that the complicated experiment, laid down in more than 600 Articles of the Convention, worked exceedingly well. Each of the parties soon found that, if, under the Convention, it favoured a liberal interpretation of its own rights, in due course the same construction would be demanded by the other side. In accordance with the principle of reciprocity, and with the assistance of the international organs entrusted with the supervision of the execution of the Convention, an equilibrium was soon established which secured a reasonable continuation of social and economic life in the divided district.

It may sound paradoxical, but it is no more than logical that the principle of reciprocity may even be found at work in the spheres of the laws of war and neutrality. Once the trump cards of power politics have been played, and the issue is left to be decided in terms of force, even for the achievement of the objects of war, the unlimited application of the means of destruction may prove to be unnecessary. As long as a certain balance of strength exists between the belligerents, there is a limited scope for the mutual application of rules of chivalry and human decency. Conventions regarding prisoners of war and the treatment of wounded and sick soldiers, as well as the work of the International Red

Cross, bear out this statement. Similarly, in the relations between belligerents and neutrals, an equilibrium tends to be reached, when the advantages to be derived from interference with neutral rights are outbalanced by the risk that an outraged neutral may ally itself with a more scrupulous opponent. Nevertheless, an express reservation must here be made. This analysis applies to wars fought for limited purposes, such as the Crimean War or the Franco-German War of 1870-1871, that is to say, to wars which are waged between powers who still have in common the minimum of common values associated with the notion of civilised States. In wars, however, such as the Napoleonic Wars or the First and Second World Wars, which were wars to the finish, the weaker side had a tendency, in favour of short-range advantages to be gained by the violation of international law, to forsake the limitations imposed on it by international customary and treaty law. Germany's resort in the First World War to unrestricted submarine warfare and to the use of poison gas proves the strength of such a temptation. Still less scope is there for the principle of reciprocity, if, as in the Second World War, Fascist States not only challenged a particular system of power politics, but world civilisation as such and, intentionally and indiscriminately, flouted international law with the express purpose of widening still further the already existing gulf between their nations and the rest of the world. Yet even then international law is far from being helpless and, in the punishment of war crimes and in the outlawry of gangster governments, it provides means of redress for the horrors committed by mechanised barbarism.

#### THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CO-ORDINATION

Any picture of the functions fulfilled by international law would be incomplete if its most promising aspect, the rules and institutions in the border-zone between the laws of reciprocity and of co-ordination, did not receive due attention.

In the sphere of the law of international rivers, national and international Courts have developed the conception of an

international river community, characterised by the common interest of all riparian States in the navigability of such rivers and by the absolute equality in the rights and duties of the members of such a regional community. By the Barcelona Convention of 1921, the benefits of this principle, which the Congress of Vienna had limited to riparian States, were extended to all the signatories of this multi-lateral treaty. Whereas the insistence on national sovereignty over certain parts of such rivers reduces their value for all to a vanishing point, the change of emphasis from an atomistic approach to one of partnership on the basis of an international convention transforms international society law into a law of co-ordination; and the concomitant restriction of national sovereignty on a basis of reciprocity makes possible freedom of communications and, within a narrow field, a regional community.

On a larger scale, and with equal success, the Universal Postal Union has solved the problem of how, in a world of sovereign States, to achieve the object of the best possible postal services all over the world. As has been convincingly shown by Sir Alfred Zimmermann, a comparison of its history with that of the International Telegraphic Union reveals the secret of the success of the Postal Union. Because of their political, military and economic importance, cables became an issue of power politics and of the diplomatic struggles between the foreign offices, while postal communications were left in the hands of professional experts and enthusiasts. Not being obsessed by notions of national interest and prestige, the postmasters set out to build up an organisation and a system which, from a functional point of view, would best serve this purpose. Contrary to all the traditions of national sovereignty, but in accordance with common sense, they treated the world as if it formed one single territory. The efficiency of the service which they provided assured the observance of the regulations made by the Union. Even universality of membership was achieved, as only at the risk of its own inconvenience could a State dare to stay outside or to withdraw from its orbit.

Limitation of space prohibits more than a reference to

the international law of co-ordination at work in the international anti-drug campaign or in the concerted action of the Western States in favour of refugees from totalitarian oppression. Yet it is impossible not to say at least a few words on the International Labour Organisation. In this international institution, the functional principle has found a—so far—unique expression. In addition to government representatives, its constituent bodies contain, on a footing of complete equality, delegates of both employers and workers. The Organisation was created partly as a counter-move against the Bolshevik bogey of 1918 and partly owing to the pressure of the working-class movement in the countries of the Allied and Associated Powers. They realised—and the Preamble to Part Thirteen of the Peace Treaty of Versailles expressly admits it—that 'the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries'. By giving expression to the antagonism and possible alignments between horizontal groups, the significance of the vertical division between the sovereign States was reduced to manageable proportions. If, nevertheless, the organisation has not had the same spectacular success as the Universal Postal Union, the reason is not far to seek. The International Labour Conferences may adopt any amount of draft conventions or recommendations for the improvement of labour conditions, but the decision whether these proposals are to be adopted remains as of old with each individual member State.

The transition from war to peace and the world-wide threat of famine and epidemics have provided further opportunities to give life to the law of co-ordination. Within limits, the victorious nations have shown themselves aware of their responsibilities and they have attempted to meet this challenge by the creation of UNRRA. In the Agreement establishing the United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Administration, the functions of this international institution were defined as giving to the population of the liberated

countries 'aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people, and as making preparations for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes and for assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services'. Admittedly, within the limits set to its activities by unavoidable shortages in supplies and a not unbounded generosity of its members, UNRRA waged a valiant fight in the war against hunger and pestilence. As, however, was shown by the speed with which UNRRA had to dissolve itself for lack of necessary means to carry on any longer, the liberality of war aims—as, for instance, expressed in the Atlantic Charter—has a tendency to dissolve into thin air with the outbreak of peace.

#### THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW

To what extent has the situation depicted so far been affected by the creation of the United Nations Organisation? Until experience shows that there has been a radical departure from the ways of the past, it appears advisable to emphasise more the likeness between this new world league and its Geneva predecessor than to dwell on yet unrealised possibilities and on the good intentions so generously displayed throughout the Charter. It is true that all the world Powers are members of the United Nations. This fact eliminates both a manifest weakness of the League of Nations and one of the most persuasive excuses for its manifold failures. It should equally be admitted that the machinery of the United Nations is more elaborate than that of the League of Nations, that the formal loopholes in the Covenant and Kellogg Pact for resort to armed force have been closed, and that a formidable framework for the application of sanctions has been created. Yet the test of the United Nations is not whether it can prevent or stop a war between smaller States—this has been achieved before by the Concert of Europe and by the League of Nations—but whether it can fulfil this function in a conflict between any of the world Powers.



Here, right from the outset, the United Nations relinquishes the role of the peace-maker. Though a permanent member of the Security Council cannot prevent the discussion in the Council of a dispute in which it is involved, and it cannot even hinder the adoption of strongly-worded resolutions, it can by its veto effectively prevent the application of any enforcement measures under Chapter Seven of the Charter. This means in effect that peace between the world Powers does not depend on the United Nations, but that the United Nations depends on peace between the world Powers. Thus, again, the international legal superstructure rests on the foundation of a balance of power system, and world order is allowed to depend on the vagaries of world power politics. Furthermore, in the form of nuclear energy and other weapons of unparalleled destructive force, some of the super-Leviathans wield power to an extent which puts the observance of the Charter completely at the mercy of their law-abidingness. If such an attitude of responsibility may be taken for granted, an alluring vista of the prospects for international law presents itself: the further enrichment of the law of nations by the case law of the International Court of Justice, the growth of international institutions, the extension of the conception of trusteeship in the colonial field, and—most fashionable—the international protection of fundamental human rights. If, however, internal difficulties, emotional nationalism, ideological intolerance, or imperialist greed should induce any of the world Powers to throw away their self-restraint, another President of another Assembly might have to repeat the words of the President of the last Assembly of the League of Nations: 'We are not assembled to discuss why our efforts were unavailing in years gone by. We know we were lacking in moral courage, that we often hesitated when action was needed, and that we sometimes acted where it would have been wiser to hesitate. We know that we were reluctant to shoulder responsibility for great decisions when greatness was needed.'

# THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

*Lessons of the Inter-War Period*

By

A. G. B. FISHER

WE are all agreed now that 'we must avoid the mistakes which we made after the last war'. This is excellent, so far as it goes, but obviously it still leaves unanswered, or indeed unasked, all the important and difficult questions. As soon as we attempt to describe with any precision the mistakes which now we must be careful to avoid, we at once encounter the sharpest divergence of opinion, amounting sometimes to flat and irreconcilable contradiction. This is not the place to offer any exhaustive analysis of the conflicts of outlook thus revealed. Our main interest here is an analysis of some of the conditions most likely to be favourable for the elucidation and application of a wise international post-war economic policy, and with that purpose in mind it would be a mistake to spend much time in arguing about the merits or demerits of the decisions which during the inter-war period were accepted or rejected by the harassed statesmen who were then responsible for national economic policies. Much that they then did was no doubt foolish and short-sighted; if they are to be judged by their actions, few even among the wisest statesmen of that time were sufficiently aware of the fact that decisions which took insufficient account of their repercussions upon the welfare of other economies would inevitably provoke countermeasures and reprisals. Even national policies which in themselves were wisely designed were thus often frustrated by similar decisions taken in other countries with equal disregard for their international implications.

It is now a commonplace to say that the economic history

of the inter-war period presents a depressing picture of conflicting and mutually frustrating national policies which continually got in each other's way and cancelled out the good intentions upon which, as often as not, they were based. The important lessons to be drawn from this experience are, however, less likely to emerge from any detailed criticism of the decisions, whether considered or irresponsible, to do what subsequently was seen to be the wrong thing, than from contemplation of the unfortunate fact that, in the absence of an effective international institutional framework, statesmen so often had no real choice in the matter. Even if they had known better, as they sometimes did, they frequently could not have acted more wisely than they did. Those who to-day have the responsibility for determining the content of our future economic policy would of course be most unwise if, as one concrete problem after another presented itself, they were to neglect the experience of the past, so much of which bears directly upon these knotty problems. There will, however, be a serious risk that even their best-intentioned efforts will again be frustrated unless they also realise how urgent is the task of filling in the gap in our institutional equipment, the influence of which was so baneful during the inter-war period. It was not merely that statesmen were suddenly overwhelmed with crisis conditions in which hasty decisions had inevitably to be made with little regard for their long-run consequences. A more farsighted policy was often in any event ruled out as impractical because the institutional framework was lacking which was an essential condition for effective international collaboration. Even when the need for such machinery was clearly realised, it was impossible to improvise it quickly at short notice. We shall not have accurately interpreted this unhappy experience unless, now that another opportunity for action has been given to us, we construct the international machinery whose absence in the twenties and thirties made futile our best endeavours at international economic reconstruction.

There is indeed a widespread recognition to-day of the value of international institutions, and there is even some danger that we may be too readily satisfied with anything offered to us to which this name can be attached. The mere existence of an impressive array of international organs and secretariats will be of little avail, if these institutions are not endowed with adequate authority or prestige, if the policies which they promulgate are ill-considered, or if the national policies which it will be their task to co-ordinate are basically contradictory and irreconcilable. Nevertheless even undue insistence upon the significance of international institutions as such may be pardoned at the present time, when we observe how frequently the outstanding lesson of the inter-war period is still neglected, and far too much time and energy wasted in debating the import of particular decisions taken at particular critical moments during that time when in the absence of an adequate institutional framework the statesman's practical range of choice was so sadly limited. We all know that the most hopeful way of avoiding the next war is not to continue planning for the last one, but many of us do not see so clearly that the most effective way of safeguarding ourselves against the economic troubles of the immediate future is not merely to refurbish the devices which we thought should have been adopted for salvage purposes from the wreck of the Great Depression. The wreck with which we are now threatened is in many fundamental respects entirely different, and common sense suggests that, whatever we may now think of the old devices, some of them are unlikely to have much relevance for an entirely new situation. If the real source of our troubles in the past is to be sought in the central fact of international anarchy itself rather than in any errors committed by individual statesmen or governments, clearly we should now seize the opportunity to probe more deeply to the roots of this anarchic situation.

It is, indeed, just because the mere existence of international institutions will not by itself be enough that it is

also essential that we should now examine carefully the structure of such international organs as are already being constructed. Unless care is taken to ensure that they will be allowed to engage in fundamental work of real importance, work of a kind which was seldom seriously attempted in the inter-war period, it will be easy for them to be constantly fobbed off with trifling tasks of little importance, and in the atmosphere of busy activity which inevitably surrounds such tasks when undertaken in an official international setting, the trifling character of the advance which has been made can easily be overlooked. It is not at all difficult for an international conference to present an impressive façade to the world, which in terms of actual realities nevertheless means precisely nothing. Some who have no difficulty in accepting as axiomatic the importance of new international organs are still unfortunately too apt to be content with mere constitutional forms, or sometimes, one might almost say, with little more than a mere name. Or alternatively their mistake may be of quite the opposite kind; some become so absorbed in elaborating the constitutional details of the international machinery which in their view 'must' be constructed if the admirable purposes to which they are devoted are to be achieved, that they overlook the unpleasant but inescapable fact that in the imperfect world in which we live it is in the highest degree improbable that such ideal forms will be permitted to exist. We should indeed perhaps not be too cautious in boldly setting forth our ultimate objectives. Many of our fundamental preconceived notions are now being called in question, and some revolutionary changes in our habits of thought and action, which a few years ago would generally have been rejected as fantastic and impossible, may now deserve more serious consideration. Nevertheless, within limits, we have to take the world as we find it. We may speculate about 'world government' if we like, but quite apart from any theoretical views we may cherish upon that subject, we must recognise the powerful resistances and obstructions which impede any dramatic move-

ment in that direction. Even inside those States where many people find speculation of this kind congenial to them, the resistances are powerful enough. Institutions of world government will also, however, need the ready assent and active co-operation of people in other countries to whom for the most part such ideas are still quite foreign. If we aim too high we may get nothing at all, and in any event it would be prudent to formulate as precisely as we can the *minimum* requirements which will have to be satisfied if we are to have not merely a pretentious array of international economic institutions, but an effective framework which will afford national statesmen some protection against the unhappy necessity in which in the past they often found themselves of being obliged to do the wrong thing.

In speculating about the future structure of international economic institutions we are evidently also concerned at the same time with the problem of the evolution of a new international economic world order. An examination of this problem throws some further useful light upon the contrast mentioned above between the content of policy and the institutional forms within which policy is worked out and applied. There are still the sharpest differences of opinion about the principles which ought to form the foundation of any reconstituted post-war international economic system. But though some of the deference which the idea commands is little more than lip-service, few would care in set terms to question the immense importance of some such system, whether from the narrower standpoint of British interests or in the wider interests of the world as a whole. Any new system which may be created will no doubt work badly if it is constructed on faulty foundation principles. But its structural form or, as it might more accurately be put, the harmonious adjustment of its structural form to the background of factual conditions within which it has to work, is of equal importance. And this in large measure depends upon an understanding of the significance of the far-reaching changes which now make it inevitable that one of the central features of the

nineteenth-century system, a feature whose importance can now in retrospect clearly be recognised, but which was easily overlooked at the time, can no longer be preserved.

We have spoken above of 'the structural form' of an international economic system. If by this phrase we mean something resembling a formal constitution, then the nineteenth century system was almost entirely lacking in anything of the kind. Its rules were never formally set down on paper, there was no binding obligation upon any of its members to observe the rules, which at all times they were perfectly free to accept or reject according to their own discretion, no one had any responsibility for enforcing them, and there were no sanctions for the discipline of recalcitrant members. Whatever may have been the faults of the nineteenth-century system, it was a very happy accident that the conditions of the time made possible such a high degree of informality and flexibility. These conditions have, however, now disappeared, and from that inescapable fact we must draw the logical conclusion. We have no real choice in the matter; whether we like it or not, we must start more or less afresh, and consciously and deliberately create a new system. And in a system so created the policy commitments assumed by National Governments must inevitably be more formal and precise than anything to which we were accustomed before 1914, or even before 1890.

It was no doubt peculiarly easy for the citizens of Great Britain to assume that these unique characteristics of the nineteenth-century system were part of the order of nature. In this country we are all familiar with the blessings of an unwritten constitution, some of us indeed so familiar as to be almost completely unconscious of the fact, and certainly to be lacking in appreciation of the quite different outlooks and habits of thought which the people of practically every other country have perforce been obliged to develop, because history has debared them from any possibility of enjoying similar blessings. In the important respects which we have here in mind the international economic system of the nineteenth century was like the British Constitution. It was a matter of some

difficulty to give a complete and exhaustive description of it, and even in regard to some of the essentials, differences of opinion were possible as to what the system really implied.

It would evidently be foolish for us in Great Britain to urge other people, who sometimes appear to us to be unduly hampered by the formal safeguards which have been written into their constitutions, to cast them all aside and imitate our example of freedom. By its nature an unwritten constitution is the product of a long and continuous process of historical evolution. It cannot be artificially created. If we have not this process of historical evolution behind us, it is useless to talk about an unwritten constitution. We in this country are able to enjoy the benefits of an unwritten constitution because, in contrast with most other States, our history has been marked by an abnormally high degree of continuity. There have been few sharp breaks in it, and we have, therefore, been able to mould our institutions continuously in the light of changing needs, without ever being obliged, so to speak, to pull the whole thing up by the roots, and to describe what we then discovered in formal documents not to be changed by the ordinary processes of legislation.

Some recent controversies have, however, suggested that many of us are very uneasy when we are asked to accept the necessity for written constitutions in relation to international economic co-operation. A little reflection should, however, show that, quite apart from the policy principles to be applied, a new international economic system must inevitably have a more formal and precise structure than its predecessors. The sharp break in the continuity of world development imposed by two world wars and one Great Depression has destroyed the conditions without which the maintenance of an unwritten constitution in this field is quite impossible. If we are again to enjoy the benefits of an orderly international economic system, it must be formally and deliberately constructed, with all the embarrassments and frustrating delays which the negotiation of such formal undertakings inevitably involves, and the apparent limitations upon our own future freedom



which are necessarily implied in formal adherence to precisely formulated constitutional principles. Unless we are prepared to revise our traditional habits of thought in regard to these matters, talk about international institutions is rather futile. However irritated we may feel at the prospect of the disciplinary restraints which membership of international institutions must, in the changed circumstances of the world, now inevitably impose upon us, we must in our more sober moments realise that there is no economy for which the creation and efficient general operation of such restraints is a more direct and more urgent interest than for Great Britain. Many would apparently still prefer us to stick out for 'a free hand', unless the rules to be adopted conform exactly to their interpretation of the necessities of the situation. 'A free hand' is however, in this context, an illusory phrase. If those who insist upon keeping it were to get their way, they would plunge the world into a state of chronic disorder, in which our freedom to do as we pleased was quite valueless, as we should be continuously obliged to make hurried decisions in the face of a never-ending stream of crises which we were powerless to control.

The nineteenth century international economic system was unique in still another respect, which it would now be hopeless to attempt to restore, but which also helps to explain both the relatively smooth working of that system, and the ready way in which people in Great Britain tended to take its operations for granted. There was during the greater part of the period when this system flourished one single centre of financial and economic activity which, whether intentionally or not, so to speak, set the pace for the system as a whole. It is easy now to exaggerate both the consciousness and the extent of the control exercised by London at this time, and this error has often been made by writers who are now anxious to discredit the old system and all its works. Nevertheless London did often serve as a focus or centre of direction of policy, the existence of which greatly simplified the working of the system; with so much of its directive force emanating from themselves, it was,

moreover, easy for people in Great Britain to accept the system without much serious reflection concerning either its nature or its implications. As a rule the influence of London was exercised with a fairly long-sighted appreciation of the interests of other economies, and it may therefore fairly be claimed that in general it was beneficial for the world as a whole. But whether it was beneficial or not, it is now idle to spend time in regretting the irrevocable disappearance of this relatively simple system. Already by 1918 the world had definitely passed beyond that stage. There were during the inter-war period at least three autonomous financial centres, London, New York and Paris, the co-ordination of whose policies was an essential but unsatisfied condition for international stability. There were also operating within a narrower range other centres of influence, which could not safely be neglected as likely to be entirely passive. The relative importance of the different centres of international economic power has been still more drastically modified by the Second World War. New York is definitely on the upgrade, while it will be a hard struggle for Paris to regain anything like its pre-war position. Everyone now understands that, on account of the violent change in our international creditor-debtor position which the financing of the war has imposed upon us, the relative position of London is also weaker than during the inter-war period, when it was already declining. And several of the smaller economies are likely to be more insistent than they used to be upon following their own line. The fact that responsibility for the direction of an international system must now inevitably be so widely diffused is an additional reason why a more formal constitution must now be accepted as inevitable. And this too no doubt adds to the difficulties in the way of a full appreciation of the changed situation by the average Englishman. It was easy enough for him, or his father or grandfather, thirty or forty years ago to talk about 'keeping in step', when what he really meant was that other people should keep in step with him. Now that the necessity presents itself for him to keep

in step with other people, his first hasty, though natural reaction is often to take quite a different view.

When we insist upon the inevitability of a written constitution for the international economic system of the future, we are not to be taken as implying that the elaboration of formal rules will ever come anywhere near doing all that will be necessary. It has often been pointed out that we get a very imperfect and distorted picture of the political and economic life of any community if we study merely the formal obligations and rights which are written into its constitution. If the formal machinery of the constitution is to be transformed into a going concern, it is always necessary that, however elaborate and detailed it may be, it should be supplemented and supported by various working constitutional conventions, sometimes quite ill-defined and often entirely devoid of any formal legal status, but from which nevertheless is derived much of the working power upon which this transformation depends. Our international institutional machinery will certainly stand in need of the same kind of support, and as constitutional conventions of this kind also cannot be artificially produced at a moment's notice, it is, for this reason among others, always wise to insist upon the continuing responsibility of each individual State, and in particular of the State of which we ourselves happen to be citizens, for the healthy growth and efficient operation of the international system. We can seldom hope to get the formal constitutional structure exactly to our liking, but our representatives should be encouraged to keep steadily before them the task of building up a set of less formal working rules and conventions, which, as they grow, may in the course of time convert even the most imperfect constitution into a useful working instrument.

It is with the various considerations in mind which we have just been discussing that it is particularly profitable now to study the development of the new international institutions which are now already in the process of birth. Naturally we must pay careful attention to the content of the obligations which membership of these institutions will impose upon us.

There is, however, little risk of our being negligent in this respect. We are more likely to be afflicted by a too lively sense of the embarrassments which formal commitments may involve, and some of the current debates have suggested that there are still far too many prepared to pay lip-service to international institutions in general, who in practice, however, would make international institutions impossible by refusing to join them except on their own terms. It would be going too far to say that any kind of international institution would now be better than none, but institutions of some kind are desperately needed, and in order to get them, it would be prudent to put up with a good deal in the way of awkward compromise.

We have already suggested that it is not very profitable at the present stage of world history to spend much time in working out in great detail elaborate blueprints for formal instruments of world government in the economic sphere. Whatever we may think about the abstract validity of such speculations, the strength of nationalist sentiment everywhere—and not least in our own country—does not appear to have so significantly diminished as to encourage any belief that within any measurable period of time it might safely be neglected. Some might even think that we were underestimating the strength of nationalism if we were to interpret the new international organs which are now developing as in any way foreshadowing the evolution of a system within whose framework national States may, in the course of time, be persuaded or gently induced to regard the impact of their policies upon the welfare of other States as a matter invariably to be taken seriously into account before important policy decisions are taken. The tone of much of the current debate of international economic policy certainly reflects very clearly the continuing strength of national feeling. In a world in which it was visibly weakening, we should, for example, hear much less of appeals to hesitant States to join the Bretton Woods International Monetary Fund on the ground that any member will always be free at any time to withdraw without

notice. Just as the private individual normally gives a high priority to his own private or family interests, so national authorities are naturally in the first instance preoccupied with the protection of the interests of their own citizens. Inside every well-ordered national economy we have, however, gradually developed a series of institutional hedges, which, with all their imperfections, help to keep most of us for most of the time moving along the right road, and yet without demanding from us any abnormal or unnatural altruism, and thus generally ensure that private interests shall not conflict too sharply with the interests of the community as a whole. Similarly now in the society of nations we need another series of institutional hedges which will make it progressively easier for national authorities, without in any way neglecting the interests of their own citizens, to take longer views than have hitherto been customary of the relations between the welfare of their own economy and that of the world as a whole. Unless something of this kind can be created, in however rudimentary a form, international organisations will be little more than an irrelevant façade. The most useful angle from which to approach the study of the constitutions of the new institutions which are either already taking shape, or are still under discussion, is by means of the question, how far are they likely to provide institutional hedges of the kind which we have suggested has now become an urgent necessity?

The problem of the 'sanctions' to be imposed upon recalcitrant States is, we shall find, still to a large extent unsolved, and perhaps, in the crudest sense of the term, may even be insoluble. Political or military sanctions are clearly not the most suitable for breaches of any international code of good conduct in the economic sphere. It has sometimes been suggested that we should endeavour to discover some benefit which might automatically disappear in the event of a breach of the rules of the system, but the loss of which would not necessarily bring in its train any serious inconvenience for other members of the system. But the consequences of any sharp break in customary economic relations

can seldom be confined to the offending party, and benefits of this kind are therefore not easy to discover. The constitution of the International Monetary Fund, however, makes some contribution to the solution of this problem. In certain specified circumstances members are liable to the penalty of expulsion, which would of course debar them from further access to the credit facilities of the Fund.

What, in more concrete terms, should we expect the new international institutions actually to do? From recent discussions there have emerged three distinguishable, though not necessarily mutually exclusive answers to this question. In the first place many have been much attracted by the possibilities of 'international planning', and have even gone so far as to contemplate the operation of international executive organs which would 'consider and decide where it is in the interest of the world as a whole that production of various commodities and their transformation into manufactured products should take place', or appoint committees with authority to fix export prices and allocate national export quotas. 'Planning' is a slippery concept, and without a more careful analysis of the meaning of the term than is possible here it is difficult to define a rational attitude to it in meaningful terms. But whatever might be thought of the theoretical merits or demerits of international planning on the lines indicated above, it seems quite clear that anything extensive or far-reaching of that kind is outside the range of practical politics. When as at the present time many important commodities are in very short supply there is a strong case for international machinery to ensure a rough approximation to fair distribution. The Combined Food Board and its committees discharge obligations of that kind, but in the present state of the world it is very difficult to conceive of any comparable organisation being entrusted with similar responsibilities in more normal conditions, in relation to commodities which were no longer abnormally scarce. Nor is it simply the short-sighted selfishness of national groups

which is at work here. Is it in fact conceivable over a period of time that any international organisation would be accepted as assessing fairly, say, the relative urgency for the peoples of the United Kingdom and India of food, or for the peoples of the United States and China of industrial raw materials? The present allocation of these and most other things is markedly unequal. Almost inevitably the attempt to find a basis for future allocation would pay a great deal of attention to the relative positions of the various economies as recorded in the past. But it is precisely these relative positions which it is impossible to expect the weaker economies to accept as normal and inevitable, and it would take a great deal to persuade them that an international organisation in which inevitably the greatest influence would be exercised by the more powerful economies who had already developed a favourable position for themselves would make the necessary adjustments in their allocations with sufficient speed.

Along the second line of development which has also already aroused interest, we should work towards the elaboration of a code of principles to be accepted by members of an international organisation as a guide to their conduct in determining their own national policies. This process has sometimes been described in terms of the evolution of a code of international good manners, but good manners may appropriately be fortified by more formal obligations, and the further national governments could be persuaded to go in working out precise statements of concrete principle, by which they would agree to be bound, the better we should be pleased.

A specific illustration of this line of development is already to be found in the constitutions of the Bretton Woods institutions. Their members will enjoy certain rights and privileges, in return for which they are under an obligation in forming their national policies to observe certain rules of conduct. The formal obligations imposed by the constitution of the Food and Agricultural Organisation are, on the other hand, very light, members being required to do little more than

submit annual reports. If, however, the International Conference on Trade and Employment which is to meet early in 1947 proceeds according to plan, it will add another chapter to the written constitution of a new international economic system which is thus being built up piecemeal. In relation to commercial policy, for example, it is proposed that the members of an International Trade Organisation of the United Nations should 'undertake to conduct their international commercial policies and relations in accordance with agreed principles to be set forth in the articles of the Organisation'.

Whether the constitutions of the new international institutions contain binding obligations or not, further movement in the same direction might be attempted by using the technique of the international convention with which the conferences of the International Labour Office have made us familiar. Valuable as this technique may sometimes be, there are, however, some qualifications to be borne in mind before we accept it as the most useful instrument available to us for hammering out the concrete principles of an international economic system.

Clearly some sectors of international economic policy lend themselves much more readily to the use of this technique than others, for it is possible in some, but not in others, to discover without great difficulty a concrete *quid pro quo* which can be offered as an inducement to national governments to fall into line. Countries which looked forward to enjoying the benefits of internationally organised credit were inevitably and naturally expected to undertake fairly precise commitments in relation to their national policies, but in the field covered by the F.A.O. the benefits offered to members are much less immediate and concrete, and there is, therefore, not the same pressure to induce them to accept binding or detailed commitments.

In more general terms however it may be said that the technique of the international convention is defective, because, whether intentionally or not, its use encourages an excessive respect for formal uniformity in national policy. The value



of the techniques available for the use of international institutions is best judged by the encouragement they are likely to give to a due appreciation of the relative importance and urgency of different problems. Judged by this standard the international convention, the terms of which it is expected will be acceptable to all, or to a very large number of national governments, cannot be rated very high. 'First things first' is always a sound working principle, but the secretariat of an international institution, one of whose most important functions is tacitly assumed to be the production of a series of international conventions, will almost imperceptibly be encouraged to give their first attention not to 'first things', but to things in relation to which the prospects for drawing up an international convention in generally acceptable terms appear to be fairly good.

Valuable as the work of the International Labour Office has been, some aspects of the history of that organisation aptly illustrate the defect which has just been mentioned. The conditions of different economies are often so diverse that it is rather difficult to discover matters which are at all capable of anything resembling uniform treatment everywhere, and problems which are set aside because they are unsuitable for treatment of this kind may well be problems of first-rate or even urgent importance. There were no doubt other and more weighty reasons which helped to determine the actual content of the year-to-year work of the I.L.O., but it is not unreasonable to suspect that the feeling that every year or two some new topic had to be discovered in relation to which an international convention might hopefully be submitted to an international conference had something to do with the general reluctance to grapple with more vital and more delicate issues. A detached observer of the world of international labour relations would almost certainly agree that the outstanding problem in this field, a problem moreover whose ramifications spread out in various intricate ways to affect the policies of practically every national economy, is the problem of the competitive strength

of low-wage producers. It is sometimes thought that this problem can be solved by encouraging the poorer economies to prescribe minimum standards for themselves which will have the effect of pushing up a little their real income levels. Action of this kind must, however, inevitably be unsatisfactory, as, if pressed too far, it would drive the low-wage producers out of world markets altogether. Apart, however, from some rather ineffective gesture of encouragement in this direction, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the International Labour Office has so far found itself obliged consistently to shelve the problem. By its nature it was incapable of treatment by the international convention method; its solution called instead for co-ordinated action in many sectors of economic policy, national and international, which could not readily be formulated in terms suitable for an international convention, but from which desirable wage-adjustments might have been expected to emerge as incidental by-products.

If we want an orderly world, we need not indeed be embarrassed to find wide divergences in many directions between national practices and policies. Such divergence is often thoroughly healthy, and progress is not necessarily assured by trying to persuade everybody to do the same thing. Some current discussions of international co-operation seem to suggest that it would be a helpful analogy to keep before our minds a picture of the movement of a regiment in which every man keeps in step and all move forward along parallel lines. A much more fruitful analogy would be drawn from observation of the manoeuvres of a whole army, the various sections of which are obliged, if the ultimate object of victory is to be attained, to engage in activities of widely divergent character, and often to move in quite different, though correlated directions. The essential requirement is something to ensure that, however divergent practice may be, each State should pay due attention in formulating its own policy to the interests of other States, and the realisation of this objective may actually be hampered

if we are too much concerned about formal uniformity. International problems, in the true sense of the word, arise when the action or inaction of any country or group of countries affects the welfare or the development of other countries, and from this point of view, national economic policies have very different degrees of international significance. The effort to formulate international conventions which can seriously be regarded as capable of universal application tends too often to end in a search for the lowest common denominator, which may involve an unfortunate neglect of the centres of influence which most need attention. It would be unwise to encourage the statesmen of Siam or of Paraguay to assume that what they did was of no importance for the rest of the world, but as a rule we need not be nearly so much worried by any decisions which they may make as by the decisions of the statesmen of the U.S.A., the United Kingdom or the U.S.S.R., or of some of the second-rate or middle Powers, which are nevertheless capable of initiating independent action with far-reaching consequences. We do well to listen to the reminders of those who are constantly telling us about the special responsibilities of the Great Powers in the post-war world, but these responsibilities are misinterpreted if they are assumed to mean that the Great Powers are in less need than others of the admonitions which from time to time an international organisation might address to them. In many sectors of economic policy, their influence is overwhelming, and if we could be assured that their activities in these sectors would be sufficiently far-sighted, the failure of some of the less important States to live up to the prescribed standard could be viewed with an indulgent eye.

If our thoughts are cast too exclusively in terms of uniform national action in relation to successive problems, considered one by one, we may also be encouraged to neglect the important and intricate inter-relations between different problems and the diverse policies of different countries in handling them. The limited time and resources of an international secretariat would often be put to the best use in

disentangling these relations, with a view to discovering opportunities for co-ordinated action, which will often be far from uniform, but may also be more effective because more careful account has been taken of the varied backgrounds of the parties concerned, and of differences in the measure of their responsibility for the welfare of the rest of the world, and in the relative importance for each one of them of the varying elements in the whole complex tangle.

There was, indeed, already before the last war some appreciation in the I.L.O. of the dangers of allowing the international convention, designed for universal application, to become a fetter, determining an invariable pattern into which the activities of an international organisation must always be forced. The League too developed a useful technique of draft model treaties which could be adapted to meet the varying requirements of individual cases. Even this technique, however, useful as it was, was not very suitable for dealing with the more complex issues of really first-rate importance, and with which for the most part during the inter-war period the international institutions of that time found themselves unable to grapple.

With all these considerations in our mind, let us then examine a third line of approach, movement along which might be expected, without forming too exaggerated hopes of what is practically possible in our highly imperfect world, to bring us perceptibly nearer to the kind of international institution, which has now become necessary if we are to have an orderly world to live in. The idea which we wish to present can be most conveniently outlined in the first instance by recalling a very modest activity of international institutions about which there has seldom been any serious dispute, and which has seldom provoked much hostile enthusiasm. In principle everyone is agreed about the importance of the collection and dissemination of accurate information. This was always a useful function of the International Labour Office and of the technical organs of the League, and the new organs to be associated in one way or another with

UNO will no doubt devote a large fraction of their time and energy to work of a similar kind. The range within which information can usefully be collected is, however, practically without limit. Even an institution with very large resources must adopt a highly selective policy here, and if action which is relevant to the sore spots of the world economy, the points where therapeutic treatment is most urgently needed both for economic welfare and for political stability, is not to be indefinitely postponed, the choice of information to be collected should be definitely and consciously directed along paths which will facilitate such action. For collecting information of this critical kind, however, the ordinary statistical sources will often be inadequate. If we are seeking for the minimum foundations necessary for an effective co-ordination of national policies, which will avoid or at least sensibly diminish the risks of mutual frustration, we might with great advantage urge our statesmen to press pertinaciously for the establishment of international organisations with responsibility for a continuous and detailed objective and critical survey of national economic and commercial policies everywhere, the results of which would be collated by the appropriate international organisation, and from time to time presented to the world in suitable published form. Even if nothing else were done, the results of a continuous survey of this kind would be of considerable value by bringing to the surface the conflicts between national policies which might otherwise often remain obscure. Its value would, however, be greatly enhanced if governments would also undertake to report to the international institution any contemplated changes of policy of international significance, with a reasoned statement of their purposes and of the grounds for believing that these purposes would be attained, and perhaps even, if this were not too much to swallow, to agree to postpone contemplated changes until the organisation had had an opportunity to comment upon them. Our immediate expectations here must be modest. We have not yet reached the day when national governments will be prepared to accept

instructions from an international body. But if there were a general and obstinate reluctance to permit any movement in the direction here indicated, much of the current discussion of international co-operation would have to be condemned as mere idle talk.

It would moreover be all to the good if the international organisation itself were to be authorised to make suggestions from time to time on its own initiative with a view to relaxing the conflicts which frequently arise between the divergent purposes of different national economies. These conflicts, indeed, often demand action of a kind which is not readily classifiable as falling within the exclusive sphere of any single specialised international agency. For good practical reasons, some differentiation between international organisations on functional lines is probably inevitable. It is, however, a commonplace that in economic policy everything is inextricably mixed up with everything else, and in working out practical programmes each organisation should be allowed a reasonable degree of freedom in associating with its work the staff of other organisations. Even, however, where a problem is easily recognisable as falling within the scope of a single organisation, there may often be considerable hesitation on the part of some national governments to initiate even informal discussions of the interrelations between their own policy and the policies of other States which are reacting detrimentally upon them. In such circumstances the initiative of an international organisation which should be in a strong position for taking a tactful lead in such matters, and organising fruitful discussions in a way which would not offend national susceptibilities, might often be positively welcomed.

For the adequate discharge of these responsibilities, it would not be enough to rely upon official or other published data. Skilled and independent investigation upon the spot would often be valuable, and perhaps even necessary. An organisation adequately equipped with staff competent for such purposes should be in a position to comment without

undue delay upon any policy changes which might be contemplated, and to make suggestions in good time which might in some measure forestall the danger of the sudden impact of crisis conditions. It might be too much to expect at once any formal obligation to defer to its comments, but the representations of an impartial secretariat whose members had formed the habit, so far as this is possible in our present imperfect world, of freeing their minds from national prejudices, would rightly command serious attention.

The wholehearted acceptance of such a technique as this would necessitate a change of attitude on the part of some governments which to some of their members would appear to be almost revolutionary. Its usefulness would not, however, be entirely destroyed even if a number of governments refused to collaborate. The world position would be far from 'ideal' if the effective membership of an organisation of the kind here outlined were too small, but there would be nevertheless no technical difficulties to prevent such a restricted organisation from doing work of great value. Obviously some time must elapse before we can expect to have an 'ideal' world, and in the meantime we might count ourselves extremely fortunate if we found at our disposal something that deserved to be classed as second-rate.

The revolutionary import of these suggestions should not, however, be exaggerated. It is already possible to find in the documents of international organisations proposals which could without undue straining be interpreted to cover the ideas which we have here in mind. The Interim Commission set up by the Hot Springs Conference on Food and Agriculture was instructed for example 'to take into account . . . the submission to member governments and authorities of recommendations for action' in regard to a varied list of problems in the field of agriculture and food, including the study of the relation of agriculture to world economy. The words now enshrined in Article I of the constitution of the Food and Agricultural Organisation suggest some measure of caution in the translation of this instruction into terms deemed suitable

for a more formal document; in any event everything turns upon the interpretation to be given in practice to such functions, but the words quoted could properly be taken to cover the essential elements of our proposal.

The implementation of this idea obviously raises important practical issues in relation to the personnel of international institutions. Whether the responsibilities contemplated should be entrusted to the Economic and Social Council, or to the proposed International Trade Organisation is an important question, into the discussion of which, however, we need not enter here. Perhaps, in a sense, it does not matter much who does it, so long as the job is done. A more difficult and delicate question is the status and character of the staff to whom in the last resort the performance of these tasks must be entrusted. We have spoken above, a little loosely perhaps, about 'an international organisation' undertaking certain responsibilities. But such phrases may be misleading if they encourage us to evade the obvious fact that in the last resort the work must be done by individuals. The members of an international secretariat are, strictly speaking, the servants of the governments who collectively give them their instructions and provide their salaries. It is asking for a good deal to suggest they should in effect be given authority to criticise the policies of the masters from whom all their power is inevitably derived.

In no conceivable circumstances indeed can the members of an international secretariat expect to enjoy anything like the same degree of freedom as in a free country a private student takes for granted in analysing and criticising national economic policies. But if the expectation is to be dismissed as utopian that in future the exercise of a rather greater measure of freedom by them than has hitherto been customary might not be regarded as an infringement of the canons of international propriety, it would be useless even to think of any more far-reaching international controls of national policy.

A subordinate point, which nevertheless has some practical importance, remains to be noted. If we could assume that a



sufficient number of national governments would be sufficiently far-sighted to take the significant step necessary for the creation of an international institution of the kind we have in mind, the question would still remain of the type of person needed for the efficient performance of its tasks. The vital issues which arise in the conflicts of national economic policy are seldom purely or exclusively economic in the narrow sense of that word. They are, therefore, not exclusively or perhaps even mainly matters for professional economists to handle. The staff should include men of wide experience and varied background, and even some who might feel positively embarrassed if they were to be described as economists. Men and women of the right calibre will for a long time to come be in chronically short supply, and this aspect of the personnel problem itself strongly reinforces our plea that the utmost care should be taken to protect the members of an international secretariat from the always imminent risk that they will be left no time to direct their thoughts to anything but matters of third-rate importance.

It is to be feared that to some who are eagerly engaged in drawing up blueprints of much wider scope than we have dared to contemplate here the present proposals will seem unduly cautious, not to say timid. Any such impatient critics should, however, first reflect how different the world would now be if during the inter-war period something of this kind had been in continuous and effective operation. If we can get something still more far-reaching, we shall not complain, but if we could get no more than has here been suggested, we should have made such a sharp break with our previous nationalistic practice that we might well for some time to come be satisfied with the progress thus registered.

# UNESCO

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THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND  
CULTURAL ORGANISATION

By

MAXWELL GARNETT

'Take thirty garden snails with their shells, and thirty earthworms from a gravelly soil; cut and bruise the snails, and cut up the worms. Place them in three pints of spring water with a handful of barley. Strain and sweeten with candied eringo or sea-thistle, which must be melted by stirring over the fire. Add a quart of milk from a red cow, and drink morning and evening.'

THIS 'certain cure for Consumption' comes from the days of Queen Elizabeth. It has been preserved in the library of an old Isle of Wight house, where there is a large quarto volume in which have been copied out, by various hands, among a host of recipes for meats and sweets and drinks of every kind, a recommended cure for almost every ill that flesh is heir to.<sup>1</sup>

'Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed . . . and . . . peace must, therefore, be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.'

This prescription for the cure of the latest and worst of the ills that flesh is heir to is a recent declaration by the governments on behalf of their peoples. But does it contain an essential ingredient of the real remedy for atom bombs or world war? Or is it no better than a concoction of snails, earthworms and milk from a red cow? These are the first questions to be faced by anyone who would understand and evaluate the United Nations Educational, Scientific and

<sup>1</sup> *Nunwell Symphony*, by C. Aspinall-Oglander (The Hogarth Press, 1945)

Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). For this declaration stands at the head of UNESCO's Constitution as it was worked out by the representatives of forty-four States members of the United Nations who met in London in November, 1945.

In the light of modern knowledge, the Elizabethan cure for consumption does not look too good. How does UNESCO's prophylactic against world war with atom bombs show up against the facts now known about the mind of man and the world of men?

Look first into the mind of man. A man in whose mind there is constant conflict between rival interests, whose diverse purposes are at sixes and sevens, is necessarily unstable in all his ways. Consistent and effective conduct, let alone outstanding achievement, is for him impossible. He will never attain any great or far-off goal. The education of every man (or woman) ought therefore to aim at bringing together into one whole the separate interests and purposes that tend to form in his mind as his life goes on. This integrative action of conscious education ought, indeed, to prolong as far as possible the unconscious integrative action of the nervous system described by Sir Charles Sherrington as reaching right up to the high cerebral centres.<sup>2</sup> It should seek to organise thought and experience in one all-embracing system, a single wide interest. Merely to form links between them is not enough: to connect together all the separate subjects one has studied or is studying at school (or as a pass-man in the University or even, here and there, in an Honours School) is only part of the process of developing a single wide interest. All one's knowledge and feelings and instinctive urges—all one's cognitions, emotions and conations—should, ideally, be synthesised in one well-ordered and harmonious whole; as when, for instance, a particular variety of animal is thought of as belonging, in ascending generalisation, to a species, genus, family, order and class.

This organisation of thought is most naturally attempted

<sup>2</sup> *The Integrative Action of the Nervous System*, by Charles S. Sherrington, F.R.S. (Constable & Co., 1915).

after the manner of the integration of the nervous system. The aim is to make every element, except the outermost, connect the elements next beyond it outwards and link them up with its neighbour on the inward side, and so with the central element of all. A tree—an almond tree in blossom outside my window as I write—gives a pretty picture of this organisation. Think of the portion of each twig between two successive branchings as one element of the whole. It joins together the elements next to it on the way out towards the blossom and links them up, at its inner end, with the element next to it on the way in to the trunk. In such a system—whether the single wide interest, the nervous system, or the almond tree—what happens at the centre influences all the rest. If the tree trunk be poisoned, or if a saw goes through it, the branches, twigs and blossoms wither and die. A sufficient disturbance of the cerebral centres of the nervous system will convulse the body and the limbs. An active purpose at the centre of a single wide interest will have its effect upon every thought and deed. Whoever possesses a single wide interest centred in a master purpose to attain the supreme good, as he conceives it,<sup>3</sup> will see the world single and will see it whole; he will be consistent in thought, in feeling, and in conduct; and, if neither other people nor things outside himself interfere, his life will be effective, moving steadily towards the goal of his high purpose.

Take the human world first and let the world of things wait for a moment. No one but a hermit is free from interference by other people. The life of every normal man overlaps and interacts with the lives of other members of his family and of every group to which he belongs: particularly his fellow-workers, neighbours and fellow-citizens. For consistent and effective living, conflict has to be prevented between the members of each group, as well as within every individual mind. Ideally, the master purpose at the centre of each person's single wide interest should therefore be in

<sup>3</sup> For a fuller account of the single wide interest, and how education may help to create it, see *The World We Mean To Make*, by Maxwell Garnett (Faber and Faber, 1913)

harmony with the central purpose of every other member of the same interacting group. Like-mindedness is as necessary as single-mindedness.

Like-mindedness makes for freedom. If what I want to do is what all other people whose lives may overlap mine want me to do in the interest of us all, then I am free to do as I wish, and only so am I free. In particular, I am free from fear of what man may do to me. I shall also be free from want, in so far as man's mastery over the world of things permits, if like-mindedness extends beyond harmony of central purpose far enough to make each man treat his neighbour's needs as no less urgent than his own. Thus fellow-feeling is the root of justice, as harmony of purpose is the root of liberty.

To have a fellow-feeling for every member of his group, and to share a common purpose with them all, is to possess what psychologists call a 'group-sentiment', a sentiment for the group as a whole: Mr. A. F. Shand defined a 'sentiment' as 'an organised system of emotional tendencies centred about the same object'.<sup>4</sup> The emotional tendencies, affective parts of instinctive processes are, of course, innate. But the grouping of these tendencies around a particular object, such as a group of people to which one belongs, is not inherited. It is the result of experience and may be the product of education.

With whom should this group-sentiment be shared? Or, as it was put two thousand years ago, Who is my neighbour? Anyone, surely, whose life may impinge on mine. In particular, every group to which a man consciously belongs, and with the other members of which he shares experiences, tends to become the object of a sentiment in his mind. This sentiment will be stronger if the common experiences are intense, if they are peculiar to the group, and if they include a common purpose. When a great orator has deeply stirred his audience, they feel the faint beginnings of a group-sentiment; and if, instead of going home, they run

<sup>4</sup> Cf. W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 122

off together to act upon some exhortation of the speaker's, their group-sentiment will become notably less faint.

Every man thus tends to possess a sentiment for his family; for his neighbourhood and those who live there; for people engaged in the same occupation as himself; for his church, if he belongs to one; and especially for his nation, since it often happens that the nation includes all the other groups to which men conceive themselves as belonging. Patriotism, the sentiment for the national group, is commonly strengthened by all the other group-sentiments and so becomes of outstanding importance. It is made stronger still by common land, language, race and the rest. It tends to be strongest of all where the nation is co-extensive with the State.

But patriotism was not always dominant among group-sentiments. Englishmen were first inspired by a joyous sense of nationhood in Elizabethan times when 'A man no longer felt his first loyalty owing to his town, his gild, or his "good lord", but to his Queen and country'.<sup>3</sup> The object of the Englishman's first loyalty has widened further since the days of Queen Elizabeth. For a hundred years it has been British rather than English, being shared with the Welsh and the Scots. Two world wars have shown that a common loyalty now unites most of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Today we need a fellow-feeling for people all around the globe, because today the lives of Englishmen interact with theirs. Our food controller, for instance, was recently discussing in America how the world's supplies of food are to be distributed during the present shortage and how much we in England are to get. International conferences in this field were unknown until the beginning of the nineteenth century and have steadily increased in number since that time. Indeed, the peoples of the world are less separated, physically, today than were the Tynesiders and men of Devon when the first railway was opened in County Durham a hundred and twenty years ago.

Ought our fellow-feeling for the world, or at least for the

<sup>3</sup> G. M. Trevelyan, *Social History of England* (1945), p. 191

people of the United Nations, to override our national patriotism? After the second world war and the first use of the atom bomb there can be no doubt about the answer. If mankind is not to risk extermination, another world war must be avoided, and the patriotism of most people must be subordinated to their world loyalty whenever the two sentiments come into conflict. It can be done, since neither patriotism nor any other group-sentiment is innate. They are all bits of mental organisation, 'psychological through and through'.<sup>1</sup> If, therefore, education succeeds in synthesising the mind, or developing a single wide interest, patriotism and all the group-sentiments which it comprises will be subordinate to, and incorporated in, a larger loyalty to all the world, or, for the moment, to the United Nations. If this orderly integration is successfully achieved, there can be no conflict between patriotism and world loyalty.

For success in building up loyalty, the success of the object of that loyalty is, however, still as necessary as it was in England under Queen Elizabeth. If most men and women are to be thrilled by a joyous sense of mankind as the patriot is by his sense of nationhood, if they are to identify their world as the patriot idealises his nation, then their world organisation must meet with some success; and the greater the success achieved by the United Nations, the better will UNESCO succeed in building an overriding loyalty to it.

Thus, wherever minds are synthesised in single wide interests, like-mindedness should include a common sentiment of loyalty to the world, or at least to the United Nations. And, in order to rule out the possibility of conflict with other group-sentiments, this loyalty to mankind must be very near the centre of the single wide interest of each of us.

How far should our like-mindedness extend in the other direction? Not of course the whole way. There must be differences between the minds of men corresponding to their different avocations, or to the division of labour. On the other hand, like-mindedness is not to be confined to political

<sup>1</sup> W. McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 90

matters or even to human relations. The more nearly what people see of the whole world—material, human and spiritual—resembles reality, the less will their plans be frustrated by events; and the more alike will their several conceptions of reality tend to be. Fortunately the material world, as it is being organised and integrated by scientific thought, fits perfectly into a single wide interest. Professor Whitehead tells us that the goal is 'a neat, trim, tidy, exact world.' It is for us to organise the human world on the same lines. Our plan should resemble a single wide interest in being an integrated whole with overriding power at the centre. And if a person's single wide interest extends to the things of the spirit, the high purpose at the centre of his mind will be to serve God, and his highest loyalty to the Kingdom of God. For all men to share that purpose and that loyalty would be the perfection of like-mindedness. 'Hitherto', wrote Lord Bryce in *The American Commonwealth*, 'civilised society has rested on religion, and free government has prospered best among religious peoples.'

But single-mindedness and like-mindedness may be attained by persons who deny the reality of spiritual things. In the Middle Ages, most men professed loyalty both to Pope and Emperor: there was no need for conflict between those whose highest loyalty was to either aspect of their world. The Reformation broke the bond between the sacred and the secular. Now, however, the two have come together again, and there is no reason for conflict—quite the contrary, because sufficient like-mindedness is present—between those whose highest loyalty is to the Kingdom of God and those in whom it is focused upon the Brotherhood of Man, or at least upon the United Nations as the next step towards the unity of mankind.

The United Nations Conference for the establishment of UNESCO was then amply justified in its prescription for a lasting peace: 'Peace must be founded, if it is not to fail, on the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind'. And,

<sup>1</sup> *The Organisation of Thought* (1917), p. 110



as our analysis has shown, this 'solidarity', 'synthesis', or 'integration' depends upon education aiming at single-mindedness and at like-mindedness. The latter is UNESCO's special concern.

If education can now be recognised by statesmen—President Truman,<sup>\*</sup> for instance—as at least one defence against the atom bomb, why was not this prescription tried out long ago? In particular, how came it that the Peace Conference after the first world war made no attempt to enlist the resources of education, 'in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security'? Educational possibilities seem to have been as far from the minds of the Big Five in Paris as, according to Lord Keynes, were the economic consequences of the peace they were making. At Paris, in the Covenant of the League of Nations, no mention was made of education as a means to the desired end: international co-operation, peace and security. But, at Geneva, after an unsuccessful move by the Belgian Senator La Fontaine at the League's first Assembly in 1920, M. Léon Bourgeois persuaded the League's Council to propose to the second Assembly in 1921 the creation of a Commission for the study of questions relating to 'intellectual co-operation and education'. The reference to 'education' was, however, struck out by the Assembly when it agreed to establish the International Committee of Intellectual Co-operation. Leading *Savants* from all over the world (Professor Einstein, Madame Curie, and Professor Gilbert Murray among them) used to meet under the Committee's auspices in Paris; and this, of course, was all to the good; but it had singularly little effect upon the education of average men and women in world loyalty and world citizenship. Although, at the instance of Dame Edith Lyttelton, the League's fourth Assembly, in 1923, resolved that young people should be made aware of the existence and aims of the League of Nations and the terms of its Covenant and should come to regard international co-operation as the normal method of conducting

<sup>\*</sup> In his speech at Fordham University on May 11, 1946 (*Sunday Times*, May 12).

world affairs, the League itself made no further move. The stimulation of teachers to undertake this task was left to unofficial bodies, such as the League of Nations Union in Britain, save where an exceptionally enlightened Minister of Education like Lord Eustace Percy<sup>\*</sup> acted on his own account.

Mr. Churchill has said<sup>11</sup> that the second world war 'could easily have been prevented if the League of Nations had been used with courage and loyalty by the associated nations'. But when the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 provided the last opportunity—and a fine one it was—the education of public opinion had not gone far enough in this and other countries. There was not enough loyalty to the League, nor enough common purpose to provide its machinery with driving power. The typical Frenchman's reaction to the situation was: '*Je ne veux pas me battre pour le Negus*'. And a British Cabinet Minister was allowed to declare in Parliament that the Government were not prepared to see a single British ship sunk in a successful battle for the cause of Abyssinian independence!

When, however, in September, 1941, Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt drew up the Atlantic Charter, foreshadowing 'a permanent system of general security' after the second world war, the need for the new machinery to include an International Education Organisation was soon acknowledged. The Council for Education in World Citizenship, established by the League of Nations Union in Great Britain, was, I believe, the first body to move in this matter. The functions of an International Education Organisation, roughly resembling the International Labour Organisation created by the Treaty of Versailles, were then discussed by the London International Assembly consisting of friends of the League of Nations, and including several Allied statesmen from countries overrun by Germany in 1940. The need was

<sup>\*</sup> He, for instance, immediately upon his appointment as President of the Board of Education in January, 1925, added a chapter on The League of Nations to the Board's volume of *Suggestions for the Consideration of Teachers in Public Elementary Schools*.

<sup>11</sup> In a letter to Lord Cecil, dated September, 1943.

recognised and first publicly stated (in October, 1942) by a Committee set up in 1941 by the British Association for the Advancement of Science to inquire into post-war university education.

A few weeks later, Mr. R. A. Butler (who afterwards told the House of Commons that education was the main arm with which to win the next peace) called together the Allied Ministers of Education then living in London. Some of them were members of the British Association's Committee; some belonged to the London International Assembly; and they at once started to plan an International Education Organisation. The same idea was explored in America, from 1943 onwards. In 1944 a strong delegation came over from the United States to pool their plans with those of the Allied Ministers. The result, a year later, was *Draft Proposals for an Educational and Cultural Organisation of the United Nations*. An official *Projet Français* for the constitution of *l'Organisation de Co-operation Intellectuelle des Nations Unies* came shortly afterwards from Paris.

On October 24, 1945, Miss Ellen Wilkinson, who had succeeded Mr. Butler, as Minister of Education, discussed these schemes with representatives of a number of scientific and other (British) societies. The Minister and all the speakers fully appreciated the need to have in education a spirit of world citizenship, or loyalty to the United Nations. Professor Gilbert Murray, drawing upon his long experience, said that the governing body of the new international organisation ought to include representatives of outstanding educational bodies as well as of governments, and wished to keep alive the work of Intellectual Co-operation among leaders of thought in the different countries. Sir Henry Dale, President of the Royal Society, and Dr. Julian Huxley spoke for Science. They believed that more effective international co-operation had existed in science, through the International Council of Scientists Unions and other channels, than in other spheres of cultural activity, although they regretted that Soviet Russia had never adhered to the Unions; and they

understood that the government would move for the word 'Science', or 'Scientific', to be included in the title of the organisation. Dr. Huxley asked for the representation of scientific as well as of educational and cultural organisations on its governing body, and for the organisation to have a scientific branch.

A week later—on November 1—representatives of forty-four members of the United Nations met in London to settle the constitution of this new organ or specialised agency. The Soviet Union had asked for the Conference to be postponed, and was not represented. But the Conference went ahead, Miss Wilkinson was elected President, and Sir Alfred Zimmern was chosen as Secretary. Complete agreement was reached in sixteen days.

The Conference began by deciding that the Allied Ministers' *Draft Proposals* should form the basis of discussion, but that full consideration should be given to the French and other suggestions. Neither the *Draft Proposals*—more concerned with the bi-lateral cultural conventions, so that the several national sections of mankind should know each other, than with means to ensure that each part should know, and feel its dependence upon, the whole—nor the French plan said plainly that the new Organisation must aim at laying the foundation of peace in the minds of men or at ensuring a constant supply of driving power from public opinion for the machinery of the United Nations. Mr. Attlee, however, had reminded the delegates in his speech of welcome, that wars began in the minds of men, and Miss Wilkinson's presidential address had put the question: 'Can we replace nationalist teaching by a conception of humanity that trains children to have a sense of mankind as well as of national citizenship?' It was clear that the new Organisation, besides all that it might do for the intellect and for the exchange of ideas and knowledge, must be prepared to go right down into the depths of the human mind. So the Constitution, signed by thirty-seven States on November 16, begins with

the declaration already quoted about peace having to be founded on the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.

This declaration is followed by the name: the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Association, or UNESCO. The British and Americans just managed to get the requisite two-thirds majority to include Science in the title and so to make sure of the co-operation of the scientific world. Science ought, after all, to make for unity since it is everywhere the same, while cultures differ and divide mankind. The French fought hard for their word 'intellectual' despite its chilly sound in English ears. But, in the end, they accepted the view of the Chinese delegate that UNESCO was a good enough name: like UNRRA it is the same in Chinese as in English or in French.

The preamble to the Constitution ends with the name. Then come the fifteen articles.

The first treats of purposes and functions. The purpose of UNESCO is 'to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture'. UNESCO is to help the peoples of the world to understand and know one another not only through schools, colleges and universities or in part-time classes, but also by less formal education, including mass education of the most general kind using broadcasting, cinemas, museums, and other means of publicity; it is to stimulate popular education and the spread of culture; and it is to maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge, particularly through the interchange of teachers and students. It is to do all this without trespassing upon matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of State Members. But it may make suggestions; and we may reasonably hope that it will do so freely, especially on education for world citizenship and for loyalty to the United Nations. For instance, it might suggest the teaching of history internationally, as the Norwegians, Swedes and Danes have been doing for some time, approving of one another's textbooks before they are used in the schools. In short, UNESCO is to promote inter-

national intellectual co-operation but not among intellectuals alone.

All members of the United Nations have the right to belong to UNESCO, and other States may be admitted by a two-thirds vote.

UNESCO is to have a General Conference consisting of delegates representing all its State Members; an Executive Board of eighteen selected by the General Conference from among the delegates (so as 'to include persons competent in the arts, the humanities, the sciences, education and the diffusion of ideas'); and a Secretariat.

The delegates to the General Conference are to be appointed by the Governments of the Member States, not more than five from each State. The General Conference is to meet annually in ordinary session at a new place every year, and it may meet in extraordinary session at the call of the Executive Board. Its meetings are, as a rule, to be open to the public. It is to submit recommendations and international conventions to the Member States for their approval.

The Executive Board is to meet in regular session at least twice a year. It is to be responsible for carrying out the programme of the General Conference, and for preparing its agenda and programme of work. 'The members of the Executive Board shall exercise the powers delegated to them by the General Conference on behalf of the Conference as a whole and not as representatives of their respective Governments.'

The responsibilities of the Secretariat—the Director-General and such staff as may be needed—are also to be 'exclusively international in character'. The Director-General has to propose action to the Conference and to the Board, and he is to appoint the staff so as to secure the highest possible standards of integrity, efficiency and technical competence, and, subject to this paramount consideration, from as wide a geographical area as he can compass.

National Commissions, broadly representative of the government and the principal bodies interested in educational,

scientific and cultural matters, are to be formed in as many countries as possible. Wherever a National Commission exists, the government is to consult it before choosing delegates to the General Conference of UNESCO. Where no National Commission has yet been formed, the educational, scientific, and cultural bodies are to be consulted. The National Commission, or the national co-operating bodies, are to advise their delegates to the General Conference and their Government on UNESCO affairs. It is to be hoped that in Britain, for instance, UNESCO will be linked up in this way, preferably through a National Commission, with the universities, the teachers, local education authorities, governing-bodies, the British Broadcasting Corporation, the Piln Institute, the United Nations Association and the Council for Education in World Citizenship; with the Royal Society and the British Association for the Advancement of Science; and with the British Academy and the new Arts Council (formerly CEMA). Many groups or institutions should be directly represented upon the National Commission, but with some of them a sufficient link would be afforded by co-opting a few suitable persons in addition to the representative members of the Commission.

Each Member State is to report periodically to UNESCO on its educational, scientific and cultural life and institutions: comparisons between these reports should help the more backward countries to catch up.

UNESCO will administer its own budget, but the budget may be approved and financed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Arrangements are to be made 'as soon as practicable' for UNESCO to function as a specialised agency of the United Nations (under articles 57 and 63 of the Charter) while retaining autonomy in its own field. And UNESCO may be linked up with other specialised agencies or with any international organisations whether governmental or not.

UNESCO's legal status is to be the same as that of the United Nations.

Amendments to its Constitution will require a two-thirds vote of the General Conference; and fundamental changes will have to be accepted by two-thirds of the Member States.

The last of the fifteen articles provides that UNESCO is to come into existence as soon as its Constitution has been accepted by twenty of the States on whose behalf it was signed on November 16, 1945, or at any later date. The United Kingdom was the first of the twenty.

The London Conference which agreed upon the Constitution of UNESCO also established a Preparatory Commission to function until the Director-General assumes office. This Preparatory Commission is at work in London with Dr. Julian Huxley as its Executive Secretary. It is to convoke the first session of the General Conference and to prepare its provisional agenda, including arrangements for the appointment of the Director-General. The General Conference is likely to assemble in November, 1946. It will meet in Paris, where UNESCO is to have its home.

It is too early<sup>11</sup> to make any definite statement about the organisation of the UNESCO Secretariat since by the Constitution this rests entirely with the Director-General, who will not be appointed until the first General Conference meets in Paris. The following is merely an outline sketch based upon the discussion of this subject by UNESCO's Preparatory Commission in July, 1946.

Apart from the necessary administration departments, there are likely to be seven Sections, devoted to the following subjects:—

- Education,
- The Natural Sciences,
- The Social Sciences,
- Philosophy and the Humanities,
- Creative Arts,
- Media of Mass Communication (Broadcasting, the Cinema, and the Press), and

<sup>11</sup> This article was written in May, 1946, and finally corrected in September UNESCO's first General Conference (at Paris in November) may decide to alter the organisation outlined here



Cultural Institutions (Libraries, Archives, Museums, etc.).

I propose to comment only upon the first and sixth of these Sections.

The first Section deals with education. It should do all it can to ensure that the Ministry of Education of every Member State supplies teachers with suggestions for developing what I have called a joyous sense of belonging to the United Nations as a potentially world-wide Commonwealth. The aim, as I said, must be to reach the emotional depths of human nature and there to lay the foundations of world-loyalty. Much of this training in world-citizenship, and that not the least valuable part of it, will not find a definite place in the curriculum of schools or universities. The learning should be incidental and practical as well as emotionally felt. Every aspect of a many-sided training has its quota to contribute to this incidental learning about the United Nations. Each of the so-called subjects, which together constitute the tradition handed on by a school to its pupils, abounds in examples of people of many different races and languages helping to build the common heritage of mankind, and each nation's own heritage. That is true of health, music, arts and crafts, gardening, literature, geography, natural science, mathematics or history. All these can be taught with an eye upon the fact that they are intended for potential citizens of the world, just as courses in arithmetic or geography suitable for boys may be modified to serve the needs and interests of girls. History, for instance, tells of a series of attempts, some successful and others that have failed, to create intellectual, moral, or political solidarity between independent and often hostile peoples. The United Kingdom of the English, Scots and Welsh, is an example of success in this field. The League of Nations looks to us like a case of failure; but future historians may perhaps see it as a necessary prelude to the successful organisation of the United Nations.

Each Member State would of course include in its Suggestions for Teachers some account of the essential facts

about the United Nations. These suggestions might be prepared by the national Ministry of Education; or by one of its national co-operating bodies (Article 7 of UNESCO's Constitution); or by its National Commission; or by a non-governmental international organisation invited by UNESCO (under Article 11) to undertake the specific task of preparing a set of suggestions for such Member States as care to use them. In any case, UNESCO should offer to help in their preparation.

UNESCO should also be ready to assist in holding conferences of teachers where the printed suggestions and their practical applications could be discussed. At these conferences, the teachers might meet representatives of the local education authority, of the national Ministry of Education, of national co-operating bodies, or the National Commission, or (occasionally) of UNESCO and any specialised international organisation co-operating with it.

Universities will come within the scope of the Section on education. I think the work of the Section might eventually lead to the creation of one or more new international universities, and might help the existing universities of Member States to co-operate in planning some most desirable developments of university education. It is, however, unlikely that more will be done in the first year than to summon a Conference on methods of training in universities and related institutions for careers involving international contracts (diplomacy, colonial service, United Nations work, journalism, commerce, teaching, and the like).

One or more new international universities seem to me to be needed so that there may never be wanting a succession of persons from all the United Nations duly qualified for the service of mankind in the United Nations Organisation and particularly in its Secretariat and in those of its specialised agencies. Some of the oldest European universities began as international seats of learning. But four centuries of close association with the national tradition of separate sovereign States have woven these traditions into so integral a part of

university life that any attempt to tear or dissect them out again would probably do more harm than good to any existing university.

A new international university need not, however, cater for undergraduates. Its concern should be with graduate study and research; but not, at first, in every field of knowledge. It must, however, cover (1) those branches of natural science, including psychology, which bear directly upon public health and human welfare, or upon problems of international defence, particularly against the misuse of atomic energy; (2) economics; (3) international law; (4) modern languages; (5) history; (6) geography; (7) philosophy; and (8) international affairs including international administration. By means of two-years' courses leading to Ph.D. degrees, young graduates should be trained for entering one of the international secretariats as administrative officers, lawyers or expert advisers, or for similar work or political careers in their own countries. Refresher courses should be offered to those older men and women who have already had some experience of work of these different kinds. The international universities should also undertake researches on behalf of the United Nations—for example, into nuclear energy and its uses—and they should co-ordinate other researches carried out for the Organisation elsewhere, whether in universities or in research institutes established by the United Nations or any of its specialised agencies including UNESCO.

There is much to be said for founding one international university in the immediate vicinity of the headquarters of the United Nations. Personal contacts between the two institutions would be made easy, and the purpose of much of the university's work would be vividly appreciated by its students and research workers. Moreover, there might be some advantage from extra-territoriality. If a second international university is required, the great buildings of the League of Nations in Geneva would provide a most attractive site within easy reach of the headquarters of UNESCO. Among the advantages afforded in Geneva would be the much

lower cost of equipping and staffing the university, and the lower fees and expenses of the students, as compared with the neighbourhood of New York or New England.

The other function of the first Section of UNESCO in this field would be to foster the international relations of existing universities. It would be concerned with the intramural and extramural work of each of them as well as with their mutual co-operation.

The British Association's Committee on Post-war University Education has recommended several developments of this kind. Included in its report<sup>12</sup> there is, for instance, a scheme for new Honours and Pass Schools offering an integrated course of study to numbers of undergraduates who need non-vocational education as citizens, but who, in many universities today, are forced to choose between a Pass School in several separate subjects or an Honours School designed for the training of specialists. The new course in Philosophy, Natural and Social, is meant to create single-mindedness and like-mindedness: 'a system of ideas which bring the æsthetic, moral and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world which have their origin in natural science'. These words are quoted in the Report from Professor Whitehead<sup>13</sup> who goes on: 'Philosophy frees itself from the taint of ineffectiveness by its close relations with religion and with science, natural and sociological. It attains its chief importance by fusing the two, namely, religion and science, into one rational scheme of thought. Religion should connect the general rationality of philosophy with the emotions, and purposes springing out of experience in a particular society, in a particular epoch, and conditioned by particular antecedents.' Even if no final integration is possible without going into the realm of hypothesis, that is, after all, the way of discovery which has led natural science to its substantial achievements.

<sup>12</sup> Printed in *The Advancement of Science* (Vol. III, No. 9, September, 1944) published by the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Burlington House, London, W1

<sup>13</sup> *Process and Reality*, 1929, pp vi and 21

Other proposals made in some detail by the British Association's Committee are for introducing some study of sociology and citizenship into all specialised Honours Schools in Natural Science, Applied Science and Technology; for providing lectures and discussion groups to enable all undergraduates to get a general view of the world as known by science; for educating present and future public servants by means of graduate schools combining university work with practical experience in the service of local authorities, national governments, or international organisations including the United Nations and its specialised agencies; and for training teachers. The study of education, and particularly of education for world citizenship, is an indispensable part of all teachers' training.

The sixth Section has to look after so-called 'mass-communication', including films and radio. It will have to work in close touch with the large department of the United Nations' Secretariat that has to handle Information and Public Relations. It will then be able to use broadcasts from the United Nations' own wireless station for the purpose of developing a 'sense of mankind' among adults whose formal education is at an end. Regular bulletins of international news from the United Nations should be kept free from views, and Member States should help and encourage their citizens to hear them. But the United Nations' broadcasts need not be confined to news bulletins. They might well include programmes in the principal languages which would be first-class alternatives to the local or national programmes. Within this framework of entertainment, UNESCO should arrange with the Public Relations department to put across a sense of the essential oneness of mankind and, particularly, of international solidarity within the United Nations. And co-operation between the sixth Section of UNESCO and the Public Relations department of the United Nations might achieve at least as much with films as with radio.

Each of the seven Sections of UNESCO, besides reporting

to its General Conference, should make interim reports on urgent matters to its Executive Board.

In addition to the long-term policy of its seven Sections, UNESCO has a programme for the present emergency. In co-operation with UNRRA (the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration), its Preparatory Commission is already at work upon the task of providing 'without delay for immediate action on urgent needs of educational, scientific and cultural construction in devastated countries'.

Trying to see further into the future we may, I think, take comfort from words broadcast by Mr. Churchill to America on June 10, 1941. 'It is but a few years ago since one united gesture by the peoples, great and small, who are now broken in the dust, would have warded off from mankind the fearful ordeal it has had to undergo.' The United Nations is likely to succeed where the League of Nations failed it, with UNESCO's help, it never stops seeking to found peace on 'the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind'. For UNESCO, as we must always remember, is planned to be part and parcel of the United Nations Organisation: one of its specialised agencies to be brought into relation with it through its Economic and Social Council as provided in Articles 57 and 63 of its Charter.

The Charter describes the political machinery, most of it already in being and at work, for removing the economic and social causes of unrest, safeguarding human rights, and raising the standards of life, for the peaceful settlement of international disputes which must arise, at least until the world has settled down and the Economic and Social Council has been at work for some time, and, in the last resort, for the physical coercion of an aggressor State. In brief, the Charter lays down the law which must be obeyed within the community of the United Nations, and the United Nations Organisation is there to facilitate (and where necessary to compel) obedience to the law. But the more vividly the law of the United Nations is presented to the minds of the peoples, and the more they act upon it, the less will it need to be collectively enforced. 'He

that loveth another hath fulfilled the law' is as true among the nations as between one person and another; 'for this, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not covet, and if there be any other injunction, it is summed up in this word, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself'.<sup>14</sup> This fellow-feeling has to be developed between the nations so that international law will be fulfilled without any need for coercion by the United Nations.<sup>15</sup> At the same time the United Nations' machinery has to be provided with driving power so that it may enforce the law. It is the function of education to make the changes needed in men's minds; in their feelings and their purposes as well as in their understandings. And UNESCO has to see that this function is fulfilled.

<sup>14</sup> St. Paul's *Epistle to the Romans*, Ch. XIII vv 8 and 9.

<sup>15</sup> Good law, law that most men usually wish to obey, is extension of our self-control': Dr Raymond West *Psychology and World Order*, 1943, pp. 41, 42.

# THE WORLD CHURCH

By

A. M. CHIRGWIN

At his enthronement as Archbishop of Canterbury, the late Dr. William Temple spoke of the universal church as 'the great new fact of our time'. Half a century ago, if men spoke of the World Church at all, they referred to it as a hope one day to be realised. To-day they speak of it as a fact of the contemporary world in the same sense in which they speak of the British Empire.

On the same occasion Dr. Temple also stated that the emergence of the World Church was the unexpected result of the missionary enterprise of the last 150 years. No one ever set out deliberately to found a world church. On the contrary, what the missionaries of the Cross have always aimed at is to preach the Gospel to as many human beings as they could reach. It was while they were doing that that they unconsciously laid the foundations of what is now a World Church.

The purpose of this article is to give some account of the church in the world to-day, its strength and weakness, and its significance from the point of view of world affairs.

The date to remember in this connection is October 2, 1792, when a handful of undistinguished men, mostly Baptist ministers, in the back parlour of a house in Kettering, resolved to form a missionary society and there and then placed their contributions, amounting to £18 2s. 6d., into the snuff-box of one of their number. From that small beginning there has grown an enterprise which such a sober historian as Professor Hendrik Kræmer of Leyden has called 'one of the most amazing movements in the history of the world'.<sup>1</sup>

It is of the very essence of the Christian movement that it should rise above national and racial barriers, and spread

<sup>1</sup> *The Christian Message in a non-Christian World*, p. 24



into all the earth. A battle royal was fought on precisely this point at the very beginning of the Christian era, the story of which is to be found in the New Testament.<sup>1</sup> Some claimed that Christianity was for Jews only; others that it was for everyone. In the sharp controversy that followed, the question was settled definitively, and from that time onwards men and women of every race and nation have been invited and received into the Christian fellowship, the only condition being that they acknowledge allegiance to Jesus Christ as Lord. To-day that fellowship is the most widespread society on earth.

The Christian church is to be found not only in Europe, America and the British Dominions; it is present in every country, north, south, east and west. Nor is it only people of the Western civilised tradition who belong to its fellowship, but men and women of every culture, race and tongue. 'The Holy Church throughout all the world' is not just a picturesque phrase; it is a solid fact of contemporary life. A man may, in point of fact, travel round the globe in any direction he may choose and call at any country he may select, and he will find that he can everywhere make contact with members of the Family of Christ.

What follows is in the nature of a hurried tour during the course of which something may be learnt of the world-wide character of the Christian church.

#### JAPAN

No sooner had Commodore Perry burst open the doors of the 'hermit country' in 1853 than missionaries began to arrive, especially from America. They came in response to the Japanese invitation to teach the language, arts and culture of the West. Christianity in Japan, at least in its modern form, is thus less than a century old, yet it has rooted itself so firmly that it has weathered the storm of the World War and is now one of the three legally recognised religions of the land. That is no small achievement for so short a time.

<sup>1</sup> Galatians 2

Christianity in Japan, especially in its Protestant form, has drawn most of its adherents from the educated middle-class section of the population. This is mainly due to Japan's eager desire to absorb Western education. This eagerness offered opportunities which Christian teachers, especially in America, were not slow to grasp. One of the first of the American educators to enter Japan played a large part in laying the foundations of the Imperial University in Tokyo, another exercised decisive influence in the creation of Japan's first Agricultural College, a third founded Doshisha, a Christian institution of university rank, while scores of others found spheres of service in the new schools that began to spring up everywhere. In the circumstances Christianity naturally won most of its earliest converts from the educated class, and it has continued to do so ever since. This fact has been both its strength and its weakness.

The church in Japan tends to be a rather select group, with a considerable proportion of civil servants and professional men. It is well educated in a country where education is highly valued, and it is apt to be more influential than its numbers would suggest. The visitor to the country is likely to be surprised to find how much influence Christianity exerts in the national life in comparison with the smallness of its congregations. This is particularly the case in the villages where its following is negligible. For some reason Christianity has never gripped the Japanese peasant. There is a measure of truth in the statement that had Christianity been stronger amongst the peasant classes, whence the army is largely recruited, China would have been spared the nightmare of Nanking and some of the other excesses of the Japanese occupation. Be that as it may, Christianity in Japan is in danger of becoming urban and bourgeois. In order to prevent this Dr. Kagawa, its best-known leader, is constantly undertaking evangelistic campaigns amongst all classes, stimulating service on behalf of the down-and-outs, and organising co-operative ventures in the country districts.

The urban and middle-class character of the Japanese church has enabled it more quickly than in most countries to become self-governing and self-supporting. Although it is less than a century old it is already producing its own leaders and financing most of its own work. The proportion of foreign missionaries has for several years been lower than in any other Asiatic country.

These steps towards complete self-government and self-support help to explain the comparative ease with which drastic changes were carried out within the Japanese church in 1941 and the vigour that was displayed under the stress of war. Under pressure, exerted probably both from within and from without, all foreigners were removed from positions of leadership and executive responsibility, all financial assistance from overseas repudiated, and all foreign links severed. These changes were drastic and sudden and had the Japanese church not been already well advanced in self-determination and self-maintenance, it would probably have collapsed when the Pacific war came and the foreign props were suddenly knocked away.

A century ago Christianity was a proscribed religion in Japan, the penalty for its profession was death. To-day it is one of the three recognised religions of the country, under the Religious Organisations Control Act of 1940, with full rights before the law, able to hold its own property, manage its own affairs, and propagate its own message. It is still the religion of a small minority; certainly less than two per cent. of the population, including Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox, but its influence is out of all proportion to its numbers. Provided a man is known as a loyal Japanese and is prepared to give full support to the regime, he is not discriminated against because he is a Christian. The number of professing Christians holding responsible posts under the Government is a sufficient proof. And it is interesting in this connection to record that when the present Emperor was crowned, three of the five men who were present as heads of the Imperial Universities of Japan were Christians.

The Japanese church began in recent years to develop a concern for overseas missionary service, a concern which grew step by step with Japan's *developing imperial power*. Shortly after Japan received the mandate for certain island groups in the South Seas at the conclusion of the first World War, the Japanese church founded a South Seas Missionary Association; after the Manchurian affair they started the Manchurian Missionary Association; and not long after the outbreak of the recent Sino-Japanese struggle they launched a Far East Missionary Association. What the effect of the loss of the South Sea Islands, Manchuria, Formosa and the rest will be upon the missionary purpose of the Japanese church it is impossible as yet to say. But it can be assumed that a church so vigorous will seek to find some field for the outlet of its missionary passion.

There may be two opinions about the advisability of an infant church beginning its missionary work in the wake of the national flag, but there can be only one opinion about the vitality and Christian conviction of a church that takes upon itself real missionary responsibilities when it is not yet a hundred years of age. During the course of the war Christianity in Japan has maintained its place in the national life, though not without some suspicion because of its ecumenical character. That very characteristic, coupled with the lowered prestige of Shintoism and the abolition of Emperor-worship, may put the Christian church in a more central place in the life of the Japanese people.

#### KOREA

Korea has had the double misfortune of being at the strategic centre of three major and rival empires, Japan, ~~may~~ and Russia, and of having too large a population for and ~~ragre~~ agricultural economy. But in spite of political ~~best-kno~~ and the handicap of poverty, Christianity has ~~campaigns-m~~ foothold in Korea, Roman Catholicism for a of the down-tantism for half that time in the country \*, Protestant Christianity Korea, which is

twice as large numerically as Roman Catholicism, has been vigorously evangelistic. The church members have been trained to pass on the Christian message and to maintain a close and constant study of the Bible. This combination of evangelical earnestness combined with a somewhat literalistic approach to the Bible has led to revivals which from time to time have swept over the land, bringing thousands into the Christian fellowship. The Korean Christians have moreover set themselves to achieve self-support by a strict system of tithes and similar expedients, and in spite of their poverty they have gone a long way towards achieving financial independence.

In contrast to the church in Japan the Korean church is drawn mainly from the poorer sections of the population and has comparatively few leaders of influence and education. It has, moreover, been part of the Japanese policy to reduce the Korean church to the position of being a branch of the church of Japan. This has had the effect of keeping the positions of leadership in Japanese hands. The Christians nevertheless form an important element in the population and their rate of increase has for several years been greater than that of the population as a whole. To-day they number about two per cent. of all the people in the country.

#### CHINA

Christianity in China has had a chequered history. The object of official favour at one period and of popular mistrust at another, it has through most of the time been regarded by the masses as a foreign and contemptible superstition.

To-day Chinese Christians number about 4,000,000, or approximately one per cent. of the population. Roman Catholic missions made an early appearance in China but the effort was short-lived. Subsequent attempts were more successful, and Roman Catholicism has been present in China continuously since the days of the Reformation and numbers about 3,000,000 out of the 4,000,000 Christians in the country. Protestant missions are of much more recent

date, their first representative reaching China in 1807. In contrast to Japan and Korea, Protestant Christians in China represent fairly accurately a cross section of society, including the poor and the privileged, the peasants and the town-dwellers, the illiterate and the cultured alike.

As in so many other countries, the Christian church has supplied a disproportionate part of the educated and trusted leadership of the land. In a country where not more than one in a hundred of the population is connected with the Christian church, it is somewhat surprising to find that one in six of the people whose names appear in the Chinese *Who's Who* is a professing Christian, and one in two was educated in a Christian school or college. Not less striking is the fact that the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, one of the most remarkable couples living, are sincere and practising Christians, and a considerable proportion of those who are associated with them in the government of the country are also Christians. Similarly many of the key positions in the educational life of China and even more, proportionately, in its medical service, are held by Christians. This is particularly true of the Protestants. The Roman Catholics, though nearly three times as numerous, have not yet produced many leaders of national note. It is, however, interesting to record that a Chinese has recently been appointed as a member of the College of Cardinals.

In spite of this high proportion of educated leadership, the strength of the Christian church in China is none the less to be found amongst the masses of the town and country population. An interesting proof of this is seen in the experience of the Christian church at the time when the anti-foreign and anti-Christian movement swept over China about fifteen years ago. This movement found its main support in the towns and its leaders were mainly drawn from the student class. If Christianity had not been strongly rooted in the countryside and amongst the humbler section of the community it might well have been wiped out. Probably at no time in its history has the Christian cause in China

been in such danger as it was in the period from 1925—1928. Shouted at in the streets, derided in the class-rooms, misrepresented everywhere, the Christians were treated as an ostracised community. Some openly went over to the opposition, others grew lukewarm and fell away, and yet others were cowed and recanted. Meanwhile the hostility increased. Many of the missionaries were driven out of the country and some lost their lives. Churches, schools and hospitals were robbed and burnt. Chinese Christians were hounded down and beaten; many were done to death. The Christian community was losing ground and its days seemed numbered.

Then the tide turned. A Five Years' Movement was launched, the two-fold aim of which was a more courageous following of Christ and an attempt to double the number of Christians in five years. 'More and better Christians' was the motto, while the prayer of the movement was 'Revive Thy Church, O Lord, beginning with me'. From that moment it has been clear beyond contradiction that Christianity is not an alien faith imported into China from the West, but that it has its roots deep in Chinese life. It is a permanent and an increasingly prominent part of the life of the Chinese people.

This Movement was the Christian church's reaction to attack, and when the storm had passed it was found that the church was stronger in numbers, more confident in spirit, and more firmly rooted in Chinese life than ever before. Ever since then Christianity has been steadily moving into a more central place in the life of the community until to-day it is recognised as having no effective religious rival in the land, and as being in some measure the source of the new-found courage and confidence that China has displayed in her struggle with Japan. 'The most important thing that is happening', writes Madame Chiang Kai-shek, 'is that our country is surely finding its soul'.<sup>3</sup>

It is too early yet to assess the effect of the Far Eastern

<sup>3</sup> *China in Peace and War*, by Madame Chiang Kai-shek, p. 237

war upon the Christian cause in China, but one or two gains and losses should be recorded. When the Chinese began their Great Migration in 1937, millions of people, amongst them a good many Christians, and scores of educational institutions, including several Christian schools and universities, moved into parts of China where the Christian church was either weak or unknown. The result has been that Christian communities have sprung up and Christian colleges have made their influence felt and there has been a definite and permanent strengthening of the Christian forces in West China. Another gain has been the widespread recognition of the resourcefulness and public spirit of the Christian church in assisting the refugees from the East and in getting them established in the West. On the other side of the account it is to be noted that in the areas that were under Japanese occupation the Christian cause has suffered grave loss, property has been destroyed, congregations have been dispersed and leaders have been removed. In addition, in the areas that were under Communist control Christian activity was either prohibited or placed under severe restrictions. It is too early to give a final judgment about the effect of the war on the Christian cause, but the repeated requests made by responsible leaders in the political, educational and medical life of China for the help of the Christian church is perhaps the clearest indication of the place that Christianity holds to-day in public esteem.

#### THE PACIFIC

Before they came under American jurisdiction the Philippine Islands were ruled for three hundred years by Spain, whose colonial policy included the active promotion, or at least encouragement, of missionary work. As a consequence fully three-quarters of the population are Roman Catholics and it is possible for the Philippines to lay claim to being the one nominally Christian country in the Far East.

About the time of the occupation of the islands by the United States, in 1898, there was a revulsion of feeling



against the ecclesiastical regime and over a million Filipinos broke away from the Roman Catholic church. To meet their need and that of the still unreached pagans and Mohammedans of the hinterland, Protestant missionaries entered the country, and during the succeeding years built up a Christian community which now approximates to a quarter of a million.

In the adjoining group of Netherlands-India there is to be found one of the most remarkable pieces of Protestant missionary work anywhere in the world. The Protestant community numbers nearly a million and three-quarters, or as many as in Japan, Korea, China and the Philippines put together. For the most part they are drawn from primitive, animistic tribes, though there is a considerable body of converts from Islam. Netherlands-India has the distinction of being one of the few places on earth where large numbers of Moslems are being won to the Christian faith. The most remarkable developments are in Sumatra, where nearly ten per cent. of the people are Christians, in Moluccas and Dutch New Guinea where the population is twelve per cent. Christian, and in Celebes where the Christians form more than a quarter of the population. In Indonesia as a whole Christians form nearly five per cent. of the population.

Of particular interest and importance is the work amongst the Batak people on the island of Sumatra. Here more than a million Bataks, whose fathers and grandfathers were wild savages, are now within the Christian community. A strong indigenous and independent church has emerged which pays its own way, conducts its own schools and administers its own corporate life. When the German missionaries, who built up the work, found themselves at the beginning of the present war cut off from their home churches, the Batak Christians demonstrated the reality of their Christian profession by undertaking to provide for their needs, and later, when the Japanese overran the island, the Batak Christians took full responsibility for the maintenance of Christian work.

In the islands south of the Equator are to be found whole populations that have become Christian. A hundred years ago in island groups like Fiji and Samoa they practised cannibalism, infanticide and polygamy. To-day the whole Fijian population is within the Christian church, and Fiji is said to be one of the most orderly and progressive of the indigenous communities of the southern Pacific. In the Samoan Islands also the whole population claim to be Christian and the vast majority live up to it. The tribes have been tamed and educated, and their corporate life has become unquestionably Christian while at the same time it has remained thoroughly Samoan. Samoa is an interesting example of Christianisation that has not been Westernisation. Only to a very limited degree have the Samoans adopted Western practices in their personal or their public life. They have carried over many of their tribal and traditional attitudes into their Christian life. It may be fairly claimed that the island populations of Polynesia and Micronesia, such as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, the Cook Islands, Tonga and Niue, have not only become Christian, but have also become largely self-supporting, self-governing and even self-propagating. One of their outstanding characteristics is their missionary zeal. They have sent many of their own sons to other island groups and have played a considerable part in the evangelisation of other peoples of the Pacific.

Space will permit of only the briefest reference to Melanesia. The Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides, New Guinea and the Trobriands form a unique area, in that they are occupied by one of the most primitive sections of the human family and are one of the least developed areas of missionary endeavour. It is only a little over half a century since the first missionaries entered the area and began work. The savage, and in some cases the cannibal, practices of the people made Christian progress slow and only in recent years has anything emerged that can be called an indigenous church. What has been proved, however, is that even the primitive Papuan, only a step from the Stone Age, can

become a good Christian and can give a good account of himself under the stress of modern mechanised warfare. The church in Melanesia is still in its infancy, but it is steadily growing and is producing leaders and advocates from its own membership.

### INDIA

Christianity was known in India long before the arrival of the British. Tradition says it was brought to India by Saint Thomas, one of the Twelve Apostles. Whether that is or is not authentic, it is beyond dispute that Christianity was known in India at the time when Augustine first preached it in Kent. The communities of 'Syrian' Christians, as they are called, which arose from this early introduction of Christianity, have had an unbroken history of many centuries. Their witness, however, has until recent times lacked vigour; in fact it was not till Carey arrived 150 years ago, that Christianity began to make itself felt in India as a whole.

Today there are at least 8,000,000 Christians in India, or approximately two per cent. of the population. Comparatively few of these have come from the higher castes and the more influential classes, the vast proportion having been drawn from the outcastes or 'untouchables'. It is one of the glories of the Christian church in India that it has given itself to the service of the least, the lowest and the lost. Those whom Hinduism thrust into the gutter, Christianity has sought to raise up. The outcastes, on their side, have seen in the church a way of escape from their age-long servitude and a means of entrance into a new religious, social, and economic life. This in part, but only in part, accounts for the rapidity of their Christ-ward movement. Converts, mainly from the lowest stratum of Indian society, have been coming into the Christian church at the rate of many thousands a year, and during the past decade the pace has been greatly accelerated and they are now entering the Christian community at the rate of over 3,000 a week.

The very success of these 'mass movements', as they are called, has created its own problems because of the abject poverty, utter ignorance, crass superstition and cringing servility of the outcaste masses. There is a danger lest these converts should lower the standards of Christian life within the church. Patient instruction has to be continued over long years lest conversion should mean little more than the acceptance of the baptismal rite and lest the church should, in consequence, become spiritually impotent. Christianity has, however, demonstrated its power amongst the outcastes in signal fashion. The careful and classic study made by Bishop Pickett and recorded in his important book *Christian Mass Movements in India* proves beyond question that where Christianity is given full play it remakes not merely the individual, but also the setting in which he is placed. The life of the community as a whole is affected. The people begin to be more cleanly in their habits and more sanitary in their villages, putting on clean clothes for worship, making windows in their huts and sweeping the foul middens from their doors. 'In nearly all of the areas', writes Dr. Pickett, 'we found Christian families growing flowers around their homes. We saw no flowers about the homes of non-Christians of the castes from which these mass-movement converts have come.' Instead of the squalor of body and servility of spirit that is bred of centuries of oppression there is the beginning of self-respect and a new-found manhood. 'We were dogs', said a group of them to a Western visitor. 'Only Christ could have made us men.'

Nor has the effect of this change been without its influence on others. In some Hindus the growth of Christianity among the outcastes and the resulting change in their way of life has inspired something like alarm, and discriminatory measures have been adopted against the Christians in the hope of slowing down the pace of the movement. In other Hindus it has inspired a desire to know something more about Christianity, with the result that a growing movement towards the Christian position is now discernible amongst the

caste people, especially in those castes that are in closest proximity to the outcastes. They too are becoming Christians in increasing numbers, and Christianity is slowly spreading upwards through the various strata of Indian society.

But however impressive the statistics of Christian growth may be, numbers are an unsatisfactory indication of the extent of the influence of Christianity in the country as a whole. Christian ideas have passed into the thought and speech of multitudes who make no Christian profession and have no intention of doing so. Such a convinced Hindu as Mr. Gandhi constantly measures proposals and policies by Christian standards and not seldom condemns them because by those standards they are seen to fall short. Even a Hindu schoolboy has been known to express to his teacher a sentiment impossible to a Hindu unaffected by Christian views. 'It occurs to me, Sir, that it is our Christian duty to love our Mohammedan brethren.' Hinduism itself is a more wholesome and more public-spirited religious system today because of the impact of Christian ideas upon it. The steady disappearance of Temple prostitutes and the formation of social service organisations will serve as examples of the influence of Christianity well beyond the fellowship of the church.

#### THE MIDDLE AND NEAR EAST

In passing to the Middle and Near East we enter the area in which the Christian church has made less progress than in any other part of the world, in spite of the fact that in these lands Christianity had its birth and won its earliest victories and its first large gatherings; in spite also of the fact that certain Christian communities, such as the Armenians, the Greek Orthodox and the Copts have kept their life alive even under centuries of persecution. Yet Christianity today can point to smaller achievements in these areas than in any others on earth. Christian life and treasure have been poured out without stint, but little impression has been made upon the granite fabric of Islam. Here and there a

few converts have been won; here and there small Christian communities have been built up; but the total number of baptised converts who have joined the Christian church in the last half century from the Moslem lands of the Middle and Near East is entirely negligible. Through schools, through literature, and still more through hospitals, an approach of a non-controversial character is being made and contacts secured which may one day bear fruit. But how far the real life of the Mohammedan world is being influenced—save in Netherlands-India—and how permanent an impression is being made it is impossible at present to say. Islam remains the one hard, proud faith that yields but little ground to the Christian attack.

The citadel of Islam is, however, being undermined by other forces and its fabric is revealing ugly cracks. Its political and social unity is beginning to be dissolved by the 'acids of modernity' and the consequent disintegration is presenting to Christianity an opportunity it has not had before. Amongst the new notions that are finding their way into Moslem thought are ideas that find their origin in the Christian faith. Perhaps the way is being prepared for the fuller entry of the Christian message.

#### AFRICA

Except on its northern shores Africa was the last of the Continents to receive Christianity. It is none the less making such rapid advance that, in proportion to the population, Christianity is growing with greater speed in Africa than anywhere else in the world. The total number of Roman Catholics in Negro Africa is not far short of three millions and of Protestants not less than three and a half millions. These totals may not be as large as those of Asia, but they represent something like six per cent. of the total population, which is a higher percentage than in Japan, Korea, China or India. The result is all the more notable in view of the standard required for admission to baptism.

The most baffling problem confronting the Christian church in Africa is the breakdown of tribal life. In every part of the Continent the structure that held African society together is collapsing as though its foundations had given way. And that is precisely what they have done. Tribal society is a closely-knit organisation in which religious and economic, family and personal strands are firmly interwoven to form a single, delicate fabric. The pattern of an African tribesman's life is laid down for him even in such intimate matters as his marriage and the training of his children. So close and continuous is the tribal relationship that the ordinary African villager is hardly conscious of himself as an individual, but thinks and acts constantly in terms of his membership of the tribe.

Through the coming of the European this closely-knit social organism has not only been submitted to many strains and stresses but has begun to disintegrate and in most parts of the Continent it is fast breaking down. Indeed, it has so far given way that many of the shrewdest observers believe that it is beyond repair, and that the African is likely to become completely detached from his social setting and will soon belong nowhere. The Government officer and the industrialist, the trader and the missionary have all had a share in this loosening of tribal cohesion. In the face of this breakdown of tribal life what the African needs above all else is some new community in which he can find new supports and sanctions in place of those that he has lost. It is precisely this that the Christian church is showing itself able to provide. Christianity is in fact giving to the detribalised African, when he becomes a Christian, the sense that he belongs somewhere, and is offering a new fellowship which may one day take the place of the tribal society that is vanishing.

So far the African has not made any very striking advance in the world of politics and commerce, perhaps because he has not been given much opportunity, and he has in any case been pitchforked from the age of patriarchalism

into that of mass-production. He has, however, made remarkable progress within the sphere of the church, where he has been given his chance and where there is little or no discrimination against him on the ground of colour or race. There are thousands of Africans who have been ordained to the Christian ministry and some have attained positions of leadership and responsibility. In many areas African Christians are organising their own church work, paying their own ministers, and meeting the cost of all their work. They are making it clear that though Christianity came late to their Continent, it has taken firm root and is growing so rapidly that it is taking its place side by side with the older churches of Europe and America.

A word must be added about Madagascar, which from a Christian point of view has considerable importance, in that it ranks with certain parts of Indonesia and the South Seas as one of the wonder fields of modern missions. After a most inauspicious start a century and a quarter ago, Christianity began to grow so rapidly that it gave rise to a counter-movement and an attempt was made to stamp it out. Persecution of an embittered kind was the lot of the Christians for twenty-five years, but the church emerged stronger in faith and in numbers, and began at once to enlarge its borders. After the French conquest in 1895 Roman Catholic missions entered the country and to-day there are close on a million Christians in a population of approximately four millions. The church in the central and most enlightened part of the island is strong and vigorous, paying its own way, maintaining its own witness, and even taking part in advancing the Christian cause in the more remote parts of the country and in the adjoining islands. Animism and ancestor-worship survive in the rural areas, and Mohammedanism has a certain following among the Indian traders especially in the coastal towns, but Christianity is, broadly speaking, the only living faith of the people of Madagascar.



which links together the Older and the Younger Churches in every land. It has promoted world-consultations of representative Christians at frequent intervals, with the result that planning and action on a world scale is now a commonplace of the modern missionary enterprise, and the machinery for its continuance exists. The second step was taken just before the second world war when it was decided to form a World Council of Churches. The war interfered with its development, and the Council is still officially described as 'in process of formation'; but some eighty-eight churches or denominations, including nearly all the best known, have already joined its fellowship. Discussions are actively proceeding with a view to the completion of its membership and the provision of the necessary machinery for the discharge of its ecumenical task.

The International Missionary Council and the World Council of Churches have already secured recognition and won a considerable measure of confidence. They have come into existence in the hour of greatest need, and it is likely that their role will become more important in the years immediately ahead. A world of nations floundering in the wake of war needs a world church with the machinery necessary to enable it to function on the world platform.

Certain achievements already stand to the credit of the World Church. One of the most notable has been the venture known as the 'Orphaned Missions' inspired and directed by the International Missionary Council. When war broke upon the nations in 1939, and especially when the German armies occupied many of the European countries, the churches of those countries found it impossible to send financial assistance to their missions in Asia, Africa and elsewhere. These 'Orphaned Missions', so called because they were cut off from their parent churches and societies at home, were threatened with extinction and would almost certainly have disappeared had it not been for the prompt and generous action of the churches and missionary societies of neutral and 'enemy' countries. Gifts of money poured

into the offices of the International Missionary Council from Sweden and Switzerland, from the United States and Canada, from Britain and Australia, and continued to do so throughout the war years. Over a million pounds was provided and with this help and the loaning of missionary personnel, the 'Orphaned Missions' were saved. Not a single important piece of work was completely abandoned and not a single known missionary of any nation or denomination was left without some kind of assistance. By practical fellowship the World Church strengthened its international links during the war and within a few months of the cessation of hostilities the committees of the International Missionary Council and the World Council of Churches met and renewed the personal contacts which were impossible during the war years. It should also be mentioned that, under the ægis of the World Council of Churches, a somewhat similar act of practical fellowship is being promoted, for a million pounds is at present being raised by the churches of Great Britain, and a much larger sum in America, for the rehabilitation of the Christian cause in the countries of Europe. These gifts are an expression of fellowship within the Christian family and are given without regard to national or other affiliations. It is easy to see that the World Church, through these twin agencies of the International Missionary Council and the World Council of Churches, is playing, and is likely to continue to play, an important part in preparing the way for that kind of international understanding which is a prerequisite of a durable peace.

On politics *qua* politics the World Church does not feel itself called upon to pronounce. Nor does it feel free to identify itself with this or that particular policy or programme, on the ground that there is no political or social order which can be properly designated Christian. There are some orders or policies which are more Christian and some less Christian than others, but none that is entitled to be called the one Christian solution that is available. Since, however, many public questions raise issues of a religious

and even of a theological character, the Christian church claims the right in such cases to utter its word and to make its voice heard. The treatment of the defeated nations by the victors is a case in point. Both on the Roman and on the Protestant side the Christian church has called for justice, not retaliation. The Pope, in his Allocution on Christmas Eve, said that 'Those who exact today the expiation of crimes and the just punishment of criminals for their misdeeds should take care not to do themselves what they denounce in others as misdeeds and crimes. Totalitarianism infects the community of nations, renders them incapable of guaranteeing the security of individual peoples, and constitutes a continual menace of war'.

Issues on which the Christian church has felt itself called upon to pronounce include race discrimination, totalitarianism, nationalism and the treatment of subject peoples. It takes its stand in these matters not because it adheres to this or that political creed, but because the issues in question are, for Christians, affected by their view of God and man. It is the Christian view of the nature and destiny of man, not just a vague or sentimental desire for inter-racial friendliness, that has led the Christian church several times in recent years to stigmatise racialism as an evil thing and to call for the complete abolition of racial discrimination. As recently as 1945 the missionary societies of Great Britain and Ireland, together with the British Council of Churches, joined in issuing a firmly-worded manifesto on the colour bar. Moreover, the practice of the World Church on this question has been almost as good as its precept. In country after country of the European continent it was the Christians who were best able to rise above race discrimination and offer help and shelter to the persecuted and homeless Jews. Also within the organisation of its own life, all the posts of responsibility and honour of the Christian church are, with a few lamentable exceptions, open to all men irrespective of race.

In somewhat similar fashion the Christian church has an important word to say on such questions as power politics

and nationalism, colonies and education. It makes a distinction between nationality and nationalism. On the one hand it recognises that every man has a national heritage which he rightly regards as something to be safeguarded and handed on, and for this reason the church looks with disfavour upon attempts to impose an alien speech and culture upon any people against its will. On the other hand it regards nationalism, as distinct from nationality, as an improper exaltation of national interests, especially in making claims upon its own citizens, and against those of other nations, which a State has no right to make. Nationalism is, in fact, not a proper political creed, but an illegitimate form of religion, and is the fertile mother of rivalry and strife. The Christian aim is not the emasculation of national characteristics or the abolition of national frontiers leading to the creation of some vague 'parliament of man and federation of the world'; it is rather the healthy and continuous development of national life and the bringing of the full contribution of each national unit into the completed family of man. The New Testament points forward to an order into which all the nations, not their denationalised citizens, will one day come. Similarly power-politics is abhorrent to the Christian if by that term is meant the attainment of results in the field of international affairs not by the ordinary processes of justice and consultation but by the threat, implied or explicit, of military or economic power. Power-politics in that sense can only evoke the condemnation of the World Church as involving a disregard of law and an exaltation of large-scale selfishness. The attitude of the Christian church in regard to Colonies is that its view of the nature and destiny of man as a child of God demands that the colonial status must be of a temporary character. For the Christian there are and can be no permanently inferior and no permanently superior peoples. There are only older and younger members of the same human family. So long as any of them is in the infant or adolescent stage they will need protection and counsel, but that protection and counsel

must from the first prepare them for their coming of age. This attitude towards colonial questions will necessarily condition both the aim and the policy of the colony-holding Powers. In similar fashion it is the Christian view of the nature of man that accounts for the refusal of the World Church to be content with a secular system of education in any part of the world. No education can be finally acceptable to Christians that does not recognise the spiritual nature of man and seek to develop it. Nowhere does this show more clearly than in what is usually called the mission field. The World Church will demand that the educational system provided for the peoples of Asia, Africa and the Islands shall be rooted in religion and shall fit the people of those countries for life in a world made by and for God.

In recent years movements have been sweeping across the world which make it clear that such movements regard the Christian church as a challenge to their aims and claims. The caesarism of Japan, the nationalism of India, and the race-discrimination of Germany and the Negro world, have not only found the Christian church standing across their path, but have met with an unexpectedly stiff resistance.

In Japan the State has been claiming the total allegiance of the citizen in every area of his being, making in fact, demands which only religion has the right to make. It further strengthened its claim by the two-fold affirmation that the Emperor was the personification of the State, and that as a divine person he was a proper object of veneration and even of worship. Nowhere has the apotheosis of the State gone further. All that can rightly be called Cæsar's has been claimed by the State, and something that is properly called God's. Japan has offered as clear an example as there has been in the contemporary world of the inevitable conflict between the claims of the totalitarian State on the one hand and of the Christian church on the other.

In India the surging tide of national sentiment is turned against Christianity on the ground that it is an importation from the West. In India's present mood this is a powerful

weapon and its use is not likely to grow less as she moves towards self-government. To be a good Indian, so the popular slogan runs, it is necessary to be a Hindu. As in Japan, religion is being made subservient to the national interest.

In Germany and in the Negro world there has been a fundamental denial of human fellowship arising from a discrimination between men on the basis of race and blood, a discrimination which is deeply at variance with the Gospel and which in Germany was exalted into a dogma of the nation's life.

Across the path of each of these movements the Christian church stands. In Japan it affirms that in addition to his loyalty to the State the Christian has another and a higher loyalty, and that he is a better patriot for that reason. In India it holds that the Christian fellowship rises above the barriers of nationalism and includes men of every tribe and nation within the Christian family, and thus points the way to a united though diversified world. In the Negro world as in Germany it proclaims that God has made all peoples of one blood and that that is the ultimate truth about man in his relation to his fellow-man.

The world of nations seems to need a world-church, a community of people that is deeply rooted in the soil of every separate nation's life and that, at the same time, reaches across the frontiers and holds together in one fellowship all who belong to Christ. It is significant that just at the time when science has made the world a single neighbourhood there should be a growing recognition that there is a Christian counterpart, namely the Holy Church throughout all the world; it is also significant that at the time when the strife and sin of man have torn the world asunder, the Christian church should be realising its ecumenical character as never before.

# THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS

By

L. LEDERMANN

## *The International Organisation of the Red Cross*

As everyone knows, the history of the Red Cross dates back to the generous inspiration of Henri Dunant. He it was who conceived the idea of the Geneva Convention of 1864 and the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross, guardian of the principles and traditions of the Red Cross throughout the world. A neutral body, its aims and work render it international,<sup>1</sup> although of entirely national composition, since it is recruited solely from among Swiss citizens.<sup>2</sup>

Almost contemporaneously with the foundation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross Societies began to be set up, thus constituting the second link in the chain of the International Red Cross organisation, whose tasks consist in promoting in every country the many beneficent activities which have made of the Red Cross what it is today: an active moral and social force. The national Red Cross Societies are the backbone of the International Red Cross organisation.

Finally, the League of Red Cross Societies is the last link in the international organisation. It is the federative body of the Red Crosses of the whole world, their international representative organ and the guardian of their moral and material interests. It is the Parliament of the Red Crosses where every national Society can make its voice heard, state its needs, work for mutual co-operation and assistance so as to make of the Red Cross a living reality for the welfare of suffering humanity.

<sup>1</sup> The International Committee of the Red Cross is a neutral intermediary the intervention of which is recognised as necessary especially in case of war, of civil war and internal disorders (Statutes of the International Red Cross, Art. VII paragraph 2)

<sup>2</sup> For the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross, cf. the collection of the *Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge*, Geneva

The International Red Cross Conference is the highest authority in the International Red Cross organisation. It is composed of delegates of the national Red Cross Societies, the League of Red Cross Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and of the States which have signed the Geneva Convention. All the bodies represented in the International Red Cross are fully independent and autonomous.

The objects of the League of Red Cross Societies are set forth in its Articles of Association, which provide that it shall, *inter alia* :—

Encourage and promote in every country the establishment and development of a duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross Society working in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Convention ;

Act as a permanent organ of liaison, co-ordination and study between the national Red Cross Societies, with a view to assisting them in the organisation and exercise of their activities both national and international ;

Collaborate with these Societies in the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering ;

Be the guardian of the integrity of its members and the protector of their interests.

During the twenty-seven years of its existence, the League has carried out its duties as the federative and representative body of the national Red Cross Societies, and international organ of liaison, co-ordination, study. It was in 1919 that H. Davison, chairman of the American Red Cross, conceived the idea of federating the national Red Crosses whose action had been so beneficial during the First World War, and thus placing them under a more effective direction for the work of peace.

Such was the birth of the League of Red Cross Societies ; its success was immediate. Constituted by five national Societies, in 1920 it numbered 27 members. In 1930, there were 57 member Societies and now there are 62, that is to say, all the national Red Cross Societies of the world, approved



by the International Committee, are members. This universality is its strength.

During the Second World War clear proof of this universality was forthcoming as well as of the strength of its federative ties. Not only did not a single Red Cross Society withdraw from the League but the federative bounds waxed stronger than ever.

#### THE LEAGUE

##### *1. The International Federative Body of the Red Cross Societies*

The international federative and representative character of the League is clearly shown in the composition of its managing bodies, the Board of Governors and the Executive Committee.

The Board of Governors is, so to speak, the general assembly of the League and its highest authority. It is composed of representatives, called Governors, of every national Red Cross Society who is a member; it meets normally every two years. The present Chairman is Mr. Basil O'Connor, Chairman of the American Red Cross.<sup>3</sup>

The Executive Committee comprises a chairman and the vice-chairmen of the League and twelve Governors appointed by the Board for four years. It exercises the powers and duties conferred on the Board of Governors during the intervals between meetings and is convened as a general rule every six months at the League head offices.<sup>4</sup>

##### *2. International Liaison Agency between the Red Cross Societies*

The League makes every endeavour to bring about a closer co-operation between the national Societies so as to make the federative bonds uniting the Red Crosses of the whole world more real. For this purpose the League must provide them with frequent opportunities to meet and exchange ideas and

<sup>3</sup> The last meeting (XIXth session) of the League Board of Governors has taken place at Oxford from 5th to 20th July, 1946

<sup>4</sup> The Executive Committee is at present composed of the Governors of the following Red Crosses: Australia, Belgium, Brazil (Vice Chairman), Canada, China (Vice Chairman), Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, France (Vice Chairman), Great Britain (Vice Chairman), Greece, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland (Vice Chairman), Turkey, U S S R and United States (Chairman)

report on their work. The League has three means for fulfilling this purpose:—

(a) *Conferences*.—The League frequently convenes conferences of delegates of the various Red Cross Societies in order to examine matters affecting their work and to adopt decisions which the Secretariat of the League puts into operation.<sup>a</sup> These conferences often bring together representatives of the Red Crosses of one district only, whose interests are especially affected. Other conferences are of a more general nature and deal with technical matters of concern to all Red Cross Societies.

The League has often taken steps to convene, or has helped to organise, international technical conferences to deal with matters approximating to its own objects and has taken part in international congresses and meetings, the agenda of which includes subjects covered by its general purposes.

(b) *Missions*.—There can be no doubt that personal meetings give the League its best opportunities for fulfilling its primary purpose, that of serving as a connecting link between the Red Cross Societies. The missions carried out by the members of the League Secretariat to Societies the world over are occasions for the examination, with the managing officers of the national Societies, and sometimes the solution, of questions of direct interest to the life and work of the national Societies.

From 1939 to 1945, that is to say when communications were most difficult, members of the Secretariat carried out more than two hundred missions to the Societies of about forty different countries. In normal times, of course, these missions are more frequent.

(c) *Study visits*.—The study visits of delegates of national Societies help very effectively to maintain and develop the indispensable co-operation between the national Societies and their international federation. These visits to the League

<sup>a</sup> On the termination of World War II, the Secretariat of the League convened at Geneva an Advisory Conference attended by the delegates of a large number of national Red Cross Societies. This Conference made many recommendations for the direction of League post-war work.

headquarters allow the delegates to become familiar not only with the work of the League, but with the work carried out by other national Red Cross Societies, for which purpose all necessary documents are compiled. During the difficult period of the war, about thirty of these visits took place.

## THE SECRETARIAT

### *Its organisation, duties and actions*

The Secretariat, which is directed by M. de Rougé, Secretary General, with the assistance of M. G. Milsom, Under-Secretary General, is the organ which carries out the intentions and policy of the League. It transforms the latter's decisions into actions. At the present time the Secretariat employs about thirty persons drawn from twelve nationalities. It is, therefore, a distinctly international body. It is at present divided into the following departments: The Organisation and Development Bureau, the Health and Relief Bureau, the Nursing Bureau, the Junior Red Cross Bureau, the Information and Public Relations Office. There is, furthermore, a Pan-American Bureau which deals more particularly with Latin America. The Secretariat also includes publications, administrative and finance services. The Bureau of Organisation and Development co-ordinates the activities of these various departments.

### 1. *Health*

As has been said the League was set up in 1919 for the purpose of strengthening the bonds between the national Red Cross Societies and co-ordinating their work; this co-ordination has become a necessity. During the period immediately following the First World War it was found necessary to conduct a vigorous campaign against the epidemics raging at that time and raise the health standard of the populations which had suffered from the war and institute measures against endemic diseases.\*

\* *La Ligue des Sociétés de la Croix Rouge et la Santé publique*

The work of the League in this field is carried on by means of the following:—

- (a) assistance to the national Societies for popular instruction in health matters;
- (b) documentation and study service;
- (c) co-operation with international health organisations and the promotion of international work for the encouragement of public health.

The League has always considered it one of its main tasks to place at the disposal of its member Societies all material likely to popularise health teaching and, in general, to aid in the raising of health standards with special reference to: treatment of diseases and prophylaxis, campaign against epidemics (e.g., typhus, plague, cholera, etc.), endemic diseases (e.g., malaria, etc.), social diseases (tuberculosis, venereal diseases), blindness, mental diseases, child welfare, medico-social assistance, blood transfusion, immunology, disinsectisation, development of medical study. This list, which is by no means fully comprehensive, shows the wide scope of activity of the League Secretariat in matters of health and the methods accomplished by it with a view to lightening the burden and facilitating the work of national Societies in therapy and the prophylaxis of diseases.

The prevention of, and the campaign against, disease and the improvement in health standards form one of the main tasks of the Red Cross Societies during this difficult post-war period. The national Red Cross Societies well know that they can rely on their international federation to give them that help which they are entitled to expect.

We mention below the principal health publications issued by the League during these last years:—

- Preventive vaccinations,
- Construction and management of hospitals,
- Food, and what the Red Cross can do about it,
- League of Red Cross Societies and Public Health,
- Blood transfusion, the organisation of blood transfusion services in various countries.

The League Secretariat has also published numerous articles on a variety of subjects connected with health in the League periodicals and has supplied the national Societies with studies on the prophylaxy and therapy of diseases for reproduction in their own magazines.

## 2. Relief

### (a) Relief to war victims

This is the proper work of the Red Cross, that for which it was created, to which the national Societies and international Red Cross organisations devote themselves without stint.

The work in this field of the International Committee of the Red Cross has aroused the admiration of the whole world; the International Red Cross federation took an important part in this work. In 1940, with a view to facilitating relief work for victims of the war, with a view also to co-ordinating this work with that of the International Committee of the Red Cross with which the League has always sincerely collaborated, the two international organisations, acting under Article 9 of the Statutes of the International Red Cross<sup>1</sup> set up the *Joint Relief Commission of the International Red Cross*, composed of representatives of the two institutions.

As hostilities spread to new fields, as the war dragged on and the distress increased more and more, the work of the Joint Commission became of increasing importance. This body consigned to the countries which had suffered the greatest hardships relief goods purchased out of moneys placed at its disposal by the national Red Cross Societies, by other philanthropical institutions or by private persons. The Red Cross was thus enabled to purchase between 1941 and 1945 (end September) 40,025 tons of merchandise to a value of 100,000,000 Swiss francs.<sup>2</sup>

In order to provide national Societies with a summary of

<sup>1</sup> The League collaborates with the International Committee of the Red Cross in questions affecting the work of both organisations, in particular with respect to the work of relief in case of national or international calamity.

<sup>2</sup> *L'action de la Commission Mixte de Secours de la Croix Rouge Internationale*  
*Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge*

the various tasks with which they would be confronted after the war and to indicate some of the methods likely to facilitate their efforts, the Secretary General of the League published in 1914 a study to which several experts contributed, in particular M. E. Dronsart, Director General of the Belgian Red Cross, under the title *National Red Cross Societies and Post-War Relief*.<sup>\*</sup>

### (b) *Relief in Cases of Disaster*

Although war is the worst of all catastrophes, it is by no means the only one. Besides the miseries due to war, the whole terrible series of disasters, floods, famines, earthquakes, cyclones, fires, explosions, mining disasters, railway accidents, etc., necessitates the intervention of the Red Cross. If one considers the fact that 87 disasters occurred in six months in one country alone; if one considers also that in one country alone, and in one month alone, 27 tornadoes and floods perpetrated untold ravages, reducing the population to the direst distress, then one can have some idea of the extent of the burden thrown on national Societies and the assistance which the League has been able to give them.

As in the case of relief of war victims, it is by no means the purpose of the Red Cross to take the place of the public authorities, national and international organisations, whether official or private. The Red Cross is an auxiliary body, but the part it plays is all the more appreciable since the Red Cross is already in working order before the occurrence of the catastrophe. The primary principle of relief of this kind is that it should be rapid, efficacious and well organised, qualities which the Red Cross Societies possess in the highest degree, thanks to their minute preparation. There is no aspect of relief, however complex, which is not covered by the Red Cross: rescue work, shelters, food distribution, clothing, fuel, furniture, medical care, prophylaxy in case of epidemics,

<sup>\*</sup> This publication was followed by a study called, *Hints on Red Cross Post-War Relief* by G. O'Rourke, and *Multilingual phrase books for use on Red Cross stations*; this latter publication allows migrants and the staff of transit posts and reception centres, ignorant of each other's language, to exchange rudimentary questions and answers.

social welfare, etc. Here also the League makes every endeavour to give the national Societies the technical assistance which they require.

### 3. Nursing

Nurses are indispensable in all Red Cross work. The League, therefore, has always attached special importance to training and improving the instruction of nurses, voluntary aids, matrons, sister tutors, chief nurses and public health nurses. Its constant endeavours have tended to helping national Societies to give their nursing services the requisite impulse.

The Nursing Bureau of the League is helped in this by an Advisory Committee, the members of which are chosen for their professional attainments from among the delegates of the various branches of the profession and the nursing organisations of the various countries. This Committee meets periodically to discuss ways and means for improving the Red Cross health services and in particular the nursing and voluntary aid services.

In 1920 the League established international courses of instruction for nurses in London. These courses are intended for qualified nurses of every country and their aim above all is to train the higher ranks, matrons and sister tutors for schools of nurses, in particular in public health work and hospital management. These courses also give the nurses an opportunity for perfecting themselves in social welfare work. The League contribution consists in the granting of scholarships to deserving cases. The national Red Cross Societies and the national nursing associations, however, soon came to supply the funds necessary for their own candidates, thus giving proof of the interest aroused by this scheme of the League. In addition, committees were formed in twenty-one countries to provide means for the same purpose.

The international courses in London were managed by the League from 1920 to 1934 when they were handed over to an autonomous body called the 'Florence Nightingale Foundation', the committee of management of which is composed as

to one half of members of the League and as to the other half of members of the International Council of Nurses. Some 850 pupils from thirty-six different countries have gone through the London courses.

In addition the League has organised study visits and travel scholarships for nurses and has allotted a large number of scholarships to national Red Cross Societies, thanks to which many girls have been able to undergo a complete course of nursing either in their own country or abroad.

The following is a list of the principal publications published by the Nursing Bureau during these latter years :

Aerial nursing services,

Public health nursing and social service in the Red Cross,

Courses in home hygiene and care of the sick,

The situation of nurses, present and future.

All these publications have appeared in French, English, German and Spanish.

Furthermore, a large number of articles on the Nursing profession have been published in the series: 'Articles for reproduction' and in the *League Bulletin*.

#### 4. Junior Red Cross

The Junior Red Cross with its thirty million members, divided into forty-nine national sections, is the fastering ground of the future active members of the national Societies; at this present time it constitutes a considerable power in the service of the Red Cross and represents one of the noteworthy features of its evolution.

The League took an important part in this development. In 1910 the Junior Red Cross flourished only in three countries: Canada, Australia, the United States. These last two published in 1910 the first two Junior Red Cross Magazines; to-day there are 24 such periodicals appearing in 19 countries.

From its very foundation, the League bent every effort to encourage the establishment of Junior Sections in all the countries of the world. In 1922, 21 national Societies had their Junior Sections.



Let there be no mistake about it, the Junior Sections have a great work to do in the life of the national Societies; they help to protect and improve the physical and moral health of the child, encourage his instincts for mutual aid and promote between the young in all countries a more intimate association. The educational value of the Junior Red Cross has been recognised by all the international education authorities with which the League has never ceased to co-operate in the closest possible manner.

*Mutual aid.*—During World War I the Juniors tried to make themselves useful in conformity with the Red Cross idea by helping the military services of their countries and war victims. During World War II the Junior Sections demonstrated their fine sense of mutual assistance by helping the war-stricken population; in particular they took care of the children.

*The Juniors and international understanding.*—The Junior Red Crosses not only promote among their members of all the social classes of their own country a spirit of understanding and fraternity, but also cultivate friendly relations with their comrades of other nations. Their best instrument in this direction is the international school correspondence which is a token of the community of ideals which animates the Juniors whatever their country. This work which helps to knit the nations together is quite unique and has taken on a very wide extension; everything points to the probability of an increased success in the future. It is by no means supererogatory to emphasise the interest of this work from the point of view of future international understanding.

The present ranks of the Red Cross contain millions of young persons whose total almost equals that of the adult members. Their contribution to the work of the Red Cross increases unceasingly. Thanks to them, much has been done to improve public health, prevent sickness and mitigate suffering. Thanks to them, also, it has been possible for the Red Cross ideals to penetrate more deeply into the various strata of the population.

The Junior Red Cross is an immense reserve of energy and

ideals. Standing ever ready at the service of the Red Cross it offers the young many magnificent opportunities to devote themselves wholeheartedly to its cause; it inculcates in them a spirit of mutual assistance and a genuine enthusiasm to serve under the Red Cross. It has made of them members of one great spiritual and moral family, a beneficent reality of the Red Cross and a legitimate source of hope for the future.

During the last few years the League has issued, *inter alia*, the following publications dealing with the Junior Red Cross:—

*Our Book, our very own book* (so successful that it had to be republished).

*The Junior Red Cross, what it is, what it does.*

*International school correspondence of the Junior Red Cross.*

*La Croix-Rouge de la Jeunesse, son organisation, son action.*

*Twenty years of the Junior Red Cross* (new edition).

*The Junior Red Cross at work.*

*The Junior Red Cross—Statements—opinions—resolutions.*

*How to interest the teachers in the Junior Red Cross.*

*The Junior Red Cross in the world.* (Illustrated pamphlet.)

*The Junior Red Cross — Its world-wide organisation.*

(Junior Red Cross book, 1939.)

*The Junior Red Cross.* (Report submitted to the 4th Pan-American Red Cross Conference, Santiago, 1940.)

Moreover, the Bureau has distributed in French and English the work by Mademoiselle Werner entitled *History of the Red Cross told to boys and girls*, published under the auspices of the League and International Red Cross Committee.

### 5. Pan-American Bureau

The League has established a Pan-American Bureau at its head office in order to be in a position better to carry out its work on behalf of the Red Cross Societies on the American Continent in the four branches for which provision is made in its Articles of Association, namely information and documentation, international co-ordination and liaison.

The League gave token of its intense interest in Latin-American Red Cross affairs by convening four Pan-American

Red Cross Conferences, the last of which was held at Santiago in 1940.

It is the constant care of the Secretariat of the League to maintain the closest bonds between the League and the national Red Cross Societies in America. The greater part of the League publications are also published in Spanish.

A considerable impulse has been given during the last years to the work of the Latin-American national Societies in health, relief, nursing, Junior Red Cross and publicity. The League leaves no stone unturned in its endeavour to promote and develop the manifold activities of the Red Cross Societies in that part of the world.

### *6. Information and Publicity*

The Red Cross stands every day in greater need of the moral and material support of public opinion in every country in order to meet its ever increasing responsibilities and satisfy even partially the many appeals for assistance arriving from every part of the world. The public opinion of all countries must be enjoined to come wholeheartedly to the support of the Red Cross as a good Samaritan to enable it to obtain the material means of which it stands in such need and receive that devoted assistance which, in addition to its financial resources, is necessary for it to carry out its work.

The work performed by the Red Cross Societies bears eloquent witness. But this work must be made known to the public so that the latter should be able to appreciate at its true worth the benefits it receives from the Red Cross. The heart of the public must be touched and its mind awakened to its debt to the Red Cross by skilful and truthful publicity for which the plans must be carefully studied and psychologically correct. For this reason the Secretariat has always considered it as one of its most important tasks to assist national Societies in their publicity.

Another important duty of the information and publicity bureau consists in keeping up to date a considerable range of documents dealing with the organisation and many-sided activities of the Red Cross Societies of the whole world. Thanks

to these documents the Bureau can keep the national Societies informed, either by correspondence or by periodical publications, of the work performed by the sister Societies. It also supplies information on the work of the League and of the national Societies to the international daily press, broadcasting services and technical periodicals.

### 7. Publications

Mention has been made in this article of the part played by the publications issued by the League Secretariat in its work of information, documentation and international liaison. These publications have always been held in high esteem by the national Societies. The League also publishes the following regular periodicals:—

*League of Red Cross Societies Bulletin* (French, English, Spanish); *Information service to National Red Cross Societies* (French, English, German, Spanish); *Information Bulletin for Red Cross nurses* (French, English, German, Spanish); *Material for editors of Junior Red Cross magazines* (French, English, Spanish); *School correspondence secretories Bulletin* (English, French, Spanish).

### CONCLUSION

The present importance of the Red Cross undoubtedly has its roots in history. Who is there that does not know the parable of the Good Samaritan and the allegory of the Judgment in the gospel according to St. Matthew? 'The peace of God' of the Middle Ages similarly had its origin in this preoccupation of preserving man from the horrors of war. We know of innumerable individual cases which throughout the long course of human history bear witness to the solicitude and generosity of men towards each other and even towards their enemies. We know also that such obligations were frequently included in international treaties, nor must we forget to take full account of such communities as the charitable Orders founded after the twelfth century. In the Red Cross, however, there is something deeper, more active and more universal. It is not tied to any single religious

idea, it is free of all political ideology and ethnical conception, of all economic and social doctrine; it is an active expression of philanthropy and charity; it is a modern and successful experiment in fraternity, solidarity and mutual assistance, and in the world of today it stands out further as an active national and international social force of considerable importance.

It is because the Red Cross holds so special a place in the life of the nations that it is interesting to study its international organisation, and some of the conclusions to be deduced from the work of an international federation grouping national non-political organisations may be of general interest. This work is frequently complex and indeed heterogeneous. In pursuance of their articles of association, such bodies frequently have no executive duties; if it were possible to apply to them a conception peculiar to international public law, it could be said that they possess no 'sovereignty of their own'. Such small amount of 'sovereignty' as they may have is left to them by the national members constituting such a federation, and this 'sovereignty' is as a rule of the slightest.

Take as a concrete example the League of Red Cross Societies dealt with in the preceding pages. Everyone is aware of the special field of activity of the constituent members of that League (or international federation), namely the national Red Cross Societies. In time of war they render assistance to wounded combatants and distribute much-needed comforts to the troops and in time of war as in time of peace they carry relief to the civil populations stricken by disaster; they give assistance in the event of accidents of every kind and in general care for the public health, conduct campaigns against epidemics and endemic and social diseases. The primary duties of the national Red Crosses include also the development of the nursing profession and voluntary aids and the instruction of the young in the principles of health and a spirit of mutual assistance and international co-operation. Such are the duties of the national members constituting an

international federation such as the League of Red Cross Societies. But what of the duties, privileges and rights of a federative body? They are clearly defined in the articles of association mentioned above.<sup>10</sup> Does this mean that the international secretariat of an international non-political organisation has no right to initiate measures of its own accord? If this were so, much of the utility of international bodies, and in particular of their secretarial organs, would be lost. Happily, however, the facts are not so. In the same way as the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations Organisation gives the Secretary General of these bodies a right of initiative of considerable scope, so also the Secretary General of a non-political international organisation can initiate measures and suggest what action should be taken by the body corporate or by certain members of the federation. This is conditioned by the foresight, experience and political acuity of the Secretary General of the organisation concerned; and here we attribute to the word political the widest possible sense, its platonic meaning which is the choice of the best means to attain a goal or the determination of the instruments or means available to a man in any given field. It will depend upon the Secretary General how he should use this right of initiative even if no special provision is made in the statutes of the organisation, without prejudicing the prerogatives (the sovereignty) of the constituent members; it is only thus that he can usefully serve the interests of the federation.

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# THE PEACE-TIME APPLICATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY

By

H. S. W. MASSEY

It is unfortunately true that it is much easier at present to predict in some detail the ways and means of employing atomic energy for military purposes than to describe the beneficent possibilities. There is no real doubt that these are very great indeed but, in stating a case to a public not versed in physical science, it is a great disadvantage not to be able to detail numerous immediate applications. In this article an attempt will first be made to indicate the immense revolution in our control over natural forces which has resulted from the first large-scale use of atomic energy. Once this is realised it is no great step further to imagine that a secure future for the world is bound to be one enriched beyond measure by large-scale employment of the nuclear processes which up to the present have provided only the material for mass destruction. In order to proceed to the discussion of immediate possibilities it is necessary to spend a little time describing the present technique of atomic power production. Once this is clear it is easy to appreciate in general terms the prospects in the comparatively near future for developments in industry, medicine and research which are likely to ensue. Finally, it is appropriate to consider briefly the possibility of establishing a satisfactory system of world control so that the great danger attendant on the development of atomic energy plants may be avoided and only the benefits retained.

## THE MAJOR SOURCES OF FORCE

As far as we know, at present there are three major sources of force in the universe—gravitation, electricity and magnetism, and that which provides the very powerful attractive forces in the nuclei of atoms. Gravitation is



important only for large masses of material. It plays a vital rôle in determining the behaviour of the solar system, of the individual planets and of the sun. Man has made use of it from time immemorial as it is the source of water power. It is responsible for the tides and hence for tidal power also.

The forces due to electricity and magnetism do not depend on the bulk of the materials concerned but on the electric charges which they possess. The outer structure of the atoms, of which all matter is composed, is determined by electrical forces. In all atoms there is a central core or nucleus which possesses a positive electric charge. This exerts an attractive force on negatively charged particles or electrons which revolve round the nucleus under this attraction in a somewhat analogous way to the revolution of the planets round the sun under its gravitational attraction. The analogy is strengthened by the fact that the atomic nucleus is very much more massive than the satellite electrons. Nevertheless, both the nucleus and the electrons are extremely concentrated specks of matter (the specific gravity of nuclear matter is about a British billion times that of water). The least distance between the nucleus and the revolving electrons, which is only about one hundred millionth of a centimetre, is at least one thousand times the radius of either. For such minute systems gravitation is entirely negligible. The whole of the vast variety of chemical changes arises from rearrangements of electrons between different atomic systems. In such reactions work is done by the electric forces which determine the positions of the electrons with respect to the various nuclei. Until 1942, almost all the power employed by man which did not arise from work done by gravitation was generated by chemical reactions (*burning of coal, explosion of petrol-air mixtures, etc.*), and hence depended on work done by electro-magnetic forces.

It will be apparent from the brief remarks already made on the structure of atoms that we must assume the existence of a third, extremely powerful, force which holds the extra-

ordinarily compact atomic nucleus together. There is a net positive charge on a nucleus and this gives rise to a tremendous disruptive effect due to the electrical repulsions between like charges so close together. Despite this, a nucleus can be quite stable even when it possesses a big charge. This can only be due to an attractive force of non-electro-magnetic origin which overcomes the electrical repulsions. The nature and detailed character of this force, which we shall refer to as the nuclear force, is still not understood, but it is quite clear from its great strength that, if it could be made to do useful work on a large scale, it would be a most abundant source of power. It is just this which has been achieved in the course of the development of the atomic bomb, and the forces primarily responsible for the potency of this weapon are nuclear ones. In this way the step taken in tapping atomic energy is comparable to that made by man in first controlling fire. Until then he made use only of gravitational forces depending on the movement of large masses of matter. In controlling fire he first harnessed the electro-magnetic forces which determine chemical actions. Gradual development of this control through the ages led to the discovery of explosives, and of comparatively compact power generators. This was all a consequence of the independence of the electro-magnetic forces of the bulk of matter involved making possible much more efficient production of power from a given quantity of material. The limitation in this case is the size of the orbits of the electrons in the atoms of matter. They cannot be indefinitely small and this means that the energy given out in any electron rearrangement is limited. In one single leap inwards from the electrons to the nucleus this limitation has been overcome and in a rearrangement of nuclear constituents a hundred million times as much energy is released per atom than in any chemical action. The achievement of nuclear rearrangement on a bulk scale thus places in the hands of man the possibility of extracting hundreds of millions of times as much power from a given bulk of material than ever before. In effecting this, he has

gone further than in his first great step in controlling fire. After all, fires do occur naturally on the earth, but it is to the sun and the stars that one must look to find reactions involving nuclear energy occurring on a large scale. They provide the main source of the solar heat. Thus, in utilising the winds, man has in fact already made use, at second or third hand, of nuclear energy. He can now do so at first hand.

#### NEW SUBSTANCES

But this is not all. The study of chemistry has led not only to new methods of power supply, but also to the manufacture of a great variety of new substances with highly useful properties. In so doing, the elementary substances have not been changed but combined with each other in varying proportions and arrangements. Thus it is not possible to convert any other metal to gold by a chemical method. The release of atomic energy involves a degree of control over the constitution of atomic nuclei and this does make possible the manufacture not only of new chemical compounds, but of new elements. In fact one of the materials used in atomic bomb construction, the metal plutonium, is a metal not previously known on the earth, manufactured in bulk from another metal, uranium. The alchemists' dream is thus realised for to make gold it is necessary to change atomic nuclei of other atoms into the nuclei of gold atoms—in the atomic piles operated in Washington State, U.S.A., uranium nuclei are converted in bulk to plutonium nuclei. Even this is not all. The new elements which are manufactured are radioactive, so bulk production of materials with properties similar to those of the previously all too rare substance radium can now be achieved. Hitherto undreamed of amounts of medically important radioactive substances can be made, making available so great an intensity of radiation that we must anticipate the discovery of a great variety of new effects which it can produce. Many of these may be of great practical importance.

## POTENTIALITIES

It will be seen that the possible peacetime applications of atomic energy can be classified broadly as depending on the provision of an entirely new, immense, source of power and of the means of bulk manufacture of radio-active materials with the attendant possibility of generating extremely strong sources of radiation of the type already used in radium therapy. Although—as quoted from the report of the United States Secretary of War's Interim Committee on Atomic Energy<sup>1</sup>—‘We are probably no more able to foresee the ultimate fruits of development than were Faraday's contemporaries to understand what could come of the discovery of electro-magnetic induction’, we must agree that the possibilities are immense, particularly when it is remembered that, during the war, practically no effort was devoted to peace-time applications. We may amplify this a little further by considering the two major new types of facility afforded by the full-scale release of atomic energy, in a little more detail.

The present technique of making nuclear power available for mechanical purposes is essentially to provide heat which can be utilised in steam turbines or otherwise in much the same way as the burning of coal provides heat for the generation of power in, say, the Battersea power station. In the nuclear ‘fire’, usually referred to as a pile, the fuel is the metal uranium. From the point of view of fuel consumption, the pile is at an outstanding advantage in comparison with any present type of plant—again through the factor of one hundred million, referred to earlier. As much heat can be derived by the consumption of one pound of uranium in a pile as from 1,500 tons of coal, 250,000 gallons of fuel oil or 40,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas. This very low fuel consumption makes it possible to establish major power stations in regions to which it would be extremely uneconomical to transport other fuels at a sufficient rate to meet the demands. It is not difficult to imagine countries which could benefit

<sup>1</sup> Referred to in the text of *Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy*, issued by the US State Department and republished by H.M. Stationery Office

greatly in this way. Thus Australia is very poorly endowed with water power and coal supplies—nuclear power might make a decisive contribution to her future economy. It might be objected that the small rate of consumption of uranium for a given power production would be balanced by the high cost and rarity of the metal and of the operation of piles. At the present time nuclear power stations probably cannot compete economically with coal or water power plants in areas where coal or water power is abundant, but they are already comparable despite the inflated costs which are always associated with entirely new developments. It is, however, true that the cost of power supply to individual factories is largely that of distribution rather than of production. Replacement of coal or water power by nuclear power does not affect the cost of distribution so it is not to be anticipated that nuclear power will, at least for some considerable time, be a competitor with present power plants. It will rather provide a complementary source available under conditions in which neither of the present types of plant will be operated economically. As far as the abundance of uranium is concerned, it is considered that the known sources of the metal are alone enough to supply the world's entire power needs for 200 years, and it is certain that intensive prospecting will reveal many other areas rich in uranium minerals. Finally, it must be pointed out that there are certain features of a pile which make it difficult to take out the heat generated at the high temperatures required for high efficiency in converting the heat to useful power. Although this problem is likely to be solved once effort is concentrated upon it, some years may be required for its successful solution. It is therefore unlikely that, even if the world situation permits, nuclear power stations will be operating on a wide scale before say, ten years.

Apart from generation of power the heat produced by a pile might be used more directly to provide large-scale central heating for urban populations, and indeed, for any other purposes requiring a big supply of heat. It is extremely

unlikely, however, that nuclear piles will receive any application in individual automotive units, such as motor cars and aeroplanes, for a very long time to come. This is because there are certain essential features of the design of a pile which prevent reduction of its weight to less than several tons. It is necessary that the bulk of uranium metal used in the pile reach a certain critical size before the nuclear fire begins to burn at all. Besides this, a pile must be surrounded by a considerable mass of concrete to protect personnel from its extremely powerful radio activity. The combined effort of these essential requirements leads to a very massive unit. For propelling large ships this may not be serious and applications of this kind cannot be disregarded.

The new possibilities made available by the large-scale production of radio-active substances in nuclear piles may well be of more immediate importance than those introduced by the prospect of large-scale atomic power production. The benefits likely to accrue will be of great advantage in medicine and industry as well as in biological, physical and chemical research.

It is not necessary to build a full-scale pile working at a high level of power production to manufacture radio-active materials in great quantity as well as variety. Such production will make these materials comparatively cheap instead of exceedingly expensive as radium has been up till now, while the wide variety of new radio-active materials which can now be produced at will makes all sorts of new procedures possible. For example, it is possible by insertion of a normal substance such as iodine into a working pile to convert it largely to a radio-active form of iodine. This does not differ chemically from the original iodine but emits therapeutically active rays. It is called a radio isotope of iodine. Now it is well known that the rays are often effective in treating tumours but cannot be used in too great intensity without seriously harming normal tissue. In order to treat effectively a deep-seated tumour by radiation from outside the body, such high intensities would have to be used to allow for absorption by

the intervening tissue that serious harm would result. If radio-active isotopes of common elements are available this may, in certain cases, be circumvented in the following way. Iodine tends, in the normal human body, to concentrate in the thyroid gland. Radio-active iodine being indistinguishable chemically from ordinary iodine will also concentrate there. If, then, this isotope is administered to a patient suffering from a tumour in the thyroid gland it will concentrate there and irradiate the tumour *in situ*, i.e., it provides a suitably placed internal source of the radiation. Other substances tend to concentrate in other parts of the body, phosphorous in the blood-forming organs of the bone marrow, strontium in the bones and so on. Radio-active isotopes of these elements may therefore be used for the treatment of the correspondingly sited tumours. These possibilities were realised before the war, but depended on the use of the very small amounts of radio-active isotopes then available. Great developments are likely to ensue from the use of the large amount and variety of such materials which will now be at the disposal of radiotherapy. It must be remembered, however, that this does not open up the prospect of a complete cure for cancer, for some tumours are resistant to radiation while no means of treating malignant growths which have become disseminated throughout the body can be provided.

Apart from their employment in medicine, the radiations may receive applications of major industrial importance. In a recent release by the U.S. Information Service it is revealed that remarkable chemical effects have been produced by use of the intense radiations now available from nuclear piles. The most sensational of these concerns the production in the laboratory of substances very like natural petroleum. This was apparently only achieved on a small scale but the radio-active sources available are so powerful that large-scale possibilities may well be practicable. It seems already clear that a wholly new and very potent agent has become available to produce large-scale chemical changes likely to result in the

discovery of an unpredictable range of substances with unusual and valuable properties.

A further wide range of application for the radio-active isotopes depends on their use as 'tracers'. Radio-active substances may be detected in extremely dilute concentrations owing to the availability of very sensitive detectors. If, then, a radio-active isotope is added to the normal material, the behaviour of the latter may be traced by observing that of the small admixture of the radio-isotope which behaves in exactly the same way. By this means the course followed through the body by different substances may be traced in detail leading to a great increase of knowledge of physiological and pathological phenomena. The importance of this in medicine is bound to be very great indeed. Similar procedures may be adopted to study the details of chemical reactions and may, for example, shed new light on such vital processes as the photosynthesis achieved by plants. Tracers may also be used to advantage in industry in many obvious ways.

The applications of science to increase man's material powers have become so pervasive that there is a strong tendency to overlook the cultural contributions made by science in adding to our knowledge of nature. Nevertheless, all scientists engaged on pure research are actuated by a desire for such knowledge—possible material applications rarely enter into their considerations. The importance of remembering this cannot be minimised and it is no mean feature of the large-scale release of atomic energy that it provides new tools for pure research in all the sciences which are likely to be very fertile in enlarging our perception of the material universe. The achievements of physical science are already very great, indeed, in modifying our outlook on the universe and they will certainly be expanded very much further by use, for example, of the very big concentrations of neutrons which a pile can provide. The removal of the threat of misuse of atomic power, with the accompanying removal of the security restrictions so deadening to pure science, would lead to the flowering of a civilisation enriched not only by



great material advances, but also by a deeper appreciation of Nature.

#### THE CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

This raises the question of the control of atomic energy developments, an extremely urgent necessity. The immense damage which can be produced to life and property by atomic bombs makes their use in a future war too horrible to contemplate. No effective defence is at all likely to be available particularly when one takes account of the probable use of rockets with atomic war heads and of sabotage using atomic mines. The 'atomicity' of the bomb certainly provides no hook on which to hang a means of defence. All countries with well-developed urban centres and particularly Great Britain would be very vulnerable in an atomic war and the cost of dispersal of population and industrial resources on a scale sufficient to reduce this vulnerability to tolerable proportions is quite prohibitive. To prevent an atomic arms race developing it is clearly necessary to introduce some new procedure as all those employed in the past for similar purposes have been unsuccessful. The urgency is great because those nations which at present do not possess the so-called 'secrets' but which possess considerable industrial resources are not likely to take more than five to ten years before beginning production of bombs. Thus, although the setting up of an international super-State would be a long-term solution of the problem, a short-term procedure must be set up to meet the immediate threat. The problem is rendered somewhat more difficult by the fact that, in the course of operation of a nuclear pile for large-scale power production, material in the form of the metal plutonium, which can be used to manufacture bombs, is produced at a considerable rate. On the other hand a pile operated solely to provide radio-active materials need not produce this material at a rate significant for bomb construction.

The problem of control calls for some method of inspection, for it is an unfortunate experience that paper agreements between nations cannot be relied upon in times of suspicion.

It soon becomes clear, however, that the devising of a suitable scheme of inspection is very difficult if the individual nations are allowed to carry on all activities connected with atomic energy except the actual manufacture of bombs. The task faced by an inspectorate under these circumstances would be very difficult if not impossible. Apart from the very difficult technical problems raised because of the comparatively short step required to utilise for bombs the plutonium produced in power piles, there are other serious disadvantages. The inspectors would have to pry in detail into the industrial activities of the various countries and it is too much to expect that this would be welcomed. Attempts might be made to evade certain investigations in order to conceal information about industrial processes not related to atomic energy. Such evasion would be bound to tend to suspicion and excitement. The international situation might therefore be worsened as a result of the inspection. Furthermore, the rapid development of industrial techniques might easily render the whole system out of date in a short time—there would be no means of ensuring that the inspectorate would keep ahead of all these advances.

In view of these considerations, it becomes necessary to re-examine the question of national sovereignty over all peacetime applications of atomic energy. A very thoughtful and thorough study on these lines has been made recently by a Board of Consultants to a Committee set up by the United States Secretary of State to consider the question. Their detailed statement has been published as *A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy*.<sup>2</sup> There is no doubt that this represents the biggest step yet taken towards the provision of a suitable plan. In essence it consists in dividing activities concerned with atomic energy into safe and dangerous categories. 'Dangerous' activities are to be carried out solely by an international Atomic Development Authority (A.D.A.). At the same time 'safe' activities could be carried on by individual nations in a competitive way, under licence from

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 269

the international Authority which would also provide the necessary raw materials. Before discussing the advantages of such a system, we must consider in more detail the nature of the activities labelled safe and dangerous respectively.

Dangerous activities are included under the following heads:

1. The provision of the raw materials. These are taken to include uranium and thorium. It is unlikely in the foreseeable future that any atomic energy development will be practicable without there being at least a small supply of uranium available. Once begun, it is possible that thorium might be used to keep the system in operation, producing fissionable material, i.e., that which could be used to make bombs. It is, therefore, considered wise to include thorium in case a nation may succeed in building up, by illicit activity, small stocks of uranium.

2. The production in suitable quality and quantity of the fissionable materials, plutonium and the uranium isotope labelled U 235 (this latter substance can be separated from ordinary metallic uranium only by a large scale operation).

3. The use of these materials for the making of atomic weapons.

The operation of piles at a low power to provide radioactive materials and radiations for research purposes is a clear case of a safe activity. A more doubtful case is the operation of piles as an industrial power plant of hundreds of thousands of kilowatts or greater. The report proposes that even this should be regarded as safe provided the basic materials used in the pile, which must be supplied by the A.D.A. as they alone can mine uranium, are 'denatured' plutonium or U 235. This denaturing consists in adding an isotope to the material which makes it useless for bombs unless the material is 'renatured' by removing the added isotope. To do this a large-scale industrial effort would have to be undertaken. In this way it would be ensured that the mere operation of power piles by a nation would not in itself

provide that nation with material suitable for bombs. Further big undertakings would be necessary to achieve this.

The A.D.A. would have positive functions in contrast with the purely negative one of an inspectorate. It would mine uranium and thorium and prepare denatured materials in bulk which would be supplied to individual nations to use under licence for various medical, industrial and research applications. Associated with these activities it would carry on active development operations in all fields associated with atomic energy. It would thus hope to keep ahead of individual nations in the rapid growth of knowledge which would ensue, and at the same time could hope to attract high class scientific technical and administrative personnel to its staff. The various plants of the A.D.A. would be located at strategic points over the whole earth so no one nation could hope to seize control of it by a *coup de main*. These plants would be operated by an international staff so they would acquire a suitable independence from interference by the particular national governments within whose territories they were located. Unlike the inspectorate system, international co-operation is likely to be increased by the close working together in progressive enterprise of experts from all nations. Evasion by any nation could be detected with comparative ease. Since no nation should be carrying out any activity except those licensed by the A.D.A. it would only be necessary to observe any other work going on to provide a warning.

It is important to realise that the efficacy or otherwise of 'denaturing' is not essential to employment of the scheme. If the operation of power plants, as distinct from plants for medical and research purposes, were classified as dangerous, the scheme could still be employed at the expense of a rather greater reduction in national sovereignty over atomic energy processes. The A.D.A. alone would be able to operate high-level power piles. By introducing 'denaturing' the report attempts to allow the maximum of individual material enterprise.

In the full operation of the scheme there could be no

'atomic secret'. A free interchange of information would be an additional safeguard besides promoting rapid development. The present secrecy restrictions would be gradually lifted, in the initial setting up of the authority, at a rate sufficient to ensure proper working at each stage.

Although this plan involves a much greater degree of united international action than anything in the past it certainly contains many very valuable ideas and offers some hope that a successful solution may be found. It may be objected that new discoveries in nuclear physics may make practicable such radically different techniques for releasing atomic energy, that the whole plan would be rendered worthless. While one can never be certain, it is the opinion of most nuclear physicists, that this is unlikely for a long while to come. In any case it is difficult to present any alternative scheme which offers as much or more chance of success.

In release of atomic energy our civilisation is presented with a challenge at least as formidable as any encountered by previous civilisations. It is for the future to show what the reaction will be—a new and finer civilisation, tempered in overcoming the challenge, or decay and death from inability to pass the test.

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## SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS

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IN spite of the well-meaning assertions of impetuous observers of international relations that the national State is the product of a bygone age, nationalism is still the strongest motive power in world affairs. It is therefore only natural that serious research should concentrate on the further elucidation of this elusive phenomenon. Nobody could be more competent to do this than Professor Kohn who has devoted a lifetime to the investigation of nationalism in the Near East, in the U.S.S.R., and in the Far East. His *Idea of Nationalism* is the first volume of what promises

to be the standard work in this field. In it, the author analyses the nature of nationalism and the peculiar state of mind of those addicted to this quasi-religion, and he holds out the hope of a 'depolitization of nationality' corresponding to a previous development of similar character in the relations between religion and State. The chapters on tribalism and universalism in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and on the emergence of European nationalism during the Renaissance and the Reformation, are a model of lucid writing and copious study.

Equally welcome is Dr. Cobban's penetrating monograph on the principle of *National Self-Determination*, a masterpiece of detached historical research. The author's object is to examine how national self-determination has operated as an actual historical process. Having set himself this question, Dr. Cobban proceeds to answer it by explaining the various national policies and attitudes towards the principle of national self-determination and its application to concrete issues such as frontiers, multi-national areas, and the place of small nations in world affairs. As is rightly stressed in this level-headed book, 'there is already in the British Commonwealth of Nations an example of a political system in which the right of national equality has been reconciled with the presence of great inequalities of power', and 'the rights of nationality are not absolute. they vary with the internal and external circumstances of each nation; and the great powers cannot themselves enjoy peace and prosperity unless by positive measures they establish the conditions in which all nations, whether they are independent States or not, can feel free from national oppression and able to share in the general progress of the world'.

Readers who are interested in case-studies in nationalism will find helpful guidance in four books, which deal with various aspects of nationalism in Europe. Professor Chadwick's *Nationalities of Europe and the Growth of National Ideologies* elaborates the connection between the languages of Europe and the growth of national feeling and gives a reliable account of the formation of the linguistic map of Europe. Perhaps still more interesting is the analysis of the claims of the various European nations to domination over Europe, as it reveals the links between nationalism and imperialism, two conceptions which, though apparently mutually exclusive, can easily be reconciled in practice on the assumption of the superiority of one's own 'chosen' people over the rest of mankind.

A border zone which provides an exceptionally fertile ground for studies in nationalism is that of the hundred million people

who live between Germany and the U.S.S.R. In *Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918-1941*, Mr. Seton-Watson has presented us with a field study which gains in value from being primarily based on personal experience and contact with the objects of his research. Fortunately, the author has avoided the mistake of adopting any one of the countries of Eastern Europe as his personal pet. He shows a healthy contempt of the ruling classes which, in the inter-war period, cultivated chauvinism and their particular brands of fascism in order to postpone land reforms, long overdue in their countries. To indicate the author's method of dealing with his problem, two quotations may be selected: 'It would be absurd to suggest that contempt for the public, pompous laziness, love of formality and fear of responsibility were the monopoly of Balkan bureaucracy. They are, however, perhaps more marked in the Balkans, Poland and Rumania than in the West'. Or, 'Hitler himself, who had sworn himself purple about his devotion to Democracy, and had made in 1933 on the respectable members of Chatham House the impression of a mild and charming Liberal, at last came out with demands for complete Nazification of German Rhenania and the adoption by Czechoslovakia of a foreign policy to be dictated by Berlin'.

The subject of the use of an ethnic minority in the service of an expansionist neighbour State is fully discussed and well documented with, so far, unpublished Czechoslovak official material by M. Hulek. His *Fifth Column at Work* makes as good a case as probably can be made for the policy of wholesale expulsion which is now being applied by Czechoslovakia against her German minority. If any further evidence were required to make us understand the uncompromising attitude of the Czechoslovak Government, it could be found in Mr. Jacoby's *Racial State*. In a scientific manner, he describes the infamies inflicted by the Third Reich on Czechs and Jews alike: the policies of segregation, assimilation, and depopulation—policies which, by their enormities, have shocked the world, but which are merely the extreme form of a fetishism as virulent as ever.

Turning from the past and present of a nationalism-ridden world to the future, mention should be made of Mr. Ivany's and Mr. Bell's *Route to Potsdam* which contains a summary of the Peace Aims proclaimed by the victorious nations in the course of the last six years, and of a report by a Chatham House Study Group on *France and Britain*. In this Report, the subject of which is one of the most perplexing issues facing British foreign policy today, the conditions of Anglo-French co-operation are



discussed both from the French and British angles and with the fairness which one is accustomed to expect from publications bearing the imprint of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The problem is rightly seen in the wider context of Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet relations and of the obligation incumbent upon both countries 'to represent, within the councils of the Great Powers, the interests and traditions of Europe'.

Issues of more than continental significance are raised in Señor de Madariaga's *Victors, Beware!* and Professor Eagleton's *Forces that Shape our Future*. It is well that Señor de Madariaga reminds us of the inseparable connection between home and world affairs. What he has to say on the alternative between 'cow' State and free order, is in the best tradition of Western Liberalism. His exposure of current fallacies on great and small nations and neutrality and his comparisons between the Spain of Philip II and the U.S.S.R., and between the foreign policies of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., contain not only the usual dose of wit which is to be found in any of Señor de Madariaga's writings, but also pearls of wisdom which, in this field, have a rarity value. In many ways, Professor Eagleton's stimulating course of lectures which was delivered at New York University under the auspices of the Stokes Foundation presents an American complement of Señor de Madariaga's theme. Professor Eagleton may feel assured that two of his points—that 'Americans are human' and 'have human virtues, too'—have been convincingly proved by him, and there can be little quarrel with his other contentions that the pressure of modern war has become unbearable, and that the plight of the individual was never greater than it is in modern mass society. It is equally true that 'a fairly complete system of international government will be needed in order to control and direct the great forces' which are shaping our future. It may be hoped that the two world Powers, on whom more than anyone else the future pattern of world affairs depends, will learn in time the lessons so lucidly set out in a book, appropriately dedicated to the author's son, 'who also must fight because of the mistakes of his elders'.

The reader who wishes to escape from the overwhelming issues of world affairs, yet still wants to study their impact on ordinary human beings, will find something very different but highly delightful in Mr. Peattie's *Immortal Village*. Vence may be in a forgotten corner of Provence, but, like any other unknown town in France, it has felt the ripples of the storms which have swept over Western Europe through the centuries. Yet—and this is the message of this significant book—again and again 'the people

emerge triumphant, and the people—even in streets with an ocean running down the middle—must recognise one another as neighbors'.

London.

G. S.

## ECONOMIC ASPECTS

- Food for the World.* Edited by TH. W. SCHULTZ. (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1945. pp. 454. \$3.75.)
- The World's Hunger.* By F. A. PEABSON and F. A. HANFEN. (New York : Cornell University Press, 1945. pp. 70. \$1.50.)
- America's Role in World Economy.* By A. HANFEN. (London : Allen & Unwin, 1945. pp. 102. 8s. 6d.)
- The United States After War.* By A. HANFEN and others. (New York : Cornell University Press, 1945. pp. 180. \$2.50.)
- World Politics Faces World Economics.* By H. D. LANSWILL. (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc. 1945. pp. 91. \$1.25.)
- Germany Is Our Problem.* By H. MORGENTHAU JR. (New York : Harper Bros. 1945. pp. 200. \$2.00.)
- The Problem of Italy.* By I. THOMAS. (London : Routledge, 1940. pp. 60. 5s.)
- A Short Economic History of Japan (1807—1937).* By G. C. ALLEN. (London : Allen & Unwin, 1940. pp. 160. 10s. 6d.)
- Co-operation in the Colonies.* Published by the British Colonial Bureau. (London : Allen & Unwin, 1945. pp. 211. 10s. 6d.)
- Economic Problems of Latin America.* Edited by S. H. HARRIS. (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc. 1944. pp. 454. \$4.00.)
- The United Nations Economic and Social Council.* By H. FINKE. (Boston (Mass.) : World Peace Foundation, 1940. pp. 121. 50 cents.)
- A Cartel Policy for the United Nations.* By C. EDWARDS and others. (New York : Columbia University Press, 1945. pp. 110. \$1.25.)
- The Washington Loan Agreements.* By L. S. AMRAY. (London : Macdonald, 1940. pp. 220. 8s. 6d.)

To the world of 1916, the economic problems left over after the end of the war seem a good deal more complex, more intimidating than those of 1919. The greater cost of this last war, its more widespread devastation and disruption of economic life may explain the greater complexity. And perhaps these problems are more intimidating because, this time, their gravity is more clearly recognised. The nations have progressed once already the primrose path of inactivity at international economic conferences. They now realise a little more readily the consequences of letting ill alone,—even though they are not yet sure what positive steps they can take. Most people realise, too, that we are faced, not only with the task of putting straight the economic distortions created by the war, but also with all the more fundamental problems of international economy which have been neglected for the past twenty or thirty years and which, each in its way, contributed to the insecurities which fertilised the seeds of war.

The rubble that remains of pre-war economic relations is still, even after a year of 'peace', in hopeless confusion. The number of plans for reconstruction is legion; the number actually being worked out in practice is pitifully small. Indeed, in 1916, we have got little further than building the rather creaky international machinery which is to do the rebuilding. What it is that is going to be rebuilt is still largely unsettled. And, to the ordinary man in every country—beset as he is after every major war with all his own personal worries and difficulties—all these plans, this grandiloquent machinery, seem hopelessly and academically remote from the higgledy-piggledy of reality.

In a way, it was easier to see the main outlines of post-war economic problems—both domestic and international—while they were yet far off, while the dust of destruction still blurred the details. Now the explosion is over and the dust is settling, it is harder to keep the same sense of proportion and to distinguish the buildings for the bricks. It is this, fundamentally, which is the problem of a yearly review. It must be selective, and it must select in such a way as to illuminate, in its own small way, the essence, the topography of thought, of one particular year. It must do this not only to interest the contemporary reader and to help crystallise his own impressions, but to reflect for future years a part of the background to what will then be historical events. The reviewer must select, not necessarily the most eminent authors, nor the bookstall favourites, but a number of books—pruned and pruned again—which most competently or

characteristically offer definitions or solutions of the problems and topics discussed and puzzled over by his contemporaries.

The most acute economic problem of the first complete post-war year is one of sheer shortage—in particular, shortage of food. It will be surprising in after years to look back and remember the suddenness with which this terrible problem reached the international headlines. The well-fed ostriches of the world had their heads feet deep in the sand; the moderately well-fed ones, as in Britain, did their best, with less success, not to notice the rumblings of famine until the last possible moment. For this reason the literature of food in the second 'hungry 'forties' is still scanty—a rash of hastily-written pamphlets and only a few full-length books.

One, typically enough, is a protesting screech from American ostriches. *The World's Hunger*, by F. A. Pearson and F. A. Harper, is the perfect example of how educated Americans can fool themselves into minimising their responsibilities towards the rest of the world. To be brutal, the authors are setting out, in spite of a speciously deceptive objectivity in the first few chapters, to prove that 'a quart of milk for every Hottentot' is a foolish and misleading mirage—and with it, of course, all the plans for raising standards of living and nutrition in under-developed countries. (It used, one remembers, to be 'a pint of milk for every Hottentot', but apparently this did not make the anti-liberal jibe quite ludicrous enough.) Some seventy pages are spent in discussing—with a disarming simpleness irritating to any reader over the mental age of twelve—the natural limitations on world food production. Tables on every other page are reproduced to substantiate such self-evident facts as that 'More inequality exists in the types of food eaten than in the amounts', 'Inhabitants of cool climates seem to use more food than do those in warmer climates',—and so on. The possibilities of raising output and so of varying unbalanced diets are airily dismissed as utopian.

In the last nine pages, the authors finally arrive at the amazing conclusion that in the long run, better diets for the 'under-nourished third' can come only (a) by dividing more equally the world's present production of the highly-prized foods; (b) increasing the production of these foods in the poorer continents; (c) reducing the number of people on the densely-populated continents. The first is ruled out as impracticable. The second as impossible; 'in most areas', the authors glibly and inaccurately remark, 'it is practically impossible to increase the

production of forage'. And the third—since the whole thesis is based on Malthusian theories of population and totally disregards the falling birth-rate from contraception which, after a point, follows a rising standard of living—as hopeless save by wars, plagues, and recurrent famine. Mr. La Guardia, President Truman and Secretary Anderson, in fact, might as well save their breath, for more food will only breed more Europeans and they, in turn, are certain to breed further wars.

*Food for the World*, edited by T. W. Schultz, of Chicago University, is in an altogether different street. Bringing together the work of twenty-two American experts—on population, nutrition, agricultural economics, international relations—it represents a collective effort under the Norman Wait Harris Foundation. The authors' aim has been to examine the basis of divergent views on food questions and food policies and to discover whether a synthesised policy can be constructed from expert knowledge having such diverse points of origin. On short-term policies the result is clearly less successful than on long-term objectives. But the amount of information collected together between two covers and the high objective standard of the essays make it a most valuable contribution to any discussion of this kind. It is impossible, in such short space, to go into all the various questions raised in so wide a field and perhaps it is better to leave it with the most flattering recommendation of all—that it should be read.

The year of famine in Europe and in Asia is also likely to be the year of decision in America. Whether a hundred thousand more or less die of starvation is a tragic question. But, to be realistic, the result will not greatly disturb the pattern of international economic progress or regress. As Mr. Clayton, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Economic Affairs, has said, 'any examination of the importance of international economic relations to world peace is at the same time an examination of the foreign economic policy of the United States'. Her vast pre-eminence as a wealthy trading nation and international money-lender, delivers the whole world economy (with the possible exception of the U.S.S.R.) into her hands. Professor Hansen tackles this problem squarely and thoroughly. Were it not that he is constantly directing his fire of logic on his fellow countrymen at home, it might seem odd that his book, *America's Role in World Economy*, is published in Britain and not in the United States. For its theme is a plea to America to co-operate in international economic organisation and effort. His key sentence is this: 'Having become

internationalist on political lines, there is the greatest danger that the United States will remain isolationist on economic lines.'

An introduction is at pains to show the dependence of political security among nations on their economic and commercial stability. A concluding set of chapters gradually eliminates the alternatives to international co-operation which a powerful America might choose to take in her foreign economic relations. Sandwiched between is a valuable summary of the structure and functions of the various international institutions set up to assist economic stability and expansion after the war. In particular, the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development are closely and expertly examined. Their functions are summarised and their usefulness defended. Professor Hansen sets out, however, primarily to meet American criticism and anyone looking for a defence of the Bretton Woods Agreement from the British point of view should look elsewhere.

But it is Professor Hansen's attack on what might be called the aggressive potential of America's foreign economic policy which is the meat of the book. The main lines of the basic argument that the best guarantee of American prosperity lies in the stability and prosperity of other nations has become familiar to British and American ears tuned to the prolonged debate over the Washington loan. Whatever other obscure and sometimes contradictory ills this particular remedy has been sworn by Administration speakers to relieve, the more intelligent burden of their marathon song has been that the loan is an investment in British prosperity—or at least solvency—without which post-war prosperity in the United States cannot be more than shortlived.

For instance, as Professor Hansen points out, all the direct and indirect means of subsidising American exports, in order to solve the problem of surplus production, end only in economic tension and warfare. Other nations are bound sooner or later to retaliate to the subsidies, the exchange depreciations and so on, with disastrous results. Alternatively, exports cannot be given away—even by concealed methods which sooner or later must be unmasked and rejected by American public opinion. Gold can no longer be accepted in lieu of imports since its unbalanced distribution—with America holding 60 per cent. of world stocks—is already such that the Treasury Department must view further supplies as a literal *embarrasement de richesse*. The only remaining alternative, of financing the purchasers of American

exports with dollar loans, is fraught with danger, as history has already proved.

If borrowers cannot afford to service and, ultimately, repay their loans, if the dollars are not productively invested and if the balance of world economy is upset, then dollar loans may well make matters worse instead of better, and in the end may embitter rather than improve international relations. But they are the only practicable alternative, at any rate immediately after the war. And it is vital—to the United States as well as to foreign countries—that they make their full contribution to an expanding world economy as safely as possible. This they can only do if they are fitted into a domestic and foreign economic policy aiming always at expansion. Domestic, because—as Professor Hansen rightly and neatly emphasises—an export surplus is only seen as the common sense solution of economic ills when there is under-employment of men, plant and materials. Only then are imports seen, not as net benefits, but as harmful competition, both by the business man and the worker. If only a high and steady level of employment could be reached and maintained in the United States, every one of the steps necessary for economic stability in the rest of the world would be made easier. Restrictions on production and trade, whether through cartels, tariffs, trade union rules or commodity agreements, would all be easier to remove. Subsidies for exports would be less feverishly lobbied in Washington and, to the extent that the volume of world trade were raised, the quicker could such post-war difficulties as the resolution of sterling balances and the freeing of the sterling area foreign exchange pool be overcome. Contrariwise, each step away from full employment, away from international collaboration, entangles the United States more tightly in the snares of her own unstable wealth.

The basic questions which Mr. Hansen tries with great courage to answer are constantly recurring in American minds looking forward to an uncertain future and outward to a complex economic world. The kind of analysis he makes and the solutions he offers are increasingly becoming accepted by American liberals. In a very real sense, the prosperity—and the peace—of the whole world depend on how far they can penetrate the narrowness and myopia of entrenched economic nationalism (regionalism, almost) within their own country.

One major point only might be made in criticism of Professor Hansen's conclusion. His main contention is that the United States is willing to back international political organisation, but

not international economic organisation; and that the first without the second is building on sand. But the real distinction, surely, in both fields, is between the expression of goodwill and idealism, the willingness to set up and even initiate international machinery, and the lamentable unreadiness to shoulder the inevitable responsibilities. It is this brazen refusal to back up words with deeds—deeds which may mean a change in the trodden paths of American thought and policy—that the rest of the world is now finding so infuriating. The danger is not this time, that the President will go home from the peace conference never to return, but that he and his representatives will stay, and do nothing to make effective the ideals they have so often expressed.

No apology is made for dealing with Professor Hansen's book at length. For its matter is basic to the most perplexing and momentous question of the year. Nor is it the only attempt to cover the same ground, though it is easily one of the best and probably the most easily available to British readers. For those who are interested the same approach has been used by Professor Hansen, as editor of a book of collected essays, to tackle some special aspects of American foreign economic policy. *The United States After War* not only helps to explain some of the thorniest problems in America's post-war economy but also helps to explain the opposition of forces standing in the way of more progressive policies. The chapter on the American Maritime Marine is particularly enlightening.

*World Politics Faces World Economics*, on the other hand, attacks America's foreign economic relations chiefly from the Russo-American angle. At a time when probably the majority of Americans are convinced of the inevitability of war with the U.S.S.R., Mr. Lasswell's short and simple book should help to clear the air. The brief numbered paragraphs in which it is written allow—indeed force—the argument to be brief and to the point. Mr. Lasswell's hopes that both of the two giants will be obliged to abandon somewhat the poles of their contradictory and rival dogmas may be a little over-optimistic. So far, the question of war or peace has not become imminent. When it does, the result will very largely depend on the outcome of the more immediate questions with which Professor Hansen is concerned. By every inch that the United States enters into the responsibilities of economic co-operation, the possibility of an ultimate war with Russia is bound to recede.

Mr. Amery's book, *The Washington Loan Agreements*, is concerned with Anglo-American relations, though more from a short-term point of view. Mr. Amery is opposed to the Loan, not so



much because he thinks its conditions are impracticable as that they are unacceptable. He is a politician, and his interpretation of economic developments in the last thirty years are those, primarily, of a Conservative politician. Indeed, his book reads more like a prolonged harangue than a logical and self-developing piece of reasoning. His views, however, are fairly widely held and have been better publicised in the daily press than those of other persuasions who do not accept his premises, for instance, on the desirability, *per se*, of Imperial Preference. The whole question of bilateralism and multilateralism in international trade is too vast to deal with here. But Mr. Amery's portrait of the wickedness of American policy is surely too glib, too opportunist and, perhaps, prematurely over-pessimistic. He uses the arguments of multilateralism but rejects even the attempt to attain it, however limited, as hopelessly beyond the scope of practical politics.

Perhaps it is a little unfair to include 'the economics of defeat'—problem of fitting three defeated, outlaw nations back into the world economy—as a major aspect of international economic relations. Nevertheless, though far too little thought, or even common-sense, has been applied to the ends and the means of economic policy towards Germany, Italy and Japan, yet the practical reconstruction has had to be begun, willy-nilly, without exactly knowing what is being aimed at.

In Germany indeed the 'de-industrialisation' plan—whether or not it will later be modified—is the key document so far. And Mr. Morgenthau's *Germany is Our Problem* is the key book. For this, developed out of a memorandum taken by President Roosevelt to the Quebec Conference in 1944, is a major root of policies now being carried out. The aim of Mr. Morgenthau's plan is 'the complete demilitarisation of Germany . . . and the total destruction of the whole German armament industry and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength'. The methods: partition, removal of industry, closing of mines, twenty years' control of foreign trade, break-up of large estates, confiscation of aircraft. That is Mr. Morgenthau in a nutshell. Mr. Roosevelt's draft was only three pages long, but by judicious use of anecdote and explanation it has been expanded into a book. The flaw, of course, in Mr. Morgenthau's plan is the facile argument that the G.I.'s are too soft, unable to keep from fraternising, and therefore must be left out of the necessary police force. The responsibility is not even to be equally shared, and France, Poland, Yugoslavia, Norway, Holland and Belgium, besides Russia—all the countries which bore the

brunt of German aggression—are also to be the ones responsible for protecting the rest of the world from yet another German war.

The rest of the world immediately suspects—and probably rightly—that Mr. Morgenthau is rationalising a new version of the old American isolationism. Month by month it becomes more obvious that, whatever plan the Americans might favour for muzzling Germany, not even the fear of Communist Europe is going to stop them 'bringing the boys back home'. Moreover, Mr. Morgenthau vastly underestimates the extent of readjustment in European trade and economy that would have to be made if a pastoral slum is artificially created in the Ruhr and other centres of German industry.

A second book, *The Problem of Italy*, by Mr. Ivor Thomas, is typical of the kind of approach which will probably be made as regards Germany in two, three or four years' time. It is a timely little book, well-documented with facts and statistics.

The problem of Italian poverty—a national scarcity of raw materials accentuated by Mussolini's 'Battle of the Births' and Fascist economic and financial policy and later by war and destruction—is most carefully explained, and Mr. Thomas' anxiety to prove his point—that Italian poverty is a danger to the world as well as to herself—is easily understandable. The propaganda put out during the war about the 'Wops' was frequently childish, often unintelligent, and nearly always unimaginative and short-sighted. It is to Mr. Thomas' credit that, himself a member of the British Government, he has foreseen the dangers of prejudice, indifference and ignorance in Allied policy in and towards Italy. (This is, perhaps, the one country in Europe where British policy is liable to lag behind American. So many Americans are of Italian descent that their propaganda has been milder and less distorting and has left behind it a truer appreciation of Italy's basic problems.) Unfortunately, Mr. Thomas' anxiety to push facts under the reader's nose seems to have left him too little space to enlarge on his moral—that Italy cannot solve her problem of poverty without positive international help and co-operation. Less than a quarter of his ninety-six pages are devoted to examining the means of achieving even relative prosperity in Italy. But he has at least set up a signpost and it is to be hoped that longer and more intensive studies will follow Mr. Thomas' little pioneer in post-war international economic thinking.

The general pattern of Anglo-Saxon thinking toward each of the defeated enemies—most emotional toward Germany, most rational toward Italy, and toward Japan merely negative—is particularly well brought out by the fact that the only serious

attempt to deal with the basic economic problems of Japan is a historical one. G. C. Allen's *Short Economic History of Japan* is, moreover, a pre-war book, in so far as the material for it was almost all collected before the war. It is an entirely objective piece of work—thorough, illuminating, and purely descriptive. It provides just that background of elementary, but very rare, knowledge of the economic facts of the country that is badly needed at the present time. It contains no suggestions for policy nor speculation about the future. Instead, it helps to make clear the paradoxically rapid rise of Japan to the stature of a major Power, unprepared though the people were by their past experience to adopt Western industrial and commercial practices. The element of luck appears almost unanny; the fortuitous combination of a docile, unskilled proletariat, aptly trained by long experience of organised effort in families, guilds and clans, and the tiny but essential nucleus of craftsmanship and organising ability. The vital part played by the zaibatsu, the powerful and wealthy business families is admirably brought out. The experience and the wealth accumulated by families such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda in years of banking and commerce enabled them to undertake the investment function which in the industrial revolutions of the western hemisphere was taken by the middle class. As a result, of course, their power in politics, in war-making even, and in the economic system (where they penetrated deeply even the sphere of small-scale enterprise) was, through its concentration in a few hands, unbelievably great.

No review of international economic problems would be complete which ignored entirely the problem of 'the backward drag'—the poverty and economic instability of colonies and other under-developed and backward countries of the world. It has at last been recognised that this is no domestic matter but concerns all of the more prosperous nations, on the hunt for over-expanding export markets, in the most intimate way. One of the most constructive contributions to this problem comes from the Fabian Colonial Bureau in *Co-operation for the Colonies*. The value of strong co-operative movements, particularly in agricultural economics, was openly acknowledged in Resolutions XVI and XVII of the Hot Springs Conference. Even where small beginnings have first to be made in the apparently unrewarding but vitally necessary task of freeing peasant cultivators from the burden of private money-lending, it is a step towards economic progress that can have far-reaching results. Not very much capital and not very many trained co-operative organisers are needed, but the adoption and encouragement of the idea marks an important

turning-point in colonial policy. A survey such as this of the possibilities, of existing achievements in various British colonies and of suggestions for future action holds out a most promising hope of economic improvement in backward countries.

*Economic Problems of Latin America* takes a broader approach to a group of countries almost equally as under-developed as the British colonies. One of the greatest problems of both is that of the unbalanced economy unduly dependent for its livelihood on the world prices of one exportable raw material. This at once links the colonial problem with international efforts to stabilise commodity prices. But for the individual country, the remedy lies chiefly in a diversification of agriculture and the development of different small industries. The experiences of Cuba, in this context, are of particular interest. Indeed, the special studies of South and Central American states which make up a good half of the book not only introduce a great deal of new material to the British reader, but serve to underline more effectively the problems discussed in earlier, more general chapters on such questions as price control, fiscal and commercial policy and agricultural economies.

It is intended as no reflection on Professor Finer's book, *The United Nations Economic and Social Council*, that it should come so late in the list. Rather, it is necessary that the questions of machinery for economic rebuilding with which he is concerned must always be seen against the vast background of practical problems that must be encountered by members of international organisations for economic co-operation. It is indeed a work of great courage; for the author had little but the bare skeleton of the United Nations Charter to work on and only the previous and rather limited experience of the League of Nations in the economic and social field to depend on for a guide. At such an early stage advice of any kind, however tentative, is surely welcome. The main purpose of the book—though its form is not always well defined—is to examine the purposes and functions of the Economic and Social Council in relation to its supporting agencies—the F. A. O., the E. C. O., the International Bank and Fund, etc. This is done with great pertinacity and knowledge and many useful recommendations and caveats for international administration are reached and explained. Some part of Dr. Finer's book is necessarily concerned with the possibility of an international cartel commission subsidiary to the E. S. C. This question is more exhaustively pursued in an American study, *A Cartel Policy for the United Nations* which is a collection of five expert essays on different aspects of the subject. Americans have

the advantage both of greater experience in legal action against cartels and trusts and in greater apprehension over their continued operation than exists in this country. It is well worth while, therefore, to hear five similar but individual views from the American point of view.

London.

SUSAN STRANGE.

## GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS

*Dynamic Europe: A Background of Ferment and Change.* By C. F. STRONG. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1945. pp. 472. 21 maps. 16s.)

*The Nationalities of Europe and the Growth of National Ideologies.* By H. M. CHADWICK. (Cambridge University Press, 1945. pp. 209. 1 map. 12s. 6d.)

*The League of Nations and National Minorities: An Experiment.* By P. DE AZCÁRATE. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945. pp. 216. Translated from the Spanish 12s.)

*The Problem of Upper Silesia.* By B. MACHRAY. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1945. pp. 134. 11 maps. 6s.)

*Solution in Silesia.* By O. LATTIMORE. (London: Cresset Press, 1945. pp. 143. 7s. 6d.)

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THE first two of these books have this much in common, that they attempt an analysis of the background out of which has emerged the present political structure of Europe. But, whereas Professor Strong is primarily concerned with the continuity of political evolution, Professor Chadwick restricts himself to a narrower field in which nationality and related linguistic matters are the predominant elements. Both authors are in agreement regarding the value of a greater knowledge of past and present conditions, political or otherwise, in the troubled continent in which we live, and both insist on the generally accepted thesis that it is only possible to understand the present state of European affairs by reference to what has happened in the past. To use Professor Strong's own words, 'we must, in short, face the truth that we are not only in Europe but of it, and that, therefore, to be a true

citizen requires a knowledge of Europe and its problems, which we cannot understand without a proper appreciation of their background' (p. 8). Professor Chadwick goes further than this and suggests a scheme whereby at least officials of the British Home and Foreign Services may acquire this essential knowledge and, we may hope, the wisdom to use it.

*Dynamic Europe: A Background of Ferment and Change* is a suggestive title and Professor Strong meets the implied challenge with all the resources of scholarship and argument and has written a book which is eminently readable. This is no dull accumulation of historical facts, but an interpretation of European history in terms of dynamism 'for the past is never wholly static and always the evolutionary process is at work. Its tempo and violence vary from one age to another according to the nature of the operative forces' (p. 5). Human affairs, whether European or otherwise, rarely lend themselves to statistical analysis, but an appreciation of European history and of its relation to present conditions can only be achieved by recognising that certain stages are characterised by tremendous activity and growth while others appear to be periods of quiescence and recovery. The causes of these 'booms and slumps' are not always perfectly understood and there are inevitably differences of opinion among historians just as economists disagree in their views concerning analogous variations in their field of study. Professor Strong's aim is to show that there is a common theme in our complex story of political, social and economic affairs and that this theme is its dynamic quality. While admitting that Europe '... is not a political term, connoting a political entity. . . . Yet it is something more than a mere geographical expression' (p. 8). Its peoples are subject to a community of customs, a reciprocity of interests and an interchange of ideas which together give them a common inheritance and a sense of solidarity which, in their turn, are the bases of the organic structure which is known as European or Western Civilisation. Such a society, compounded of widely varying elements and inhering a territory composed of markedly different physical environments, cannot avoid conflict and dissension any more than it can remain static. To enjoy the fruits of its past endeavours and to share in the benefits of its future achievements, it must continue to be dynamic, to grow and to expand; the only alternative is to decline and ultimately to perish. The dynamic process will inevitably demand new adjustments to changing conditions; that is the urgent and immediate problem facing statesmen today and 'growing pains' will have to be endured with patience and tolerance if we are to avoid

catastrophic events similar to those of the first half of the twentieth century. Professor Strong's survey shows how Europe has survived crises in the past and indicates the resources it possesses for facing future attacks on its continued existence as an organised society.

In his opening chapter the author gives a concise but well-informed account of the major aspects of the contemporary problem under the heading of 'European Scene'. He draws attention to the too frequently disregarded fact that more than a quarter of the world's population lives in Europe, that is, on approximately one-fourteenth of the globe's surface. Although this situation may be considered in some ways as analogous to that in China or India, the demographic uniqueness of Europe lies not in the diversity of origin of its peoples nor in the variety of languages which they use, but in the pattern of states, as illustrated by the political map, which has been built up and which epitomises the growth of nationalism, '... one of the most potent factors of political idealism or expediency, according to its aims and purposes' (p. 14). Each of these states is extremely 'nationalistic' and the inhabitants of each are apparently unwilling to sacrifice the smallest fraction of their national sovereignty, so that 'The very existence of a number of separate sovereign states implies the absence of an authority with the power to enforce law and order among them' (p. 28). In consequence, other methods of maintaining state relationships are used and the author shows that they are diplomacy, treaties and international law. If the dynamic theory of evolution in European affairs has any meaning at all, then nationalism can only be a phase, a useful and creative phase no doubt, but sooner or later it must be replaced by some form of supernational organisation which will bring the 'Good Society' within sight of achievement.

Having analysed the present situation, the author devotes twenty-one chapters to assessments of the major contributions which have been made at different times, during the last thirty centuries, to the evolution of European society. Some selected chapter headings indicate the range of his work: *Greek Politics*, *Roman Dominion*, *Christian Church*, *Imperial Disintegration*, *Medieval Unity*, *Expansion of Europe*, *Industrial Revolution*, *National Democratic Experiment*, *Russian Revolution*, *Nazi Upheaval*, *Unfinished Victory*, and so forth. Each of these chapters is a fair, objective study in itself, but through them all runs the common theme, that each phase contributed its quota to the aggregate which we

have inherited. 'Our civilisation rests mainly on those ancient foundations which were originally laid in Greece, Rome and Judea' (p. 31). Imperial disintegration which followed in the steps of the Barbarian Invasions was accompanied by '... an infusion of new and vigorous blood which ... ultimately contributed a new element to the compound of Western Civilisation' (p. 97). Again, the disruption of Medieval Unity '... created a dichotomy from which Europe has never recovered and today the problem of European unity is essentially that which the medieval world failed to solve' (p. 113). As for more recent times, he asserts that 'The dynamism of Europe, indeed, had found a fresh spur in the political idealism of national democracy, especially in its latest form of self-determination, but that dynamism was also profoundly affected by the social and economic effects of the Industrial Revolution' (p. 304). He has no kind words to say of Fascism or of Nazism, rightly considering them to be obstructions in the dynamic course of European evolution so that the second World War was '... in the precise meaning of the words, a war for the preservation and triumph of Western Civilisation' (p. 410).

In his concluding chapter, 'International Outlook', he summarises his arguments and focuses them in two lessons which are to be learned from the epoch in the evolution of Dynamic Europe which ended with the conclusion of the last war. First, 'It is a delusion to suppose that we can successfully restore an earlier political order without reference to the effect of intervening events'. Secondly, 'No political machinery will work that does not allow for growth and change in the organism it is intended to serve' (p. 420). The post-war settlement will therefore call for '... statesmanship of the first order, with a highly intelligent citizenship behind it, and require machinery of the most flexible and adaptable kind' (p. 421). Here is no facile optimism, but Professor Strong does see some hope in the United Nations Organisation, provided armed power is placed at its disposal. The atomic bomb may be the easiest way of enforcing decisions of the Security Council, but it is worth remembering that we now possess a new means of spreading information and of moulding public opinion, in the radio. It is probably too early yet to assess the value of broadcasting during the war, but it is conceivable that this new means of communication, more especially in the form of television, may go further in bringing the peoples of Europe together, and thereby facilitating the fulfilment of their dynamic purpose, than any military weapon which has ever been invented.

If 'The sovereign nation state, as it now exists after five



centuries of evolution, is, in some respects, decadent' (p. 432) as Professor Strong says, there can be no doubt that it still remains the dominant political form throughout the world and nowhere is its presence more important than in Europe. Nevertheless, the terms 'nation', 'nationality', and 'nationalism' are still used in different ways by different authors for different purposes. The greatest confusion arises in the use of the term 'nationality', partly because it has different meanings in legal terminology and in popular usage, but mainly because the concept associated with the word does not lend itself to a clear-cut definition acceptable by all. The fundamental basis of any nationality is the sentiment of 'belonging together', with which is closely linked the enjoyment or suffering of common interests and belief in common ideals within the national group. But such psychological elements are not susceptible to collection and analysis because as soon as any form of nationality census is attempted, external factors intervene. Assuming that all the members of a group are consciously aware of their nationality, and that is by no means a safe assumption, and admitting that such a census is only necessary in a debatable area, every national is liable to some sort of pressure as soon as the count begins. That is why the results of plebiscites and censuses which attempt a numerical evaluation of nationality are unable to give a true record. Hence the primary difficulty with which authors and officials are confronted in dealing with nationality questions, hence also the way in which statistics vary widely according to the nationality of the authorities responsible for the count. This inability to classify, in a reliable numerical form, the existence and distribution of nationalities in a region where there is any doubt as to the nationality of the inhabitants, probably explains why efforts have been made to find a more clearly measurable basis. In Europe, the racial or ethnic basis is now thoroughly discredited, partly because of its misuse in Nazi Germany, but mainly because it is now generally realised that the peoples of the Continent are so mixed ethnically that they cannot be grouped reliably and accurately on this basis. Adherence to religious beliefs also overlaps the boundaries of nation states in such a way as to make it unworkable as a criterion of nationality. Language has a great advantage in this connection in so far as it is relatively easy to determine the numbers of people who speak a given language in any given area provided that pressure is not brought to bear, directly or indirectly, on the people who are making their declarations. Moreover, use of a common language is probably the closest tie, where it has been allowed to develop freely and without compulsion, between people,

but it does not necessarily follow that because people use the same language they share the sentiment of 'belonging' together'. The linguistic and political maps of Europe are not identical; in fact, a map of Europe such as Professor Chadwick provides at the end of his book and which attempts to show linguistic boundaries, can be very deceptive. To the uninformed, and Professor Chadwick asserts that the great majority of people are uninformed as to the distribution of languages in Europe, this map may easily suggest that the Continent is divided into more or less compact linguistic areas.

Unfortunately for the statesmen whose task it is to delimit political boundaries, and in spite of the view that ' . . . all nationality movements on the Continent seem to be connected with language ' (p. 2), it is impossible to draw linear boundaries which will include only one type of nationality or language. That is why minorities exist in many parts and must continue to exist as long as Europeans insist on living in sovereign states each enclosed by clearly defined political boundaries. Professor Chadwick points out that ' . . . the number of distinct languages in actual use cannot be said to be less than forty ' (p. 14), that is, there are more languages than nation states in Europe. As one of the major economic problems of modern Europe is its excessive fragmentation, the future well-being of the Continent and of its inhabitants cannot be served by the erection of states on a purely linguistic basis. Indeed, it would be more helpful to put less emphasis on language and on linguistic differences as a step towards reconciling those hostile national sentiments which have already brought misery and trouble to so many millions of people.

There can be no disagreement with Professor Chadwick's expressed purpose in writing this book, ' . . . to call attention to the need for more knowledge, not only of national movements—their characteristics and causes, and the ideologies associated with them—but also, and more especially, for more knowledge of the nationalities themselves'. A knowledge of European languages and of the history of their growth and distribution is essential to an understanding of the whole problem of nationality. This is not only a question of being able to read the literature, and to converse with members, of any particular state. It is also desirable to know of the evolution of their language and of the cultural and political institutions which are associated with it. 'Such knowledge and understanding cannot be acquired without learning the languages of the peoples concerned' (p. 187). It may be added that knowledge of this sort, sufficiently widely disseminated, might well have prevented the spread of at least

some of the fantastic ideas which became current on the Continent during the inter-war years.

Professor Chadwick does not stop at analysing the growth of nationalities and their associated ideologies but puts forward a scheme for a new organisation. 'We have to recognise that international relations are no longer the concern of governments only, and that the governments themselves are dependent on their peoples. We must learn to realise and appreciate the difficulties of other peoples, and be ready to help them if they require our help' (p. 198). To this end, he advocates the formation of 'An Institute of Imperial and International Studies' the primary function of which would be to provide courses of study for '... recruits for certain government services, especially the foreign, colonial and Indian services' (p. 200), but urges that such courses should not be confined to this particular class alone. The Institute should also promote research and should make available to the public the information thus acquired. The work should not be restricted to linguistic studies but should include the 'geography, history, antiquities, art, literature, education, social and political conditions, industries and trade of a country or region' (p. 199). His intention is that such study should be post-graduate or, at least, should be preceded by preliminary study at a University. He is wise in insisting that the course should occupy not less than two years in view of its scope, but even so it is difficult to envisage students acquiring a sufficiently detailed knowledge of all the branches of learning which he suggests. Some scepticism may be the result of the author's suggestion that '... the "Regional Studies" established in the University of London for eastern Europe might in general—with modifications—serve as a model for all regions' (p. 200), but that there is a need for some central Institute of this type is apparent. It may be worth drawing attention to the fact here that the London Institute of World Affairs is already in existence and that the Honours Schools of Geography in the University of London provide much of the material which Professor Chadwick appears to have in mind.

By a somewhat unusual coincidence, the next two books on the above list are supplemental to those reviewed earlier in so far as they deal with specific aspects of European affairs. Professor P. de Azcárate, former Director, Minorities Questions Section of the League of Nations, spent twelve years in the service of the League and examines the results of that experience in his book, *The League of Nations and National Minorities: An Experiment*. The author's chief concern is to explain the methods used by the League in handling minority problems. He does not attempt to justify or

to blame the League in its successes and failures but writes with remarkable and commendable objectivity. His book is a complete answer to those critics who consider that the League failed to resolve the problem of minorities 'As though the "problem" of minorities (or any problems of a political or social nature) were as susceptible of solution as those of physics and mathematics' (p. vii). Although he refuses 'to draw any conclusions as to the form in which this experiment could be utilised in the future international organisation' (p. viii), there can be no doubt that this book, and more of its kind, will be of great assistance to both statesmen and officials if it only draws attention to some of the pitfalls to be avoided.

While it is true that the existence of minorities in Europe has resulted in much discontent and suffering, indeed in some cases persecution has had tragic consequences, it should be remembered that there have always been minorities of some sort or other. Only with the emergence of the sovereign nation state as the overwhelmingly dominant political form, has the minority problem assumed a status of urgent and primary importance. Minorities Treaties were made after the first World War in an effort to secure just treatment of those national groups living within states where the majority of the inhabitants were of different nationality. None of the Allied and Associated Powers were compelled to adhere to these treaty obligations—hence Italy, among others, was unfortunately left free to treat her minorities without any responsibility to the League—and this was often a sore point with the ex-enemy states as well as with those states which were newly created in the post-war reorganisation. Furthermore, the League, through its Minorities Section, was not only practically powerless to enforce conditions for the treatment of minority groups but was faced with the unenviable task of trying to find a *modus vivendi* whereby the rights of the majority could be reconciled with those of the minority without arousing the antagonism of the state in question. Complete success in this task was clearly impossible, but the League made a positive contribution to European peace '... not so much in ending or lessening the oppression of minorities (a humanitarian activity with which it was not entrusted), as in preventing the greater or lesser oppression of minorities from provoking international disputes or conflicts' (p. 15). Even more important than this achievement was the pioneer work of the League in a direction which is seldom appreciated. The League Secretariat had '... the duty of collecting information concerning the manner in which the Minorities Treaties are carried out' (p. 89), but members of

the Council had the right to bring to the notice of the Council any infraction, or danger of infraction, of any obligation contained in the Treaties and also the right to refer any difference of opinion to the Permanent Court of Justice. At the same time, the Council of the League had the right ' . . . to take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances ' (p. 97). As Professor Azcárate points out, these innovations ' . . . forced the widest breach which has ever been made in that granite-like structure known as national sovereignty ' (p. 97), and constituted ' one of the boldest experiments which has been made in the international limitations of the sovereignty of states ' (p. 98). In view of the fact that ' . . . the strength of the League of Nations was exclusively political and moral ' (p. 100), its relatively successful handling of minority questions was a great tribute to the patience, tact and unceasing efforts of its Secretariat, which consisted of a band of devoted men and women who seldom appeared in the limelight.

As an official of the Minorities Section, and later as its Director, Professor Azcárate had opportunities of visiting many parts of Europe and of investigating minority questions in the most critical areas. His survey covers ' a series of political and social problems for which the Central European countries and the Balkans might be termed a regular experimental laboratory ' (p. 129) and reveals a fundamental weakness in international affairs. Whatever decisions may be arrived at by International Conferences, at Geneva or elsewhere, the implementation of those decisions depends very largely on local conditions in the minority areas. ' The fact is that international influence and certain types of control . . . can easily reach a central government and central authorities, but their effectiveness is frequently lost in the complicated and labyrinthine channels connecting the government with the local authorities ' (p. 45). Paradoxically enough, this difficulty was greater in the so-called democratic states than in those under authoritarian régimes because a highly centralised and rigidly controlled administration was characteristic of the latter. When the United Nations Organisation turns its attention to minorities, as it must do sooner or later, it will certainly be confronted by this problem of ensuring that its directions reach the lowest levels of administration. There is little use in giving minority peoples equality in the eyes of the state when the exercise of that equality is easily frustrated, in a thousand ways, by petty local magnates and functionaries.

Professor Azcárate's conclusions in his section on ' National Minorities and Frontiers ' should be read carefully by all those

statesmen and members of commissions who are at present engaged in the delimitation of various European boundaries. His answer to the questions 'Is the existence of national minorities caused by a defective tracing of frontiers? Could national minorities be suppressed by a just tracing of frontiers? Is it possible to form states comprising only peoples of the same race and language?' (pp. 6-7) is a categorical negative because '... the regions where national minorities exist are precisely those where the population is most mixed from a racial and linguistic point of view' (p. 7). The present reviewer's detailed studies of the Julian March (Venezia Giulia)<sup>1</sup> have brought him to the same conclusions. Linear ethnic boundaries simply do not exist. To attempt to identify international boundaries, therefore, with 'ethnic lines' is crass stupidity. Short of abolishing inter-state boundaries, and Europe is not ready for that yet, the only practicable method is to draw the boundaries so that minorities remain as numerically small as possible and then provide adequate safeguards in the hands of some international body with adequate powers at its disposal for the application of these safeguards. No doubt this will lead to further encroachments on national sovereignty, but that is inevitable and probably desirable.

The final third of Professor Azcárate's book is taken up by an appendix which contains a 'Report of the Committee instituted by the Council Resolution of March 7th, 1929'. Although the material in this appendix is to be found in the 'Official Journal' of the League, its inclusion here serves a useful purpose, particularly when taken in conjunction with the author's own examination of minority questions. The whole book is a powerful answer to those who are opposed to international action in any sphere. It justifies the efforts of the League Secretariat which, without working miracles, did achieve a measure of success in dealing with one of the most complex and difficult sections of European affairs. Should Professor Chadwick's Institute ever come into being, *The League of Nations and National Minorities* must find an important place on the shelves of its library. Finally, it would be ungenerous not to compliment Miss E. E. Brooke on the excellence of her translation of Professor Azcárate's originally Spanish text.

Whereas Professor Azcárate deals with an aspect of the general problems which Professors Strong and Chadwick analyse in their books, Mr. Machray takes a specific region which, until recently, was one of the most debated territories in Europe. His treatment of *The Problem of Upper Silesia* is subjective throughout

<sup>1</sup> *The Italo Yugoslav Boundary* (London: Philips 1945)

in so far as all his sympathies lie with the Poles and his arguments may be briefly summarised in the statement that Upper Silesia should be incorporated in Poland for economic, ethnic and historical reasons. The book was written before the Germans were driven out of Poland and the rapid march of events in the last two years has resulted in his hopes being realised although perhaps in a way which he would not have approved. Among his chief conclusions, he finds that 'Upper Silesia is part of the Polish economic area; its economic expansion must inevitably and exclusively be eastward, towards Poland and South-Eastern Europe' (p. 109). Conditions in Eastern Europe at present suggest that the easterly component in the economic expansion of Upper Silesia may be far greater than ever Mr. Machray imagined, but he is not alone in falling behind the times when writing about contemporary Europe with its 'background of ferment and change'.

This compact little book is full of useful information, including eleven well-drawn maps, in spite of the fact that its author is very one-sided in his outlook. The essence of the Upper Silesian Problem, from the point of view of a 'good European', is that this region, richly endowed with those mineral resources without which industrialisation cannot take place, is centrally located in Eastern Europe, which is primarily concerned with agriculture and the peoples of which are in need of large and cheap supplies of those commodities which only a highly organised industrial region can supply, yet Upper Silesia has been divided politically for centuries so that the full exploitation of its resources and the complete integration of its industrial production have been retarded. The problem is therefore more than one of Polish-German relations. Its satisfactory solution may well affect the future of the whole of Eastern and Central Europe. Already one scheme has been put forward for the supply of electricity to a large non-Polish area by means of a grid deriving most of its current from the Silesian coalfield. This and other schemes could do much to bring about the economic integration of a region the history and politics of which have for long been characterised by excessive disintegration.

Europeans have for so long thought of their continent as the centre of the world that many of them regard world affairs from what is almost a parochial angle. In spite of the global character of the two world wars of this century and in spite of the ever-growing economic interdependence of the component parts of the earth's surface, they are apt to forget that non-European affairs are at least as important as what happens on their one-fourteenth of the planet. Any corrective to this line of thought is therefore

useful and Mr. Lattimore renders us a service in his *Solution in Asia* by drawing our attention to events and developments in the largest continent.

Mr. Lattimore is an American with many years of study and travel in Asia to his credit. His book grew out of a lecture course to his fellow countrymen and is, therefore, somewhat more outspoken because his objective is to stimulate American thinking and to direct it towards Asia. 'Asia was for several centuries an area in which political history and the economic fate of hundreds of millions of people were determined by things that happened somewhere outside Asia. We have now crossed over into a period in which things happening in Asia, opinions formed in Asia, and decisions made in Asia, will largely determine the course of events in the world' (p. 1). For these reasons, he thinks that the second World War is a 'watershed dividing two periods of history' in the sense that nationalism has come rapidly to the front, at least in Asia outside the U.S.S.R., there certainly seems to be a new phase in political evolution, but this is hardly a 'watershed'. It may be a diversion by means of which political, social and economic forces may be canalised along different lines, but the idea of a watershed suggests too abrupt a change. As Mr. C. P. Fitzgerald shows in his preface to this book, three of the four political systems which may prevail in Asia, being more or less democratic, are derived from concepts of European origin so that there may be more continuity in the evolution of the Old World than Mr. Lattimore appears to appreciate.

London.

A. E. MOODIE.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS

*Man, Morals and Society.* By J. C. UGAREL. (London: Duckworth, 1915. pp. 328. 21s.)

*Handbook of Social Psychology.* By KIMBALL YOUNG. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1916. pp. 578. 21s.)

*Psychology and World Order.* By HANFORD WEST. (Harmondsworth and New York: Pellem Books, 1915. pp. 125. 1s.)

*Higher Education in German Occupied Countries.* By A. WOLF. (London: Methuen & Co. 1915. pp. 187. 6s.)



*Total Education.* By M. L. JACKS. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1946. pp. 160. 10s. 6d.)

*Education: Its Data and First Principles.* By SIR PERCY NUNN. (London: Edward Arnold & Co. Third edition. 1945. pp. 283. 7s. 6d.)

*New Teaching for a New Age.* By A. H. T. GLOVER. (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. 1945. pp. 188. 15s.)

DR. FLUGEL's book on *Man, Morals and Society* provides a clear and comprehensive survey of psycho-analytic findings in their relation, not so much to the abnormal or neurotic, as to humanity in general. Indeed, the book has already been cited as the author's *magnum opus*. In it Dr. Flugel describes the chief results achieved by the psycho-analytic approach, sets them in a background of orthodox psychology, and attempts to show their relation to the common welfare of man. With this end in view he discusses, in psycho-analytic terminology, but with much common sense, what he takes to be the main psychological processes underlying the characteristic phenomena in the fields of politics, of morals, of religion, and (what is perhaps most opportune at the present moment) of war and peace.

It is impossible to do justice here to his general exposition of the psycho-analytic theory. Very broadly Dr. Flugel holds that real moral progress can only be achieved by man learning to judge the behaviour of others in the light of objective thought and scientific knowledge, rather than in accordance with the cruder, more primitive precepts of traditional morality. Much of this old morality—the result of the workings of that part of the mind dubbed (most irritatingly) by psycho-analysts the ‘super-ego’—is, he argues, crude and out of date. Its roots lie in early childhood, and its motivation is largely unconscious and therefore inaccessible. It influences our present behaviour much more strongly than is generally supposed. The super-ego is a ‘primitive, slap-dash affair’, made up of tenets imposed in early years by surrounding adults. These tenets are adopted and assimilated by the child, who, on account of his immaturity and almost total dependence on his parents, is in no position to do otherwise. In this process some of his natural anger at the way he is dictated to becomes repressed; and then expresses itself later in distorted forms, for example, in over-severe condemnation of the behaviour of other people. There are a large number of traits motivated by such anger which may result from ‘super-ego’ formation. Dr. Flugel

in describing these indicates that many human problems connected with so-called right and wrong are due, not only to unconscious, amoral impulses, as earlier psycho-analysts would have had us believe, but also to unconscious mechanisms having a seemingly moral origin.

Not only is the origin of man's traditional morality to be found in early childhood; but this is also the source of a great deal of his religious beliefs and his political leanings. Both in the political and religious spheres the wishes, guilts and fears, having their beginnings in the early relation between the child and his parents, strongly influence—though the individual is unaware of it—his subsequent thought and behaviour.

Turning more particularly to the problems of war, Dr. Flugel advocates, as others have done before him, the adoption of a 'moral substitute' for war. Terrible as war is, there can be no doubt, he says, that there are certain essential qualities in man to which war makes an appeal, and certain good things to be learned from it. War satisfies the adventurous spirit, and affords an opportunity for supreme human effort; it binds together the members of a nation more strongly than they are bound in peace, imparting to them a sense of comradeship, of belonging together, and of group-purpose. It tends to free them from individual competition and from the worries incidental to such competition; and, finally, provides an outlet for the aggressive impulses. It should, therefore, be our aim to see that these needs are adequately fulfilled in peace—a task which only psychological analysis and forethought can enable us fully to carry out.

In his final chapter Dr. Flugel suggests that everyday work in peace-time should be more explicitly related to the welfare of the whole national or international group, so that people should have the satisfaction of working co-operatively for a higher and a larger purpose than that of merely earning their daily bread; both aggression and the spirit of adventure could well be satisfied by making the battle one of man against Nature rather than man against man. A drastic revision of thought is essential in order that 'the application of the notion of moral responsibility should go hand in hand with an insistence on the ultimate value of the individual'. With progress (in the widest sense of that word) explicitly announced as the ultimate goal, there should at every stage be full provision for personal courage, ingenuity, and skill.

Such a condition of affairs can come about only as men learn to be more honest in their emotional thinking, and to apply scientific principles to their own lives. Nevertheless, its approach could undoubtedly be facilitated by suitable political machinery.

This should be designed to attract some of the loyalty, now directed towards national states, towards an international, world organisation. This transfer of loyalty (which the League of Nations so lamentably failed to achieve) should, Dr. Flugel suggests, be systematically encouraged by appropriate symbols of leadership—such as flags and anthems—and by sustained propaganda directed to these nobler ends.

It will be seen that Dr. Flugel's book is not easy to judge. Many of the conclusions would command almost universal agreement. The theories that led Dr. Flugel to these conclusions, however, are based avowedly on certain assumptions. And a prior question has first to be raised: to what extent is it practicable to interpret the behaviour of ordinary men in terms of mechanisms deduced largely from the study of neurotic patients? In defence of such an interpretation, it may, of course, be plausibly contended that the mechanisms of neurotics are but exaggerated forms of those found in more normal people. Further, we are bound to recognise that certain of the psycho-analytic mechanisms such as wishful thinking, projection, rationalisation and identification, to mention only four, have been fairly generally recognised and accepted, if in a somewhat bowdlerised form, as widespread. Nevertheless, it is equally true that, at least in certain neuroses, these exaggerated mechanisms dominate the personality in a way that is impossible in normal life, and thus to a large extent preclude normal experience and rational behaviour. If so, in studying neurotics, the psycho-analyst may not only be studying something which, for all practical purposes, lies in an essentially different field, but at the same time neglecting to study something else which would be relevant and essential.

The initial assumptions, therefore, have still to be established: and the onus of establishing them lies on the psycho-analysts. It is for them to demonstrate their case. Meanwhile, Dr. Flugel has put forward a sincere and eminently hopeful analysis, based on what is virtually a life's work; and his conclusions and suggestions are too important to be neglected or deferred.

Whereas Dr. Flugel's thesis is built up, for the most part, from an intensive study of the individual, Professor Young's approach is rather from the environment in which the individual lives, and the influence of that environment on him. The new edition of Professor Young's *Handbook of Social Psychology*, published in this country, forms a complete revision of the earlier version, which has been expanded and indeed largely rewritten.

Social Psychology, as Professor Young points out, lies on the borders of many other branches of knowledge, such as general

psychology, sociology, history, and the political sciences. The whole field is one in which well-controlled experimental situations are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve; thus, observation, the study of recorded events, and the analysis of data obtained by questionnaires or interviews, must play a major part in the methods of study employed. The social psychologist requires a wide and accurate knowledge of human phenomena and of other aspects besides the psychological before he starts. Ultimately, of course, his interpretation of social behaviour will depend on the particular theories of individual psychology that he adopts.

Professor Young sets himself the immense task of analysing recent social behaviour on a national and an international scale, in the light of such knowledge as is obtainable to date from social psychology. As he points out, social psychology is a young science; but it has achieved considerable progress during recent years, and brings a definite contribution of its own.

The handbook is divided into three parts. The first contains a study of 'basic aspects of personality and culture'. It starts with an excellent review of work on the social life of monkeys and apes (including a detailed account of a creature called, rather appropriately, a 'howler'). This Professor Young regards as the 'animal prototype of human behaviour'. He then takes up the main problems of culture and personality as they confront us in human society; and illustrates his discussion by illuminating examples, showing how widely personality may diverge in different cultures. This, he contends, is attributable not so much to inheritable or racial differences as to the differential influence of the cultures themselves. He then describes those fundamental concepts of personality on which his general theory is to be founded—namely, drives, emotions, attitudes, learning ability, traits, psycho-analytic mechanisms, and the like—all of which, in their interaction with society from the earliest years, combine to produce the adult 'self'. This whole section concludes with an examination of dominance and leadership, of stereotypes and their formation, and of the development of myths and ideologies.

The second part deals with the chief aspects of social conflict. Special attention is paid to prejudice as a source or phase of conflict. This leads to a detailed analysis of the psychology of war and revolution.

The final section is entitled 'Mass Behaviour'. Here the author first treats mass behaviour in general, as manifested in audiences and crowds; and then proceeds to the study of public opinion. The media chiefly responsible for forming public opinion in modern

communities—the press, the wireless, and the motion picture—are described in turn. And the volume closes with a psychological examination of propaganda, of so-called psychological warfare, and of the sources of social power and control.

Professor Young is most familiar with American society, and draws his illustrations largely from his side of the Atlantic. But the problems which he examines are those with which almost every modern society is vitally concerned. To solve such problems a fundamental balance must, he argues, be achieved between the rights and liberties of the individual and the moral responsibilities entailed thereby towards the community. In studying any society, the primary questions in his view are these: who possesses the power? how is this power manifest? 'In a well-integrated community the externalised controls that direct and limit the use of power become internalised in those that hold it.' For present-day societies the most workable social systems, he suggests, must have a democratic basis, the individuals possessing the power being elected to represent the masses of the people. They will manifest their power by passing laws for the benefit of all; and those laws will govern officers and ordinary members alike. Such representatives will have their special moral responsibilities towards the people; and, when they fail in this, an adequate machinery should be available for removing them. Class-structure should be 'open', that is, flexible and free, with people moving up and down the social ladder according to merit, which will be determined by ability, skill, and above all sense of moral responsibility. It is this sense of moral responsibility towards society which forms, in Professor Young's view, the crux of the whole problem.

In a work covering so vast a field it would not be difficult to discover numerous statements calling for criticism or question. But one point seems to call specially for comment. Professor Young rejects the Freudians' generalisation of the so-called Oedipus complex as the universal key to every inter-social problem. But he puts great faith in the psycho-analyst's over-simplified explanation of the phenomena of aggression. Throughout his book there runs the implicit assumption that all aggression directed towards what he terms 'out-groups' (that is, other communities than the one whose standpoint is under consideration), consists of 'projected' anger having its essential origin in childhood. Thus all social conflict is considered to spring from the fact that, as children, the members of conflicting groups were frustrated by their parents. While young they were punished whenever they 'got angry back'; and so they quickly learned to transfer or 'project' their anger on to others. These substitutes would naturally be persons or groups

for whom their parents cherished a dislike, since in this way they would win social approval for their anger instead of chastisement. No one would doubt that this situation does actually and frequently arise. We may even admit that its influence on subsequent behaviour may be far stronger than most of us at present believe. But it is difficult to believe that this can be the sole source of inter-group aggression in every form.

In general, however, Professor Young adopts a broad, objective, and eclectic viewpoint. At the present time his book should be invaluable as a comprehensive textbook. It will be found especially useful for the many summaries it contains of recent American research and for the extensive lists of references appended to each chapter. There is at the moment no similar book at once so up to date, so comprehensive, and so full of helpful material for those about to embark on the study of social psychology or to bring their pre-war knowledge up to date.

Dr. Ranyard West's 'Pelican' entitled *Psychology and World Order* (or, as the author himself would prefer to phrase it, *The Psychology of Law and Order in the World*) is an attempt to show that the study of political psychology deserves the consideration not only of the statesman but also of the voter. Dr. West believes that he has a few new points to contribute; but for the most part he claims merely to say a number of old things in a new way and with a new emphasis.

Dr. West is a medical man who began his work as a psychiatrist. Later, however, he became interested in applying Freud's psychology to social and political problems, and is now Lecturer on Social Psychology at the University of Edinburgh. It is therefore not surprising that he, too, believes that the key to current international difficulties is to be found in a proper understanding of man's hidden motives and irrational desires. Dr. West is eager to assure us that this or that 'bit of the psychology of Freud has been confirmed by everyone without exception who has examined the Freudian approach by Freud's method'. But, in point of fact, most of the explanations he adduces could have been advanced, and in fact were frequently advanced, by psychologists and sociologists before Freud's views had been published. What is novel is rather the somewhat strange or startling terminology in which the conclusions are expressed.

With Dr. West's initial premise no psychologist will find fault, namely, that 'in causing events to happen, attitude of mind matters more than economic forces'. Economic motives, idealistic motives, and, one might add, selfish motives all 'mix in men's minds'. But of the two main factors, the emotional and the

material, 'it is the material that are far more easily controlled'. It follows, therefore, that, in order to understand the causes of peace and war, we must begin by considering the emotions which ordinary people show when they are dealing with each other in large and powerful groups.

Dr. West sets out by demonstrating that the mental qualities of different peoples are very much the same. Differences in their behaviour are due more to differences in their political organisation and traditions than to any inherent differences of racial mentality. We believe that those nations whom we fear or fight are different from ourselves, but that is only because our judgment is distorted by our prejudices. The first step, therefore, towards world order requires that men shall look upon their past history and their current problems in a detached rather than in a national way.

By order, Dr. West understands 'harmonious community of life, free from the violence of anarchy and war'. Such order, he holds, can only be achieved and maintained by law. Law exists, not because our morals are weak, but because our prejudices are strong. Its purpose is to secure our physical, mental and spiritual needs by preserving that balance between our selfish instincts and our social instincts which we have agreed is necessary to our common life. In short, law is Philip sober controlling Philip drunk. What Dr. West says of national and international law would not perhaps be wholly accepted by the legal expert: but his attempt to indicate its psychological basis is certainly suggestive if not altogether satisfying.

World order he believes may be secured in one of two ways—by a world-wide co-ordination of states or by a world federation of peoples. On the whole, Dr. West favours the latter. To establish a world democracy, five things, he maintains, are requisite: first, a world charter, which he briefly outlines at the end of his book; secondly, a world legislature to issue and to revise the charter; thirdly, a world court to judge the disputes between the larger human groups; fourthly, a world force to maintain the principles of order established by the charter and the court; and finally a world executive 'to press the necessary buttons'. These are things that we can only hope to build up slowly. But there is one thing which we might embark upon forthwith, and in which the humblest might do his share: and that is to establish a World Democratic Party to stimulate and stabilise a keen international interest in the establishment of an orderly world government.

Professor Wolf's little book on *Higher Education in German Occupied Countries* is a sequel to his previous volume on *Higher Education in Nazi Germany*. The present account, like its pre-

decessor, was prepared at the request of the Rockefeller Committee of the London School of Economics. In it he gives a series of brief descriptions, showing the fate of education in those countries which suffered under German occupation in the war. In a final chapter he sums up his 'concluding reflections' on the fundamental errors in pre-war systems of education, and outlines a possible solution to these errors in the future education of the nations, including Germany herself.

The Nazis rose to power, he says, first of all because there was 'something peculiarly aggressive and brutal in the German people as a whole', and secondly because there was too little moral concern over Germany on the part of the other powers. In Germany itself the system of education before the rise of the Nazi regime was in all essentials similar to that obtaining in most other civilised countries; nevertheless it proved inadequate to control the anti-social impulses of the Germans themselves. This failure was due to the fact that the system of education lacked provision for moral training—a lack shared by the non-German countries. In German education as elsewhere there was too much glorification of science—of scientific knowledge and scientific method for its own sake; and too little concern with 'wisdom, in the sense of the wise conduct of life'.

The essential need of the present moment is the inclusion of moral inspiration in established educational systems. It is not practicable to look to religion for this, since the various religions are not reconciled among themselves, and evidence from history does not suggest that religious teaching alone will be effective. The solution lies rather in founding a general moral code, which should be explicitly taught as part of education, and which has as its fundamental principle a respect for human life. Such respect is the first step on the way to a respect for the individual rights of others, and violation of this respect was the greatest of the Nazi crimes. Such a moral spirit should be imparted by teaching and example; and, where this fails, sanctions should be imposed. Thus, men everywhere should be taught to recognise that legitimate freedom for oneself is dependent on due regard for the freedom of others.

This book should be read by all English-speaking people, even if they do not altogether agree with Professor Wolf's final conclusions. No matter how sympathetic we may feel towards those who suffered under the German occupation, it is not easy for us to understand the problems that Europe is facing now, for our countries were not occupied by the Nazis, and we have no first-hand knowledge of their methods. We do not know what it was



like to see existing systems and principles swept aside, often in a most brutal manner. It is this knowledge that Professor Wolf's book provides, and in so doing throws into greater relief the value of liberty and freedom which, if not actively threatened, can perhaps too easily be taken for granted.

The series issued as *The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction*, under the editorship of Dr. Karl Mannheim, is continued with a suggestive book by the Director of the Department of Education at the University of Oxford. Dr. Jacks calls his book *Total Education: A Plea for Synthesis*. Having had totality in war, he argues, we should aim at totality in education. Total education will form the best counterblast to totalitarian education. It caters for the needs of all members of the community both young and adult in their infinite variety, and seeks to develop the whole of their human personality. It is thus essentially synthetic.

'Analysis', as Herbert Spencer once declared, 'has for its chief function to prepare the way for synthesis.' Of the two, as Dr. Jacks insists, to synthesise is more difficult than to analyse. We have already attacked educational problems analytically, and seem in danger of stopping at that stage. 'No institution has suffered more from the disintegrating tendencies of the time than education: but no institution has finer powers of re-integration or greater possibilities of leading man from the barren results of analysis to the fertile fields of synthesis.'

The first step towards this end, we are told, has already been taken in the passing of the Education Act of 1944. For the first time in our educational history this Act attempts to set down the aims which education should observe. Moreover, it provides the Minister with the necessary powers to fulfil these aims. Accordingly, having re-formulated the aims of education, Dr. Jacks begins by examining the problems of organisation and administration. He then goes on to discuss in separate chapters the child who is to be educated, the curriculum that we are to teach, the teachers who are to undertake the teaching, and the community and the world which the pupils are ultimately to enter.

Of all the practical steps that must be taken, the most urgent and the most important is the provision of teachers. To implement the new Education Act, between seventy thousand and a hundred thousand new teachers are required. But Dr. Jacks laments that attention has hitherto been concentrated on the quantity of the teachers rather than on their quality. It would, he believes, be 'a disastrous mistake if we were to content ourselves with merely increasing the numerical product in traditional training courses'.

Here he goes on to enunciate a paradox: 'All teachers should be trained, but there should be no specific training of teachers.' If himself holds that 'The era of the training of teachers is past'. So long as our aim was simply to bring up a 'literate generation', teachers had to be trained: to-day the need is to bring up a 'cultured generation', and for this we require, not so much teachers as spiritual leaders for the young. The teacher has to consider not so much the items to be taught as the personality of the child who is to learn them. He must think, not so much of the three R's as of the three A's—Age, Ability, and Aptitude. Accordingly, says Dr. Jacks, it is far more important for the teacher to know why he is to teach this or that than to know how he is to teach it.

This perhaps is carrying idealism a little too far. The reasons for selecting this or that subject of the curriculum will concern the decisions of a few teachers only, and that at a comparatively late stage. The vast majority have little choice in selecting the subjects that they are required to teach. But, since modern education is so complex and varied, and has introduced so many ingenious devices, it is essential that the efficient teacher should be familiar with the technique of teaching his own particular subjects. No doubt the very methods that he adopts will be affected by the reasons that he has in mind, and he should certainly be aware of the reasons. But it seems highly misleading to say that a knowledge of the reasons is far more important than a knowledge of methods.

In accordance with this view, Dr. Jacks goes on to maintain that it is of much greater importance for the intending teacher to obtain a firm grasp of the theory of education than for him to obtain a knowledge of educational psychology. We ought, he believes, to 'de-psychologise our courses'. This suggests that the psychology which is at present taught in training colleges is the kind of psychology 'which tells you a good deal about the mind of the psychologist, but very little about the mind of anyone else'. But surely this is no longer true. Take down any recent textbook on educational psychology, and you will find that it is full of data on the intellectual and emotional differences between children—of the stages through which they develop, of the appropriate methods for teaching them to memorise, to acquire skill, to transfer their knowledge and their abilities, and of methods for testing the differences in mental ability and in acquired attainments. This, says Dr. Jacks, 'is simply the study of children'; but he does not seem to appreciate that it is a scientific study based upon research, not upon mere common sense and enlightened experience. Indeed, through many of his chapters one can trace misleading conclusions

due to the fact that Dr. Jacks himself is not always familiar with the results of what he calls 'the study of children'. At times he writes as though the pupils in the elementary schools were all of much the same ability as his own former pupils at Mill Hill. He believes, for example, that the new Act, by providing secondary education for all, will so increase the number of boys and girls who go on to the University that it will 'produce a new potential University population'.

However, there are plenty of books on education published in this country and in America which describe and emphasise the crude realities. It is therefore of great value to have a book like this which adopts a frankly idealistic approach and which insists that all education should be firmly based on a lofty moral philosophy. Indeed, Dr. Jacks himself believes that 'the full synthesis for which we have been searching is only to be found in religion', and that the aim of education is 'not merely to study things and to study man, but also to study God'.

*Education Its Data and First Principles*, has been for more than twenty years the standard textbook for teachers in training; but it is well suited to the needs of all who are interested in the aims and methods of education. Indeed, as Sir Percy explained in his original preface, his book was from the outset intended for two classes of readers: first, for the professional student, to whom it offers a preliminary survey of the entire field of educational theory and practice; and secondly for 'that wider public whose enlightened interest in the greater issues is the mainspring of social progress'. It was first published just after the previous world war. Now, as then, education is in the forefront of social discussion; and a book from one who, until his death last year, was the leading authority on the subject in this country, should be read by every thinking citizen.

The present edition has been completely revised. The alterations consist chiefly in more up-to-date accounts of recent educational investigations, particularly in the field of mental and scholastic tests, and a number of additions to the selected list of references are appended at the end of each chapter.

The book itself is an amazing piece of condensation. But an even greater merit is its eclectic impartiality. It provides a comprehensive review of all the main theories of education; it shows an up-to-date familiarity with all kinds of novel teaching devices and school experiments; finally, instead of being concerned to base his educational views on some one psychological school, Sir Percy gives a sympathetic survey of all the modern movements, and selects what is sound and suggestive in each one. All through the author's

main purpose has been (in his own words) 'to re-assert the claim of individuality to be regarded as the supreme educational ideal, and to protect that ideal against both the misrepresentation of its critics and the incautious advocacy of its friends. Like Dr. Jaekes, Sir Percy held that education should be based on a sound philosophy; but he offers a philosophy at once more definite and more general, and makes its connection with practical education more explicit and more precise.

Mr. Glover's book describing a *New Teaching for a New Age* gives an admirable account of a large-scale experiment on the 'project method' of teaching. Without any explicit or abstract formulation of the underlying theory, nevertheless implicitly embodies many of the newer and well-recognized principles of educational psychology. The author looks more particularly in view the requirements of the new Education Act and the problems it entails. The school-leaving age is raised, and secondary (i.e., post-primary) education is to be provided for children who are not suited for grammar or technical schools. For pupils in these new categories the principles and methods outlined in Mr. Glover's book will be found most valuable.

He gives a helpful, factual account of four projects carried out by the Junior Art Department of the Sheffield College of Arts and Crafts. Such work, he claims, is suitable for children of varying ability, but above all for the child.

The first project was based on the simple question: 'For what purposes do you live?' To answer this the children drew on their own experience for realisation of some of the fundamental needs and desires. After considerable discussion they decided to find out and sketch had become models the different ways in which English people have satisfied these needs throughout the centuries. The project was to consist in 'A History of English Life' where references and textbooks were supplied; and, where necessary, the children were encouraged to go outside the school to obtain the requisite information.

Every teacher will no doubt at first experience minor difficulties in his endeavour to put such a scheme into practice. But the detailed description given in the book can leave no doubt that the advantages will far outweigh the drawbacks. The method combines theory, purpose and practice in an indivisible whole, and aims at teaching children how to obtain knowledge of themselves both about their own country and the world, past and present. In addition, it gives them the satisfaction of completing, in co-operation with others, a piece of work.

Department of State provided further raw material for legal analysis in Mr. Hackworth's *Digest of International Law* which condenses into seven volumes the more recent State practice of the United States, and most of which were already available when Professor Hyde prepared the second edition of his standard treatise. As anyone who applies the inductive method in his own work knows from experience, research on this basis cannot be done in a hurry and if pursued seriously is the task of a lifetime. Necessarily, therefore, this second edition which embodies the results of an additional twenty years of research compares as favourably with the first edition as Sir William Holdsworth's last edition of his *History of English Law* with the first. Though at the time of its first publication it was justly considered an event, in retrospect, it seems merely a skeleton of the more mature work that was to follow.

The system adopted by the author is as good as any that can be devised, though it may be wondered whether Consuls are sufficiently important to deserve the honour of having allotted to them one of the seven main parts of the work. Yet this is probably due to the author's desire of providing not only a text-book primarily designed for academic purposes, but also a hand-book for United States consular officers.

Naturally, the reader expects to find—and is not disappointed in his search—in this work fuller treatment than can be found elsewhere of questions with which the United States are especially concerned, such as the Monroe Doctrine, the position of the Panama Canal, or the attitude of the United States to the assertion of sovereignty over the Polar regions. It may be suggested that, in a third edition, to which we are confidently looking forward, Professor Hyde will deal more fully with the legal aspects of the Pan-American Union than he has done so far.

One further point the reviewer feels unable to suppress, and that is another feature of this book which other writers of text-books might do well to remember. What makes this book such a joy to read, apart from the intrinsic interest of the material and its masterly presentation, is the complete absence of—to use one of Bentham's happy formulations—any trace of *ipse-dixitism*.

Of a very different type is Professor Lauterpacht's *International Bill of the Rights of Man*. Justly, the author claims that the adoption of his scheme would involve revolutionary innovations in existing international law, and no advocate of such proposals could have argued his case more plausibly and with more erudition than the Whewell Professor of International Law. As Professor Lauterpacht frankly admits, the picture drawn by him of the

connection between the rights of man, the law of nature and the law of nations may appear to be 'dialectical to the point of ingenuity'. Nevertheless it is hard to remain immune against the disarming charm of Professor Lauterpacht's technique. With an air of complete innocence and detachment, he himself raises a good many objections and difficulties of first magnitude. After having admitted that there may be some substance in them, he unconcernedly proceeds to develop his theme from the foundation of what, in the realm of ideas, may legitimately be claimed to be one of the vital and continuous threads in the evolution of world civilisation. In this way, the author achieves two objects. In the first place, there is no surer way in Anglo-Saxon countries of silencing potential critics and of putting their proverbial common sense temporarily out of action than by abstract arguments drawn from legal and political theory. Secondly, whenever a restive reader should dare to think that all this sounds very fine, but is rather remote from real life, he is sternly reminded: 'We are concerned here with the growth and the influence of ideas.' Thus, the most serious deficiency of a very learned and readable book—the author's hesitation to analyse a problem from a sociological point of view—itself serves a purpose: the reader is tempted to forget what is more important than the idea itself, that is to say, the function which, in any given social environment, it has fulfilled or is likely to fulfil. To give merely one instance, we are told that the League of Nations was originally conceived as an association of democratic States. Considering the history of the drafting of the Covenant and the wording of paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the League Covenant, no fault can be found with this statement. Yet in order to understand the real significance of such a fundamental principle, it is at most only half the story to leave it at this, and not to follow it up by an exposition of what happened in the practice of the League of Nations: how, under the impact of really potent forces, this principle was interpreted away until the term 'self-governing' State became synonymous with 'sovereign' State.

While it is impossible, within the limits of a review, to comment in detail on Professor Lauterpacht's attractive draft of an International Bill of the Rights of Man, it may be mentioned that the rights guaranteed to individuals in Part I of the Bill are subject to Article 16: 'The enforcement of any law safeguarding the legal rights of others or providing for the safety and the welfare of the community shall not be deemed to be inconsistent with the guarantee of the fundamental rights proclaimed in Part I'. It is hard to deny that this clause permits practically

unlimited evasion of the duties incumbent upon States under Part I of the Bill. In accordance with Article 18, the Bill is placed under the guarantee of the United Nations, and, under Article 20, the Security Council may by a majority of three-fourths take against any recalcitrant State 'such political, economic, or military action as may be deemed necessary to protect the rights of man'. In a world which is split on fundamental issues as much as our age is, can it be expected for a moment that the United Nations will do more in this field than limit itself to the passing of pious resolutions on the revered model of the League of Nations? Can such action be imagined unless a majority of members of the Council are resolved on weightier grounds to wage a war against one of the minority Powers and wish to use the Bill as a handy ideological cover? In any case, under the Charter, no such executive action can be taken against any of the permanent members of the Security Council without their kind permission. Here we come to the crux of the matter. To advocate at this stage the adoption of such an International Bill is to put the cart before the horse. As Professor Lauterpacht admits in one place, 'it is only within the scheme of an overriding international order that we can give reality to the otherwise contradictory notion that the supreme authority of the State is limited and that the rights of man must be based on that limitation'. With regard to the great ones of this earth, the Charter of the United Nations has failed to establish such an international order. Might it have been for this reason that the San Francisco Conference indulged so eagerly in the diversionary pastime of adorning the Charter with clauses on fundamental rights? It will be incumbent on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. It may be hoped that, when the Commission on Human Rights will be established, Professor Lauterpacht will not be forgotten, and that his future experience, both as a government representative and as an observer of his colleagues, will bring him in closer touch with those realities from which the author's approach to the subject presents such an engaging form of escapism.

While Professor Lauterpacht makes himself the advocate of a cause which is universal, Dr. Táborský, the former Private Secretary of President Beneš and now Czechoslovak Minister in Stockholm, in his *Czechoslovak Cause* raises some of the many thorny issues in international law which arose owing to the contradictions of the appeasement period and the complications

inherently connected with government in exile. There can be no doubt that Dr. Táboršký has skilfully handled and argued his case. Nevertheless a touch of the method sketched above—the style of disarming frankness—would only have strengthened the author's position. For instance, nowhere in the book is to be found a thorough discussion of the significance—or lack of it—of Dr. Beneš' resignation from the Presidency of Czechoslovakia in 1938 or of the Confederation between Czechoslovakia and Poland, outlined in the joint Declaration of November 11, 1940, and so completely discussed by Dr. Táboršký in the July, 1942, number of the then *New Commonwealth Quarterly*. Yet this criticism is not meant to detract from the value of a book which, though suffering from the 'diplomatic' approach to its subject, is a scholarly work on controversial problems of State continuity, recognition, and the jurisdiction of governments temporarily dispossessed of their countries.

Readers interested in the border-zones between international and municipal law will find their meat in Dr. Webber's *Effect of War on Contracts* and in the number of *Law and Contemporary Problems* which is devoted to the no less topical issue of *Enemy Property*. As Sir David Maxwell Fyfe rightly stresses in his Foreword to the second edition of Dr. Webber's book, it is more than a practitioner's book, and chapters such as that on the Procedural Capacity of the Alien Enemy are a model of succinct and lucid analysis. The symposium on *Enemy Property* which we owe to the Law School of Duke University, contains much useful material on the treatment of enemy property in the western hemisphere. Dr. Domke's comparative survey of the administration of enemy property in various American States is an excellent guide to legislative enactments which are hard to come by; Mr. Berman's article on *Cartels and Enemy Property* gives a clear indication of the difficulties facing the modern State at war in dealing with the ramifications of international monopoly capitalism; and Mr. Rubin's contribution on 'Inviolability' of *Enemy Private Property* is a lucid exposition of the case for utilising enemy property assets for securing payment due from enemy countries.

Students of the history of international law will welcome a handy English edition of Bodin's *Method for the Easy Comprehension of History*. Written before the *Res publica*, this work is important both for its intrinsic merits and for the influence which it exercised on early sixteenth-century thought. While it is primarily the concern of the historian and political scientist, the international lawyer will find what he is looking for in the passages



which foreshadow Bodin's doctrines of sovereignty, subsequently more fully developed, and in Bodin's observations on the status of citizens and foreigners. A paragraph which illustrates Bodin's views on international law deserves to be quoted in full: 'Moreover, all kingdoms of all peoples, empires, tyrannies, and states are held together by nothing but the rule of reason and the common law of nations. From this it follows that this world is just like a city-state and that all men are associated, as it were, under the same law, because they understand that they are of one blood and subjected to the same guardianship of reason. But since this dominion of reason constrains no one, one state cannot actually be forged out of all peoples. So princes, by using either their armies, or treaties, or mutual goodwill, seek to obtain lawful conduct and adjudication of affairs outside the borders of the kingdom.' We have to thank Miss Reynolds not only for an excellent translation of Bodin's work of his thirties, but also for a useful Introduction and competent notes explaining a not always easy text.

But for the war, recognition could have been given earlier to Mr. Stuyt's *Survey of International Arbitrations*, which is one of the most useful works of reference published in recent years. In it the author lists more than four hundred cases of arbitration which have been adjudicated between 1701 and 1938 with all the necessary references regarding parties, matters in dispute, names of arbitrators, and details regarding compromise and award. By this self-denying work, the author has succeeded in making much more widely accessible material which is indispensable for the inductive study of international law.

Finally, mention should be made of the *Monthly List of Books Catalogued in the Library of the League of Nations*. In the volume covering the years 1940 to 1944, many publications on international law and organisation will be found which, owing to the curtailment or breakdown of communications with neutral and enemy countries during that period, might otherwise be overlooked.

London.

G. S.

*International Law. Volume I: International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals.* By G. SCHWARZENBERGER. (London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 1945. pp. 645. £3.)

Any legal system has to pay attention to both logic and experience. Its rules should be both general and effective. They ought to be

consistent with one another and with the principles deemed to express the values of the community within which they operate. They ought also to approximate a description of the actual behaviour of the persons whose conduct they profess to regulate. Some departures from the rules are to be expected in a system of jural law, but if departures become too frequent the rules cease to be law. The community of nations has been decentralised and unstable in respect both to the sources of its values and the enforcement of its law. Consequently the practices of the members of that community have frequently been inconsistent with one another and with the values which the community is at the moment formally professing. It is, therefore, difficult to formulate international law as a system conforming to the desideratum of logical consistency and also that of practical observance.

While most treatises on the subject attempt to give due weight to all sources of international law—agreements, customs, general principles of law, judicial decisions, and juristic analyses—utilising materials from writers and institutions of all nations as well as from international institutions, the result is likely to disclose a considerable variety of opinions on most points, and thus to give an appearance of vagueness and uncertainty to the entire structure.

The difficulty is greater in the writing of a comprehensive treatise than in the solution of a particular dispute. In the legal solution of an international dispute the mass of relevant materials, inconsistent as they may be, can be analysed and compared, and a decision arrived at in accord with the weight of practice and opinion rationally interpreted. Where, however, attention is directed toward a logically coherent system capable of solving all controversies likely to arise, such an exhaustive weighing of materials relevant to the facts of any particular dispute is impossible. Consequently, writers who wish for precision tend either to follow the naturalist or the positivist school. The first tends to neglect experience in the interest of logical consistency with fundamental principles. In proportion as the situation is dynamic and change is rapid the experience of the past becomes a poor guide for the future and jurists tend to become 'naturalists' and to appraise the law anew in the light of the basic principles which the community wants it to sustain. The positivist school, on the other hand, tends merely to describe practice which under such conditions permits of little generalisation. The naturalists produce rules and principles with little assurance of their observance, the positivists produce a classification of historical events

*Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases.* This section makes it clear that there is a growing body of procedural law applicable to judicial, administrative, and quasi-legislative international organs. The systematic treatment of this subject on a comparative basis is perhaps the outstanding value of the volume.

The author maintains a commendable objectivity in presenting his materials. The book abounds with brief but pertinent quotations. Only occasionally does the author's own opinion appear, as, for instance, in the discussion of the classification of international institutions, and his suggestions that there are 'essential differences between society and community laws', that 'rather narrow limits' are 'set to international law within a system of world power politics' (p. 338), and that the legal problems of the League of Nations are likely to be relevant in the future even though the League itself failed in its attempt 'to transform into an organised society of states the "great community of nations" which had grown up in a haphazard way in the course of the last four hundred years' (p. 458).

It would be tempting to discuss many of the points of law considered, as, for instance, the implication of the Permanent Court of International Justice that a rule which confers rights upon an individual beyond the power of a State to change is not a rule of international law, but is a rule of municipal law which international law forbids the State to change (pp. 68-69). The latter interpretation seems useful only to sustain the thesis that individuals cannot be subjects of international law. Those who see no particular value in that thesis are likely to accept the simpler interpretation.

In general, it cannot be said that international law as interpreted by international tribunals differs radically from international law as expounded in traditional textbooks. The main difference is probably in the greater attention to international procedures, the lesser attention to fundamental rights of States, and the superior certainty and consistency of the rules. On the whole, the volume seems to support Professor Lauterpacht's thesis that the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice has tended toward a restrictive interpretation of State sovereignty (*The Development of International Law by the Permanent Court of International Justice*, London, 1934, p. 89). In spite of the acceptance by international tribunals of the thesis of State sovereignty and the presumption that agreements qualifying that sovereignty are to be interpreted restrictively, international tribunals approach their problem, not with a bias towards

exaggerating national rights, but with the effort to interpret customary and conventional rules so as to give full effect to the intention which the States had when they accepted those rules. The common purpose of the parties bound by the rule tends, therefore, to control, rather than the desire of one of the parties which subsequently finds the rule burdensome. The volume presents convincing evidence that international law would prosper if international tribunals played a larger role in its application and development.

The book is well indexed and the appendices include the constitutional texts of the Permanent Courts of Arbitration and of International Justice, as well as the opinions in seven important cases decided by international tribunals.

Chicago.

QUINCY WRIGHT.

*The Scheldt Question to 1839.* By S. T. BINDOFF. (London. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1945. pp. ix and 238. 10s. 6d.)

TONAY perhaps some courage is needed to add yet another book to the immense literature which has accumulated upon the history and the problems of the Scheldt, but to a certain extent Mr. Bindoff has broken new ground, and his book makes a real addition to our knowledge. He refuses to accept the conventional starting-point in 1572 and his narrative covers the three centuries which precede this date. At the other end he devotes more attention than most writers to the period from 1830 to 1839, and many readers will wish that he had not closed his work at this point. It would have been interesting to have learned his views upon the controversy between the Allies and the Netherlands which arose out of the outbreak of war in 1914, a controversy which raised a real problem of principle. Perhaps the author is over-optimistic in hoping that the common ordeal through which both Holland and Belgium have lately passed may bring an end to their interminable disputes about the Scheldt and other waterways. The problem has not yet become one of merely historical or academic interest, and Mr. Bindoff is well qualified to make a useful contribution to the discussion of the problem as it stands today.

To most readers Mr. Bindoff's survey of the later mediæval period will come as something new. It is the product of careful and well-documented research, and perhaps the clearest impression which it leaves is that of the essential continuity of history. The picture presented is really a miniature of that with which we

have become familiar in more recent times. The same drama is played out upon a smaller stage. Then, as now, all the difficulties arise from the crossing of a natural and physical unit by artificial political divisions. Every important river basin is by nature a geographical and economic unit, but mankind seldom treats it as such. As the result of such events as wars, royal marriages, and diplomatic bargainings, artificial lines are drawn across these natural units, and behind these lines competing material interests are created and cultivated by those in authority. The scale may be small or large. At the beginning of the story the contestants are the petty provinces and municipalities interested in the water-borne trade of the later Middle Ages. In the seventeenth century England stands behind the young Dutch Republic, whose southern border is for England her frontier with Spain. In the eighteenth century France takes the place of Spain as the arch-enemy, and with the artificial re-union of the Netherlands in 1814 the peacemakers of the day thought that the problem of the Scheldt had passed into history. In less than a generation this illusion was shattered, and in the resulting confusion it fell to Palmerston to draw up the settlement which in substance has fasted to our own time.

To the student of international law the perusal of this story is a lesson in humility. The picture presented is one of a continual conflict of interests—commercial, political, and strategic. The lawyer is left in the background, and he is only brought forward when it is thought that he may be able to render some small service to his masters. Indeed, questions of legal principle do not really emerge until the end of the eighteenth century, and then only as a camouflage for other interests. When the French National Assembly in 1792 declared that the freedom of international rivers was a fundamental right of natural law the decree was merely intended to give a decent excuse for the imminent invasion of the Netherlands by Dumouriez. The truth is that it is quite impossible to lay down any abstract principle of freedom equally applicable to all rivers. More than a century after the Congress of Vienna the futile Barcelona Convention made it clear that any supposed general principle must in practice be devoured by a host of necessary exceptions.

To the Netherlands Government scholars are indebted for the financial help which has rendered possible the publication of a very useful book, and this help has been given in spite of the fact that the author's opinions do not always coincide with the official views of his Government. The text is somewhat overloaded with detail, and in any future edition the literary form would be

improved if some of the details were relegated to appendices. Scales of distance should be inserted in all three maps, and the text would be easier to follow if these maps indicated the canal connections between Antwerp and the towns on the Flanders coast.

H. A. SMITH.

*Soviet Legal Theory.* By R. SCHLESINGER. (London. Kegan Paul. 1945. pp. vi and 209. 16s.)

THIS is the first full length study of Soviet law and legal theory to be published in this country, and it therefore fills an obvious gap in legal literature. Dr. Schlesinger has very special qualifications to write this book for he speaks Russian, knows Russia, and has long studied the Soviet's institutions. The result is therefore a clear picture of the formative years of a new legal system which shows wide differences from anything with which Europe has previously been familiar.

Soviet legal theory, as is well known, is derived from classical Marxism, itself a form of legal realism. The State, it is alleged, is simply the machinery by which the ruling class preserves its dominating position. It does so by the enforcement of a system of law, determining social relations and social responsibility. It therefore follows that with the emergence of the classless society, both Law and the State will wither away. Here, however, in the experience of Soviet Russia, we encounter a major difficulty. Neither Law nor the State shows any signs of 'withering away'. Indeed, they are quite as strong as, or stronger than, anywhere else. Of course, the Communist has plenty of explanations for this phenomenon. It is due to the transitional nature of Soviet society, to the necessity for the Soviet to protect herself against potential enemies, and so forth (arguments which may incidentally be true of other States besides the Soviet Union). May there be, however, another argument, given by Marx himself? May it not be that for one ruling class, the Revolution of 1917 substituted another? What else can the frequent appeals in the Soviet legal system to 'revolutionary justice', and the preservation of the Soviet system mean?

Dr. Schlesinger's book treats of the evolution of Soviet law and legal theory historically, and with full reference to its social and economic setting. No other method is possible, for without it, much that is new would be almost completely meaningless to

the western reader. Certain features stand out beyond others. The Soviet criminal law has little faith in the reformatory element in punishment—it is deterrent, since the interests of the State are paramount—a curiously anti-Marxian position. Indeed, in the criminal law, the identification which enthusiasts sometimes claim to exist between the State, the ruling class, and the proletariat breaks down completely. The criminal law is simply repressive machinery, operating for the security of the State, which is administered by a ruling class, doubtless recruited differently from other ruling classes, but easily identifiable, nevertheless. The final chapter is a full and thoughtful attempt to grapple with Soviet theories of international law, and an understanding of it will assist in the elucidation of the reasons why, on any major problem of international relations, there is a cleavage between the Soviet view on the one hand, and the Anglo-American view on the other.

London.

G. W. K.

## INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

- Foundations of Modern World Society.* By L. A. MANDER. (Stanford University Press. Stanford University, California. 1945. pp. 910. \$4.25.)
- Charter of the United Nations.* By L. M. GOODRICH and E. HAMBRO. (World Peace Foundation. Boston. 1946. pp. 400. \$2.50.)
- A Guide to the Practice of International Conferences.* By V. D. PASUKOV. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington. 1945. pp. 275. 15s.)
- The International Secretariat.* By E. F. RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington. 1945. pp. 500. 25s.)
- League of Nations and National Minorities.* By P. DE AZCÁRATE. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington. 1945. pp. 216. 12s.)
- An African Survey.* By LORD HAILEY. (Oxford University Press. 1945. Second Edition. pp. 1,837. 35s.)
- Great Britain and Palestine, 1915—1945.* Published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (London. 1946. pp. 177. 7s. 6d.)

- Syria and Lebanon.* By A. H. HOURANI. (Oxford University Press. 1946. pp. 402. 18s.)
- The Common Interest in International Economic Organisation.* By J. B. CONDLIFFE and A. STEVENSON. (International Labour Office. Montreal. 1944. pp. 185. 6s.)
- The United Nations Economic and Social Council.* By H. FINER. (World Peace Foundation. Boston. 1946. pp. 121. 50 cents.)
- The International Labour Movement.* By J. PRICE. (Oxford University Press. 1945. pp. 273. 15s.)
- Some Political Consequences of the Atomic Bomb.* By E. L. WOODWARD. (Oxford University Press. 1945. pp. 22. 2s.)
- Kampf um Europa.* By H. BAUER and H. G. RITZEL. (Europa Verlag. Zuerich. 1945. pp. 284.)
- Crossroads of Two Continents.* By F. GROSS. (Columbia University Press. New York. 1945. pp. 162. 18s. 6d.)
- The Big Three.* By D. J. DALLIN. (Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 1946. pp. 232. 8s. 6d.)
- The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States.* By C. B. SWISHER. (University of Chicago Press. 1946. pp. 261.)
- 

It cannot be emphasised too often and too strongly that a constructive approach to world affairs can only be made by the further development of international institutions. In order to realise fully how imperceptibly these organs of international collaboration have grown and spread, Professor Mander's *Foundations of Modern World Society* should be a great help. In the author's words, 'this volume attempts to emphasise the urgent need of developing an attitude of political discovery, so as to adapt political institutions to meet new and unprecedented tasks, to demonstrate that the full promise of contemporary civilisation depends upon man's political inventiveness in this time of rapid change, and to present international relations not so much in terms of power politics as in terms of constitution building and of establishing political units more in accordance with the facts of life'. As will be seen from Professor Mander's own description of the task which he has set himself, the title of his book is rather misleading. Whether we like it or not, the foundations of existing world society can only be analysed in terms of power politics; any other description does not appear to fit either



past or present international affairs. Yet this is far from being incompatible with an attitude which does full justice to the limited possibilities of international institutions within a system of world power politics and with an assertion of the tremendous possibilities for such institutions which are waiting to be realised in an international community proper. Professor Mander's treatise covers fields as wide apart as the international prevention of crime and international religious co-operation, world monetary problems and international regional organisation, and it contains a chapter on the prospects of world order which, we hope, does not end on too optimistic a note. In any case, we owe to Professor Mander an excellent and, at present, unequalled text-book on international institutions.

At a time when Statesmen and teachers of international law and relations are busy learning the new international law which is embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, there could be no greater service done to them than to provide a commentary which, based on the work of the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences, lucidly explains the intentions of the drafters and the meaning of the compromises achieved in the various Commissions and Committees of the San Francisco Conference. Mr. Goodrich and Dr. Hambro should be congratulated on having achieved in their *Charter of the United Nations* this aim at such speed and with the discretion for which such work calls. Especially useful are the frequent comparisons between the Articles of the League Covenant and the Charter and the fifteen documents which form the third part of an indispensable work of reference.

To turn to more specialised aspects of the subject, a wealth of significant books on international administration and organisation have been published during the current year. Mr. Pastuhov's *Guide to the Practice of International Conferences* accurately describes the mechanism of international conferences and gains in value from the author's experience as an international civil servant. The same can be said of Dr. Ranshofen-Wertheimer's *International Secretariat*. It is the special merit of both these books that they are written from 'inside' and, therefore, contain observations and deal with aspects of the matter which any but an exceptionally well-connected 'outsider' would have been bound to overlook. In the case of the last-mentioned volume, this knowledge is coupled with the author's acute awareness of the sociological aspects of his subject. When Dr. Ranshofen-Wertheimer deals with questions such as the international official, he is at his best. Anyone who knows the damage done

to the League in the years of the decline of the League of Nations by officials who were merely the agents in disguise of anti-League Powers will be interested in what the author has to say on this subject. He does so firmly, if perhaps too briefly, and with an excess of tact. 'In the case of sympathisers with the totalitarian policies of their countries . . . any advantages accruing from this practice [of the presence of citizens of non-member States in the League Secretariat] were balanced by the fact that the Secretariat offered the prestige of its membership, diplomatic immunities, and considerable salaries to "enemies within" unable or unwilling to foster the aims of the League but perhaps only too willing to serve as informers.'

Though there is no scarcity of studies on the minority regime in the inter-war period, the special value of M. de Azeárate's *League of Nations and National Minorities*—another volume in the useful series on *Studies in the Administration of International Law and Organisation* which is edited by Mr. Finch for the Carnegie Endowment—lies in the fact that the author was for twelve years Director of the Minorities Questions Section of the League of Nations. As M. de Azeárate himself says, 'the guarantee of minority rights established by the League of Nations on the basis of the Minorities Treaties did not give satisfaction to the governments of the "minority" countries, to the minorities themselves, or—and thus was the most serious factor of all—to that world public opinion which was interested in minority questions during the last post-war period'. Yet, as a comparison between the Minorities Treaties of 1919 and the experiment of Upper Silesia under the German-Polish Convention of 1922 will show, lack of reciprocity was probably the most serious flaw in the former type of minorities treaties and contributed more than anything else to their ultimate breakdown or non-observance. In addition, in Upper Silesia there was an international agent who could settle difficulties on the spot, whereas, in all other cases, matters could be dealt with only by the slow-moving machinery of Geneva. Rightly, therefore, the author arrives at the conclusion that 'Upper Silesia constitutes the only precedent for a system to which recourse may conceivably be had in the future when dealing with political difficulties created by the existence of national minorities, or other problems of a similar nature'.

As the conception of the mandate has been resurrected in the trusteeship territories, it is timely that a second edition of Lord Hailey's invaluable *African Survey* has just been published. The new edition does not, however, appear to deal with

any developments which have taken place during the last seven years or with the new problems which the war has created in Africa south of the Sahara. Nevertheless, the volume remains the standard work on the physical background of this area, its economic, social, and educational problems, and—what is most important from the point of view of this report—the feasible patterns of government and administration in an area which can be developed in accordance with the standards of trusteeship now professed by practically all colonial powers only by means of much fuller international co-operation than existed in the past. While the bulk of the work stands unaffected by more recent developments, an editorial committee would do well to bring up to date chapters such as those on the Non-European immigrant communities, especially the Indian Community, and on the development of inter-racial relations between the white and black populations in South Africa during the years of the war. Statistical figures, too, might well be reconsidered in such a general post-war overhaul.

On a smaller scale this need for accurate and up-to-date information has been admirably met by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in a new edition of its information paper on *Great Britain and Palestine* which covers the period from 1915 to 1945. The chapters on the Peel Report, the Arab Rebellion, the fluctuations in British policy since 1939, and on Palestine during the War provide exactly the kind of background material on which any judgment of the Report of the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry ought to be based. For purposes of reference, the addition of a short index to future editions of this useful handbook may be suggested.

Mr. Hourani's *Syria and Lebanon*, also published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is more elaborately produced. It is announced as the first of several books which Chatham House intends to issue on Middle Eastern affairs. As, apart from Professor Toynebee's discussion of these questions in the relevant volumes of his *Surveys of International Affairs* and official documents, there are only French studies on the subject, Mr. Hourani's book ably bridges a surprising gap in English literature on one of the sore points in the relations between France and the Arab world and between the two Western countries. The author's treatment of the history of Syria and Lebanon, of the impact of Western civilisation upon the Arab-Islamic way of Syrian life and of the growth of Arab nationalism

in this region deserves high praise. In order to assess more recent developments, the documentary appendix to this attractive monograph is indispensable.

While, ultimately, progress in the field of non-political international institutions depends on the stability of the political international order, this plexus is no reason why functional integration in these spheres, and especially in the economic sphere, should not be pushed forward by all available means. It, therefore, is highly opportune to be reminded by Professor Condliffe and Mr. Stevenson of *The Common Interest in International Economic Organisation*, and of the fact that policies of full employment and social security are compatible with an increased volume of international trade, provided that—as is underlined in the official Preface of the International Labour Office to this slender but weighty volume in its series of *Studies and Reports*—appropriate international machinery is created through which such national policies can be co-ordinated. In the authors' words, 'food, agriculture and raw materials, money, commerce and investment represent . . . the four great fields in which international co-ordination of national economic policies is essential if high levels of employment and economic security are to be maintained and if the improvement of living standards is to progress beyond the relatively narrow limits attainable through independent national action'.

The possibilities that exist for the achievement of these purposes within the framework of the United Nations form the subject of Dr. Finer's study on *The United Nations Economic and Social Council*. In quick succession, he reviews existing international agencies, those in process of being established, and some which—like the world migration organisation or the world commission on commodity agreements and cartels—may have to bide their time before they will be permitted to emerge into international life. The constructive possibilities are there. If they fail to be realised, it will not be for the lack of adequate international machinery. This is the keynote of Dr. Finer's booklet, which is animated by cautious optimism—or is it optimistic scepticism?

As is indicated by the experience of the International Labour Organisation, there is no surer way of galvanising into life international institutions than to permit those whose own sectional interests are bound up with the success or failure of such experiments to take an active part in the work of these agencies. While, in theory, the tripartite delegations sent by each member State to International Labour Conferences are national delega-

tions, the individual vote guaranteed to each delegate by the Constitution of the I.L.O. and the reality of common professional interests give opportunities for realising within limited fields the internationals of employers and workers. For a long time, there has been a need for the scientific exploration of these non-official international groupings, and, in his *International Labour Movement*, Mr. Price has done valuable spade work in a field which should not remain the monopoly of the political pamphleteer. Mr. Price's book conveniently summarises the activities of the Second International and of the International Federation of Trade Unions in the inter-war years and the difficulties resulting from the interneecine warfare within the working-class movement. The author meets the challenge that the international organisation of the labour movement has failed in what it set out to do by the rejoinder that 'whatever failures there may have been, . . . they were not confined to the labour movement, but were setbacks for international co-operation as a whole'. While this is only too true, it is merely a polite way of saying that labour and trade unions, like religious or other international movements, are themselves conditioned both by overriding national loyalties and the duties imposed by the sovereign State on its citizens within a system of world power politics. It will be interesting to see what, in a second edition, Mr. Price will have to say on the new World Federation of Trade Unions, in which Western and Soviet Trade Unions are joined within the same fold. While the war-time alliance between their Governments assisted in—or made possible—the creation of such a united front, it will be a pointer to the strength of the positive motive powers behind this International whether it will stand the strain of post-war political divergencies between the world powers.

Of the implications of such dissensions we are forcibly made aware in Professor Woodward's *Some Political Consequences of the Atom Bomb*. Rightly, he emphasises that 'most of the great choices of history have been made, as it were, blindfold', and against the background of his wide historical knowledge which is perceptibly crystallising into a significant philosophy of history, the author examines various patterns for the control of nuclear energy and rejects all of them as wanting but one: world government. Yet, apart from the fact that 'it may turn out to be a gross and fearful tyranny' and 'may only make all war into civil war', 'within the next ten years there is not much possibility of getting it, since there is not the slightest chance that either the United States or Russia will surrender to it the powers which each now exercises in full sovereignty. Moreover, there is no safe

resting-place halfway between the present system of sovereign States and a single world-State. A new division of the world into two or three large federations would only increase our danger'.

On paper, this strieture of regional unions has been anticipated in Messrs. Bauer's and Ritzel's *Kampf um Europa*. They conceive a European Union as an organic part of a world federation. Yet the Europe which they visualise is a thing of the past. Europe today appears more definitely divided into zones of differing, if not conflicting, interests and ideologies than it ever was in the past, and Europe increasingly appears to become an object of world politics rather than one of its determining factors. A similar air of unrealism surrounds Mr. Gross's conception of a democratic federation of East-Central Europe which is the subject of his *Crossroads of Two Continents*. While it is possible to imagine a closer grouping of countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and the Balkan countries within the orbit of the U.S.S.R., the conception of such a federation as a bridge between the West and East appears incompatible with the atmosphere which the Big Three consider congenial for their symbiosis in the post-war world.

These issues, which are the basic problems of international life today and tomorrow, are admirably set out in Mr. Dallin's *The Big Three*. In a nutshell he presents lucid pictures of the relations between the United States and the British Empire, the aims of Soviet policy and the zones of conflict between the World Powers in the Middle and Far East. Wisely, the author arrives at the conclusion that 'the war did not eradicate the divergencies of international interests, it did not abolish coalitions and alliances, rivalry and power politics. It did not achieve these goals because no war can achieve them'. Thus the main problem on which the future of all international institutions depends, but which can only be solved constructively within their framework, is still as much before us as it ever was.

It has been said of the United States' Constitution that 'it is a case of men building better than they knew', and it is for this reason and because of our painful awareness that this *dictum* does not apply to any of the achievements so far made on a world scale that, almost automatically, the student of international planning turns back to the experiment of American federalism. Though conditioned by social forces, which are lacking in world affairs, there is something of universal validity in this attempt to replace the incompatibilities of sovereign States by the division of functions which remain their exclusive preserve and others

which, for a higher common good, they consent to pool under the benevolent supervision of a supreme judicial arbiter. It, therefore, seems fitting to conclude this report with a reference to Professor Swisher's stimulating study on *The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States*. It brings out well the elastic and dynamic character of federalism in the United States with its continuously shifting boundaries and the checks and balances evolved within this complicated system of government. Its ultimate safeguard is the 'watchfulness, understanding, and participation on the part of the American people'. It will depend on the capability of the common man everywhere to bring these factors into play whether international institutions will develop into an alternative to world power politics.

London.

G. S.

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